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CHAPTER 1
Randomness and Providence: Is God 
a Bowler or a Curler?
Kelly James Clark and Jeffrey Koperski
1.1  How Does GoD Do It?
Most Abrahamic theists affirm divine providence, the doctrine that God 
brings about or allows everything that happens in the universe; moreover, 
they hold that God controls creation so that all things either are good or 
work together for good.
How, then, does God do it? How does God’s providential guidance 
work? These are old questions, but the traditional answers did not have to 
face the modern scientific claim that nature is, to some degree or other, 
random. How then can God ensure that God’s providential aims are met? 
This is the central question of this volume. We briefly present some of the 
issues in this introduction.
K. J. Clark (*) 
Department of Philosophy, Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul, Turkey 
J. Koperski 
Department of Philosophy, Saginaw Valley State University,  
University Center, MI, USA
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1.2  tHe BIBle tells Me so
The earliest Judeo-Christian view of creation represents God as creating 
the heavens and the earth and all they contain in six days. God created the 
heavens and the earth and then God populated the earth with plants, birds 
and sea animals, and land animals and humans on six successive days. Then 
God rested.
But God didn’t rest for long. God, according to early folk science, rou-
tinely acts in the world or acts on the world to directly or indirectly create 
and sustain the heavens and the earth and all that they contain. Increasingly 
sophisticated views emerged starting in the first millennium AD, allowing 
the doctrine of providence to comfortably evolve within a Greco-Roman 
framework for several centuries (Fergusson 2019, chap. 2).
1.3  MoDern scIence
The scientific and Darwinian revolutions would require Abrahamic theists 
to rethink God’s activity in the world in at least two ways.
First, the discovery of the principle of inertia and the law of gravity 
would eliminate the need to postulate God’s direct intervention or ulti-
mate causation of the motion of the planets; as such, scientists would 
increasingly think of divine activity in the world as through God-created 
natural laws. God would not need to intervene in the natural order if 
events were already determined by the laws of nature, which God had 
ordained. A god that needed to tinker with nature from time to time, as 
Leibniz argued, would not be an omnipotent, omniscient creator (Leibniz 
and Clarke [1717] 1956, 11–12).
Second, the Darwinian revolution offered a compelling explanation for 
the development of plants, animals, and people in terms of natural selec-
tion. As such, scientists began to extend the notion of law into the biologi-
cal realm. While one might think this a minor development, it was quite 
controversial at the time. It was commonly believed that while natural laws 
could explain the behavior of inorganic matter, they were in principle inca-
pable of explaining the creation of plants, animals, and especially humans. 
While many religious scientists have increasingly come to understand God’s 
creation in terms of God-ordained laws, many Abrahamic believers con-
tinue to believe that the origin of humans involves direct divine interven-
tion. While such religious believers have easily accommodated the 
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Newtonian world-picture for the planets and weather, they believe their 
Scripture forbids the extension of creation by natural law to, at least, people.
In sum, western religious scientists have increasingly come to believe 
that God creates and sustains the world—from planets to people—through 
the laws of nature rather than through direct divine intervention. Where, 
then, does divine providence fit in?
1.4  Is GoD a Bowler or a curler?
Let’s paint a word-picture, in the broadest strokes, to see how religious 
thinkers divide in their basic understandings of providence: is God a 
bowler or a curler?
In curling, the captain slides his heavy stone down the ice and then calls 
out instructions to his sweepers who direct the stone to its final destina-
tion. The captain does his best to set the stone on the right path, but it 
reaches its final destination only through the intervention of the sweepers. 
Typically, in curling, the stone couldn’t reach its intended destination 
without the intervention of the sweepers.
In bowling, on the other hand, the bowler rolls her heavy ball toward 
the pins trusting its arrival at its final destination to both her initial 
throw and natural laws like gravity and friction. After her roll, she sits 
back and watches without any additional interference. Ideally, in bowl-
ing, the ball reaches its intended destination without the intervention of 
the bowler.
No one, of course, holds that God literally acts like a curler or bowler. 
However, one’s rough view of divine providence—the way God operates 
in the world—tends to look like one or the other, bowler or curler. 
Whichever way one leans, what are the theological implications for one’s 
view of divine creation and providence given the developments of modern 
science, including evolution by natural selection?
God as Curler If one holds that God is like a curler, one typically holds 
that God created the heavens and the earth in the beginning, and that 
God guides some events by direct divine intervention. According to the 
curler view, God might have directly created, say, plants and fish and mam-
mals days, months, years, or even millions of years after God’s initial cre-
ation. God, on this view, intervenes into the world to create either life 
itself or at least the conditions for the creation of say, plants and fish and 
mammals (and, of course, human beings). Among contemporary curlers 
1 RANDOMNESS AND PROVIDENCE: IS GOD A BOWLER OR A CURLER? 
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are young earth creationists and intelligent design theorists—views in 
which God intervenes throughout history. According to young earth cre-
ationism, the earth and its contents were created six thousand to ten thou-
sand years ago through an initial series of direct creative activities (over the 
course of, on the most famous view, six days); on some views the Earth itself 
has attained its present state through a subsequent series of God-directed 
catastrophes—like floods and earthquakes. The key point for our discus-
sion: young earth creationists, rejecting evolution, attribute the creation 
of every kind of plant and animal to direct divine activity. Intelligent design 
theory holds that the origin of life and some complex features of living 
things are best explained by an intelligent, intervening cause (not an 
unguided or undirected process like natural selection). Since complex bio-
logical systems (such as blood-clotting or the flagellum of the E coli bacte-
rium or the human eye) have features that, they claim, could not have 
arisen through evolutionary processes, an intelligent designer must have 
inserted itself at each point to create such complex processes. God, on the 
curler view, does not create everything through natural law; indeed, many 
Abrahamic theists believe that God creates the most important things—
including human beings—through direct, divine intervention. 
God as Bowler If one holds that God is like a bowler, one holds that God 
creates by natural law. According to this view, God created the world per-
fectly in the beginning, including all the seeds of creation. While God cre-
ates everything in the beginning, including plants and fish and mammals, 
the plants and fish and mammals appear billions of years later through the 
operation of God-created natural laws. Contemporary theological bowlers 
tend to hold that evolution is the natural law through which God creates 
plants and fish and animals. One’s view of the nature of God, the nature 
of God’s creative activity, and the nature and integrity of God’s creation 
determine one’s views of how God creates: Does God create indirectly 
through natural law or directly through intervention? While these do not 
exhaust the options for divine action, proposals tend to lean one way or 
the other.
To be clear—both the bowler and the curler affirm that God creates 
and sustains the universe; moreover, both hold that God guides creation 
so that all things either are good or work together for good. But they 
disagree about how God is provident.
 K. J. CLARK AND J. KOPERSKI
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1.5  ranDoMness anD ProvIDence
Science has complicated the picture. The bowler metaphor fit nicely with 
physics prior to the twentieth century. In classical mechanics, nature and 
its systems were machinelike, strictly governed by deterministic laws. Just 
as one could understand the regular behavior of a clock through observa-
tions and experiments, one could discover the underlying laws and mecha-
nisms at work in nature. And with enough knowledge, physicists believed 
they could predict exactly how those systems would evolve over time. 
Indeed, according to Pierre-Simon Laplace ([1814] 1902), an intelligence 
with sufficient computational capacity could predict the future state of 
every particle in the universe.
What about random events, like throwing dice or flipping coins? From 
the point of view of classical physics, randomness is only superficial. If one 
knew exactly how the dice were thrown, what sort of surface they would 
land on, and so on, then one could calculate precisely how the dice will 
land. Dice-throwing and coin-flipping are “random” only in the sense that 
the average person doesn’t have adequate information about either the 
conditions or the natural laws to make the calculations. But given the laws 
of nature, they must land precisely as they do. With few exceptions, so- 
called random events in classical mechanics are merely events that are too 
complex for humans to predict in real time. In reality though, their behav-
ior is just as mechanical and deterministic as a clock.
That, however, is not the sort of universe we inhabit. After the discov-
ery of quantum mechanics, we now know that nature is not mechanical 
and that classical physics does not describe how things work at subatomic 
scales. Parts of the quantum world are truly random; they are indetermin-
istic and intrinsically unpredictable. Let’s consider one example.
Materials like uranium undergo radioactive decay. In other words, ura-
nium atoms are unstable—they will break apart given enough time. While 
we can predict how long it will take for some lump of radioactive material 
to decay, we can’t predict which atom will decay or when. Suppose we 
zoom in and pick one specific uranium atom in the lump and ask, “When 
will this atom decay?” According to the standard interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, there is no precise answer to that question. A quantum 
physicist can tell you the probability that that atom will decay in the next 
hour or year or decade, but nothing more. Decay events are intrinsically 
random. There is no hidden mechanism that causes an atom to decay. Not 
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even God could predict when such an event will happen based strictly on 
a complete knowledge of the laws of nature.
Notice what this means for God’s providential control. In a quantum 
world, no matter how precisely God sets the conditions at creation, the 
universe will develop in an indeterministic way—that is, it will develop in 
ways that not even God could predict. If randomness were limited to 
radioactivity, there might be ways for God to deal with it. Unfortunately, 
this is just one example of an entire class of quantum events. The upshot 
is that God cannot bring about a particular outcome merely by setting the 
initial conditions of the universe. How, then, can God providentially guide 
events except by intervening?
As we’ve seen, evolution showed there are laws of nature governing the 
biological realm, but Darwinism presents a new set of problems for provi-
dence. While random mutations play an important role, “randomness” 
has a different meaning in biology than in physics. In biology, randomness 
primarily is the denial that evolution is guided by any sort of purpose.
According to Neo-Darwinism, genetic mutations do not occur for the 
benefit of a creature or species; mutations, as such, arise independently of 
the needs of a species. They are random in that a given mutation could be 
useful (adaptive) in acquiring food, resisting pests, finding a mate, and so 
on, but the mutation did not occur so that a species could acquire food, 
resist pests, or find a mate. Indeed, mutations are more likely to be useless 
or even harmful (that is, maladaptive). (“More likely” because it is easier 
for a mutation to undermine a useful trait than for it to produce an adap-
tive one.) Death and destruction, then, seem required for evolutionary 
“progress.” Not only did the dinosaurs go extinct, it is estimated that 
99.9% of all the species that have existed have gone extinct. It is difficult 
to see, then, how all things work together for good.
But randomness plays a significant role in evolution even apart from 
mutations. Small contingent events can have dramatic effects over time. 
Consider some possible scenarios:
 A) A creature has a mutation that provides it with camouflage in its envi-
ronment. This advantage will likely be passed on to future generations. 
But then a natural disaster changes the species’ environment in such a 
way that the coloration instead makes it easier to be seen by predators. 
The traits that come to proliferate in that species will now be very 
different.
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 B) A creature has a mutation that significantly improves its eyesight, but 
is eaten before it grows into an adult, thus preventing those genes 
from being passed on to later generations. As a result, a different spe-
cies comes to dominate in that location.
 C) The asteroid that struck the Yucatan peninsula 66 million years ago 
instead misses Earth entirely. The so-called Great Extinction, which 
changed the course of whole ecosystems, doesn’t come to pass. As a 
result, pre-human mammals and, hence, humans never appear on earth.
The point is that there is a great deal of contingency in evolution. Chance, 
so it seems, plays the leading role in nature, not purpose, or design. 
Ecosystems are shaped by sudden changes to a local environment, or 
when otherwise favorable traits are selected out by a chomp, or by hav-
ing/avoiding a natural disaster. While natural selection promotes—among 
other things—the survival of fittest, there is no guarantee that the fittest 
will survive and spread its genes within a given population. If mutations 
are random and their uptake in a species so radically dependent on count-
less contingencies, how could God guarantee the outcome of such a 
process?
Once all the randomness in the natural world is accounted for, one 
might wonder how one can believe in God at all, let alone God’s provi-
dence. No surprise, then, that scientific randomness figures prominently in 
non-theistic worldviews. For example, biologist Douglas Futuyma claims 
that chance undermines belief in a creator: “By coupling undirected, pur-
poseless variation to the blind, uncaring process of natural selection, 
Darwin made theological or spiritual explanations of the life processes 
superfluous” (1998, 5). And Harvard paleontologist George Gaylord 
Simpson asserts that “Man is the result of a purposeless and natural pro-
cess that did not have him in mind” (1967, 345). Secular thinkers, who 
increasingly assert “chance” as a synonym for “naturalistic,” allege that 
chance is by definition blind (thus, not divinely guided), and that chancy 
evolutionary processes preclude rational belief in God.
Any substantive claims about providence and randomness, on the part 
of believer and unbeliever alike, require serious, perhaps new, thinking 
about both providence and randomness.
1 RANDOMNESS AND PROVIDENCE: IS GOD A BOWLER OR A CURLER? 
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1.6  conclusIon
If one accepts both contemporary physics and biology, how can one rea-
sonably maintain that God intentionally created the heavens and the earth 
and all that they contain?
This book is the result of a three-year, Templeton-funded project, 
involving 36 Muslim, Christian, and Jewish philosophers, theologians, 
historians, physicists, and biologists, aimed at understanding how the 
world can be as science tells us and God be as the Abrahamic scriptures tell 
us. In particular, how can God providentially and reliably guide creation if 
reality is random? Is it possible to be both scientifically and religiously 
faithful without loss to either?
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CHAPTER 2
The Many Faces of Randomness
Jeffrey Koperski
2.1  No SiNgle DefiNitioN
While “random” is a familiar word, its definition is surprisingly hard to pin 
down. Some think of random events as lacking a cause or purpose. For 
others, the idea is bound up with improbability, indeterminism, or unpre-
dictability. Making matters worse, the definition found in one discipline 
tends to conflict with those given in others. A statistician’s random 
sequence has little to do with random mutations in evolutionary biology.
This chapter offers an overview of the terrain, looking at how random-
ness and closely related terms are used in a variety of disciplines. As will 
see, some are more relevant to the question of providence than others.
2.2  PurPoSe
Let’s begin with purpose. Driving down the road is a purposeful act. A 
rock bouncing down a hillside and coming to rest in the road is not. It 
might just as well have landed in a ditch. Its precise path down the hill and 
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where it lands is random. Many of the best examples of randomness are 
natural events like this: leaves blowing in the wind, water molecules bounc-
ing off the side of a glass, or when the next meteorite will strike the moon. 
In contrast, artifacts are designed to mitigate the effects of random changes 
in conditions. A car might run over that rock in the road, but its tires and 
suspension are designed to minimize the risk of an accident. Perhaps a lack 
of agency or purpose is at least a necessary condition for randomness.
Not so, as we sometimes use random processes for our own ends. 
Consider games with dice or ping-pong balls in a state lottery. In both 
cases, manufactures ensure that no particular outcome has a higher prob-
ability than another. Random number generators in computers are 
designed to produce random-looking sequences. If randomness can be 
employed in a purposeful way, then the two are not mutually exclusive.
2.3  Probability aND StatiSticS
Improbability was mentioned above. Perhaps probability theory could 
help to define randomness. Take a fair coin, flip it fifty times, and record 
the order of heads and tails. Call the following sequence S1:
H H T T T H H H T T H H T T T T T H T T H T H T H
H H T H H H T T H H T H T T T H T H T H H H T H T
This seems like a typical random distribution of heads and tails. What is 
the probability of getting this sequence? For one toss of the coin, P(H) = ½ 
and P(T) = ½. So for fifty tosses, the overall probability for this sequence 
is P(S1) =  (½)50, a small number. One might therefore think that small 
probabilities are indicative of random events, but basic probability theory 
immediately presents a problem with this. What if instead of S1, the coin 
produces S2, which is fifty tails in a row. Such a sequence is physically pos-
sible. One might think that P(S1) > P(S2), but that is false. If the coin is 
fair, then P(S2) = (½)50, the same small number. Of course, S2 doesn’t look 
like a random sequence, so small probabilities alone do not seem to be a 
good indicator of randomness. At best, we might say that tossing the coin 
is a random process, but that process need not yield a random-looking 
product (Smith 1998, 149).
Turning to a related area of mathematics, “randomness” is well-defined 
in statistics, but it is a technical term that does not hew closely to everyday 
usage. Statistical randomness only applies to a sequence of events, not the 
way in which the sequence was produced. It would have nothing to say 
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about the process, whether perfectly fair dice or ones that were obviously 
not symmetrical. Statistical randomness is a matter of patterns and pattern 
matching. A fully random sequence lacks any pattern or correlations. On 
this approach, S1 would count as random but S2 not at all. But these are 
extremes. Statistical randomness is a relative notion. Consider a third 
sequence, S3:
H T T T H T T T H T T T H T T T H T T T H T T T H T
T T H T T T H T T T H T T T H T T T H T T T H T T T
Statistical tests would judge S3 to be more random than S2, but much less 
than S1. This is because S3 is a repetition of one H followed by three T’s. 
The fact that one can specify such a pattern means that it is not completely 
random. In statistics, there are many well-known tests that detect degrees 
of correlation or patterns within a data set (e.g., the chi-square test). 
Mathematicians Andrei Kolmogorov and Gregory Chaitan emphasized 
the compactness of a description in defining degrees of randomness. To 
reproduce S1, the best one can do is specify each data point individually, 
spelling out the entire string of events one by one. There is no shorter set 
of instructions. The fact that S1 is incompressible in this way means that the 
sequence is random. S2, in contrast, can be reproduced by two rules:
 1. Print T
 2. Repeat step 1 forty-nine more times
One need not mention all fifty points of data in order to reproduce S2. 
That such rules exist shows that S2 is not random. Finally, S3 is slightly 
more random because it requires a less compact set of instructions to 
reproduce:
 1. Print H
 2. Print T
 3. Repeat step 2 two more times
 4. Repeat step 1 twelve more times
The relation between compressibility and statistical randomness can be 
rigorously defined and it plays an important role in communications the-
ory. There seems to be little relevance here, though, to the question of 
providence. Some sort of pattern in nature could be evidence of divine 
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action, although attempts to make such a case have not met with success.1 
Moreover, God could exert meticulous control over every natural process 
and yet make any sequence of events look random. In short, if the 
Kolmogorov/Chaitan compressibility is relevant to the question of provi-
dence, it is not clear how.
Let’s return to the probability theory and consider a distinction. 
Probability can be understood in either an objective or subjective way. 
Physical symmetries, like those in dice or coins, ground objective proba-
bilities. There is a fact-of-the-matter about the probability of rolling a 5 
with a fair die. If two people disagree, at least one of them must be wrong. 
The correct probabilities in these situations are part of reality, independent 
of what anyone believes.
Subjective probabilities are different. Say that my neighbor believes 
there is better than a 50% chance that a Democrat will be the next President 
of the United States. This probability captures his degree of confidence 
about a future state of affairs. My provost, on the other hand, might say 
there is a 75% chance, and both would be right given that they are merely 
describing their own subjective degrees of confidence. While quantifying 
beliefs like this might not seem to have much practical value, Bayes’ 
Theorem is a well-known rule for how one’s subjective probability should 
be updated in light of new information (Joyce 2019). Bayesian probability 
theory has proven to be extremely useful, with applications everywhere 
from rational decision making to artificial intelligence. One of its key fea-
tures is that although people’s experiences will lead them to assign differ-
ent probabilities to an event before data-gathering has begun (the so-called 
prior probability), values tend to converge as more observations are made. 
In other words, it doesn’t seem to matter that people disagree about how 
likely an event is (i.e., their subjective priors differ). The correct applica-
tion of Bayes’ Theorem ensures that those differences will shrink as data 
accumulates.
The two interpretations of probability can help us to get a handle on 
the problem of randomness and providence. Subjective probability is use-
ful for describing finite beings with limited experience. While people 
believe all sorts of weird things and so would rank their subjective degrees 
of belief accordingly, an omniscient being would hold every belief with 
1 Intelligent Design Theory is the most prominent example.
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certainty—a probability of 100%. God’s subjective probabilities do not 
change over time.2
The question then becomes how God’s providential control can be 
squared with objective probabilities. If God wants a fair die to land on 5, 
in what sense is there only a 16  chance of that happening?3 From a God’s- 
eye perspective, it seems as if the only real probabilities are 1 and 0. To 
some extent, physics backs this up. We use dice and coins in games to 
introduce a degree of uncertainty. With enough information, however, 
these events are perfectly predictable. The angular and linear momentum 
of the dice leaving your hand along, the strength of gravity, and the table’s 
coefficient of friction determine the outcome of the dice. We do not have 
that information available and could not do the calculations before the 
dice came to rest even if we did, but based on the physics alone the out-
come is in principle predictable. Dice are at best random for all practical 
purposes, but not fundamentally so.
There are other reasons for doubting that probabilities should be inter-
preted objectively. One is that perfectly good yet contradictory probability 
distributions apply to the same events. Say that a malfunctioning machine 
randomly fills soda pop bottles anywhere from one drop to completely 
full.4 One could measure the bottles over the course of the day to calculate 
the probability that the machine will fill ¾ of a bottle. But what does it 
mean to be ¾ full? For a 20 cm tall bottle it could mean that the liquid 
reaches 15 cm in height. Note, however, that if the bottle has a total vol-
ume of 1 liter, then ¾ full could mean 750 ml. One way of determining ¾ 
full seems just as good as the other. While it might not be obvious, the 
measurement based on height will typically not be the same as the one 
based on volume. In other words, there is no one fact about when the 
bottle is ¾ full and so no one probability P(¾ full). Two different num-
bers will emerge depending on which units one chooses.
The problem is that the probability based on height seems just as real 
and correct as the one based on volume. Neither has a better claim to be 
the objective probability of interest. For the notion of objective probability 
to make sense, a unique probability distribution needs to exist, what physi-
cists call a “natural measure.” The reason many theorists favor subjective 
2 There are some possible complications here for open theism and God’s beliefs about 
future contingents, but let’s ignore that for now.
3 Robert Koons takes up this question in Chap. 11 of this volume.
4 This is based on an example in Sklar (1993, 119).
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probability is that situations like the bottle are the norm and examples 
with a single probability distribution like dice are the exceptions.
If all probabilities are subjective, then probability theory isn’t going to 
be of much help with the questions at hand. As we saw, an omniscient 
being would hold all beliefs with certainty. Even if the non-uniqueness 
problem can be overcome, it might still be the case that objective proba-
bilities are only prima facie, like the dice example. Again, rolling dice are 
only random for all practical purposes. In terms of the underlying physics, 
the dice must roll precisely the way they do. Can all examples of objective 
probability be reduced in this way? To answer that question, let’s turn 
from probability theory to natural science.
2.4  PhySicS
Physics provides many examples of randomness.
2.4.1  Statistical Mechanics
What we experience as air temperature depends on the average velocity of 
the molecules in the air around us. The higher the kinetic energy of the 
molecules, the warmer the air feels. Statistical mechanics is the area of 
physics that relates the aggregate behavior of particles to detectable prop-
erties, like temperature and pressure. Such averages are not directly calcu-
lated from the velocities of each molecule in the room. There are far too 
many molecules in even a cubic millimeter of air to track or simulate on a 
computer. Since no one can predict the evolution of a system with more 
than a dozen or so particles, physicists must resort to probabilities. The 
precise state of such systems fluctuates randomly.
2.4.2  Chaos Theory
Chaos poses some of the same challenges as statistical mechanics, but 
often for far simpler systems, like the tumbling of an odd-shaped moon5 
or a dripping faucet. Even the best supercomputers supplied with informa-
tion from the most advanced measuring devices cannot accurately track 
the evolution of a chaotic system. There are two reasons for this. First, 
chaotic systems display sensitive dependence on initial conditions (SDIC). 
5 Namely Hyperion, one of Saturn’s moons.
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Even with a set of equations that perfectly models the evolution of the 
system, the slightest error in the initial conditions will explode exponen-
tially fast. Since all physical measurements involve some error, there is no 
way to provide the model with initial conditions that are perfectly accurate 
and precise. Because of SDIC, state predictions based on less than perfect 
information fail for all chaotic systems. Second, digital computers have a 
finite amount of storage and memory. No matter how many digits they 
can store, most calculations will involve some amount of roundoff error. 
Much like the measurement errors in the previous case, these will cause 
state predictions of a chaotic system to fail in a relatively short time.
2.4.3  Instability and Singular Points
Think of a perfectly symmetrical sphere balancing on a knife edge. Say that 
the system exists in a vacuum and is isolated from all vibrations. In prin-
ciple, the sphere could remain in place indefinitely. If the sphere were to 
fall at some point in the future, nothing in the laws of nature at present 
dictates which way it would fall. The relevant equations have so-called 
singular solutions that block any predictions about how the system will 
evolve. Physicists Joseph Boussinesq and James Clerk Maxwell, still work-
ing in the age of classical mechanics, hoped that such systems could pro-
vide insight into freewill (van Strien 2014, 175–76).
While the sphere example involves several idealizations, singular points 
pose real-world obstacles for mechanical engineers. If a locomotive 
were to come to rest in such a state, there would be no way to know which 
way the train would go when started again.
2.4.4  Norton’s Dome
Consider another system from classical mechanics, in this case a point par-
ticle situated at the top of a frictionless dome. When the mathematics for 
this system is restricted to “well-behaved” force functions, the particle will 
remain in place until a new force nudges it along. So far, this is much like 
the sphere on the knife edge. However, what if we loosen the restrictions? 
Instead of ruling some solutions out by fiat, let’s allow a wider range of 
functions.6 In that case, the particle may move off the dome at some 
unknown time without being nudged. While this might seem impossible, 
6 Technically, those that are not Lipschitz continuous.
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many papers have been written exploring “Norton’s dome” (Norton 
2008). What is not controversial is that, unless we simply choose to ignore 
such possibilities, the particle will move off the dome without perturba-
tion at some finite time in the future. Moreover, there is no way to know 
when this will happen.
2.4.5  Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking
There are many different types of symmetry in physics. The simplest are 
spatial, like a pin balancing on its tip. The pin looks the same no matter 
from which side one approaches it. When the pin falls, the symmetry is 
broken. Other symmetries are purely mathematical, like those that give 
rise to conservation laws.7 Still others are about physical processes like the 
formation of magnets. The atoms in a piece of iron have their own tiny 
magnetic poles. Above 770 °C, these poles are randomly oriented and so 
the piece of iron as a whole is not magnetic. As the metal cools below the 
Curie point, the magnetic poles of the atoms align, and a weak magnetic 
field emerges. At this point, the symmetry is broken. The magnetic field 
has a defined orientation in space. There is no way to know in advance, 
however, which direction this alignment will take place. It seems to be a 
random process.
There are many other examples of spontaneous symmetry breaking in 
condensed matter physics. It also plays an important role in particle phys-
ics, including the behavior of the recently verified Higgs boson. In each 
case, a system evolves from an unstable, symmetric state to a stable, asym-
metric one. But the choice of asymmetric state appears to be random. 
Nothing in nature prefers one possibility rather than another.
2.4.6  Quantum Mechanics
The best-known examples of randomness in physics have to do with quan-
tum mechanics. One is radioactive decay. Quantum mechanics can only be 
used to predict the probability of a uranium atom decaying within a des-
ignated time. While conditions must be right in order for decay to occur, 
7 For example, the fact that physical laws work the same way locally as they do in other 
galaxies is a type of symmetry related to the conservation of momentum. That they work the 
same now as they did in the past is associated with the conservation of energy. The precise 
relations were proven by Emmy Noether in 1915.
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there is no hidden mechanism that causes a particular atom to decay pre-
cisely when it does. It “just happens.” This is also true for quantum mea-
surements and the collapse of the wavefunction, part of the famous 
Schrödinger’s Cat scenario. This thought experiment restricts the out-
come of a measurement to two states: the cat lives or the cat dies. There is 
a 50% chance for either. Once again, nothing in the laws of nature deter-
mines which will happen. All measurement events in quantum mechanics 
are to some degree random.
These examples show that randomness has been part of physics for cen-
turies. Do they pose a problem for divine providence? Some might, but 
most do not. Let’s work back through the list in a different order.
Most physicists would dismiss cases like Norton’s dome as physically 
impossible. While the mathematics might allow the particle to move by 
itself, not all solutions to the governing equations need to be treated real-
istically. Mathematical possibility is broader than physical possibility. 
Norton’s dome is therefore nothing but an idealized thought experiment.8
As for instability and singular solutions, it’s true that the sphere on the 
knife-edge will not move until perturbed in some way—the slightest vibra-
tion or the impact of a single air molecule. But if we knew what the per-
turbation was, then it would be trivial to predict which way the sphere will 
fall. Once all the physical conditions and influences are accounted for, the 
outcomes are completely predictable, much like the dice example men-
tioned earlier. Examples like this are only random in a superficial way.
A useful device for sorting out the other cases is what is now called a 
“Laplacian demon.” Physicist Pierre-Simon Laplace discussed the idea of 
a super intelligence with perfect knowledge of the laws of nature and the 
state of every particle in the universe at a point in time ([1814] 1902, 4). 
With such information in hand, a Laplacian demon could calculate all 
future states of a universe governed by Newton’s laws. For our purposes, 
we need to expand on this idea a bit. Let’s give the Laplacian demon 
unlimited computational capacity and perfect knowledge of the state of 
any given system. If there is a truth about how events will unfold given the 
physical conditions and the laws of nature, the Laplacian demon would be 
able to accurately predict it. Such a being is clearly an idealization. (The 
observable universe contains a finite number of particles, which puts a 
8 I believe that this easy dismissal begs the question, but it is nonetheless the majority view. 
For more, see Koperski (2020, sec. 6.3).
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limit on computational capacity. Plus, no physical measurements are per-
fectly precise.)
Even this improved Laplacian demon falls far short of omniscience. 
Laplace’s idealized intelligence is not a model of divine knowledge, but 
rather a limiting case. It is more like a perfect computer that solves equa-
tions based on error-free information. This means that if a Laplacian 
demon could predict the outcome of an event, then surely God knows it 
as well.
With some further analysis, it turns out that only quantum mechanics 
would pose a fundamental challenge to a Laplacian demon. Classical sta-
tistical mechanics and chaos are just more complex versions of the dice 
example given earlier. Given enough information, a physicist could predict 
how a pair of dice will roll. Given unlimited computational capacity—no 
roundoff errors—and perfect measurements, a Laplacian demon could 
calculate the collisions in a many-particle system and track the evolution of 
chaotic ones.
The physics behind spontaneous symmetry breaking can be far more 
complex, but it also requires some sort of perturbation for a system to 
move from an unstable, symmetrical state to a stable, asymmetrical one. 
Like the sphere on the knife-edge, a Laplacian demon with complete 
knowledge of all the physical influences could predict how and when these 
symmetries would be broken, with one exception. In the examples involv-
ing the most sophisticated physics, the perturbations will sometimes be 
due to quantum fluctuations. Not even a Laplacian demon could predict 
when a given uranium atom will decay or whether Schrödinger’s cat will 
live or die. The type of randomness involved is intrinsic and cannot be 
resolved with epistemic access to some underlying physics. Many in the 
science-and-religion literature refer to this as “ontological randomness” to 
emphasize that it is real and not merely perceived. The other examples 
involve “epistemic randomness,” which is ultimately based on a lack of 
knowledge. This is why the Laplacian demon is useful. By definition, it has 
access to all the physical facts, even ones that are hidden to us, and so is 
not susceptible to epistemic randomness.
As Nidhal Guessoum points out, physicists do not use “epistemic ran-
domness” to describe these events (private conversation). The more stan-
dard terminology refers instead to determinism. Take two identical 
systems, say two solar systems with the same sizes and orbits of planets and 
identical stars. Determinism says that if those systems have the same over-
all configuration at one point in time, then they will remain in perfect sync 
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unless something interferes with one system or the other (Butterfield 
2005). The relevant laws and state of the system at one instant determine 
the evolution of that system arbitrarily far into the future. Given that the 
same laws of nature govern both, if the two systems have the same overall 
state at one instant, the two will evolve in lockstep. Except for a few special 
cases (Earman 2007), classical mechanics is deterministic. This is the 
underlying truth that Laplace was trying to illustrate.
For the most part, quantum mechanics is also deterministic. The evolu-
tion of a system according to Schrödinger’s equation would pose no chal-
lenge to a Laplacian demon. The reason that it cannot predict radioactive 
decay and the outcome of a Schrödinger’s cat experiment is that those 
events are indeterministic. Two uranium atoms in identical environments 
will likely decay at different times. Two Schrödinger experiments with 
identical cats might result with one alive and one dead. The laws of nature 
and the initial conditions do not fix a unique set of future states for these 
systems.
This gets to the heart of the matter vis-à-vis randomness and provi-
dence. If a system is deterministic, then no matter how complex or chaotic 
it is, God would know its future states. Recall Clark’s bowler analogy (sec-
tion 1.4 of this volume). The physics of bowling is deterministic. Given 
the angular and linear momentum imparted to the ball, the pins must fall 
the way they do. A Laplacian demon would rightly predict which pins will 
remain. But what if quantum events were manifested at the level of our 
experience, and bowling involved some degree of indeterminism? In that 
case, no amount of skill, knowledge, or precision could guarantee that 
when the ball leaves the bowler’s hands it will produce a strike. This illus-
trates one concrete challenge involving randomness. Can God providen-
tially govern a universe that contains irreducibly indeterministic processes 
without intervening along the way? Is a world with quantum events in 
some sense risky for God?
There is one more thing to note about quantum mechanics. Not all 
interpretations are indeterministic. The orthodox, Copenhagen approach 
is, as well as others with a collapse of the wavefunction, such as the GRW 
interpretation (Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber). But Bohmian mechanics and the 
Everettian many-worlds interpretation are not. This means that quantum 
mechanics has not proved that some events are indeterministic. In the next 
century, most physicists might come to reject a collapse of the wavefunc-
tion and thereby restore determinism to quantum mechanics. In any case, 
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of the many ways of understanding randomness, indeterminism appears to 
be one of the better candidates.
2.5  biology
Another obvious place to look for randomness in science is evolutionary 
biology. Random mutations play a key role in Neo-Darwinian evolution. 
In what sense are they random? In part, the word is used to deny any sort 
of teleology or directedness in the process. In Lamarckian evolution—a 
theory which predates Darwin—changes from one generation to the next 
had a clear direction. Lamarck believed that nature responds to the needs 
of a species. According to this theory, giraffes evolved long necks because 
of their persistent stretching for leaves on tall trees over many generations. 
Likewise, the more elephant ancestors used their trunks, the more func-
tional they became in their progeny.
Darwin explicitly rejected this sort of directed evolution. He believed 
instead that changes from one generation were random: some might prove 
useful in acquiring food, resisting pests, finding a mate, and so on, but 
most would be maladaptive. (“Most” because it is easier for a mutation to 
undermine a useful trait than for it to produce an adaptive one.) With the 
discovery of genetics, we can say more precisely that there is no direction-
ality to genetic mutations with respect to the evolution of the species in 
which they occur. This is the sense in which mutations are random. How 
does it compare to those in physics?
The answer depends on the cause of a given mutation. Some mutations 
arise during cell division. Errors occur when genes fail to produce exact 
copies themselves. But such events need not be random in any deep sense. 
The underlying biochemical processes could be fully deterministic. There 
is only one causal pathway for a mutation given the interactions of the 
organic molecules involved. Other mutations are due to external sources, 
such as radiation. While the exact chain of events is more complex, it 
would be just as tractable to a Laplacian demon as the collisions of ping- 
pong balls in a lottery machine.9 In short, the underlying processes respon-
sible for random mutations are on a par with examples of deterministic, 
epistemically random events in physics.
9 The radiation event itself would be indeterministic, as discussed in the previous section.
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Philosopher of biology Alan Love discusses a less obvious type of bio-
logical randomness in the writing of paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould 
(Chap. 7 of this volume). Gould highlighted the role of contingency in 
evolution (1989, 48–51). Would the phylogenetic tree of life look differ-
ent if evolution were restarted from the same initial conditions? In other 
words, if we could “run the tape again,” would natural selection produce 
roughly the same set of species? Gould thought not. There is too much 
contingency involved to think that evolution would play out the same way 
again. The distant ancestors of any species would have been extremely 
lucky to survive and pass on their genes. Consider the earliest primate. 
Think of all the things that could have happened before it had a chance to 
reproduce. It could have been killed by a predator. It might have died 
from disease or starvation. Say that the asteroid that hit the Yucatan 
Peninsula 66 million years ago had missed the Earth by a few hundred 
miles. Dinosaurs would have continued to dominate for some time. As 
Gould put it,
replay the tape a million times from a Burgess beginning, and I doubt that 
anything like Homo sapiens would ever evolve again. … Wind the tape of life 
back to Burgess times, and let it play again. If Pikaia does not survive in the 
replay, we are wiped out of future history. (1989, 289, 323)
The tree of life seems to have been shaped by this ever-present contin-
gency. If crucial events had gone differently, our ecosystems would be 
populated with other species, and humans would not be among them.
In most ways, evolutionary contingency does not pose any new problems 
for divine providence. The Yucatan asteroid and many of Gould’s other 
examples are no more unpredictable or indeterministic than those in statisti-
cal mechanics or chaos theory. There is, however, a possible exception. Say 
that the first primate had been eaten by a carnivore before reproducing. Was 
this event foreseeable? The answer is tied up with the difficult question of 
free will. Many theists hold that humans have a robust sort of free will that 
is not compatible with determinism.10 A Laplacian demon, therefore, could 
not predict one’s free choices. And while some, like Descartes, did not 
believe that animals have free will, theists generally believe that high-func-
tioning animals do as well. If the predator in question had the free will to 
10 Philosophers refer to this as libertarian free will.
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pursue our primate ancestor or some slower- looking prey, then that decision 
would be indeterministic. No amount of knowledge about the relevant laws 
and conditions would allow one to predict which choice the predator would 
make. At best, there is an objective probability that the creature would make 
one choice rather than the other.
Does God know what choices a free creature will make? This is a con-
tentious issue. Most theistic philosophers would answer “yes,” but there is 
little agreement about how God knows this. They do agree, however, that 
if God has exhaustive foreknowledge, the way in which God knows our 
future choices is nothing like the prediction of a Laplacian demon. In 
contrast, open theists deny that that there is a definitive fact-of-the-matter 
now about what a free creature will choose. There is simply no truth “out 
there” to be known, and so the answer is “no,” God does not know the 
outcome of free choices.
Going back to Gould’s notion of contingency in evolution, does preda-
tion by higher animals pose a challenge to divine providence? Maybe. If 
open theism is right and God does not precisely know the outcome of free 
choices, and if prehistoric predators had free will—both of which are ques-
tionable—then that sort of contingency would make a particular view of 
providence more difficult.
Of the many concepts in mathematics and the natural sciences that are 
related to randomness, few seem to pose a problem for divine providence. 
The main challenge comes from indeterminism. It is difficult to see how 
God could exercise providential control over nature without intervening if 
events are indeterministic. Quantum fluctuations shortly after the Big 
Bang might have produced an uninhabitable universe. Free will choices at 
key points in history might have led to a world with far more suffering, or, 
if the predation example is correct, one without Homo sapiens. In either 
case, God could not guarantee how events would unfold in the future 
from a given set of conditions at creation.
There is clearly a conceptual tension, then, between some forms of 
randomness and providence, one that I have not sought to resolve in 
this essay.
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CHAPTER 3
Randomness and Providence: Defining 
the Problem(s)
Aaron M. Griffith and Arash Naraghi
3.1  IntroductIon
Traditional monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) all 
express a commitment to God’s providence (from the Latin providere, to 
foresee or to provide for) over the created world. While different concep-
tions of God’s providence are found in and among these traditions, they 
each affirm that God governs and controls the whole of creation, includ-
ing the lives of individuals, with perfect power, goodness, and knowledge. 
However, the created world appears to be full of randomness. Many events 
are unpredictable and lack a discernable pattern, purpose, or cause. From 
the sub-atomic level, to the human social world, to the formation of galax-
ies, creation seems to display randomness that cannot be explained simply 
by human ignorance. Such randomness appears to be part of the very 
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fabric of the world itself. Indeed, our best contemporary science—quan-
tum mechanics, for example—seems to indicate that some events are in 
principle unpredictable.
Such randomness is prima facie incompatible with God’s providence 
over creation. The tension is easy to appreciate. Random events seem not 
to be controllable and not part of any plan, much less any good plan. But 
God’s providence consists in his ability to control and foresee the unfold-
ing of events in such a way that they lead to a good and meaningful goal. 
If this tension is genuine, it would be a serious worry for traditional 
Abrahamic monotheism. If the world is ungovernable, then we have rea-
son to doubt that God is provident, and hence to doubt that God exists. 
For God’s providence is tied up with his other essential attributes: omnip-
otence, omniscience, omnibenevolence. Moreover, the challenge posed by 
randomness for the believer is that it calls into question the purposiveness 
of events as well as God’s ability to fulfill his promises. Trust in God’s plan 
and care for his creatures looks to be eroded by randomness in the world.
As compelling as this problem might initially seem, we argue that it is 
difficult to formulate an uncontroversial version of the problem of ran-
domness for God’s providence given the various empirical and theological 
variables at play. This chapter is primarily an attempt to locate the numer-
ous choice points (empirically and theologically) that could generate a 
tension or incompatibility between randomness and God’s providence. 
We begin by outlining different ways in which ontological randomness can 
be understood. We then consider various conceptions of God’s provi-
dence, which differ with respect to the nature of God’s foreknowledge, 
power, and purpose for creation. With these variables on the table we go 
on to develop a number of arguments for thinking that randomness is 
incompatible with God’s providence and consider some replies from dif-
ferent conceptions of providence.
3.2  ontologIcal randomness
‘Random’ is a label applied to a number of importantly different phenom-
ena. These include outcomes of games of chance, sequences of numbers 
lacking a pattern, coincidence of independent events, methods for sam-
pling populations, radioactive decay, quantum indeterminacy, genetic 
mutation, and chaotic non-linear systems (Bradley 2012). The sort of ran-
domness we are concerned with is ontological rather than epistemological. 
Ontological randomness is randomness in being itself, irrespective of 
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human cognition and its limits. What appears to us to be indeterminate, 
unpredictable, or purposeless is there in the world itself, not merely our 
understanding of the world. We distinguish two broad forms of ontologi-
cal randomness: one in terms of indeterminism and another in terms of 
purposelessness. We think this distinction can help capture the common 
uses of ‘randomness’ found in the literature.
3.2.1  Randomness as Indeterminism
The first form of ontological randomness is defined in terms of indeter-
minism. A random event, in this sense, is the outcome of an indeterminis-
tic process. That is to say:
Indeterministic Randomness: Event E is randomI iff E occurs and E’s 
occurrence is not determined to be part of 
a unique future, that is, both E and not-E 
are outcomes compatible with the way 
things are up to E’s occurrence.
Indeterminism has implications for predictability: if an event E is the result 
of an indeterministic process in the above sense, then there is no way to 
predict with certainty that E will occur.1 Being the result of an indetermin-
istic process explains why E’s occurrence could not have been predicted 
with certainty on the basis of a complete description of events up to E’s 
occurrence.
It is important to distinguish two readings of Indeterministic 
Randomness. On the one hand, a randomI event may be indeterminate in 
the strongest possible sense, that is, one that is indeterminate with respect 
to any factors whatsoever up to the event’s occurrence. Such events are not 
determined by either physical or ‘metaphysical’ or ‘supernatural’ causes, 
for example, God’s direct action in the world. On the other hand, a ran-
domI event may be indeterminate with respect to physical factors. Such 
events may, therefore, be determined by metaphysical or supernatural 
1 To predict E, as we’ll understand it here, is a matter of knowing that E will occur on the 
basis of complete knowledge of the world prior to E’s occurrence and the relevant laws. 
Moreover, if an event E is predicted, then E occurs. Although all indeterministic events are 
unpredictable in this sense, we do not assume that all unpredictable events are indeterminis-
tic. Chaotic systems can involve events that are all causally determined despite the system’s 
unpredictability due to extreme sensitivity on initial conditions. See Bradley (2012, 78).
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factors despite their lack of physical determination. Call randomI events 
that are entirely indeterministic, ‘metaphysically randomI’ and events that 
are indeterministic with respect to physical factors, ‘physically randomI.’
Metaphysical RandomnessI: Event E is metaphysically randomI iff E 
occurs and E’s occurrence is not determined 
to be part of a unique future by anything 
whatsoever, that is, both E and not-E are 
outcomes compatible with all factors up to 
E’s occurrence.
Metaphysically randomI events would be, as Clark (2014) puts it, “in 
principle unpredictable.”
Physical RandomnessI: Event E is physically randomI iff E occurs and E’s 
occurrence is not determined to be part of a 
unique future by any physical factors, that is, 
both E and not-E are outcomes compatible with 
the laws of nature and the state of the world up 
to E’s occurrence.2
RandomI events cannot be predicted with certainty. Of course, inability 
to predict with certainty is not incompatible with ability to predict with 
high probability. RandomI events have an objective probability of occur-
ring less than 1 and greater than 0. There may be antecedent factors that 
make such an event more likely to occur. Knowing the antecedent factors 
that make the event more or less likely may allow us to predict its occur-
rence with high probability.
Given this, it is worthwhile articulating a notion of randomnessI in 
which random events are not predictable in the sense that they are events 
whose occurrence cannot be predicted with high probability. Not only 
would such an event be the result of an indeterministic process, but there 
would also be no connection between the probability of the event and 
other prior events. Such an event would be arbitrary:
2 If a physically randomI event is determined by something non-physical, for example, 
God’s direct activity, then, it would not, in a strict sense, be randomI. Our inability to predict 
such an event would simply be due to our ignorance of the metaphysical cause of the event 
and hence be an example of epistemic randomness. On the other hand, if the whole of reality 
is physical, then all physically randomI events would thereby also be metaphysically randomI.
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Arbitrary RandomnessI: Event E is arbitrarily randomI iff E occurs and 
E’s occurrence is not determined to be part of 
a unique future and the probability of E’s 
occurrence is completely independent of the 
occurrence of any event prior to E’s occurrence.
Many physicists hold that there is ontological randomness at the quantum 
level (especially those holding to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics). They think that Bell’s Theorem provides strong evidence that 
some quantum events—for example, determining whether an electron pass-
ing through a beam splitter has an up-spin or down-spin—are in principle 
unpredictable rather than unpredictable because of our ignorance of hidden 
variables. Such quantum events appear to be examples of randomnessI. They 
are not predictable with certainty, though they may be predictable with high 
probability. These physicists deny that such events are arbitrarily randomI, for 
the occurrence of these events are not arbitrary but rather have a certain 
probability of occurring and are governed by statistical laws.
Libertarian free will might also be thought to involve randomnessI. Free 
actions, according to the libertarian, are the results of indeterministic pro-
cesses: their occurrence or non-occurrence is compatible with the state of 
the world immediately prior to their occurrence. They are not predictable 
with certainty on the basis of knowledge of the world up to the time of 
their occurrence. However, most libertarians want to avoid calling free 
actions random because it connotes arbitrariness. We think they may still 
accept that free action involves Indeterministic Randomness as long as it 
does not involve Arbitrary RandomnessI.
3.2.2  Randomness as Purposelessness
The second form of ontological randomness is defined in terms of lack-
ing a purpose. Events with a purpose are brought about for a reason or 
play a role in realizing some goal, non-accidentally. Peter van Inwagen 
holds that an event is a ‘chance’ event if it is “without purpose or signifi-
cance; it is not a part of anyone’s plan; it serves no end; it might very well 
not have been. ‘Why did that happen?’ the only right answer is: ‘There is 
no reason or explanation; it just happened’” (1988, 50–51). One way to 
capture this idea is to sever the connection between the probability of the 
event and its contribution to a purpose or goal. An event does not serve a 
purpose if there is no connection between the probability of the event’s 
occurrence and its contribution to that purpose. Hence,
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Purposeless Randomness: Event E is randomP iff E occurs and the prob-
ability that E occurs is completely independent 
of its (non-) contribution to any purpose.
Since the examples we will consider below concern specific purposes or 
goals, it is helpful to have a relativized notion of randomnessP, that is, a 
notion of randomness with respect to some particular purpose or goal:
Relative RandomnessP: Event E is relatively randomP with respect to 
some purpose P iff E occurs and the probability 
that E occurs is completely independent of its 
(non-) contribution to P.
If E is randomP with regard to purpose P, then E’s occurrence is not for 
the sake of P. According to evolutionary biology, mutations are random in 
the sense that they do not occur for the sake of the fitness of the individual 
(or species). Mutations may have genetic causes and be more or less pre-
dictable, but their purpose is not the survival of the organism. So, at least 
with respect to the fitness of organisms, such mutations are examples of 
Relative RandomnessP.
Having defined two general categories of randomness—randomnessI 
and randomnessP—it is worth noting that the two categories cut across 
each other. Some randomI events also lack a purpose, that is, they are ran-
domP. Arbitrarily random events, for example, ‘just happen’ and so are not 
produced for the sake of anything else. But other randomI events may 
have a purpose. If there is libertarian free will, then there are events, for 
example, an agent’s freely chosen action, that are the result of an indeter-
ministic process but occur for the sake of some purpose, that is, whatever 
goal or intention the agent had in mind. Moreover, it is possible for an 
event to be purposeless while still being the result of a deterministic pro-
cess, that is, non-randomI. Such an event may be the result of a determin-
istic process despite not serving any purpose. In sum, some but not all 
randomI events are randomP events and some but not all randomP events 
are randomI events.
It should be noted that we will not argue for the actual existence of any 
examples of ontological randomness. So, we do not take a stand on 
whether the mathematical equations used to represent quantum states is 
best interpreted according to the Copenhagen (indeterministic) or 
Bohmian (deterministic) interpretations. And we do not insist that 
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genuinely free actions are libertarian free actions. Ours is a conceptual 
project exploring the compatibility or incompatibility of ontological ran-
domness and God’s providence. The question is, is it possible for God to 
be provident in a world containing ontological randomness (whether or 
not such randomness is actual)?
3.3  dIvIne ProvIdence
Scott Davison writes, “In the most basic sense, a person is provident over 
something if and only if that person exercises control over it, based upon 
knowledge, for a good purpose” (1999). Davison’s gloss identifies the key 
elements in traditional monotheistic accounts of providence, namely, 
God’s power, God’s knowledge, and God’s goodness with respect to his 
creation. Many proponents of the doctrine agree on this much. But in the 
details of the doctrine we find substantial disagreement about how it 
should be articulated. Three broad approaches to divine providence can 
be distinguished: Super Meticulous Providence, Meticulous Providence, 
and General Providence.
3.3.1  Super Meticulous Providence
Under this heading we include ‘Theological Determinism,’ which is the 
view that “God unconditionally decrees every event that occurs in the his-
tory of the world” (Vicens 2014). God determines that all events happen 
as they do, either by directly causing them to happen or by initiating a 
sequence of events such that each event is necessitated (Judisch 2012). 
What is common to Super Meticulous views of providence is that nothing 
happens that is not intended or permitted by God. Each event that hap-
pens has a purpose and plays a specific role in God’s ultimate plan for 
creation. This plan is wise and loving in execution and realization. On 
Super Meticulous views, God has complete and detailed knowledge of the 
actual past, present, and future. This includes foreknowledge of what crea-
tures will freely do.3 This is the most exacting form of ‘risk-free’  providence, 
for quite literally nothing is outside of God’s control; God’s plan will be 
3 Proponents of Super Meticulous Providence will be determinists and hence endorse a 
compatibilist view of free will. They may also attribute to God knowledge of the conditionals 
regarding what creatures would freely do in various circumstances. However, they will deny, 
as the Molinist holds, that such truths are true independent of God’s will (Flint 1998, 86).
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realized exactly as God intends, with no chance of failure or alteration. 
Super Meticulous views of providence are found in Calvin and Edwards in 
Christianity, among the Ash’ari theologians in Islam, and among Hasidic 
thinkers like Mordechai Yosef Leiner in Judaism. Although controversial, 
we include here Aquinas’ view on which God works through secondary 
(created) causes, concurring or cooperating with them to bring about 
each new event and state of the world in time.
3.3.2  Meticulous Providence
Like Super Meticulous views, Meticulous Providence depicts God’s rela-
tion to creation as ‘risk-free.’ While nothing is outside of God’s knowl-
edge, God allows some level of genuine agency, autonomy, or indeterminism 
in his creation. In Islam, versions of Meticulous Providence are defended 
by Mu’tazili theologians and some philosophers such as Farabi (tenth cen-
tury). In Judaism, Maimonides appears to be an advocate of Meticulous 
Providence (1904, 161, 285–287). In Christianity, Molinism is a prime 
example of Meticulous Providence. According to Molinists, God ordains 
all events to happen. For some events, God is the ultimate sufficient cause, 
while for others, God casually brings about circumstances under which 
events will take place (even if not with necessity) (Rhoda 2010, 283). 
What is crucial for Molinists is that God has ‘middle knowledge’ of con-
tingently true conditionals concerning which events will non- 
deterministically occur in a given set of circumstances. Call these 
‘counterfactuals of indeterminism’ (cf. Flint 1998, 40). Among these are 
‘counterfactuals of creaturely freedom’ (Flint 1998, 46), which are con-
tingently true conditionals concerning what creatures will freely do when 
put in certain circumstances. Meticulous Providence allows for indetermi-
nate events in creation but insists that God knows (and promotes and 
permits) the outcomes of such events. If God has middle knowledge, then 
prior to creating he can decide which world to create among the feasible 
alternatives4 and know with certainty how things will turn out in each 
alternative. Defenders of Meticulous Providence hold that God’s plan is 
4 According to Flint (1998, 51ff.) feasible worlds are those that God can actualize, where 
that is determined by the complete set of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom God knows 
to be true. If God knows the counterfactual (C → A) is true, then he cannot actualize a 
world—such a world would be ‘infeasible’—in which circumstance C obtains, yet action A is 
not performed.
 A. M. GRIFFITH AND A. NARAGHI
37
loving and that nothing can happen that will jeopardize God realizing his 
plan (though they may disagree amongst themselves about how specific 
God’s plan is).
3.3.3  General Providence
Adherents of General Providence deny that God determines (directly or 
indirectly) all events to happen. They also deny that God has knowledge 
of certain things, precisely because there is no knowledge of such things to 
be had. For example, according to Open Theism, God has exhaustive and 
complete knowledge of the past and present but not of the actual future, 
since there is no actual future according to most Open Theists.5 There are 
some events, for example, the freely chosen actions of human beings, of 
which God has neither foreknowledge nor middle knowledge. God may 
know with certainty that some events will occur, such as those that are 
necessitated by the present and the laws of nature. But Open Theists hold 
that many future events are indeterminate and may hold that God only 
knows that future events have a certain probability (less than 1 and greater 
than 0) of occurring. On this view, God’s governance involves his reaction 
or response to his creatures’ actions that, in some cases, he does not fore-
know or have middle knowledge of. Hence, God’s plan is general insofar 
as the details of the plan are not specified in advance but filled out as God 
interacts and responds to his dynamic creation. The success of God’s plan 
is dependent upon the actions and choices of created things, some of 
which God does not intend or foresee. While God is infinitely resourceful 
and knowledgeable about the past and present, he only knows the proba-
bility that things will turn out as he intends.
These positions represent the main approaches to characterizing God’s 
providence. However, a variety of other theological considerations are at 
play in specifying the nature of God’s providence. First, there are impor-
tant questions about the specificity of God’s providence. Does God act in 
creation only generally, for example, by governing through the laws of 
nature, or by specific divine actions at particular places and times? Is God’s 
5 See Hasker (1989), Pinnock, et al. (2010), Sanders (1998), and Rhoda (2007). It’s not 
clear whether there are any proponents of open theism among historical Muslim or Jewish 
theologians. Abd al-Jabbar (eleventh century) and Gaylan ed-Dimaski (eighth century) may 
hold views closest to open theism in Islam. In Judaism, Ibn Ezra (twelfth century) and Levi 
ben Gerson (fourteenth century) may be proponents.
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providence primarily aimed at maintaining the order of creation as a whole 
or also aimed at promoting the flourishing of individual creatures? Second, 
there are questions about God’s causal interaction with the created world. 
Does God’s intervention in creation involve suspending or breaking the 
laws of nature? What is the nature of these laws? Are they mere regularities 
or are they necessary connections between universals or are they probabi-
listic? Third, there are questions about God’s relation to time. One view is 
that God is in time and his eternality consists in his existing at every time 
from the past through the future with no beginning or end. A rival view is 
that God exists timelessly, that is, God transcends time, existing not at any 
temporal location but in a timeless state (cf. Craig 2009, 145). Advocates 
of (Super) Meticulous Providence adopt different positions on this ques-
tion. Answering the question about God’s relation to time helps answer 
the question about how God knows the future, for example, by prediction, 
by direct acquaintance, by perception, or by timeless apprehension. Open 
Theists deny that God exists timelessly and typically adopt ‘tensed’ views 
of time, such as those on which the future is non-existent or at least inde-
terminate, for example, presentism or growing block theory.
We take no stand on which view of providence is correct or which views 
are ‘orthodox.’ These seem to be the main views of providence on offer 
and we only intend to consider their compatibility or incompatibility with 
ontological randomness.
3.4  the Problems
The basic structure of the problem that randomness is supposed to pose 
for God’s providence can be stated as follows:
 (1) There are instances of ontological randomness.
 (2) If God is provident, then there are no instances of ontological 
randomness.
 (3) Therefore, God is not provident.
If one thinks that God could not but be provident (given his choice to 
create), securing (3) would allow the defender of such an argument to 
draw the stronger atheological conclusion,
 (4) Therefore, God does not exist.
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We will concern ourselves with arguments seeking to establish (3) but 
leave it open that such arguments could be further developed to deduce 
(4) from (3).
Like the problem of evil, randomness might be used to generate an 
evidential, rather than a logical, problem for God’s providence. Such 
problems might take the form of an inductive argument, a probabilistic 
argument, or an inference to the best explanation argument that have the 
conclusion that it is unlikely that God is provident. We formulate the 
problems below in terms of logical incompatibility for the sake of simplic-
ity but recognize that suitable evidential versions of the problems can be 
developed.
We also assume, for the sake of argument, that there are in fact instances 
of ontological randomness such as those discussed in Sect. 3.2. So we 
assume that (1) is true or likely to be true. The arguments we consider 
below constitute ways of defending premise (2), pitting specific forms of 
randomness against specific aspects of God’s providence, especially his 
power, knowledge, and perfect goodness. In discussing these arguments, 
we evaluate how effective they are against the different conceptions of 
God’s providence presented in Sect. 3.3.
3.4.1  Power
God’s providence involves his power insofar as God exercises control or 
governance over the unfolding of creation. The first argument contends 
that randomness is incompatible with God’s control of how the created 
world unfolds:
Argument from Control: Suppose that there are ontologically random 
events, in the sense of randomnessI. If there are such events, then noth-
ing and no one, including God, has control over whether such events 
occur. Such events are not determined to be the case and so not predict-
able; they just happen. If there is pervasive randomness in the world, 
then God lacks control over much of the world’s unfolding. If God 
lacks control over how much of the world unfolds in this sense, then 
there is no way for God to guarantee that his plan for the world comes 
to fruition. But such a guarantee is required for God to be provident. 
Therefore, the existence of pervasive randomnessI entails that God is 
not provident.
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The Argument from Control assumes, in the first place, a strong form of 
randomness, namely, metaphysical randomnessI, which entails that ran-
dom events are entirely indeterministic. The argument does not show, 
however, that God’s providence is incompatible with a weaker form of 
randomness, for example, physical randomnessI, which defines a random 
event as one that is indeterministic with respect to any physical factors. 
Such randomness is compatible with being determined to occur by some 
transcendent cause like God’s direct activity. Some (see Byl 2003 and 
Jaeger 2015) have noted that there can be no empirical confirmation that 
an event is randomI in the stronger sense because no amount of empirical 
inquiry could reveal that an event is entirely indeterministic.
Does the argument, therefore, show that metaphysical randomnessI is 
incompatible with God’s providence? It would if God’s providence is 
taken to entail that the world is deterministic. Some versions of Super 
Meticulous Providence, for example, Theological Determinism, have this 
feature. But Meticulous and General views of Providence both counte-
nance indeterminism. The Molinist, for example, can allow that there are 
events that are the result of entirely indeterministic processes but insist 
that God knows prior to creation which events will indeterministically 
occur in a given set of circumstances. Open Theists already deny that God 
has exhaustive knowledge of the actual future on account of the indeter-
minacy of free human action. Presumably, they would also allow for non- 
human indeterminacy. The indeterminacy of metaphysical randomnessI 
appears to pose no special problem for Open Theists.
The central move in the argument is to connect randomness with lack 
of control. RandomI events may be uncontrollable in the sense that they 
‘just happen,’ that is, by not being determined to happen. But as we noted 
in Sect. 3.2 above, it is important to distinguish the genus, indeterministic 
randomness, from the species, arbitrary randomnessI, for it is only the lat-
ter that ‘just happen’ in the sense that the probability of the event is com-
pletely unconnected to antecedent states of the world. RandomI events 
that are not arbitrary may still be governed by statistical laws and have 
their probability determined by what precedes them (as well as the natures 
of the entities involved in these events). Consequently, God may know the 
likelihood of randomI events that are not arbitrarily randomI.
The notion of ‘control’ operative in the Argument from Control is 
unspecified. Certainly, God would have control over a world of random 
events in the sense that he could remove his sustaining activity and let the 
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world go out of existence.6 Power to employ such a ‘nuclear option’ is, 
however, not what defenders of God’s providence have in mind when they 
attribute to God control over creation. The argument assumes that God 
is, as it were, at the mercy of the outcomes of random processes, unable to 
intervene. But on many views of providence God controls creation not 
simply through the general laws and the initial state of the world, but also 
through direct action at specific times and places.7 Hence, even if a ran-
domI event ‘just happens,’ God need not sit idly by if such an event is not 
part of his plan. If God foresees a randomI event will occur (or knows it 
has a high probability of occurring) he may preemptively intervene to 
diminish or neutralize its causal effects. The point is that the above argu-
ment assumes that God’s control over the world is exhausted by the laws 
and mechanisms he put in place at the initial creation.8
Next, the argument relies on ‘pervasive’ randomnessI to generate a 
problem for God’s control. It is difficult to assess how much randomnessI 
would be required to wrest providential control from God. In the first 
place, we would need to know what sorts of events are taken to be ran-
domI: ordinary physical events involving inanimate objects or human 
choices that may determine one’s eternal destiny? God may tolerate large 
amounts of randomnessI in matters that make no difference to his ultimate 
plan, for example, the shape of a stone smoothed by flowing water over 
millennia, but not in events central to his plan, for example, the course of 
human history. Even if randomnessI is pervasive with regard to events 
central to his plan, the worry only has bite if God is unable to mitigate or 
compensate for randomnessI that results in effects counter to his plan.
Second, for ‘pervasive’ randomnessI to generate a problem for God’s 
providence we would need to know at what level of reality randomnessI 
pervades, for example, the quantum, chemical, biological, psychological, 
or social levels. Then we would need to know whether and how random-
nessI at one level influences events at another level. Even if the quantum 
6 See Davison (1999) for a taxonomy of different forms of control relevant to providence.
7 The literature on ‘special divine action,’ that is, whether God intervenes in creation at 
specific times and places, is vast and can’t be adequately addressed here. Pollard (1958), 
Russell (2008), Bartholomew (2008), Murphy (2009), and Polkinghorne (2005) hold that 
indeterminacy at various levels of reality provides God an entry point for providential action 
in the world. See Saunders (2002), Koperski (2015), and Jaeger (2015) for critical discussion.
8 This is not to say that there are no challenges for thinking that God’s intervention in the 
world is pervasive and constant. See van Inwagen (2006, 120) and Swinburne (2004, chap-
ter 8) for discussion.
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level displays pervasive metaphysical randomnessI, higher levels of reality 
may not display the same randomnessI. Some physicists contend that 
macro systems do not display the kind of uncertainty and indeterminism 
observed at the quantum level because quantum effects are ‘washed out’ 
as systems interact with each other. To make the argument compelling, its 
defender needs to identify a form of randomnessI that pervades certain 
created phenomena whose activity plays a crucial role in God’s plans.
The most familiar argument of this kind concerns randomness in the 
evolution of life on earth:
Argument from Biological Evolution: Evolutionary theory is our best sci-
ence regarding the development of life on earth. According to evolu-
tionary theory, species evolve by a process of natural selection involving 
mutations that are random in the sense that they do not occur for the 
sake of the fitness of individuals or species. The very mechanism that 
drives the development of life on earth operates ‘blindly’ or ‘uncon-
cerned’ with the existence and well-being of human beings (and of 
every other species for that matter). Consequently, if God only relies on 
the mechanisms underlying evolution to populate the earth, God can-
not control what species are produced. Hence, when God created the 
earth, there is no way for God to guarantee (though God could have 
knowledge of the probability) that human beings—much less particular 
individual persons—would emerge from the evolutionary process. 
Therefore, our best scientific accounts of the development of life on 
earth, if true, entail that God was simply fortunate to have created a 
world in which human beings emerged. Being fortunate in this sense is 
incompatible with providential control.
Suppose evolution involves metaphysical randomnessI, for example, it 
involves some mutations that are the result of entirely indeterministic pro-
cesses at the quantum level that “reverberate ‘upwards’ into biological 
structures” (Wessling and Rasmussen 2017, 985). If that is the case, then 
Super Meticulous Providence faces a problem insofar as it is generally 
incompatible with metaphysical randomnessI. Meticulous and General 
views of Providence do not face this problem, as we’ve seen. However, 
General Providential views like Open Theism do face the problem that if 
natural selection involves mutations that are metaphysically randomI then 
God will not have full knowledge of how the evolutionary process will 
unfold and hence diminished ability to direct the evolutionary process. He 
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may know how things could go or how likely they are to go a certain way, 
but he may not know with certainty that humans (or anything much like 
us) would be produced by evolution.9
The Argument from Biological Evolution assumes that it was part of 
God’s plan to create human beings in particular, rather than creatures like 
us in certain respects, for example, finite, conscious, rational, free, and 
embodied creatures. Super Meticulous Providence would seem to share 
this assumption insofar as it depicts God as intending and determining 
every event to occur for a reason. The question is whether God would or 
could issue a general decree like this: ‘let there be finite, conscious, ratio-
nal, free, embodied beings who can be in a relationship with me.’10 Such a 
decree would be general in that it doesn’t specify the exact nature of the 
creatures that satisfy this description. There is reason to think, however, 
that Super Meticulous views of Providence cannot have God issue general 
decrees like this. Suppose God issues a decree such as “let there be X crea-
tures, or Y creatures, or, Zs, or … so long as they are finite, conscious, free, 
and embodied, etc.” Such a decree would be realized so long as Xs, Ys, or 
Zs, and so on were produced. But if God did not also determine which 
particular kind of creatures are produced, then there would be events that 
undetermined by God, namely, those leading to the production of those 
creatures. That is incompatible with the commitment to God’s complete 
deterministic control over creation of Super Meticulous Providence.
Meticulous Providential views depict God as choosing among a range 
of feasible worlds to actualize. Prior to creation, God could actualize a 
number of worlds, some in which human beings exist, others in which dif-
ferent creatures, like us in certain important respects, exist. But after the 
choice to actualize a certain world is made, there is no possibility or poten-
tial that the evolutionary process would produce anything other than what 
that world specifies it contains. Hence, for the Molinist, God could not 
give the general decree for a particular world given that each world is 
completely specified and individuated prior to actualization (in part 
because of its unique profile of true counterfactuals of indeterminism). 
Nevertheless, the Molinist rejects the claim that God is ‘fortunate’ to have 
created a world with human beings. However, he is ‘fortunate’ to have a 
feasible world like this one to actualize on account of the independence of 
the truth of the counterfactuals of indeterminism from his will.
9 See Clark (2014) for discussion of this issue.
10 van Inwagen (1988, 48ff.) contains a similar discussion of God’s general decrees.
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General Providential views seem to have the best chance of pursuing 
the response being considered. God can issue the general, open ended 
decree ‘let there be Xs, Ys, or Zs …’ because there are no facts of the mat-
ter about what creatures will be produced in an indeterministic world at 
the initial creation. Depending on how indeterministic events unfold—
which God does not know ahead of time—this very world will produce Xs, 
Ys, or Zs, and so on. Hence, Open Theists can adequately resist the charge 
that God’s plan for this world had to involve the creation of human beings 
rather than some other creatures.
3.4.2  Knowledge
The following argument seeks to show that there is an incompatibility 
between randomness and God’s omniscience, which is traditionally taken 
to be entailed by his providence:
Argument from Unpredictability: Suppose that there are metaphysically 
randomI events. If such events occur, then no one, including God, can 
know prior to their occurrence that they will occur. Therefore, no one, 
including God, can know prior to their occurrence that metaphysically 
randomI events will occur. Therefore, God does not have complete 
foreknowledge in a world in which metaphysically randomI events 
occur. Therefore, God is not omniscient.
The Argument from Unpredictability assumes that God’s foreknowl-
edge is a matter of predicting future events. But few views of providence 
depict God’s foreknowledge as a matter of prediction, where prediction 
of event E is a matter of knowing that E will occur on the basis of com-
plete knowledge of the world prior to E’s occurrence and the relevant laws. 
Simple foreknowledge views attribute to God knowledge of future 
events, not by prediction11 but by direct apprehension of or acquain-
tance with actual concrete events. Molinists, likewise, deny that God 
foreknows by prediction. God’s providential control over creation 
11 Aquinas (1912, I, 14, 7) says that God’s foreknowledge is not ‘discursive,’ that is, “God 
does not derive his knowledge by deducing conclusions from other things that he knows” 
(Wierenga 2018). See Hunt (2009) for defense of simple foreknowledge, the view that God 
has exhaustive knowledge of the actual future but not middle knowledge.
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consists in his free knowledge and his middle knowledge of what unde-
termined events will take place in certain circumstances. Moreover, if 
one adopts a timeless view of God, then one denies that God believes 
anything at a time (insofar as God lacks any temporal properties what-
soever). Rather, God has a complete atemporal grasp of all temporal 
events ‘at once’ or ‘simultaneously’ (Zagzebski 2017). God’s atemporal 
knowledge of an event is not dependent on there being a chain of events 
determining the event to occur; God could know that the event occurred 
even if the event were undetermined by prior events (and even if it were 
random in the strongest sense, metaphysically arbitrarily randomI). For 
God’s knowledge is not dependent on prediction or foreknowledge if 
God is timeless.
The argument also presupposes that an adequate account of God’s 
omniscience requires him to have complete knowledge of the actual 
future. But Open Theists deny that there is any knowledge of the actual 
future for God to have because they think there is no actual future (and 
thus no truth regarding the actual future) to be known. This, they hold, is 
consistent with God’s omniscience. Moreover, Open Theists think that it 
is a benefit of their account that there is no knowledge of the actual future 
for God to have. This makes room, they contend, for free human action 
and the autonomy of creation and consequently for genuine divine respon-
siveness and relationship. The point here is that the unpredictability of 
random events need not pose a challenge to God’s omniscience—on any 
view of providence—without the widely rejected assumption that God 
foreknows (if he foreknows at all) by prediction.
But there is another way in which randomness may be incompatible 
with God’s omniscience, understood as including exhaustive foreknowl-
edge of the actual future. God’s foreknowledge is thought to be infallible. 
That is, if God believes something of the future, then he could not be 
wrong about it. A plausible view about the past is that it is fixed such that 
whatever is past is necessary as of the present—’now-necessary’ or ‘acci-
dental necessity.’12 With these assumptions we can formulate an argument 
for thinking that God’s foreknowledge is incompatible with metaphysical 
randomnessI.
12 Ockham introduced the terminology of ‘accidental necessity.’ This is the sort of necessity 
that the past is supposed to have because it is closed or fixed. See Adams (1987) for helpful 
interpretation of Ockham on this issue.
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Argument from the Fixity of the Past: Suppose e is a metaphysical randomI 
event. Hence, e is the result of an entirely indeterministic process and e is 
one outcome among a set of possible outcomes whose occurrence has an 
objective probability of less than 1 and greater than 0. Let ‘E’ be the 
proposition ‘that e will occur.’ Assume that yesterday God infallibly 
believed E. By the necessity of the past, it is now-necessary that God infal-
libly believed E. Suppose that necessarily, if p is now-necessary and p 
entails q, then q is now-necessary. Necessarily, if yesterday God believed E, 
then E. Hence, it is now-necessary that E. If it is now-necessary that E, 
then e will occur with probability of 1. Therefore, e will occur with prob-
ability of 1. If e will occur with probability of 1, then e is not metaphysi-
cally randomI. This contradicts our original supposition. Therefore, if e is 
metaphysically randomI, then God cannot foreknow that e will occur.
Readers familiar with the freedom and foreknowledge debate will rec-
ognize this argument as a version of the argument for theological fatal-
ism.13 Some of the responses available to compatibilists about freedom and 
foreknowledge are available to compatibilists about foreknowledge and 
randomness. For instance, one could deny that there are any future con-
tingent truths like E. That is the route Open Theists take. Consequently, 
they have a straightforward (but not uncontroversial) way to respond to 
the argument. Super Meticulous views of providence are in a more diffi-
cult position insofar as they deny that there are any non-determined 
events. That is, the mere supposition that there are events that have an 
objective probability of less than 1 and greater than 0 is incompatible with 
Theological Determinism.
Those who deny Molinism but affirm God’s foreknowledge have at 
their disposal the Ockhamist response to draw a distinction between ‘hard’ 
facts about the past (those solely about the past) and ‘soft’ facts about the 
past (those that are partly about the future) (see Plantinga 1986). One 
response to the freedom and foreknowledge question is to reject the prin-
ciple that to be free one must have alternative possibilities available to 
them. The above argument does not rely on this principle since it does not 
target free will. Instead, the analogous move in the argument concerns the 
objective probability of the metaphysically randomI event, namely, that the 
event be one among a number of possible outcomes whose probability is 
13 In fact, this argument directly parallels the argument for theological fatalism formulated 
by Zagzebski (2017).
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less than 1 and greater than 0. It appears that there’s no plausible way to 
get out of the argument by denying that metaphysically randomI events 
need to have an objective probability of less than 1 and greater than 0. 
That would simply be to reject the notion of randomness being consid-
ered, to change the subject to another notion of randomness.
There is a similar argument that targets Molinism directly:
Argument from Middle Knowledge: Suppose e is a metaphysical randomI 
event. Hence, e is the result of an entirely indeterministic process and e 
is one outcome among a set of possible outcomes whose occurrence has 
an objective probability of less than 1 and greater than 0. Suppose God 
has middle knowledge of the following counterfactual of indeterminism 
E*: ‘if circumstances C were to obtain, then e would non- deterministically 
occur.’ Suppose God actualizes a world w that contains E*. If God actu-
alizes w, the objective probability of e is 1. Therefore, the objective 
probability of e is 1. This contradicts our original supposition. Therefore, 
if e is metaphysically randomI, then God cannot middle know E*.14
The crux of this argument is that when God actualizes a world in which 
a certain counterfactual is true, the objective probability of the indetermi-
nate event is 1 in that world. This just seems to be a consequence of the 
Molinist’s commitment to a risk free-view of providence. God knows how 
things will turn out once he makes certain circumstances obtain, despite 
the fact that the counterfactuals constituting his middle knowledge are 
contingent. Therefore, his choice to actualize a certain world makes the 
objective probability of an event named in the consequent of a counterfac-
tual of indeterminism be 1, which means that God’s middle knowledge of 
random events undermines the possibility of those events being metaphys-
ically randomI (though not necessarily that they are physically randomI).
3.4.3  Goodness
A final class of arguments concern the connection between randomness 
and God’s goodness or wisdom. One argument focuses on evolutionary 
randomness to generate a problem for God’s good and wise governance 
of creation.
14 Cf. Koons (this volume) for a similar challenge to the Molinist way of handling 
randomness.
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Argument from Evolutionary Evil: Evolutionary theory is our best science 
regarding the development of life on earth. According to evolutionary 
theory, species evolve by a process of natural selection involving muta-
tions that are relatively randomP; they do not occur for the sake of the 
fitness of individuals or species. The process of natural selection results 
in massive amounts of suffering and death over long periods of time. 
God is said to have providential control over creation insofar as God is 
said to lovingly guide creation toward a good end. The process of natu-
ral selection appears to conflict with God’s providential control over 
creation since such a God would not use such a wasteful and brutal 
method for populating and sustaining the creation when more direct 
and less wasteful/brutal means are at his disposal. If God exists and has 
providential control over creation, we would not expect to see the 
amounts and kinds of waste, suffering, and haphazardness we find in the 
evolutionary records. In particular, it seems that our best scientific the-
ory of the development of life on earth is in tension with (is evidence 
against) God’s good and wise guidance of creation.
Arguments like this challenge all conceptions of God’s providence since 
they target God’s means for realizing his goals. Super Meticulous views of 
providence face the greatest challenge since they hold that God intends 
and determines every event to occur. Given the high degree of control 
God has over creation, we would not expect him to use these means to 
achieve his goals. Common responses to this argument appeal to the value 
of an autonomous creation (Wessling and Rasmussen 2017). But on Super 
Meticulous views of providence like Theological Determinism, creation 
has no autonomy. Such responses are not available to Super Meticulous 
Providence of this sort.
Defenders of Meticulous Providence can grant that creation has a cer-
tain amount of autonomy insofar as they hold that God does not control 
the truth-values of conditionals concerning what indeterministic events 
will occur in what circumstances. But despite that autonomy, Molinists 
still hold that God chose to actualize this world with its unique profile of 
true counterfactuals of indeterminism. So there remains the question why 
a good and wise governor would actualize a world with wastefulness and 
brutality of the evolutionary record we in fact find. General Providence 
attributes to God at least control over the unfolding of creation of the 
various views of providence. Such views seem to be able to fully account 
for the autonomy of creation. But the concern the above argument 
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presents for General Providence is that a good and wise creator would cre-
ate a world that he had so little control over, that is, a world he knew had 
the possibility of unfolding in the (putatively) problematic way we observe.
On all conceptions of providence, God is thought to lovingly and wisely 
guide creation to its intended goal. However, if random events are 
purposeless,15 then we might question whether randomness is compatible 
with God’s loving and purposeful plan:
Argument from Purposelessness: If there are ontologically random events 
(in the sense of either randomnessI or randomnessP), then there are 
events that are not part of any plan or purpose. Suppose that there are 
such events. If God is provident, then every event occurs for a purpose 
and is integrated into his loving plan for creation. So, the presence of 
ontological randomness entails that some events are not part of a pur-
pose or plan, whereas God’s providence entails that all events are part of 
a purpose or plan. Therefore, the presence of ontological randomness is 
incompatible with God’s providence.
Traditionally, Super Meticulous views of providence are committed to 
every event being part of God’s plan (cf. Byl 2003, 106). Is this a necessary 
commitment of an account of God’s providence? Suppose we agree that it 
is. Then it appears that Super Meticulous Providence is incompatible with 
randomnessI and randomnessP. If God determines every event to happen 
and God is rational (always acting on the basis of consistent reasons), then 
it follows that no event is the result of an indeterministic process and that 
every event occurs for a purpose. Hence, Super Meticulous Providence is 
incompatible with randomnessI and randomnessP.16 However, defenders of 
Super Meticulous Providence might push back and question the idea that 
because God is rational, every event he determines is determined to occur 
for a reason or purpose. Suppose God sets up the initial state of the world 
such that a unique future unfolds. It could be that as that future unfolds 
there occurs an event E that God has no purpose for: E is merely a causal 
15 Here we are only considering the purposefulness of events in terms of what purpose they 
occur for. We are not concerned here with God’s ability to, as it were, ‘repurpose’ events for 
his aims. See van Inwagen (1988, 53) for a similar discussion. He draws a distinction between 
God’s “eternal” plan and his “reactive” plan.
16 Divine determination is consistent with randomnessP where there is no purpose from a 
scientific or physical perspective. That is, God may have a purpose for an event that is randomP 
with regard to goals detectable to scientific investigation.
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byproduct of a series of events that help fulfill God’s plan, but the occur-
rence or non-occurrence of E contributes nothing to realizing that plan. 
God would have been equally satisfied had E not occurred at all.
Similar considerations may be thought to apply to Meticulous Providence. 
According to Molinists, God knows what will unfold in a world prior to 
actualizing that world on the basis of his free and middle knowledge. The 
thought is that God would not actualize a world with certain events capri-
ciously, but rather only for a purpose. Hence, even if not all events are deter-
mined to occur, God’s rationality and purposefulness in actualizing a world 
entails that there are no purposeless events. However, the Molinist will 
point out that God may have a purpose in actualizing a particular world 
(because, say, of certain goods it contains) without having a purpose for 
each particular event in that world. God, suppose, chose to actualize this 
world for a reason, but this world contains an event that God could take or 
leave (or even that he’d prefer was not included). Hence, Molinism does 
not obviously rule out purposeless events.
Open theists, on the other hand, are not obviously challenged by the 
argument given above. Open theists deny that God determines or that he 
fore/middle knows all future events. Therefore, there may occur events 
that he did not intend or desire, events that play no role in realizing his 
plan and may even be detrimental to his plan. The possibility of randomP 
events seems built into the Open Theist’s view of providence.
3.5  conclusIon
There is far more to say about each of the above arguments. Our paper 
surveyed the conceptual landscape of the connection between randomness 
and God’s providence. To that extent it merely scratched the surface of 
the many and complex issues at play. What we have hoped to do is to iden-
tify the various factors and choice points that need to be decided upon in 
order to argue for the compatibility or incompatibility of ontological ran-
domness and God’s providence. Our discussion of the different forms of 
randomness and different conceptions of God’s providence show, we 
think, that there is no easy route to establishing that randomness is incom-
patible with God’s providence over the created world.17
17 Thanks to the participants in Models of Providence: An Abrahamic Inquiry for the many 
conversations about ideas in this paper. Special thanks to Jeff Koperski, Kelly J. Clark, Scott 
Davison, and Chris Tucker for comments on the paper.
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CHAPTER 4
Randomness in the Cosmos
Nidhal Guessoum
4.1  IntroductIon
Throughout their history, humans have been aware that the results of 
some actions, for example, throwing a dice or flipping a coin or drawing a 
stick out of a group with different symbols, are difficult if not impossible 
to predict. Many cultures have interpreted this as hidden divine knowl-
edge (believing that God obviously knew the outcome of any such action) 
or even divine intention and plan (God expressing His will through these 
“chance” practices); people thus often used those actions as a method of 
divination, an approach known as cleromancy, aiming to access God’s 
intentions.
Unpredictability was thus, for a long time, believed to be simply a 
reflection of our limited knowledge, in contrast with God’s unlimited 
knowledge. In that optic randomness in any real, fundamental sense does 
not exist. Chance is simply how unpredictable things appear to humans, 
while God knows their reality. Divine providence, hidden in God’s myste-
rious ways, could be revealed in the casting of lots.
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A brief, even spotty review of ancient scholars’ views of “chance” (and 
its relation to providence) will confirm this general stance. For example, 
according to Augustine (fourth–fifth centuries AD): “Nothing in our lives 
happens haphazardly. Everything that takes place against our will can only 
come from God’s will, his Providence, the order he has created, the per-
mission he gives, and the laws he has established” (Augustine 2011, 118, 
12–32). John Calvin (sixteenth century), like Augustine, claimed that 
divine providence precludes randomness in the world: “it must be observed 
that the providence of God, as it is taught in Scripture, is opposed to for-
tune and fortuitous accidents” (Calvin 1813, I:16, 233). Avicenna (tenth–
eleventh centuries) and Averroes (twelfth century) argued similarly 
(although Avicenna was a much stronger determinist than Averroes): since 
there is a primary cause to everything, everything (except human will and 
action) must have a prescribed cause, hence no fundamental randomness 
(Belo 2007). The poet-philosopher Omar Khayyam (eleventh–twelfth 
centuries) expressed a similarly deterministic view of the world in one of 
his quatrains: “And the first Morning of Creation wrote/What the Last 
Dawn of Reckoning shall read” (Britannica Academic 2021a).
However, the belief that free will conflicts with absolute determinism 
led other scholars, including Thomas Aquinas, to reject absolute deter-
minism in the world (e.g., Hoffman and Michon 2017, 1–36). Aquinas 
also considered the relationship of chance to the existence of divine provi-
dence and concluded that the latter does not preclude contingency and 
does not negate the occurrence of fortune and chance (Strumia 2002).
The rise of modern science seemed to side with determinism. In the 
early seventeenth century, Johannes Kepler showed that the orbits and 
motions of planets could be described using simple laws, making it possi-
ble to predict the positions and speeds of all planets at all times, even 
centuries or millennia ahead. Half a century later, Isaac Newton showed 
that those laws followed from his universal law of gravity and laws of 
motion, more deeply grounding the predictability of the motions of all 
objects here on Earth or in the heavens. A century and a half later, Pierre- 
Simon de Laplace (1840) took these developments to their logical, final, 
and stunning conclusion, arguing that if one had enough brain or com-
puting power, one could determine the position and speed of every object 
in the universe at all times, past, present, and future.1 Also, famously, 
1 “We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state 
and as the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in 
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Laplace argued, contra Newton, that God was not needed for the clock- 
universe to work precisely for all infinity—except perhaps to set it off at 
t = 0 (the time of creation).
By the nineteenth century, however, physical phenomena began to 
reveal a serious difficulty: gases are made of zillions of molecules (though 
at that time no one knew what those were exactly), which are moving at 
various speeds, constantly colliding and changing directions and speeds, in 
unpredictable ways. So, it seemed, the Laplacean claim—we can know the 
positions and speeds of all objects in the universe at all times—was, at least 
in practice, not true. While we may be able to know that about planets, 
molecules in gases were much more difficult. Indeed, tiny differences in 
initial positions, speeds, or directions of molecules would change the dis-
tribution drastically after a long enough time. While “chaos” (phenomena 
so sensitive to initial conditions as to be unpredictable after a long enough 
time) had not yet made its big entry into science, its seeds were already 
in place.
By the early twentieth century, various phenomena, experiments, and 
theoretical developments led to the formulation of quantum mechanics, 
with Heisenberg’s foundational ‘Uncertainty Principle’ and fundamental 
randomness (at least in the standard, Copenhagen interpretation). Indeed, 
Mark P. Silverman refers to quantum randomness as “the mother of all 
randomness” (Silverman 2014, 112). However, a minority of physicists 
have insisted that behind quantum randomness is a deterministic reality, 
with Albert Einstein leading that camp.
By the late twentieth century, randomness became an important fixture 
in physics and other scientific fields, and even in technology (for example, 
cryptography). Moreover, Laplace’s claim of total determinism was shown 
to be wrong even for planets in the solar system, as we shall see.
Randomness is not merely a subject of academic, philosophical, and 
scientific study, it also relates to humans’ lives. Indeed, randomness may 
impact our survival, at the individual, group, or species levels. Humans 
need some ability to predict things, for example, when it will rain (for 
farming schedules and such), and if nature exhibits too much randomness, 
nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary positions of all things in the universe, 
would be able to comprehend in one single formula the motions of the largest bodies as well 
as the lightest atoms in the world, provided that its intellect were sufficiently powerful to 
subject all data to analysis; to it nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the past 
would be present to its eyes. The perfection that the human mind has been able to give to 
astronomy affords but a feeble outline of such an intelligence.”
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then life becomes unmanageable. In fact, rainfall does carry some element 
of randomness, in terms of timing and amount; however, it turns out that 
we can extract patterns in the data, which allows us to predict rainfall by 
month and by region (Eagle 2005, 752).
At the species level, the importance of randomness to humanity can be 
exemplified by the asteroid that struck Earth some 66 million years ago 
and resulted in the disappearance of the dinosaurs, paving the way for the 
emergence of primates and humans. Was that a random event? Was it pre-
dictable as per Laplace? Could it have been a smaller asteroid, thus not 
exterminating all the dinosaurs, or fallen some place in a large desert and 
not have had the transformational effect for mammals, primates, and 
humans? I will review this particular case in the section I devote to the 
bombardment of Earth by meteoroids.
Yet science retained its remarkable ability to predict outcomes of pro-
cesses and phenomena (at least probabilistically) even in situations where 
randomness seemed to play a fundamental role. Behind the randomness, 
as I will try to show, and this will be my main thesis, there seems to be 
some order after all, which is reflected in most, if not all, areas of the cos-
mos: the tiny quantum fluctuations in the very early universe (which led to 
clumping of matter and the formation of stars and galaxies), the formation 
of planets, asteroids hitting Earth, solar activity (big flares and eruptions), 
supernova explosions and gamma-ray bursts, all impacting life and animals 
on Earth.
4.2  What Is randomness?
In the introduction, I mentioned ‘randomness’, ‘chance’, ‘haphazardness’ 
(in the quotes from Augustine and Laplace), ‘chaos’, ‘probability, ‘deter-
minism’, and so on, without defining them. I basically take “random” to 
mean “unpredictable” and “chaos” to refer to processes or systems which 
are so sensitive to initial conditions that they sooner or later become 
unpredictable, even though those phenomena had no intrinsic random-
ness. There are many examples of such chaotic phenomena, from the 
weather to the orbits of planets in our solar system.
At the end of the introduction, I alluded to some order underlying the 
randomness of a given system, giving us the possibility of making at least 
probabilistic predictions.
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We need more precise definitions, however. We can adopt the basic 
definitions given by the Encyclopedia of Mathematics (2021) or the 
Britannica Academic (2021b):
• ‘Randomness’ per se is not defined in either the  Encyclopedia of 
Mathematics (EM) or the Brittanica Academic (BA)  (delete EB); how-
ever, they define ‘random events’ (“Any combination of outcomes of an 
experiment that has a definite probability [but not certainty] of occur-
rence”—EM, n.d.) and ‘random variable’ (“a numerical description of 
the outcome of a statistical experiment”—(BA), n.d.). Since random 
numbers, variables, or events are not equally probable, a probability 
distribution “describes how the probabilities are distributed over the 
values of the random variable” (BA). We can thus surmise that random-
ness is the absence of exact and specific predictability of the outcome of 
a given measurement, or (equivalently) the existence of random vari-
ables in the process, which are described by a probability distribution.
• ‘Chance’ and ‘probability’ (also, commonly, ‘odds’, ‘likelihood’, or 
‘expectation’) can be defined as: the extent to which something is 
likely to happen, with “extent to which” being quantifiable (a “fre-
quentist” definition of ‘probability’ is the ratio of the number of 
times a given outcome occurs to the total number of trials).
• A ‘stochastic process’ is one which involves random variables or 
events. For example, the process of radioactive decay of unstable 
nuclei can be said to be stochastic and is described probabilistically. 
“More generally, a stochastic process refers to a family of random 
variables indexed against some other variable or set of variables” 
(BA, n.d.). Oftentimes, the variation (or “indexing”) of random ele-
ments with time is what defines the stochastic process.
• Phenomena or processes are said to be ‘deterministic’ when the 
outcome or next state of the system can—in principle—be calculated 
or described completely if one knows the current state fully. This is 
what Laplace expressed, as he assumed that all physical processes fol-
low well-defined and fixed laws and thus allow one to predict all 
future events (of any system, even the entire universe) from current 
states. Indeterminism, on the other hand, holds that at least some 
events in the world do not follow deterministic laws but, instead, 
involve some element of randomness or unpredictability.
• ‘Chaos’ combines determinism on short scales and unpredictability 
over extended periods of time, due to some sensitivity of the system to 
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its initial conditions; the system is thus deterministic over the next 
short time-step, but unpredictable over long time intervals. How long 
a time before a system becomes chaotic depends on the physical param-
eters and interactions involved in each case. It is important to note that 
chaotic phenomena are not fundamentally random, but they are still, 
practically speaking, impossible to predict after long enough times.
• ‘Pseudo-random numbers’ are numbers which are generated by a 
numerical algorithm (usually) or a physical device (sometimes) in 
which sequences appear to be random, such that it will be extremely 
difficult to extract the rule, function, or operation that generated 
those numbers, even though there is such an algorithm. Pseudo- 
random numbers are very widely used in simulations (Monte Carlo 
or other) in various fields (meteorology, climatology, cryptography, 
economics, etc.).
Having given simple definitions of the terms being used in this topic, 
we can now focus on randomness and present its different types and 
characteristics.
Carmen Batanero offers four widely held conceptions of the term ‘ran-
domness’ (Batanero 2015, 34–49):
• Randomness as equi-probability: where people think (or assume) 
that the possible outcomes of an unpredictable process are equally 
probable. (This is a misconception, as the distribution of probabili-
ties of a random variable may not be constant and uniform.)
• Randomness as the opposite of causality, or as a special type of cause.
• Randomness as uncertainty in an outcome: the existence of multi-
ple possibilities under the same conditions.
• Randomness as a way to describe some phenomenon when informa-
tion about it is limited, making it “unpredictable” (to us).
Batanero (2015, 38) also gives five scientific meanings/conceptions of 
randomness, along with the problems that they address and the proce-
dures used in such cases. They can be summarized as follows:
• Intuitive: what we think of as luck and fate, unknowable except per-
haps (in the past) with divination tools (dice, coins).
• Subjective: what we think of as “possibilities”, which start (in our 
minds) as all equally probable but get updated using methods such 
as Bayes’ theorem.
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• Classical: events being equally probable based on dearth of knowl-
edge about any underlying factors; this is used as a basis for fair bet-
ting in games of chance, probabilities computed using 
combinatorial analysis.
• Frequentist: related to the frequency of outcomes, probabilities esti-
mated and used as projections in the long run.
• Formal: experiments are performed, random sequences are observed 
and measured; mathematical properties are described, simulations 
are conducted using pseudo-random numbers or sequences.
In the rest of this paper, I will be dividing randomness into “fundamen-
tal” (found in quantum systems), that is, intrinsic and not due to our 
limited epistemic (knowledge) capabilities, and “chaotic”, which is due to 
the exponential growth of uncertainties and appears erratic only because 
we cannot follow the system with any precision in our calculations.
Let us now focus on what I am calling the “fundamental” (quantum) 
type of randomness.
As I have mentioned, there are several interpretations of quantum the-
ory, including some that assume determinism (“hidden variables theo-
ries”, most notably); however, standard interpretations consider 
phenomena at the smallest levels (elementary particles, atoms, molecules) 
as fundamentally random. The best example is the decay of an unstable 
nucleus, say Aluminum-30, which has a half-life of 3.6 seconds. A half-life 
is the time after which half of a sample (say 1 gram) of the given element 
will have decayed. But there is absolutely no way of knowing which nucleus 
will be among the half that will have decayed. If we zoom in and focus on 
one specific nucleus, we may wait a millisecond or a century before it 
decays, even though half the sample will have decayed in 3.6 seconds and 
then half of the remaining half will decay after another 3.6 seconds, and so 
on. The process is fundamentally random (i.e., not knowable even in the-
ory), even though there is a simple probabilistic rule (half will decay over 
each half-life) that allows us to make predictions and use the material and 
the law that regulates it.
More generally, according to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, it 
is impossible to predict precisely where an electron will be at any given 
moment. However, the Schrödinger Equation allows us to calculate the 
probability of finding an electron in any spot (of any size, small or large) at 
any moment. Moreover, the Schrödinger Equation allows us to draw 3-D 
distributions of a single electron’s probability distribution (or that of a 
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large ensemble, assuming they are under the same physical conditions), 
telling us where it (or they) will more likely be found in a measurement.
And these probability distributions in the quantum world will translate 
into non-uniform distributions in the densities of particles at small scales. 
This also applies to the universe when it was small enough for quantum 
physics to apply.
4.3  randomness In the early unIverse; 
Galaxy FormatIon
Quantum randomness played a key role in the affairs of our universe from 
the earliest times. When the universe was 10−36 seconds old, and under the 
effect of the inflaton field that suffused it, the universe underwent an 
“inflation”, that is a period of exponential growth in size, by a factor of 
about 1026, making the universe go from smaller than an atom to about 1 
millimeter in diameter. This inflation had a number of consequences, 
including (in what concerns us here) the amplification of tiny quantum- 
level fluctuations in the inflaton field to macroscopic scales.
The usual analogy is that of a balloon in which we blow air, with the 
surface of the balloon representing the spatial dimensions of the universe 
and the radial direction inside and outside the balloon, representing time, 
past and future. (The center of the balloon would be the origin of space 
and time, the “singularity” from which the universe came out.) If tiny let-
ters are written on the surface of the balloon, any exponential increase in 
the size would make the letters macroscopically large and separate. And if 
the writing on the surface of the balloon were done by quantum fluctua-
tions acting on ink that would have been uniformly distributed on the 
surface early on, then we would see how large-scale structures (the big 
letters in our analogy, the galaxies in the real universe) would have 
emerged, especially as gravity would soon start to act on clumps of matter 
whenever they become large enough for gravity to affect them.
Thus, large-scale cosmic structure (the distribution and sizes of galaxies) 
is due in some fundamental way to (i) the quantum fluctuations that hap-
pened in those early times, (ii) the inflation that magnified those fluctuations 
to macroscopic levels, (iii) the expansion that continued on afterward, and 
(iv) the gravitational attraction between large clumps of matter, which them-
selves resulted from those fluctuations in the density of microscopic particles.
The fluctuations (Fig. 4.1), also translated into slight variations in the 
radiation that was emitted when (about 380,000 years later) electrons and 
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protons started to bind as atoms (the universe having expanded to be cool 
enough to allow atoms to form and not break up immediately). That radi-
ation, “decoupled” from the atoms (no longer interacting with matter), 
filled the “small” universe, and with the continued expansion, had its 
wavelength stretched, to reach microwave scales today. This “cosmic 
microwave background” as it is known today, because it fills the cosmos 
almost uniformly in all directions, constitutes one of the main pieces of 
evidence for the Big Bang model.
But this “fossil” radiation should carry the imprint of the original fluc-
tuations in density and not be totally uniform. If we measure the radiation 
in various directions in the sky, we should see some tiny differences. 
Fig. 4.1 Growth of quantum fluctuations in the density of matter in the early 
universe. (Source: Nidhal Guessoum)
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Indeed, the mapping of this cosmic microwave background has been per-
formed with higher and higher precision and resolution over the last 
20  years, with the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP), 
which operated between 2001 and 2010, and with the Planck satellite, 
which was launched in 2009 and operated until 2013, both producing 
cosmic maps (Fig. 4.2, below).
Variations in the temperature of the cosmic radiation were found to be 
of the order of 10−4, in agreement with the theoretical calculations. What 
matters to us here is the fundamental role that quantum fluctuations, 
Fig. 4.2 Maps of the cosmic microwave background radiation produced by 
WMAP (top: https://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/media/121238/index.html) and Planck 
(bottom: https://wmap.gsfc.nasa.gov/media/121238/index.html)
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which are random in nature but follow well-known and well-understood 
laws, played in the formation of structures (galaxies, clusters) in the uni-
verse. No model or theory could ever predict what galaxy would have 
formed, where, and with what size or characteristics, but the appearance 
of such structures and the statistical distribution of their sizes were “writ-
ten” in the quantum laws from the start.
4.4  randomness and chaos In the FormatIon 
oF the solar system
Fast forward about 9 billion years, and in one region of what will later be 
called the Milky Way galaxy, a nebula (big cloud of gas and dust) is rotat-
ing very slowly around itself. (Everything moves, and almost everything 
rotates, in the cosmos, because of gravity’s pull on one side or another of 
a given object by nearby or passing objects.) But the nebula being large 
enough (originally a few light-years across and weighing a trillion solar 
masses), its internal mass pulls everything inward. The nebula thus con-
tracts, and density becomes much larger in the central regions. The smaller 
the nebula becomes, the faster it rotates (this is a manifestation of the ice- 
skater rotation effect, or more technically a result of the conservation of 
angular momentum). And the faster rotation makes the nebula flatten 
(this is the “pizza dough effect”, or more technically collisions having to 
conserve angular momentum), making the solar system flat (except for the 
farthest matter, which was too far to be drawn to the disk).
At this point, some creative chaos occurs. First, most of the matter will 
have fallen to the inner “small” region of the nebula (a few million kilo-
meters across), with densities and pressures reaching very high values, rais-
ing the central temperature to above 10 million degrees, which then allows 
for nuclear fusion reactions to occur—a star (the sun) is born! The sun 
then clears up its surrounding region by swallowing up what is very close 
by and blowing away the remaining nearby gas with its powerful radiation.
The dust in the inner region then undergoes countless collisions and 
mergers. “Planetesimals” start to form, and small rocky objects slowly 
emerge, with sizes between about one third and a few times that of Earth.
But the collisions between rocks being numerous, and their outcomes 
being very sensitive to the speeds and directions of the colliding objects, 
the formation of Earth, with a perfect size and at a perfect location around 
the Sun, that is, right in the middle of the “habitable” zone, seems rather 
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fortuitous. Indeed, a “perfect” planet for future complex life, must have 
the right size for a “good” atmosphere to form (thanks to its appropriate 
gravity), be rocky (with a solid surface for animals to later evolve and 
thrive), and be in a region where water, after it is brought over by comets 
and asteroids, will be liquid, allowing life to form sometime later; plants 
will then absorb the carbon dioxide (which would have been released into 
the atmosphere by volcanic and other geological activity) and release oxy-
gen, the latter being vital for the animals (and humans later) to prosper 
and evolve.
Thus, it is clear that Earth was not necessarily bound to appear, at least 
not in this particular solar system, considering all the randomness that is 
involved in the formation of planets. But if we recall that there are tens of 
billions of solar systems in our Milky Way galaxy alone, then a planet of 
roughly the size of Earth (a bit smaller or larger would still have worked) 
at the right location and with the right kind of star, would have appeared 
somewhere.
However, there is an important difference between an Earth-size, an 
Earth-like, and a life-bearing planet. Indeed, life-friendly planets are prob-
ably not so easy to find, as a number of criteria must be simultaneously 
fulfilled. And this is just at the formation stage. More trouble lies ahead.
Indeed, it is not enough to form a planetary system, one must ensure 
its stability, that is, that the planets will not crash into each other before life 
has had a chance to evolve, as well as the survival and prosperity of life, 
that is, not be wiped out by unpredictable, disastrous impacts or bursts of 
radiation.
4.5  stabIlIty oF the Planetary system
Once the planets formed and the system (the sun and everything else) 
settled, the main issue is whether it was stable. Do the planets keep their 
orbits over long periods of time; are the planets’ motions regular enough 
for their positions to be predictable after millions or billions of years; and 
can we trace back their positions (absolute and relative) into the far past to 
determine what happened at various points?
Before comets were understood as small objects, thus having negligible 
gravitational effects on other objects, their gravitational effect when pass-
ing by planets at various distances had to be considered. Newton realized 
that these pass-bys could lead to incremental changes in the speeds and/
or directions of motion of planets, and he concluded that God had to 
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intervene from time to time to restore the order, or else the planets would 
crash after some time. Leibniz, in contrast, rejected the idea of God having 
made an imperfect creation and needing regular interventions to save 
the world.
Laplace, as we noted earlier, believed in total determinism, though this 
did not contradict Newton’s realization that comets could disturb plane-
tary orbits. The point that remained unclear was whether small gravita-
tional effects (the comets would soon be known to be really tiny compared 
to planets) would end up disrupting the whole system. Chaos had not yet 
appeared in physics, this had to wait until 1963 when Edward Norton 
Lorenz published his seminal paper ‘Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow’ 
(1963, 130–141), the foundational work for chaos theory, and so the 
issue did not worry scientists too much (yet).
Well before chaos theory came on the scene, it was realized that there 
could be an issue with the stability and predictability (or lack thereof) of 
three-body problems. No general solution had been found for a gravita-
tionally interacting system of three objects (say the Sun, the Earth, and the 
Moon), and around 1888, King Oscar II of Sweden was enticed to offer a 
prize for the scientist who would solve the problem or at least make major 
advances on it (Scott 2007, 21–22; Charap 2018, 67). Jules Henri 
Poincaré (1854–1912), by then already an accomplished mathematician, 
submitted a 158-page essay for which he was awarded the prize in January 
1889. Just before publication, however, he realized he had made an 
important mistake. The revised version (submitted in January 1890) was 
270 pages long and concluded that not only were there no general solu-
tions to the problem for all initial conditions (Scott 2007), in some cases 
the system would vary unpredictably over the positions-velocities param-
eter space,2 the landmark of what we would come to call ‘chaos’. Poincaré 
(1908) would later write: “It may happen that small differences in the 
initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena. A small 
error in the former will produce an enormous error in the latter. Prediction 
becomes impossible, and we have the fortuitous phenomenon” (Maitland 
1914, 67).
2 A “parameter space” (a concept used widely in physics, in statistics, and in other fields) is 
the space of all the possible combinations of values for the different parameters that a model 
could adopt. This “parameter space” is often searched or sampled to find the optimal set of 
values for parameters A, B, C, and so on, that give the best fit to the data or best description 
of a given phenomenon.
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Despite further work on the stability of dynamical systems, particularly 
by the Russian mathematician and physicist Aleksandr Mikhailovich 
Lyapunov (1857–1918), with his introduction of the ‘Lyapunov expo-
nent’, which characterizes the timescale over which a system becomes 
highly unstable, unpredictable, and chaotic, the problem was mostly for-
gotten until the aforementioned Lorenz discovered it while running 
weather forecast numerical simulations (on computers) around 1960. 
However, this was not applied to planets and their orbits until 25 years later.
In 1989 and 1990, Jacques Laskar made important contributions to 
the problem by performing high-precision numerical calculations on the 
time evolution of the solar system, taking up to eight planets into account 
and evolving the system for up to 100 million years (Laskar 1989, 
237–238; 1990, 266–291; 2013, 239–270). He found that a difference of 
1 kilometer in the initial position of a planet could grow to 1 AU (150 
million km) over 95 million years! He also showed that for certain initial 
conditions, some planets could be ejected from the solar system (or other 
planetary systems out there), which would later explain the discovery of 
“rogue planets”. Others would later confirm these findings, for example, 
Gerald J. Sussman and Jack Wisdom: “The evolution of the entire plane-
tary system has been numerically integrated for a time span of nearly 100 
million years. This calculation confirms that the evolution of the solar 
system as a whole is chaotic, with a time scale of exponential divergence of 
about 4 million years” (Sussman and Wisdom 1992, 56).
Additional simulations, more and more precise with faster and faster 
computers, would later reach the following important conclusion: orbits 
of the planets in our solar system are stable for 99% of the initial condi-
tions, but phase (where along its orbit a planet would be after, say, 10 
million years) is not predictable, at least for some planets. If a planet’s 
rotation axis is inclined, as both Earth’s and Mars’ are, then big changes 
of its position along its orbit over millions of years make it difficult for 
scientists to trace back or forward climate conditions, the evolution of life, 
and survival. In other words, we do not know whether July in the year 5 
million BC corresponded to summer or winter in each hemisphere. We do 
have ice cores that can tell us what the temperature was like in that era, but 
not so precise as to determine the weather in a given month north or 
south of the equator.
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4.6  FormatIon oF the moon
Another “random” event, unpredictable due to the huge number of colli-
sions that will have occurred before—and a very lucky one for life and 
humans billions of years later—occurred about 50 million years after Earth 
had formed. The planet had not yet fully settled, indeed its surface had not 
hardened yet, when an object the size of Mars (about ten times smaller 
than Earth in volume) hit it in what is commonly referred to as “the giant 
impact”.3 The object, which has been called Theia, the name of the mythi-
cal mother of Selene, the Greek goddess of the Moon, was completely 
destroyed, its debris scattered in space, along with the parts of Earth that 
were excavated in the collision.
Indeed, contrary to the way other planets have acquired moons in the 
solar system (co-accretion of many moons for the large, gaseous, outer 
planets; capture by Mars of small objects from the asteroid belt), Earth 
acquired a moon in a giant collision-breakup. Evidence from this comes 
mainly from the high similarity between the composition of rocks on the 
moon and the geological material below the crust of our planet (Young 
et al. 2016, 493). The giant impact thus produced a relatively large moon 
(the largest moon/planet ratio in the solar system), which enabled it to 
play a vital role in the evolution of life on Earth. Indeed, for the climate to 
be stable and not vary widely and wreak havoc on life, the inclination of 
Earth’s axis needs to be stable, that is, not vary by more than about 1 
degree; a large moon provides that stability. Moreover, a large moon pro-
duces substantial tides, which lead to the mixing of nutrients and life forms 
on coasts, further helping biological evolution. Furthermore, a recent 
paper (Grewal et al. 2019, 3669) has indicated that the giant impact may 
have brought important chemical elements (carbon, nitrogen, and sulfur) 
to the bulk Earth, elements which were vital for the emergence of life later.
This seems like the luckiest event that one could possibly envision for a 
planet like Earth. Without that giant impact, the chemical conditions for 
life to form may have been insufficient, and there would have been no 
moon to stabilize the climate and allow for an upward evolution of life to 
complex animals and ultimately humans.
3 The collision has widely been assumed to be a glancing one, Theia hitting Earth on the 
side; however, recent work has indicated that the collision may have been head-on, as large 
amounts of energy were involved for the mixing of materials to give results as measured 
today (Young et al. 2016, 493).
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However, here too, statistics make even such a fluke event not so won-
drous. Indeed, studies of embryonic star-planets systems (using the infra-
red Spitzer Space Telescope, in particular) find some tentative evidence of 
“catastrophic collisions” (Gorlova et al. 2007, 516–535). It has been esti-
mated that 5–10% of such planetary systems undergo big enough colli-
sions to produce large moons. If so, our lucky event was not such a rare 
incident after all.
4.7  randomness In the bombardment oF the earth 
by meteoroIds
There are two important issues in the history of our planet: when did life 
appear and what impact did the bombardment by meteoroids and ener-
getic solar radiation have on the emergence and evolution of life and the 
appearance of primates and humans?
The strong gravity exerted by the giant planets (Jupiter and Saturn) on 
objects orbiting or passing nearby tugs those objects, slightly modifying 
their motions, sometimes enough to send them toward the inner regions 
of the solar system, to then be attracted by Earth, other planets, our Moon 
(thus the heavy cratering), or the Sun.
In the last 40 years or so, scientists have become convinced that a “late 
heavy bombardment” occurred between 3.8 and 4.1 billion years ago 
(Fig. 4.3). The main evidence for this comes from the radiometric dating 
of a number of craters on the Moon—hence the other name “lunar cata-
clysm” (Tera et al. 1974, 1–21; Cohen et al. 2000, 1754); the absence of 
an atmosphere there leads to a rather pristine preservation of the craters, 
small and big.
A number of hypotheses have been advanced to explain this major 
event: a dynamical instability in the outer Solar System; the collisional 
disruption of a large Mars-crossing asteroid; a gravitational event that 
swept objects out of the asteroid belt; and other possible scenarios.
Interestingly, the earliest fossils of life forms that have been found on 
Earth date back to roughly that time. It is often assumed that such a sus-
tained assault on Earth would have wiped out life, if it existed then in 
whatever form. Recently, however, studies have suggested that craters pro-
duced by such impacts could have been ideal for the appearance of life, for 
meteoroids bring water and iron, and impact craters present important 
helpful features, including secondary minerals which can act as templates 
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or catalysts for prebiotic syntheses, diverse impact energies resulting in dif-
ferent rates of organic syntheses, and so on (Cockell 2006, 1845–55).
Another important event which had a crucial consequence on the 
emergence of humans on Earth was the fall of an asteroid on Earth about 
66 million years ago. The meteoroid is estimated to have been about 10 
kilometers wide, and it is believed to have struck just off the coast of the 
Yucatan peninsula in Mexico. The blast it produced in the shallow sea was 
the equivalent of 10 billion Hiroshima-type atomic bombs or 100 trillion 
tons of TNT; it released 10,000 billion tons of carbon and sulfur-rich 
gases, blocking sunlight for months, igniting fires in many forests, and 
producing a dead world, killing almost all reptiles, most birds, and plants, 
starving the dinosaurs to death within a few months, and paving the way 
for mammals. It was a sudden and brief event by cosmic and geological 
scales, but a momentous one by all measures.
Fig. 4.3 Time plot of Moon bombardment in the first billion years, showing the 
‘lunar cataclysm’, that is, the ‘late heavy bombardment’. (Source: Nidhal Guessoum)
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This event is often cited as an example of how randomness and chaos 
rule the world, and our existence could very well never have come about, 
if the asteroid had been smaller or if it had hit in a place where its impact 
would have been much less devastating.
This is where statistics and probabilities again come to play an impor-
tant role in our understanding of the world. A study of craters and mete-
orites found around the globe has allowed us to infer an empirical law of 
the frequency of such strikes as a function of the size of the incoming, 
falling rock/meteoroid. This is not an easy, straightforward matter, it 
must be stressed, partly because not all meteorites are found or registered, 
craters are often eroded, and data is thus necessarily incomplete. A 20-year 
record of “air bursts” (explosions of meteoroids as they hit the thicker part 
of the atmosphere) or medium-size (1–20 meter) meteoroids entering 
Earth’s atmosphere is shown below (Fig. 4.4).
And Fig. 4.5 is a similar map made for “fireballs” (very bright meteors) 
recorded between April 15, 1988, and April 22, 2019.
From these records (data), one can plot the frequency of, and time 
intervals for, meteoroids entering Earth’s atmosphere as a function of 
their diameters and the energies they release (Fig. 4.6).
Fig. 4.4 Record of small meteoroids entering and disintegrating in the atmo-
sphere between 1994 and 2013. https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/
bollide.jpg
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Fig. 4.5 Fireballs reported by US government sensors (April 15, 1988 to April 
22, 2019). Alan B.  Chamberlin (JPL/Caltech—https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/
fireballs/)
Fig. 4.6 Frequency and time interval of meteoroids entering Earth’s atmosphere 
as a function of their diameter and corresponding energy release. (Source: Nidhal 
Guessoum)
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From the plot, one can see that 10-km size asteroids strike every 100 
million years or so, 1-km meteoroids hit every million years or so, 100-m 
rocks arrive at earth roughly every 1000 years, and so on. Again, we find 
that random events of these kinds follow rather simple probabilistic and 
statistical laws, and they can thus be forecast in terms of probabilities.
The important conclusion from this realization is that Earth was bound 
to be hit by a large asteroid, within a hundred million years or so. The 
probability of a dinosaur-exterminating asteroid hitting Earth during the 
last 300 million years was more than 99%. Humans and other highly 
evolved creatures might not have existed precisely 4.567 billion years after 
Earth’s formation, but intelligent and conscious creatures would have 
appeared sooner or later, since evolution was unfolding in full glory.
4.8  randomness In the sun’s actIvIty
The Sun’s activity and evolution during its first billion years is also an 
important issue pertaining to both randomness and the emergence and 
evolution of life on Earth. There are, however, a number of important 
uncertainties in this regard: (a) the composition of Earth’s early atmo-
sphere is not well known; (b) there are indications that liquid water existed 
fairly early on the surface of our planet, but this is not strongly established; 
(c) it is widely believed that the young Sun was less luminous (by about 
25–30%, since its core gradually heats up and produces more energy), but 
without an Earth atmosphere richer in greenhouse gases, it would have 
kept the planet frozen for the first 2 billion years (Sagan and Mullen 1972, 
52–56); (d) the random solar flare and eruption activity, which was very 
probably much stronger early on, and which would have repeatedly zapped 
our planet with UV and X-ray radiation; (e) as with the bombardment, it 
is not clear whether the energetic radiation would have hindered or helped 
the emergence and the evolution of life on Earth.
I will focus here only on the randomness part, namely, the solar surface 
(magnetic) activity, which is observed in the sunspots and flares/eruptions 
that appear on the Sun, and which leave a mark in tree trunks (over 
decades, centuries, and sometimes millenia) or ice cores (over centuries, 
millenia, and longer periods). Sunspots are the footprints of flares, which 
together with the much stronger coronal mass ejections send out large 
quantities of charged particles (electrons and protons) into the solar sys-
tem. This “solar wind”, along with the energetic photons of the accompa-
nying X-ray and UV radiation, can break organic molecules on Earth or at 
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least ionize them and induce reactions or even mutations in the DNAs of 
the cells. And this can either kill a cell or produce a mutation that is most 
likely destructive, but it can also lead to the appearance of different species 
or life forms—evolution.
Reproducing early solar activity is extremely difficult. Figure 4.7 shows 
the variations in sunspots over the last 400 years (upper panel) and over 
the last 40 years (lower panel). In fact, one can produce plots of sunspot 
numbers for the last 10,000 years (Yin et al. 2007) from Carbon-14 con-
centrations in tree-rings and/or geomagnetic variations. One method by 
which one can explore solar activity in the first 1–4 billion years is to study 
stars that are very similar to the Sun but have different ages. Egeland et al. 
(2016, 330–334) studied five such sun-like stars and found that young, 
fast rotating ones show many-times larger variabilities in their activities, 
while old, slowly rotating ones display very little variability.
What must be stressed here, however, is that while solar magnetic activ-
ity is chaotic, it still follows quasi-periodic cycles. The most famous and 
easily noticeable cycle of solar activity is the 11-year cycle, which takes the 
Sun from “solar maximum” to “solar minimum” and back, periodically; 
neither the 11-year interval nor the level of activity repeat exactly, as can 
be shown in Fig. 4.7.
Figure 4.7 clearly shows both the irregularities in the activity over short 
time scales (month to month, year to year) and the quasi-regularity (cyclic-
ity) over long time scales (decades), even though the magnitude of the 
activity in each cycle varies substantially.
4.9  randomness, order In the World, 
and dIvIne ProvIdence
What we have learned from this general review of “random” processes in 
the cosmos is that “randomness” is ubiquitous in the universe. We have 
found important examples of it ranging from the earliest times of the uni-
verse to rainfall in farmers’ fields today, including the chaotic formation of 
the planets and our moon, the subsequent meteoritic bombardment and 
energetic radiation that Earth was subjected to, particularly in the first bil-
lion years or so, and the chaotic solar activity still going on today.
The second important idea that I have stressed is that there are two 
kinds of randomnesses: the “fundamental” one, which is due to quantum 
indeterminacy (as believed by most physicists), and the “epistemic” one, 
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Fig. 4.7 Sunspot number (solar activity) variation over the last 400 years (top: 
https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/products/solar- cycle- progression), and  40  years 
(bottom: https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/products/solar- cycle- progression)
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which manifests itself in chaotic phenomena and which is only due to our 
inability to theoretically determine (calculate) the state of a system over 
long timescales if it is highly sensitive to initial conditions and the equa-
tions that describe it are non-linear.
The third and perhaps most important idea I have stressed is that all the 
randomness that we encounter in nature is, however, not without some 
underlying order or probabilistic-statistical pattern. In each case, whether 
quantum-based or chaotic, we have found some laws regulating the ran-
dom process. Even the two big “lucky” events that allowed life to evolve 
and let humans emerge after a few billion years, namely, the planetary col-
lision from which our Moon was born and the asteroid strike that killed 
the dinosaurs and the big reptiles and allowed mammals to prosper and 
produce primates, those two events were not “flukes” but rather expected 
to occur on long enough timescales.
One comes out amazed from such a big-history review that random-
ness not only follows simple, elegant laws and produces beautiful order, 
but in fact was necessary for differentials to occur in nature and varieties to 
emerge. Without quantum fluctuations, the universe would have been 
utterly homogeneous, and complex structures (galaxies, stars, planets, 
etc.) would not have formed.
What emerges is a multi-layered picture of our universe: at various 
scales (of space or time), processes can be probabilistic, then collectively 
predictable, then chaotically unpredictable, then globally or long-term 
predictable, and so on. For instance, Earth’s atmosphere, made of gases, 
has: quantum probabilistic (un)predictability at the lowest scale (individ-
ual atoms and molecules); then statistical predictability of the gases’ char-
acteristics (temperature, pressure, etc.); chaotic behavior of the weather, 
becoming unpredictable over just a few days; predictability of the climate 
over longer timescales (seasons and long cycles); instability over very long 
terms; and so forth.
In earlier times, randomness used to be conceived of as God’s way of 
hiding His plans (recall that many cultures practiced cleromancy, casting 
lots by throwing dice or bones with symbols to try to “uncover” divine 
plans or divine hints). More recently, and with the realization that ran-
domness may play a key role in cosmology and biology, a number of 
authors have insisted that randomness strongly conflicts with divine provi-
dence. For instance, Robert Charles Sproul wrote: “The mere existence of 
chance is enough to rip God from his cosmic throne. … If chance exists in 
its frailest possible form, God is finished” (Sproul 1994, 3). Similarly, 
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Benedikt Paul Göcke, reviewing randomness in cosmology and biology 
formulated an ‘Argument [against the existence of God] from Chance and 
Randomness’: “If there is a random state of affairs in the universe, then 
God does not know that his providential plans are fulfilled” (Göcke 2015, 
233–254). As I explained earlier, if the collision between Theia and early- 
Earth had occurred with different parameters (a different size for Theia, a 
different angle of collision, etc.), life would probably have evolved differ-
ently, perhaps not leading to primates and humans; likewise, if that 10-km 
asteroid that struck Earth 66 million years ago had been substantially 
smaller or had hit elsewhere, the dinosaurs would not have been extermi-
nated, and we humans would not be here today.
However, what we have seen in this review is that there are probabilities 
and regularities behind those random events. For instance, 10-km sized 
meteoroids strike Earth every 100 million years or so, thus sooner or later 
one such asteroid or comet would have hit Earth and changed the course 
of life’s history on the planet. And if we believe that the primate niche is 
inscribed in the general evolutionary scheme of Earth’s environment, then 
a species more or less similar to humans would have emerged at some 
point (around now, give or take a few hundred million years).
Is God’s plan then built on probabilities and statistics? There are two 
ways to answer this question.
The first is by an analogy used by Peter van Inwagen in his essay ‘The 
Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God’ (van Inwagen 1988, 225), 
that he and his wife, when they decided to have a child, knew they wanted 
one to be born sometime in the next year or so, but they didn’t plan for a 
specific child, a girl with detailed characteristics. According to van Inwagen, 
God made general plans for creation, established the laws (some of which 
are probabilistic) by which natural processes will lead to the creation of 
various objects and beings, and most importantly sustained those laws and 
interactions (the way he sustained those causal interactions is, according to 
van Inwagen, how God acts in the world), and let things unfold.
This view is still subject to the critical retort: so God does not know the 
characteristics of each object, creature, and event at every point in time?!
The second way to answer the above question is, in my view, to insist 
that God being outside of time “sees” everything happening everywhere 
and everywhen, thus God does know the full characteristics of everything 
even though the process that leads to this or that may be partially or fully 
probabilistic or even random, unlike the above child conception analogy.
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But what about quantum randomness, which is “fundamental”? 
Quantum randomness can be related to God in an interesting way that 
was suggested by Serkan Zorba in an essay titled ‘God is Random: A Novel 
Argument for the Existence of God’: only God has the ability to generate 
absolutely random numbers or sequences, as opposed to pseudo-random 
numbers, which follow complex, difficult to break, but nonetheless deter-
ministic rules. He writes: “I will propound the idea that the epistemic cost 
of unpredictable randomness is infinite intelligence, and thereby present a 
new a posteriori argument for the existence of God from the irreducible 
randomness of the quantum world” (Zorba 2016, 51).
At the other end of the theological spectrum, a number of western 
theologians have proposed “open” relations between God and nature, 
whereby God willingly granted some freedom and autonomy to nature by 
setting some fundamental indeterminacy in the world; just as God granted 
humans free will, He may have granted nature free processes. Traditional 
Islamic theologians will not accept such an “open, free” relation between 
God and nature; however, panentheistic traditions (including some Sufi 
conceptions of God, the world, and humans), might integrate characteris-
tics of nature, including any intrinsic randomness, into the (mysterious) 
divine nature.
Our understanding of randomness in the world, nature, and the cos-
mos, is far from robust or complete even in the scientific realm. And how 
it can be integrated into any religious or spiritual conception of the world 
and any theistic or even deistic philosophy still has much ground to cover.
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CHAPTER 5
Randomness, Providence, and the Multiverse
Bruno Guiderdoni
Is there evidence for the action of providence in the cosmos? Most cos-
mologists would answer “no.” For them, the universe has no purpose at 
all, and it is ruled only by randomness acting according to the laws of 
physics (ultimately, general relativity and quantum field theory). To their 
eyes, the outcomes of the universe, including the existence of life and 
human beings on Earth, are radically contingent. However, this view is 
now discussed anew, in the context of a series of discoveries in the last 
decades. This chapter presents a brief summary of the issue. It addresses 
how science evacuated the centrality of the human of the universe by 
unfolding the importance of contingency, how contingency itself was 
questioned, and how cosmologists are trying to answer this question.
As a matter of fact, most cosmologists would subscribe to the material-
istic view, as stated by Jacques Monod, a French biologist and Nobel Prize 
Winner. In 1970, Monod published Chance and Necessity, a book on the 
alleged philosophical implications of the contemporary discoveries in 
molecular biology, including his own on the role of RNA in decoding 
DNA. This book had a strong impact on the general audience, and was 
translated into many languages. At the very end of the book, Monod 
summarized his views on the cosmos with a few sentences: “The old 
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covenant is broken. Finally the human knows that it is alone in the indif-
ferent immensity of the universe, from which it emerged by chance. Its 
destiny and its duty are written nowhere. To it belongs the choice between 
the Kingdom and darkness.”
5.1  The IndIfferenT UnIverse of MaTerIalIsM
Monod’s statement is clear: the universe is indifferent to the existence of the 
human, which has emerged by chance. With these words, Monod put a con-
clusion to the long-lasting philosophical project of materialism, which started 
25 centuries ago with the works of Democritus (470–360 BCE) and Epicurus 
(341–270  BCE), and was subsequently developed in more details by 
Lucretius (99–55 BCE). According to Lucretius’ work, De Natura Rerum 
(Lucretius 1993), the world is eternal, and ruled by chance. There is no “first 
principle” (archè) that produces the world, as pre-Socratic philosophers 
thought, and no god to enforce his will. Of course, Monod’s views are much 
more sophisticated than Lucretius’. But both worldviews share the same 
ontological reductionism and materialism. For Monod, the deciphering of 
the DNA and RNA codes is an important step forward in the scientific 
endeavor, and it shows, after the unraveling of the mysteries of matter by 
physics and chemistry, that life itself can be understood by the interplay of 
chance (random mutations) and necessity (the laws of biochemistry and 
selection pressure). Very much as Lucretius, in his times, considered this 
interplay to be the full and final explanation of the “nature of the things.”
Monod’s views are interesting for another reason, his choice of the 
words in his final sentences: “the old covenant,” “destiny and duty,” “the 
Kingdom” (with a capital in the original French word “Royaume”) and 
“darkness.” It is not clear why Monod chose these specific words. In his 
book, he commented on, and criticized, animism and the separation 
between mind and matter, and he explained that the attraction of the 
human to metaphysical explanations and religions is likely coded into 
one’s DNA itself. According to Monod, there is no God, and the universe 
is indifferent to the human. In its loneliness, the human has a choice 
between, on the one hand, the “Kingdom,” which in Monod’s mind is the 
quest for “objective knowledge” (i.e., science), a quest that is demanding 
and valuable, and, on the other hand, the “darkness,” which is likely to 
refer to superstition and obscurantism. Monod uses these Biblical motifs 
to subvert them, and criticize the monotheistic views on the world, espe-
cially God’s existence and providence.
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5.2  General and specIal provIdence
For monotheistic religions—principally Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—
every created being has purpose in accordance with God’s plan. To be 
more specific, it is useful to distinguish between various modes of action 
that creation implies in monotheistic doctrines. First, God has the power 
to bring things into existence out of nothingness. All three religions agree 
on the creation “ex nihilo,” that is, from nothing other than God’s Wisdom 
and Will. Second, God does not bring into existence all of what is possible. 
He has the capacity to make choices, and to give existence to a subset of 
possible things within a larger ensemble. Third, God organizes created 
things “ex numero et pondere,” that is, he measures things, and makes the 
cosmos appear as an organized whole out of all the individual creatures 
that are brought into being and their interconnections. Finally, God has a 
specific relationship with each one of his creatures, to which he provides 
what is necessary for its subsistence, and for achieving his plans for it. 
Obviously, this relationship is unique with the human being, which is 
gifted with spirit and free will to fulfill a central role in God’s plan for the 
Creation.
It is important to realize that each of these characteristics is related to 
four specific issues in metaphysics and philosophy. God as the Creator 
(attribute 1) is an answer to Leibniz’s (1714) questions: “Why is there 
something rather than nothing?” God as the Chooser (attribute 2) explains 
why we live in this specific world rather than in a world with different 
characteristics. God as the Organizer (attribute 3) is an explanation for the 
existence of laws of physics in the world, including the possibility that 
these laws drive change or evolution in the cosmos. All these actions are 
linked to what can be called “General Providence” directed toward all 
creatures. Finally, because God is the Provider (attribute 4), humans have 
a specific relationship with God, and they should thank him and behave in 
accordance with his Will, inasmuch as God gives purpose and meaning to 
their lives.1 This can be called “Specific Providence,” because it refers to a 
peculiar link that God has with each of his creatures, and especially each 
human being. We could say that, according to those who believe in him, 
God is a sufficient explanation for many, if not all, patterns of our existence.
1 According to the Islamic tradition, God has many names that refer to specific aspects of 
his relationship with Creation. God is the Creator (al-Khâliq). He is also the Existentiator 
(Al-Mûjid), the Measurer (al-Muqaddir), the One who wills (Al-Murîd), and the Provider 
(ar-Razzâq).
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In contrast, materialism does not believe that God is a necessary expla-
nation for any of the above-mentioned four philosophical issues. These 
issues can get satisfactory answers without invoking a transcendent Agent. 
For instance, materialism claims that there is no cause to the existence of 
matter, and we have to assume that matter has always been there, although 
its form can change. For it, having God as the “Creator” just shifts the 
issue from the existence of matter to the existence of God. When mono-
theism answers that God is the only necessary being, materialism claims 
that matter could very well be the necessary being, without multiplying 
explanatory entities. As for the “Chooser” among a set of possible things, 
materialism thinks that things appear by chance out of an ensemble of pos-
sibilities. In an infinite universe, everything that is possible will end up 
happening. For issue three about the organization of the cosmos, the laws 
of physics do the job of the “Organizer.” Of course, we do not know why 
laws hold, but this issue is hidden under the consideration that these laws 
are primarily the creation of the human mind to describe observations and 
experimentations. And finally, for materialism, the only purpose and mean-
ing of the human are given to the human by the human itself, as Monod 
wrote at the end of his book.
According to Monod, the deciphering of the riddles of biology by the 
discovery of DNA and RNA was the final step of the destruction of the 
world of the “old covenant” which relied on God’s existence and provi-
dence and flourished in the medieval synthesis of, for instance, Thomas 
Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae or Dante Alighieri’s Convivio or Divina 
Commedia. In this medieval synthesis shared by Jews, Christians, and 
Muslims, and based on Aristotelian physics and Ptolemaic astronomy 
interpreted in the light of the Sacred Scriptures, the centrality of the 
human appears through its location at the center and lower place of the 
world, as a result of a “Fall” that was both physical and moral. But, step by 
step, modern science has dismantled this medieval synthesis in which the 
human being was central in a closed world with a finite age.2 Let’s briefly 
consider this shift.
In the Copernican model of the world, the Earth is a planet with the 
Sun occupying the central place in the universe. However, at the begin-
ning of the seventeenth century, it appeared that the stars were other suns 
2 As stated in Dante’s Convivio, the radius of the closed universe, after the major work of 
Al-Farghânî (d. 861, Alfraganus for the Latin), is 120 million km, and its age corresponds to 
a creation 4000 B.C. according to Biblical counts of the ages of the prophets.
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located at large distances, and that the Sun was one of the stars among 
many. When, in 1610, Galileo Galilei sees mountains on the Moon, spots 
on the Sun’s surface, satellites turning around Jupiter, or a ring around 
Saturn, he shows that there is nothing special with the Earth. The passage 
from the closed world to the infinite universe was hard to accept, because 
it displaced humanity from its central role. Isaac Newton gave the key to 
understanding the structure of the world with the laws of motion and 
gravitation. He showed that there were many “centres of fall” in the cos-
mos. However, in his views, there was still some providence in the uni-
verse, because only God could guarantee that the law of gravitation holds 
at a distance. Empty space as the locus of gravitation became the sensorium 
Dei. Moreover, for Newton, God corrects the motions of the planets to 
keep the solar system stable, because the mere application of the law of 
gravitation seemed unable to account for the details of astronomical 
observations. Later, Pierre-Simon de Laplace explained this disagreement 
by computing the gravitational influence of all the planets of the solar 
system on each one of them, thanks to Newton’s law of gravitation, and 
Albert Einstein elucidated the puzzling characteristics of a law of gravita-
tion at a distance, with the curved space-time of general relativity. Each of 
these steps effectively placed God at a greater distance.
The true scale of the universe was discovered incrementally, with the 
identification of the shape of the Milky Way by William Herschel (1781), 
the first measurement of the distance of a star by Friedrich Bessel (1838), 
and finally, the discovery of the extragalactic nature of the “spiral nebulae” 
by Edwin Hubble (1926). At each step forward, the universe appeared to 
be larger, and the Earth became more insignificant in terms of size and 
location. Physical cosmology, which appeared at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, was built on the foundations of general relativity, and 
the growing power of telescopes, spectrographs, and photographic plates 
to probe the deep universe. The “principle of mediocrity,” which was born 
at the time of the Copernican model, is at the basis of the cosmological 
theory. We humans live on an ordinary planet, orbiting an ordinary star, 
on the periphery of an ordinary galaxy, the Milky Way that includes about 
100 billion stars. The Milky Way itself is in the Local Group, with several 
other galaxies, and especially the Andromeda galaxy (M31) at 778 kpc,3 
our closest giant neighbor, which is about twice as big as the Milky Way. 
The Local Group itself is at the periphery of the Local Super-cluster, 
3 1 pc = 3.26 light-years, 1 kpc = 1000 pc, and 1 Mpc = 1000 kpc.
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centered on the Virgo cluster, which is located at a distance of 16.4 Mpc, 
and where the giant galaxy M87 occupies the center. There are many 
super- clusters in the universe, at the crossing of the filaments and sheets 
that constitute the large-scale structures. This “principle of mediocrity” 
translates into the so-called Copernican principle, stating that the Earth is 
not located at a special position or at a special epoch of the universe. From 
the cosmological point of view, “there” is like “here,” and “some time 
ago” is like “now.” Another (although not equivalent) way to restate the 
Copernican principle is to postulate the “universality of the laws of phys-
ics,” without which any attempt to develop cosmology is hopeless. This 
universality of the laws is constantly checked by the cross-consistency of all 
the astronomical observations, and there are dedicated research programs 
to detect any change of the constants of physics.
It is possible to solve the Einstein equation of general relativity under 
the so-called cosmological principle which states that, above a given scale, 
there are “average properties” of the universe that do not depend on loca-
tion. The cosmological principle, which is another way to rephrase the 
“principle of mediocrity,” leads to the simplifying assumptions of a homo-
geneous and isotropic universe with a uniform time flow. Under these 
assumptions, Einstein’s equation can be solved to obtain the Friedmann- 
Lemaître equations that describe the space-time evolution of the universe. 
The observations of Hubble and Humason (1931) confirmed what these 
equations described: we live in an expanding universe, although it is 
important to emphasize that it is space itself that is expanding and not 
matter “exploding” into previously empty space.
Two models would be in competition in the following 30 years: the 
Big-Bang model (BBM), in which the universe emerged out of an “initial 
singularity” (Friedmann 1922, 1924; Lemaître 1927), and matter is 
diluted by the expansion, and the Steady State model (SSM) in which the 
universe is eternal, and eternally expanding, with new matter constantly 
appearing to fill in the voids, and to compensate the dilution (Bondi and 
Gold 1948; Hoyle 1948). In BBM, there is a special time (the initial sin-
gularity), but not in SSM. For this reason, these two models suggested 
philosophical implications. Would BBM be reminiscent of Biblical cre-
ation, and SSM of the eternal universe of Lucretius? Whereas Pope Pius 
XII claimed that science confirmed the Biblical narrative of creation in his 
address of 1952, Georges Lemaître was more careful about this type of 
“concordism,” because he knew that physics, based on conservation laws, 
is unable to conceive of the appearance of something out of nothing. On 
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his side, Fred Hoyle, one of the proponents of SSM, also saw the Big Bang 
as a revival of the creation ex nihilo in the fiat lux of Genesis, and preferred 
the eternal universe in which things have plenty of time to appear “by 
chance,” in the wake of Lucretius’ views.
The discovery of the Cosmic Microwave Background (Penzias and 
Wilson 1965) provided evidence for a universe much hotter and denser in 
the past and strongly favored the Big-Bang model. SSM was quickly aban-
doned. The CMB observations are consistent with the theory of Big-Bang 
nucleosynthesis in which light elements such as He3, He4, and Li7 are 
made during the first three minutes of the expanding universe. The heavier 
elements are forged in stellar interiors, and thermonuclear reactions pro-
vide stars with their source of energy (Burbidge et al. 1957).
Another piece of the cosmological puzzle is the existence of “dark mat-
ter,” whose gravitational effects appear in the fast motions of cluster galax-
ies, as well as in the flat rotation curves of spiral galaxies and the deviation 
of light rays by gravitational lensing (Zwicky 1933; Rubin et  al. 1978, 
1980; Tyson et al. 1984). Dark matter is mostly made of unknown parti-
cles, which are not those that make “normal matter” (the particles of the 
so-called Standard Model of particle physics), whose density is constrained 
by nucleosynthesis. Dark matter is the dominant component of matter, 
and rules gravitation at large scales. To end this brief sketch of the pan-
orama offered by modern cosmology, it is necessary to mention the dis-
covery of the accelerated expansion of the universe (Perlmutter et  al. 
1999), which is interpreted as the result of “dark energy,” whether it is 
due to a non-zero cosmological constant, or to an unknown “scalar field” 
associated with a still-to-be-discovered particle.
Many pages of the narrative of cosmic evolution are now written, and 
the Earth appears as a tiny, peripheral bit of matter within the vast expanse 
of space. Probably one of the most striking pictures that illustrate this nar-
rative is the image of the Hubble Deep Field taken by the Hubble Space 
Telescope (Williams et al. 1996), which unveils about 10,000 galaxies in 
the field of 11 arcmin. We see distant galaxies as they were in the past, 
when light was emitted and the universe was much younger than it is now. 
Subsequent galaxy counts seem to show that the observable universe, 
defined as the sphere around us where light can reach us during the finite 
age of the universe (13.8 Gyr is the current best measurement), includes 
about 100 billion galaxies, each of them including 1–1000 billion stars.
The richness of the universe unveiled by modern cosmology still 
increased with the identification of the first exoplanet (Mayor and Queloz 
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1995) that was followed by the discovery of thousands of planetary sys-
tems around nearby stars, many of them harboring rocky planets similar to 
the Earth and located in the so-called Habitable Zone that enables the 
presence of liquid water. After surveys conducted by the Kepler satellite, it 
is believed that most stars have planets. One of the main issues now is to 
detect bio-signatures in the atmospheres of some of these exoplanets that 
would signal the existence of elementary life forms, for instance unicellular 
organisms that would have something similar to a photosynthetic function 
that would produce biotic oxygen. Several projects are in preparation to 
make use of the forthcoming James Webb Space Telescope (launch in 
2021) and the 30-meter class telescopes (commissioning in 2025) to 
attempt such detections.
5.3  Is The UnIverse fIne-TUned for lIfe?
It is clear that the development of modern cosmology bolstered the idea 
of an indifferent universe. What would be the purpose and meaning of the 
human life among so many billions of stars and planets? Cosmological, 
geological, and biological evolution appear to have been contingent with 
random processes at all the stages. Theologians and deist/theist philoso-
phers would have to find how God acts in this universe within the con-
straints given by science (see, e.g., Barbour 1997; Saunders 2002; 
Polkinghorne 2005; Ward 2007). Yet, the idea of a purposeless Earth (and 
human) in a vast universe would begin to be criticized just a few years after 
the publishing of Monod’s essay, during a meeting held in Krakow in 
1973, to celebrate the 500th anniversary of Copernicus’ birth date. 
Brandon Carter, a physicist, suggested that we should be careful about too 
systematic an application of the Copernican principle: clearly we live in a 
zone of the universe where, and at an epoch when, our very existence as 
observers is possible. This is known as the Weak Anthropic Principle 
(WAP). Carter proposed a stronger statement, the Strong Anthropic 
Principle (SAP): the universe must have the overall properties that make 
our existence as observers possible: any change in the values of these over-
all properties would have made our existence either more difficult or 
impossible. These two statements triggered a long-lasting controversy 
among scientists and philosophers of science, with attitudes ranging from 
exasperation to excitation (Bertola and Curi 1993).
WAP seems reasonable. It looks like a reminder of the series of “decen-
tring discoveries” of the last centuries, and question each one of them. We 
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should not be surprised that we are located in a galaxy (very few stars, if 
any, form out of galaxies), and more specifically in a spiral galaxy: elliptical 
galaxies are mostly made of old stars, most of them being 10 Gyr-old Red 
Giants that have inflated in their late stages and have destroyed nearby 
planets, whereas late-type, irregular galaxies have low contents of those 
heavy elements that are necessary to form planets. We should not be sur-
prised by living in a universe that is 13.8 Gyr old, because the chemical 
enrichment of the interstellar medium took a few Gyr before the forma-
tion of the Solar System, 4.56 Gyr ago. The emergence of life took 0.5 
Gyr on Earth, and evolution proceeded slowly to produce the first animal 
and vegetal diversification. As a result, we should not be surprised to live 
not only in an old universe but also in a vast universe, because the expan-
sion has lasted all this time, and galaxies were able to travel away from their 
neighbors. Similarly, the Earth, located around a G-type star (among the 
most frequent spectral types in the Milky Way), is in the habitable zone, 
bringing what is sometimes called the “goldilocks” conditions, “not too 
hot and not too cold,” that enable the existence of liquid water. The exis-
tence of liquid water is also conditioned by the Earth’s mass, which enables 
plate tectonics and the presence of an atmosphere at a sufficient pressure. 
Less massive planets have no tectonics, and more massive ones keep their 
thick initial atmosphere of hydrogen and helium. Finally, the Moon played 
a role in stabilizing the rotation axis of the Earth, very much as Jupiter 
gave inner rocky planets some kind of gravitational protection against 
deadly comets coming from the outskirts of the solar system.
The list of all these conditions (plus many others) gave birth to the 
“Rare Earth Hypothesis” (REH; Ward and Brownlee 2000) that is antag-
onistic to the “principle of mediocrity.” It is not easy to assess the combi-
nation of the low probability of gathering all these conditions with the 
very large number of planets that are present in the Milky Way (or in the 
universe), what could be coarsely encapsulated into Drake’s frequency 
equation (Drake 1961). The general feeling among the community of 
astrophysicists is that the very large number of planets should more than 
compensate the restrictive list of REH. The fact that this feeling is over-
whelming manifests itself in the organization of a growing international 
community of active astrobiologists, as well as in the development of 
costly research programs aiming at detecting bio-signatures in solar system 
planets and satellites, and in nearby exoplanets.
Of course, WAP and SAP were immediately criticized for being too 
anthropocentric. What is at stake here is not really the emergence of the 
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human beings, that is, life with superior cognitive capabilities, but rather 
the existence of planets that make simple life possible, or even complex life 
possible, that is, multicellular life, or maybe more, the existence of preda-
tors and preys, a powerful trigger for biological evolution. It is possible 
that the existence of multicellular life forms, and predator-prey couples is 
linked to some overall property of the Earth (like the Great Oxygenation 
Event), since motility involved in predator-prey couples requires more 
oxygen for metabolisms. Multicellular life forms (Gabonionta) seem to 
have appeared already 2.1 Gyr ago (El Albani et al. 2010) and maybe even 
moving life forms (El Albani et al. 2019). As far as life forms with superior 
cognitive capabilities are concerned, we get into the hazy field of the 
emergence of the human, which might be totally contingent (Gould 
1989), or, on the contrary, unavoidable, provided the mechanisms of con-
vergent evolution are at work (Conway-Morris 2003).
Clearly the emergence of life on Earth required many local conditions, 
and WAP has been discussed mostly in the related background of REH. In 
the context of theism, WAP may be seen as evidence for divine providence, 
but is of no consequence for our overall understanding of nature. The case 
for SAP is different as it involves the very possibility of life anywhere in the 
universe. As a consequence, it triggered a fierce debate that is still going 
on now, more than 40 years after it started. The ensemble of pieces of 
evidence that was initially referred to as SAP, is now preferentially called 
“the apparent coincidences” of the properties of the universe (Carr and 
Rees 1979), the universe “just right for life” (Davies 2007), the “fitness of 
the cosmos for life” (Barrow et  al. 2008), or the “fortunate universe” 
(Lewis and Barnes 2016). The list of these pieces of evidence is impressive 
(see, e.g., Barrow and Tipler 1986 for a first thorough study, and the 
above-mentioned references). One characteristic example is the formation 
of carbon nuclei in the interior of stars through the so-called triple-alpha 
process. It is made possible by the existence of a “resonance” in carbon 
energy levels that is ultimately due to a happy combination of various con-
stants of physics (Hoyle 1981). Without such a coincidence in the con-
stants, all within tightly defined ranges, carbon would have formed in 
much lower quantities in stars, making the formation of planets and of 
carbon-based life a much more difficult process.
Rees (1999) produced a convincing summary of how most of the large- 
scale patterns of the universe that seem to be necessary for harboring life, 
are based on “just six numbers.” The number of space dimensions D = 3 
is a condition for the stability of the planetary orbits around stars, as well 
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as electrons’ orbitals around nuclei. One or two space dimensions (D = 1 
or 2) are just too simple for the development of complexity, and D = 4 or 
larger produce the above-mentioned instabilities. The relative matter den-
sity of the universe Ωm = 0.25 assesses the influence of gravitation on the 
expansion of the universe, and the possibility to form galaxies and stars. 
With a significantly lower value, no galaxies and stars would have formed. 
With a significantly larger value, the universe would have collapsed within 
the few Gyr, without letting enough time for the development of life. The 
magnitude of the cosmological constant Λ = 0.75 gives the value of the 
acceleration of the expansion. A larger cosmological constant would have 
produced a much faster acceleration that would have hampered galaxy and 
star formation. The intensity of matter fluctuations at the epoch of recom-
bination, as they are measured on the CMB, is Q = 10−5. Smaller values 
would have given a much smaller number of galaxies now, and larger val-
ues would have given very dense galaxies where planetary system would be 
unstable because of the frequent gravitational encounters between stars. 
Admittedly, the fine-tuning of these last three parameters is not very tight. 
Values different by 10–20% would not give qualitatively different evolu-
tions for the content of the universe. The intensity of the weak interaction 
(that participates in the internal binding of nuclei) is ε = 0.007. With a 
slightly larger value, Big-Bang nucleosynthesis would have been more effi-
cient, and all stars would have burnt their nuclear fuel in a short amount 
of time. On the contrary, a slightly smaller value would have made stars 
unable to light up. Finally, the ratio of the electromagnetic constant to the 
gravity constant N = 1036 defines the sizes of the planets as well as of the 
life forms that would live on them. A slightly smaller value would make 
smaller life forms probably unable to evolve toward complexity, whereas a 
slightly larger value would slow down planet formation.
This list gives an idea of the kind of arguments around the “coinci-
dences” or the “apparent fine-tuning” of the properties. Maybe each value 
by itself could be considered coincidence, but the whole argument of the 
fine-tuning relies on the number of these coincidences, which seems unex-
pected, or puzzling. The heart of the issue is that the universe seems to be 
fit for life, or bio-friendly, and it unavoidably brings to mind the religious 
statements about a world created for the human being. Of course, what 
fine-tuning might say is that the world is finely tuned for the existence of 
life, and not necessarily for the specific existence of the human being. But 
the religious discourse about providence starts already at this level of gen-
eral providence, and the sacred scriptures remind the believer that the 
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world was created as a gift to the human, before developing the topic of 
the specific providence by which God feeds, teaches, and loves each 
one of us.
5.4  debaTes on fIne-TUnInG
Because fine-tuning is reminiscent of providence, very much as the Big- 
Bang model was considered similar to the fiat lux of Genesis by Hoyle and 
Pope Pius XII, the evidence of fine-tuning was, on one side, criticized, 
and, on the other side, discussed and interpreted.
The first attitude toward the argument is denial. After all, how exactly 
are the constants fine-tuned? Some of them seem to be loosely-tuned. The 
cosmological constant might be one half, or twice, its measured value 
without much change in the fitness of the universe for life. However the 
“natural” value proposed by theory is much larger: it should be 10120, and 
the fact that it is close to 1 is already an extraordinary fine-tuning that has 
led many theorists to think that some kind of (unknown) mechanism 
should have put it exactly to zero (Weinberg 1989). Consequently, the 
observational measurement of its non-zero value was really a surprise. The 
list of fine-tuning coincidences includes some tight ones and some loose 
ones, but the overall probability of finding all of them gathered in a single 
realization of a random process appears very low. The evidence is such that 
it demands an explanation.
Alternatively, one might think fine-tuning is a kind of observer selec-
tion effect. If the universe did not have the properties that enable our 
existence, nobody would have been here to see the hostility of cosmic 
conditions. However, this attitude seems contrary to the scientific quest 
that always question facts. White (2003) illustrates this situation by the 
metaphor of the firing squad.4 If a convict must be executed by a platoon 
of soldiers, and if he survives the execution, he would not say: there is no 
problem to discover that I am alive, because if I were dead, I would not be 
able to discover anything. On the contrary, he would try to understand 
whether there was a plot to save him, or whether the guns used by the 
soldiers had some kind of malfunction.
The last type of criticism of cosmological fine-tuning consists in deni-
grating this position as another shameful type of “Intelligent Design,” a 
line of argument that tried to disprove the theory of evolution. However, 
4 See also Swinburne (2010).
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cosmological fine-tuning is completely part of mainstream science, and 
does not contradict cosmic, geological, or biological evolution, which are 
even very much part of the case. If the case for fine-tuning is sound and 
serious, it has to be interpreted, and this interpretation comes at a cost. 
Four roads seem to have been explored, one with more success.
The first road consists in slightly modifying the rules of science by 
incorporating SAP into it as a methodological principle. In addition to, for 
instance, Occam’s razor, the refusal of final causes, and the Copernican 
principle, we would include the principle that the universe has the proper-
ties to host observers. If SAP were a starting principle, no more discussion 
is needed. However, asserting SAP as a first principle looks like a desperate 
patch. It is a glaring admission of weakness, and, because it stops further 
exploration of the topics, it may hide a whole avenue of interesting 
discoveries.
The second road is to confess our ignorance. In his well-known “Seven 
World Riddles” (Du Bois-Reymond 1880), Du Bois-Reymond lists the 
apparent teleological arrangement of nature as one of these riddles that 
might remain unanswered in spite of the efforts of scientists. We surely 
won’t be able to unravel all the laws of nature. This line of arguments, 
called the ignorabimus, might be defended by very different kinds of peo-
ple. Such a standpoint means that cosmology as a science is reaching its 
limits, and that we should consider the patterns of the universe, and the 
coincidences that make it, as just “happenstance.” The line of arguments 
of cosmological fine-tuning leads us to question our very existence as 
observers, and we know that self-reference can produce tricky problems. 
The issue of fine-tuning might be linked to the way we become aware of 
the cosmos, and we know that our consciousness itself may be a scientific 
riddle, as put forth, for example, by the philosophical standpoint of “mys-
terianism” (McGinn 1991).
The third road is to accept some sort of teleological argument—some-
thing most scientists would be reluctant to do. Whereas the first road was 
adding up a new principle to science, this third road would suppress one 
of its fundamental principles, that is, the refusal of final causes. This kind 
of interpretation of the properties of the universe with final causes is 
favored by deism (which would speak only of general providence), and 
theism (whether it is Judaism, Christianity, or Islam) that would add spe-
cial providence to general providence. However, final causes do not belong 
exclusively to monotheism: pantheistic views can endorse them. They 
might consider that matter is slowly “taking awareness” of itself (see, e.g., 
5 RANDOMNESS, PROVIDENCE, AND THE MULTIVERSE 
98
Reeves 1981), and that this process requires properties of matter that 
make complexity possible. A variant of these views can be found with 
Wheeler’s Participatory Anthropic Principle (PAP). PAP is an interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics “à la Wigner” in which the observer is respon-
sible for the collapse of the state vector. Thus the observation of the 
universe by observers puts its wavefunction in a state that enables their 
very existence as observers.5 In this context, the universe must have the 
properties to enable the existence of the observers, because the observers 
select the wavefunction of the universe. Here, “must have” describes the 
result of a causal process.
The mainstream interpretation of SAP is the multiverse, which would 
re-inject randomness into cosmology. According to this proposal, our uni-
verse is drawn from a large ensemble of realizations (or random draws) in 
a kind of “cosmic lottery” that explores a whole range of possibilities for 
the values of the laws of nature and constants of physics. One specific 
example of this explanation is Lee Smolin’s theory (Smolin 1997) in which 
stellar black holes are the seeds of subsequent Big Bangs, with different 
parameter sets. The parameter sets that enable the existence of massive 
stars (and their final evolution to black holes) are very fecund. These 
parameter sets are also those that enable the existence of life. However, the 
so-far preferred scenario of the multiverse comes from particle physics. An 
overarching law, or “fundamental law” (at high densities and tempera-
tures), would produce “derived laws” (at lower densities and tempera-
tures) by “symmetry breaking,” where some of the characteristics of the 
derived laws, including the values of the constants, are determined 
at random.
There is a mechanism for producing such symmetry breaking: cosmic 
inflation (Guth 1981; Linde 1982; Albrecht and Steinhardt 1982). 
Inflation was introduced to explain properties of the observable universe 
such as flatness, isotropy, and the absence of magnetic monopoles. The 
overall idea is that, when the universe was very young (typically 10−35 sec 
after the “singularity”), a scalar field was responsible for an exponential 
expansion that diluted the universe, homogenized its initial density irregu-
larities, and flattened its space curvature as measured within a Hubble 
radius (the size of the observable universe). This process can occur repeat-
edly, in various places, giving rise to “eternal inflation,” and a large num-
ber of Big Bangs and “universes.” CMB observations have already 
5 See Barrow and Tipler (1986).
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corroborated some of the predictions of inflation. The scalar field is not 
known yet, but there is hope that forthcoming observations of the CMB 
will be able to test a large fraction of the possible models, and especially 
the possibility that the scalar field is simply the recently discovered 
Higgs boson.
Grand Unified Theories (GUTs) should give us the nature of the over-
arching or fundamental law. The best candidate could be superstring the-
ory, one of the two major attempts to unify general relativity and quantum 
physics. Particles are described as vibration modes of “superstrings” in a 
10D space. At lower energy, some of the dimensions have to be “compac-
tified,” and to become very small, to make predictions in agreement with 
our observed 3D universe. However, the theory is currently undergoing a 
strong crisis since there seems to be 10500 different ways to compactify the 
extra dimensions. At this stage, either we have to contemplate the possibil-
ity that these 10500 universes actually exist, which Susskind (2008) calls the 
“landscape,” or there is a yet-to-be-found process that makes only one 
compactification possible, which is the hope of those who still defend the 
theory. In any case, the theory is not tested yet, and there are debates 
about the very possibility of its testability.
5.5  The cosT of each opTIon
This brief overview shows that it is not easy to get rid of SAP. As scientists, 
we are not ready to accept the existence of final causes, because this refusal 
is one of the fundamental principles of modern science. We cannot accept 
either the ignorabimus, which is the end of the scientific exploration in a 
whole field of cosmology. Finally, we would be very reluctant to include, 
into the list of our fundamental principles, an anthropic principle that 
seems a completely ad hoc way to solve a potentially fruitful crisis.
Since we cannot be satisfied by final causes, the ignorabimus, or the 
anthropic principle, there is only one option left, that is, the multiverse. It 
seems an attractive solution, because it is suggested by GUTs. However, 
there is a cost for this option, and even a “double” cost. First, it may not 
be testable. Could a non-testable theory be considered as scientific? At this 
stage, we might have to slightly twist the definition of what a scientific 
theory is, by accepting that it may have untestable consequences beyond 
our observable universe, provided there is sufficient evidence within our 
observable universe (evidence which is still missing for the superstring 
theory, Woit 2006; Smolin 2006). Second, are we sure that we have 
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gotten rid of final causes with the whole process of the multiverse? 
Shouldn’t the overarching law that produces the cosmic lottery be consid-
ered “fine- tuned” to be able to produce bio-friendly universes among its 
many duller outcomes?
There are three possible answers to this question. We may find in the 
future that one, and only one, fundamental theory is self-consistent and 
possible. But why would it be this specific theory that makes bio-friendly 
universes possible? Or we may find that several or many theories are self- 
consistent and possible. Maybe all these theories exist in reality, in the 
spirit of the “ultimate ensemble theory” (Tegmark 1998), there is no 
choice, and everything exists. Or maybe only one of these possible over-
arching theories actually exists, and we are led to understand why this one 
rather than another one: there has been a “choice,” which it is difficult to 
attribute to randomness, because randomness presupposes a process for 
the realization of random outcomes, and, by definition, there is no physi-
cal process over the fundamental law.
Of course, it is very difficult to guess whether we shall have hints toward 
one or the other of these three answers in the future. At this stage of bold 
speculations, the preferred option is a matter of faith. In any case, we shall 
always face the issue raised by Leibniz: why is there something rather than 
nothing? And why is there this “something” rather than another one? Or, 
in other words: what is the origin of the substance that makes the world 
(Haeckel 1900)? What puts the “fire in the equations” that transforms 
mathematics into matter (Ferguson 2004)? Is it the mere logic of the only 
possible solution? Or does all what is logically possible have a correspon-
dence in matter? Or is there a still unknown metaphysical process or reality 
that triggers/makes a choice?
Finally, there is another aspect of the issue to be considered. The 
observed fine-tuning favors bio-friendly universes, but is life the rule or 
the exception? Many scientists would think that elementary life might be 
ubiquitous, given the large number of planets in the habitable zones found 
by current surveys. We have no evidence of it, but we hope that, in the 
next decades, we should be able to conduct spectroscopic surveys of bio- 
signatures in a few dozen planets around nearby stars. Only one positive 
result would confirm the intuition of many astrobiologists, while negative 
results would only put a limit on the statistical frequency of life. Now, 
what about observers? So far, the only known observers are present on 
Earth. The problem is that once animals with superior cognitive capabili-
ties appeared on Earth (such as dolphins, elephants, dogs, or apes), it took 
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just a few ten million years to have Homo sapiens, and just a few hundred 
thousand years to have a technologically-developed civilization that would 
be detected through its short wavelength radio wave emissions within a 
sphere of about 70 light-years, that encompasses about 40,000 stars and 
probably a similar number of planets. Why does a whole bunch of evi-
dence, from Fermi’s paradox to the absence of signal in the 60-year old 
SETI surveys, point to the silence of the universe? At this stage of the 
reflection on the “Great Filter” (Hanson 1998; Bostrom 2008), there are 
three possibilities: (i) the “emergence bottleneck,” in which life is a very 
rare event, in the wake of REH; (ii) the “Gaian bottleneck,” in which 
elementary life appears frequently, but vanishes quickly because it is not 
able to control the evolution of the planet, and avoid the transformation 
of the latter into a desert without atmosphere or an ice ball, following a 
scenario that might have been the one on Mars (Chopra and Lineweaver 
2016), or (iii) the “self-destruction bottleneck,” where technologically- 
developed civilizations disappear “just after” they start developing, either 
through war or through the exhaustion of natural resources. Do these 
considerations change the perspective on fine-tuning? It seems that they 
may have at least an ethical consequence. If we are actually alone in the 
(observable) universe, because of one of the three above-mentioned bot-
tlenecks, or maybe the combination of the three, doesn’t this loneliness 
bring back a new centrality to the Earth and give a certain sense of respon-
sibility to the human? It is interesting to note that the multiverse explana-
tion tends to transform SAP into a variant of WAP (we are located in a 
specific location of the multiverse, that is, a bio-friendly universe), and the 
silence of the universe tends to transform WAP into SAP because the large 
bio-friendly universe would have just the single outcome of the human 
kind as observers.
At the end of this overview, let us come back to Monod. For him, the 
world can be fully described by the interplay of chance and necessity. This 
interplay explains the contingency of the human being, and its subsequent 
meaninglessness. With Monod’s words, the human beings appeared by 
chance in an indifferent universe. Necessity is the set of constraints given 
by the laws of nature, within which random processes can unfold. It turns 
out that, with WAP and SAP, this necessity is more constraining than what 
Monod was considering in the 1960s, when he wrote his book. The set of 
constraints tightly corresponds to the possibility of a bio-friendly universe, 
and a small change in these constraints would have the dramatic conse-
quences of making the universe more hostile to life. In this context, the 
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multiverse appears as a solution to release the strong constraints of the 
current laws, by injecting a new dose of randomness in the process, at an 
earlier stage.
With the multiverse, matter is necessary, and all patterns, including the 
derived laws, are the products of randomness and necessity. Necessity is 
now understood as the frame of constraints imposed by the overarching 
law. Is this overarching law necessary (as the only one that is self- consistent), 
or are there various possibilities? No matter the answer, the question 
remains as to what has put “the fire in the equations.” If there are various 
possibilities, we are still facing the classical issue: why is the universe so? 
What gave the preponderance to one choice on another one? Or, to put it 
with Leibniz’s words: “Moreover, if the things have to exist, we have to 
explain why they have to exist in such a way, and not otherwise.”
For a long time ahead, the hypothetical overarching law might appear 
similar to Lucretius’ clinamen,6 something whose action is “just enough” 
to let randomness play its role, but whose origin is mysterious. Believers 
might think they are still right to continue to see it as evidence for provi-
dence in the multiverse. Of course, the multiverse appears to be still larger 
and more astonishing than previous views on the universe. But it is not a 
problem for those who believe in God’s Will and Power. The vast expanses 
of sterile universes in the multiverse might just be a consequence of God’s 
creative power, which makes the overarching law with the purpose of cre-
ating a bio-friendly universe that is not “indifferent,” and ultimately crea-
tures like the Human. “I am the Lord, the God of all mankind. Is there 
anything too difficult for me?” (Jeremiah 32:27).
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CHAPTER 6
Can a Muslim be an Evolutionist?
Caner Taslaman
6.1  Religious AuthoRity
“What should a Muslim reject on religious grounds?” Every Muslim 
denomination affirms the authority of the Quran: every fundamental tenet 
of faith—such as the almightiness and mercy of God, and the Hereafter—
must have a basis in the Quran. A Muslim should reject, then, any claim 
that contradicts any verse, under all plausible interpretations, of the Quran 
(one need not bother with strained or exaggerated interpretations). If a 
claim contradicts a certain interpretation but not another plausible inter-
pretation, it cannot be claimed to conflict with the Quran simpliciter. 
Since the plausible non-contradicting interpretation may be correct, the 
claim may not conflict with the Quran.
Most Muslims also accept the authority of the Hadith, a collection of 
the sayings and actions attributed to the Prophet Mohammed. But the 
Hadith contains some fabricated statements (hadith mawdu) that are 
falsely attributed to the Prophet. Some of these fabrications came from 
Judeo-Christian narratives (referred to as Israilliyyah and Masehiyyah). 
There is an abundance of Hadiths related to the creation of the universe 
and life, details which are not given in the Quran. Since many of these 
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Hadiths are rightly disputed, I will restrict my discussion of whether or not 
the theory of evolution conflicts with Islamic beliefs to the Quran.
Of course, merely not contradicting the Quran does not imply that a 
claim is true. I often start my speeches, “I believe that the theory of evolu-
tion is not in conflict with Islamic belief.” But that claim is not about the 
truth of the theory of evolution. I leave discussions of the truth of evolu-
tion to, for example, biologists and geneticists. While I might similarly 
claim that the helical structure of DNA does not conflict with Islam, I 
leave the determination of the truth of the claim to, say, biochemists. And 
when I say that the Quran doesn’t conflict with the theory of evolution, I 
do not mean that the Quran reveals evolution; yet, these two statements 
are also often mixed up. Likewise, if I were to claim that the helical struc-
ture of DNA does not contradict the correct, I would not mean to say that 
the Quran reveals the helical structure of DNA. I only argue that evolu-
tion is compatible with Islam, not that all Muslims must believe in evolu-
tion. Moreover, I reject the claim that Islam is incompatible with evolution.
Consider, for example, the (false) claim that the moon is bigger than 
the sun does not conflict with Islam. Since the Quran doesn’t mention the 
sizes of the sun and the moon, no claim about their relative size could 
contradict with the Quran. So, although the claim that the moon is larger 
than the sun has been scientifically discredited, it doesn’t contradict 
with Islam.
Likewise, I will argue, no claim about the emergence of life forms and 
humans can contradict Islam. Although the Quran clearly asserts that all 
species of life, including humans, are created by God, it does not reveal 
how God created. Since the Quran doesn’t teach how God created species, 
the Quran is compatible with evolution.
6.2  CReAtion: PRoCessive oR 
instAntAneous CReAtion?
If a painter were to tell us, “I made this painting,” we would understand 
what he means. We would also know that the painting came into existence 
through various processes: the painter bought a canvas and dyes, mixed 
the dyes, stuck the brushes in the dyes and then stroked them on the can-
vas, and so on. “I made this painting” does not contradict the fact that the 
painting was made through these processes. Such processes are integral 
parts of the painter’s creation. Likewise, when God says, “I created the 
heavens” or “I created living beings” or “I created humans,” one should 
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not assume that such expressions imply immediate, processless creation or 
instantaneous comings into existence.
According to Islam, everything that we observe around ourselves is a 
product of God’s creation, which is typically involved in various processes. 
When a Muslim finishes his meal, he says “Alhamdulillah” to thank God 
for the food. However, prior to becoming a meal, the potatoes on the dish 
went through several processes—they grew in the field, were picked by a 
farmer, sold to a grocery, bought by a person, and then cooked. All such 
processes happen thanks to God’s creation of atoms, the earth, life, plants, 
and time. So a Muslim should not claim that creation through processes 
contradicts the existence of God. When a Muslim drinks milk with his 
meal, he might recall: “And, behold, in the cattle there is indeed a lesson for 
you: We [God] give you to drink of that which is secreted from within their 
bellies between that which is to be eliminated from the animal’s body and life- 
blood: milk pure and pleasant to those who drink it ” (Quran 16:66). By 
drinking milk, the grateful Muslim does not reject the facts that the cow 
ate grass, the grass went through many processes in the cow’s body and 
the milk came to the table via the labors of many people. While the verse 
never mentions all of these processes, believing that God works through 
processes does not contradict, “We give you to drink.”
Many claim that Quranic descriptions of God’s creation such as “He 
says: Be, and it is” (Kun fa Yakun) imply a processless creation of life and 
humans.1 But ordering something to be does not imply instantaneous 
(non-processive) causation. It implies only that the command (or will) of 
God was involved in creation. While some translate the Arabic article fa as 
“immediately” and interpret Kun fa Yakun as “He says: Be, and it imme-
diately is,” fa is often understood, in other contexts, as “afterwards, here-
upon,” implying process.
For example, when “He says: Be, and it is” is used in the narration of 
the creation of Jesus, the context suggests a processive creation: “Said she: 
‘O my Sustainer! How can I have a son when no man has ever touched me?’ 
It is answered: ‘Thus it is: God creates what He wills when He wills a thing to 
be, He but says unto it, ‘Be’ – and it is ’” (Quran 3:47). Jesus came into 
existence by God’s order, “Be,” yet according to the Quran, his mother 
carried him in her womb until due time (i.e., processive creation). 
1 The following verses contain the statement “He says: Be, and it is”: Surah al-Baqarah, 
2:117; Surah Ali-Imran, 3:47, 59; Surah al-An’am, 6:73; Suran an-Nahl, 16:40; Surah 
Maryam, 19:35; Surah Ya-Seen, 36:82; Suran al-Mu’min, 40–68.
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Moreover, when the statement “He says: Be, and it is” is used for the cre-
ation of the universe, many Muslims affirm a processive creation; yet they 
thoughtlessly claim that the same expression for the creation of human-
kind implies instantaneousness. There is no reason to interpret the cre-
ation of humankind and Adam (like Jesus and the universe) as 
“instantaneous.”
While verses containing fa and “Be!” express the essentiality (but not 
the immediacy) of God’s will, God’s creation can be processive. Those 
who reject evolution because it would require God to create through pro-
cesses ignore both the Quran’s teaching and God’s creation.
We can come to appreciate the Might and Art of God through the uni-
verse functioning via processive creation. The causal succession of chains 
of events in the universe is a prerequisite for acquiring scientific knowl-
edge. Through scientific knowledge we have learned about the internal 
structure of the stars, the atmosphere around the earth, how bees produce 
honey, and the function of the human. Without appreciating the laws of 
processive creation, it would be impossible to properly comprehend the 
actions of God.
6.3  CReAtion in six stAges (DAys)
Some of the earliest objections to the theory of evolution involved opin-
ions about the ages of the universe and the earth. Christians who took a 
very literal interpretation of Genesis, for example, held that the creation 
lasted just six days. Even today some Christians hold to “Young Earth 
Creationism,” which claims that the creation of the earth happened no 
earlier than 10,000 years ago. But, since our focus is Islam, I ask: Can a 
Muslim accept that the universe is 13.8 billion years and the earth is 4.5 
billion years old? I will argue that this scientific calculation of the age of 
the universe does not contradict Islamic beliefs.
The Christian parallels are not irrelevant since the Quran says the cre-
ation of the universe and the earth in “six stages (days).”2 Do these verses 
contradict the ages of billions of years of the universe and the earth? In the 
Quran, the Arabic word used to describe “six stages/days,” yawm, has the 
same etymological roots as the Hebrew word “yom.” Likewise, yawm can 
2 The verses where “six stages/days” occurs are: Surah al-Araf, 7:54; Surah Yunus, 10:3; 
Surad Hud, 11:7; Surah al-Furqan, 25:59; Surah as-Sajdah, 32:4; Surah Qaf, 50:38; Surah 
al-Hadeed, 57:4.
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mean both “24-hours” and “stage” or “period of time.” We find such 
interpretations in Islamic literature centuries before modern scientific 
views on the age of the universe. Moreover, in the Quran itself yawm refers 
to 50,000 years and 1000 years, consistent with a “stage” interpretation. 
These verses are:
Sajdah, 32:5- He governs all that exists, from the celestial space to the earth; 
and in the end all shall ascend unto Him on a Day the length whereof will be 
like a thousand years of your reckoning.
Ma’arij, 70:4- All the angels and all the inspiration ascend unto Him, in a 
day the length whereof is like fifty thousand years.
Since the Quran doesn’t commit Muslims to creation in six literal 24-hour 
days, the geological and paleontological findings indicating that the uni-
verse is billions of years old did not ignite any religion-science clashes in 
the Islamic world.
6.4  CReAtion of MAn fRoM ClAy
The most common Muslim rejection of evolution involves the creation of 
man from clay.
An’am, 6:2- He it is who has created you out of clay, and then has decreed a 
term for you—a term known only to him. And yet you doubt.
While the creation of Adam (with name explicitly mentioned) from dust is 
mentioned only once (Surah Al-i Imran, verse 59), several verses mention 
the creation of man from dust and water (clay). For example: We have cre-
ated you out of dust (Surah al-Hajj, verse 5); Now, indeed, We create man 
out of the essence of clay (Surah al-Muminoon, verse 12); He creates you out 
of dust (Surah ar-Room, verse 20). Since the verses that describe the cre-
ation of the first man also describe the creation of all humanity, let us 
approach a Quranic understanding of the creation of the first man through 
an understanding of the creation of all humans.
We are often misled by far out interpretations instead of the simplest 
and clearest explanation that stands before us. What is that simple explana-
tion? Our food comes from animals and plants. When a seed is planted in 
the soil, it germinates and develops into a full plant by mixing together 
water and soil (clay, mud); when animals eat these plants, they digest and 
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re-generate them into body parts. For example, a corn seed is thrown into 
the soil, the seed takes water and minerals from the soil and becomes a 
mature plant, the corn is then fed to a chicken, the chicken modifies the 
corn and distributes its constituents to its body. Both plants and animals 
are formed via modifications of the raw materials present in mud. And 
when we eat animals, their body parts become ours. The raw materials of 
me, then, are the plants and animals that I eat, which are in essence a pro-
cessed version of mud. We ourselves are formed by the processing of clay. The 
body of every single human being is continually formed (created) from 
body parts of plants and animals. In short, creation from clay is not an 
instantaneous, completed process. Indeed, every element in our bodies, 
iron, oxygen, calcium, zinc, and so on, is present in the soil. Without alle-
gorical or strained interpretation, these verses describe the regular, proces-
sive creation of all humans from clay. Hence, evolution should not be 
ruled out because the Quran affirms “creation from clay.”
The Quran also describes the “creation from clay” as an initial stage, 
which “beginning” (badaa) implies the occurrence of other stages:
Makes most excellent everything that He creates. Thus, He begins the creation of 
man out of clay. Sajdah, 32:7
When someone produces something out of a certain material, he could 
describe the process by making reference to the material. A sculptor, for 
example, might say “I made the statue from marble.” When we hear such 
commonly used language, we do not assume that the marble didn’t require 
shaping and polishing. Why, then, assume that “I created men from clay” 
implies a lack of processes? Pointing to the raw material does not imply no 
process. If there is no problem understanding a sculptor processing the 
raw materials into products, there is no problem thinking that God creates 
through intermediary processes. “Creation from clay,” then, is a short-
hand specification of the raw materials of every human being, not a denial 
that the clay becomes a human being through a divinely guided process.
So when Prophet Saleh tells his people “He brought you into being out of 
the earth” (Quran, Surah Hud, verse 61), nobody takes this verse to mean 
that people emerge from the earth without the involvement of parents or 
biological processes. If divine creation implies lack of processes, then 
should we understand this verse as meaning the immediate creation of the 
people from earth, which is ludicrous.
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The Muslim, then, rejects the claim that God does not create humans 
through physical and chemical processes (from clay to animals and plants 
to humans). God, the Quran tells us, governs all these processes with the 
intention of creating animals and humans. Biology is the branch of science 
that tells us how God did it. Theologically speaking, no biological descrip-
tion (correct or not) of the formation of life out of lifeless raw materials 
(e.g., clay) can contradict creation as taught by Islam.
6.5  huMAn Dignity, CoMMon AnCestRy
Muslim’s reject evolution on the basis of the theory’s claim of common 
ancestry between humans and animals, particularly with the apes. I often 
hear rejections of evolution expressed as follows: “My grandfather is not 
an ape!” However, when asked to specify which verses of the Quran speak 
against common ancestry, critics have little to say. However, some claim 
that descent from apes would be against human dignity. In this chapter, I 
will consider objections related to human dignity.
The establishment of an ancestral relationship between humans and 
apes does not jeopardize human dignity. In the Quran, Satan is censured 
for his arrogance in claiming his origins superior to that of man, thereby 
rising against God.3 From this, should we understand that the Quran con-
demns ancestral arrogance. Rooting human dignity in ancestry lacks a 
Quranic foundation.
Consider Pharaoh and Abu Lahab: humans share ancestry with them, 
yet sharing ancestry with wicked people is no detriment to human dignity! 
If the existence of such wicked people among our species does not dimin-
ish our dignity, why would ancestry shared with an animal? Indeed, the 
fiercest enemies of the Prophet Muhammad, Abu Lahab and Abu Caheel, 
were his relatives. If being related to a bad person diminished human dig-
nity, it would follow that the Prophet Muhammad lacked dignity. But no 
Muslim would accept such a claim. Ancestry has nothing to do with dig-
nity. Is the claim of common ancestry of humans with fish or apes worse 
than the claim of shared ancestry with Pharoah or Abu Lahab?
Indeed, while Pharoah and Abu Lahab are censured in the Quran, fish 
and apes are not. So why should one feel uncomfortable about sharing 
ancestry with animals which are not scorned in the Quran, yet feel no 
3 Surad Sad, 38:76.
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discomfort about sharing ancestry with those that the Quran declares as 
worse than animals?
The compatibility of evolution with human dignity does not imply that 
evolution is Islamically correct or that it should be accepted. That would 
require an assessment of the evidences of biology, geology, paleontology, 
and so on. Nevertheless, there is no Quranic basis for rejecting evolution 
from an Islamic perspective on human dignity.
6.6  Nafsi Wahida: DesCent fRoM ADAM AnD eve?
While some Muslims hold that non-human species were created through 
evolution, humans, they claim, are an exception. However, as we’ve been 
arguing, there is no Islamic problem in believing that God created all liv-
ing beings, including humans, through evolutionary processes. How, 
then, should we understand the Quran’s claim of “creation out of one 
kind/entity” (nafsi wahida):
O humankind! Be conscious of your Sustainer, who has created you out of one 
kind, and out of it created its mate, and out of the two spread abroad a multi-
tude of men and women. (Nisa, 4:1)
Some theologians interpret “one living kind/entity” (nafsi wahida) as the 
creation of Eve4 from Adam’s rib and the descent of all humankind from 
this first couple. However, the Quran says nothing about the creation of Eve 
from Adam’s rib. That belief snuck into Muslim thought from the Judeo-
Christian tradition (Isra’iliyyat), which contains many apocryphal narra-
tives. Hence, Muslims should not base religious views on such narratives.
This narrative is also exploited for the denigration of women—wom-
an’s creation from and for man grounds, some say, the ontological inferi-
ority of women to men. Some also claim that since woman was created 
from an errant rib, she has an inborn tendency to go astray. Again, the 
Quran neither contains nor tolerates such sexist arguments.5
The creation of humanity out of a single kind is more properly under-
stood as asserting that men and women are members of the same species 
(Yar 2011, 78–79). So we read in the following verses the Arabic word 
nafs as meaning “kind”:
4 The name “Eve” does not occur in the Quran.
5 For more on this subject, see Barlas (2002, 133–36).
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He creates for you mates out of your own kind (nafs).6 Room, 30:21-
he raised up in their midst an apostle from among themselves (nafs). Ali Imran, 3:164-
The first verse emphasizes the creation of mates of the same kind, and the 
second speaks of messengers of the same kind (the apostles were not chosen 
from among angels). Since neither mates nor apostles were created from the 
body parts of humans, the term “creation out of one kind/entity (nafsi 
wahida)” should be taken to mean “as members of the same, human species.”
The Quranic claim that humans are created out of one kind, then, does 
not imply that Adam was created instantaneously out of the clay and that 
Eve was created out of Adam’s rib (and all subsequent humans created 
from this first couple). It implies something much simpler—all human 
beings are of the same species. As such, it doesn’t conflict with evolution-
ary theory. And, so, evolutionary theory does not conflict with Islam 
properly understood.
6.7  theologiCAl AgnostiCisM
So far, I have attempted to show that the theory of evolution is compatible 
with belief in God, and that from an Islamic perspective there is no need 
to oppose this theory. I argued that Quranic terminologies such as “cre-
ation from clay” and “nafsi wahida” do not require the rejection of evolu-
tion. Moreover, I reject the claim that the Quran teaches or even implies 
the theory of evolution. Combined, these arguments show that it is impos-
sible to argue for or against the theory of evolution based solely on the 
content of the Quran. The best stance for a Muslim, then, is to evaluate 
the scientific-philosophical aspects of the theory independently of reli-
gious concerns; that is, Muslims should be theologically agnostic about 
evolution. By theological agnosticism, I mean that since the Quran neither 
favors nor rejects the theory, a Muslim should, with respect to theology, be 
agnostic about whether or not evolution is true; the Quran neither affirms 
nor denies the truth of evolution. Therefore, a Muslim can and should in 
good faith focus entirely on the scientific aspects of the theory (safely set-
ting religious considerations aside).
I do not use the term “theological agnosticism” in its common sense of 
“God is unknowable.” The Quran affirms both the existence and 
6 See also Surah an-Nahl, 16:72; Surah ash-Shu’ra, 42:11.
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attributes of God (such as God’s Knowledge and Power). And it reveals 
the creation of life by God. So a Muslim should not be agnostic about 
God’s existence and some of God’s attributes.
So while the Quran reveals that God is Creator, it does not reveal how 
God created. So, rationally, the Muslim should be theologically agnostic 
about God’s methods, when viewed from a purely religious angle. Indeed, 
Muslims should be theologically agnostic about every scientific issue that 
does not conflict with the Quran. So, for example, Muslims should be 
theologically agnostic about the precise number of continents or planets 
(let geology and astronomy answer those questions for us). And since the 
Quran doesn’t specify, we should be theologically agnostic about whether 
species were created independently or evolved from each other (let biol-
ogy, say, or paleontology tell us).
Theological agnosticism does not imply scientific agnosticism—while 
Muslim theology does not tell us the number of planets or continents, 
various sciences do. And theological agnosticism does not imply that a 
Muslim should be scientifically agnostic about evolution. A Muslim should 
carefully consider the relevant sciences to determine their rational belief. A 
Muslim, then, can consider evolution with either prejudice or fear. She has 
no theological stake on the issues. Muslims should reach their opinions 
about evolution on the basis of scientific evidence and without any reli-
gious concerns, just as they do when assessing theories of light, fluid 
dynamics, or Einstein’s general theory of relativity.
What does the scientific evidence say about the theory of evolution? 
While there are still issues outstanding, it is the most successful scientific 
theory of all of it alternatives. Indeed, there is a marvelous beauty in this 
theory as it relates all living beings to each other and reveals a kind of unity 
in life.
If God has not revealed an issue to us, it is best to say, “I do not know” 
(theologically) and turn, again without prejudice or fear, to the relevant 
sciences.
6.8  ConClusion
I have distinguished the question “Can a Muslim be an evolutionist?” 
from the debate about the correctness of the theory, and focused on the 
former. I have argued that a Muslim can, without prejudice or fear, accept 
evolution. The Quran, clearly considered, offers no verses that contradict 
the theory of evolution. Therefore, a Muslim can believe in evolution. I 
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have not claimed that a Muslim must accept evolution. Just as the Quran 
contains no verse that conflicts with the theory, no verse in the Quran 
obligates believing in the theory either.
I have defended theological agnosticism about evolution, holding that 
the acceptance or rejection of evolution is not determined from an Islamic 
perspective; theologically, Muslims should be agnostic about the theory. 
Our judgment about the theory, then, should be based on the relevant 
scientific evidence. So, although I am theologically agnostic about evolu-
tion, I am convinced that the theory of evolution is the most successful 
scientific explanation among its alternatives.
Since the theory of evolution is not in conflict with Islam, Muslim 
thinkers can relax and approach the topic with open-mindedness, scruti-
nizing evolution in the light of scientific findings and philosophical evalu-
ations, and thereby arrive at their own considered conclusions about 
evolution.
BiBliogRAPhy
Barlas, Asma. 2002. Believing Women. In Islam: Unreading Patriarchal 
Interpretations of the Qur’an̄. Austin: University of Texas Press.
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CHAPTER 7
Chance, Evolution, and the Metaphysical 
Implications of Paleontological Practice
Alan C. Love
7.1  Evolutionary MEtanarrativEs
Stories are narratives that connect agents and events in causal relations to 
show a particular path through a welter of possibility (Beatty 2016). A 
subspecies is metanarrative, which is intended to interpret or explain life 
circumstances and bring meaning to isolated events by setting them within 
the context of an overarching pattern. A metanarrative typically offers a 
framework for structuring and justifying the beliefs and practices of indi-
viduals, groups, and societies. Throughout human history, metanarratives 
have been pervasive and are associated with religious, political, or social 
institutions that perpetuate asymmetric power relations between groups of 
people. This suggests that metanarratives might be less common in the 
realm of scientific inquiry where many of their aspects have been called 
into question, if not significantly undermined. However, their ubiquity 
might also indicate that metanarratives should be expected among 
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communities of scientists, even if they take on distinctive shapes and con-
tours (Beatty 2017; Losos 2017).1
For more than two decades, a protracted debate has been waged over 
how to interpret the wider significance of fossils from the Burgess Shale 
and the Cambrian Explosion. On the side of contingency that empha-
sizes unpredictability, Stephen Jay Gould argued that if the “tape of 
life” was rerun, then the lineages that resulted would differ radically 
from what we find today (Gould 1989). One implication is that the 
human species is a happy accident, a pure gift of chance from the evolu-
tionary process. On the side of convergence that emphasizes repeatabil-
ity, Simon Conway Morris argued that if the “tape of life” was rerun, 
the lineages that resulted would be largely similar to what we now 
observe (Conway Morris 1998). A significant implication is that intel-
ligence would still emerge from the evolutionary process (Conway 
Morris 2003). Although diametrically opposed, both sides provide an 
explanatory metanarrative with a basis in evolutionary biology seen spe-
cifically through the lens of paleontology and its efforts to reconstruct 
the history of life from the fossil record. Conway Morris and Gould set 
forth overarching interpretations of life circumstances that bring mean-
ing (or not) to isolated evolutionary events by contextualizing them 
within a pattern of history which can structure and justify beliefs about 
what it means to be human.
A central inferential maneuver of these metanarratives is that the suc-
cess of evolutionary science (primarily) and paleontology (in particular) 
justifies the perspective on offer. This move—from scientific success to 
general metaphysical conclusions about what the world is ultimately like—
is common and has been scrutinized extensively by philosophers in the 
context of questions about scientific realism. An assumption pervading 
these analyses is that the relevant success is located in the performance of 
scientific theories or their component features, such as whether a theory 
has made novel predictions: “Scientific realism is a positive epistemic atti-
tude towards the content of our best theories and models” (Chakravartty 
2017). However, as Ian Hacking argued several decades ago, “One can 
believe in some entities without believing in any particular theory in which 
1 Metanarratives are not scientific theories. Although there can be implicit theories that 
structure and guide inquiry, there also are situations where metanarratives operate in science, 
such as by constraining explanatory options or as supposed outcomes of successful investiga-
tion. The latter possibility is in view here.
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they are embedded” (Hacking 1983, 29). Hacking concentrated on visu-
alization practices in microscopy to illustrate this point, bequeathing to 
philosophy the memorable slogan in relation to electron microscopy: “if 
you can spray them then they are real” (23).
Assuming the sciences are a—if not the most—reliable way to learn 
about the way the world is, then the successes of science are a good place 
to work out the structures of reality (i.e., metaphysics). However, we 
know from history that scientists can be dramatically wrong. The suc-
cesses of today could be the failures of tomorrow. Empirically successful 
theories of the past have subsequently been falsified and rejected. Why 
think anything different will obtain for current theories? Part of the moti-
vation for shifting from theories to practices is that many practices have 
been stable across dramatic changes in scientific theories. For example, 
genetic approaches have been in use for more than 100  years despite 
major changes in our understanding of the nature of heredity and concept 
of the gene (Waters 2017). Practice-based knowledge is a distinct locus 
for scrutinizing the success of evolutionary science, and paleontology in 
particular.
Recent methodological innovations in paleontological practice, in 
combination with empirical work in evolutionary biology (Blount et al. 
2018; Losos 2017), call into question whether either of the metanarra-
tives put forward by Gould or Conway Morris is justified. These practices 
illustrate how analyzing fossils in terms of parts (traits) and wholes (e.g., 
organisms, lineages) advances our understanding of character evolution 
and suggest that global claims about the history of life, whether in terms 
of essential contingency or predictable convergence, are unwarranted 
(Hopkins and Lidgard 2012; Hunt et al. 2015; Lidgard and Love 2018). 
Do these successful practices harbor other metaphysical implications? 
Possibly, but in a much more piecemeal fashion than is conducive to meta-
narrative. Instead of an epic saga or metanarrative, successful scientific 
practices are better suited to circumscribed narrative genres, such as a 
short story. They seldom lead to global metaphysical conclusions of the 
kind that have been at stake in ongoing debates about the history of life. 
However, they can provide fodder for theological analysis and I explore 
some possible directions of inquiry related to implications of these suc-
cessful paleontological practices for aspects of standard conceptions of 
divine providence.
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7.2  ChanCE and ContingEnCy vErsus ConvErgEnCE 
and PrEdiCtability in thE history of lifE
Surviving rocks of the Ediacaran period (~635–541 million years ago 
[mya]) and Cambrian period (541–485 mya) chronicle a complex evolu-
tionary transformation, culminating with the appearance of Cambrian fos-
sils that represent multicellular animals and exemplify characteristic 
features of extant phyla (Erwin and Valentine 2013). The appearance of 
these fossils in the Cambrian Explosion over a short span of geological 
time, and at this time and not earlier or later, constitutes an enduring evo-
lutionary problem (Erwin et al. 2011; Marshall 2006; but see Wood et al. 
2019). Several Cambrian localities of exquisite preservation contain large 
numbers of individuals in a wider array of taxa than normally observed and 
exhibit rare detail for both soft and hard tissues. The Burgess Shale in 
Canada (508 mya) is arguably the most famous of these (Briggs et  al. 
1994), especially because of beguiling arrangements of morphology, such 
as the five-eyed and stalk-mouthed arthropod Opabinia regalis.
Although ongoing research is helping to elaborate and refine multidis-
ciplinary explanations of this distinctive event in Earth history, much of 
the controversy has revolved around what kind of meaning or wider sig-
nificance the Cambrian Explosion, and Burgess Shale in particular, has for 
understanding who we are as humans. The competing evolutionary meta-
narratives of contingency (Gould 1989) and convergence (Conway Morris 
2003) have dominated this discussion, both of which move from the suc-
cess of evolutionary science and paleontology to metaphysical conclusions 
about what the world is ultimately like.
7.2.1  Contingency
Gould’s argument for the contingency metanarrative begins with a 
thought experiment about what would happen if evolution “started over”, 
especially at the dawn of animal life reflected in the Cambrian Explosion. 
It was framed in terms of a technology that has largely (though not wholly) 
been superseded: magnetic tape data storage.
I call this experiment “replaying life’s tape.” You press the rewind button 
and, making sure you thoroughly erase everything that actually happened, 
go back to any time and place in the past—say, to the seas of the Burgess 
Shale. Then let the tape run again and see if the repetition looks at all like 
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the original. … I believe that the reconstructed Burgess fauna, interpreted 
by the theme of replaying life’s tape, offers powerful support for this differ-
ent view of life: any replay of the tape would lead evolution down a pathway 
radically different from the road actually taken. (Gould 1989, 48, 51)
The phrase “view of life” is intentional as Gould is explicit in drawing out 
the metaphysical implications of this paleontological success: “This … 
alternative represents no more nor less than the essence of history. Its 
name is contingency” (51). The invocation of essences signals a meta-
physical picture:
This book is about the nature of history and the overwhelming improbabil-
ity of human evolution under themes of contingency and the metaphor of 
replaying life’s tape. It focuses upon the new interpretation of the Burgess 
Shale as our finest illustration of what contingency implies in our quest to 
understand the evolution of life. (51)
Three elements of Gould’s argument need to be recognized. The first is 
that contingency is used in two distinct ways (Beatty 2006). One sense of 
contingency is unpredictability or contingency per se. If you stood at the 
origination point for the playing of the tape, the sheer number of possible 
combinations that could occur through time would make it impossible to 
predict the direction of evolution (unless you were an omniscient Laplacian 
demon). Hence, we get “the overwhelming improbability of human evo-
lution.” The second sense of contingency is causal dependence or the 
effect of a historical pathway (contingent upon). Current products of the 
evolutionary process, such as humans, are conditioned by a host of detailed 
prior states that were necessary to yield a particular outcome. This aug-
ments the metanarrative because the influence of causal history means any 
present outcome is unique or contingent upon many details of depen-
dence that could have been different on many occasions by virtue of con-
tingency per se.
The second element of Gould’s argument is the contrast class to con-
tingency. He frames two distinct and mutually exclusive possibilities for 
the outcome of replaying life’s tape. Why did only a small number of phyla 
or major taxa persist compared with the many that arose in the early 
Cambrian period (at least on this reconstruction of the Burgess Shale)? 
The first possibility is that the survivors (including our ancestors) were 
much better adapted to their environments. If we replayed the tape over 
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and over again, we would get similar outcomes (i.e., convergence arising 
from adaptive evolution to similar environments; see §2.3). “If each replay 
strongly resembles life’s actual pathway, then we must conclude that what 
really happened pretty much had to occur” (Gould 1989, 48). The second 
possibility is that the survivors (including our ancestors) were lucky, win-
ning a lottery among equally, if differently, adapted forms. Replays of the 
tape would yield different outcomes, “results strikingly different from the 
actual history of life” (48). This contrast can be applied directly to think-
ing about human existence. Why did Pikaia—the first known chordate 
and possibly an ancestor of vertebrates, including humans—persist, rather 
than Opabinia? Gould affirms the second possibility: “replay the tape a 
million times from a Burgess beginning, and I doubt that anything like 
Homo sapiens would ever evolve again. … Wind the tape of life back to 
Burgess times, and let it play again. If Pikaia does not survive in the replay, 
we are wiped out of future history” (289, 323).2
A third element in Gould’s argument is a different interpretation of 
patterns of diversity through the history of life. He accuses evolutionary 
biologists of harboring a default assumption that there is a gradual and 
steady increase of species diversity through evolutionary time (a cone of 
increasing diversity). However, the lottery-style survivorship of some 
major taxa rather than others in the Cambrian points to a different model 
of diversification—decimation followed by diversification—in which an 
initially large amount of diversity is severely pruned and followed by sub-
sequent diversification occurring within surviving lineages. This illustrates 
the previous two elements because the decimation-diversification model 
accents both senses of contingency and aligns with the second interpreta-
tion of surviving lineages winning the evolutionary lottery and diversify-
ing into many different and uniquely adapted forms.
These three elements—(1) two senses of contingency, (2) contingency 
and convergence as mutually exclusive options, and (3) the decimation- 
diversification model of diversity—together comprise Gould’s argument 
that replaying life’s tape supports an evolutionary metanarrative of contin-
gency. This is a metaphysical conclusion based on the paleontological 
achievement of having reconstructed the Burgess Shale fossils, justifying 
the claim that they have implications for human existence. “The animals of 
2 Gould does not claim that Pikaia is actually ancestral in the human lineage. For literary 
purposes, he has it stand in for a small group of chordate taxa extant in the early Cambrian.
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the Burgess Shale are holy objects—in the unconventional sense that this 
word conveys in some cultures. … we greet them with awe because they 
are the Old Ones, and they are trying to tell us something” (Gould 
1989, 52).
7.2.2  Convergence
Simon Conway Morris, one of the paleontologists involved in reconstruct-
ing Burgess Shale fossils, agrees that the fossils have something to say, but 
disagrees about what they are trying to tell us. Conway Morris thinks the 
message affirms the first possibility of convergence—the independent evo-
lution of similar traits due to similar environmental circumstances. If we 
replayed life’s tape, we would get a very similar outcome.
The reason for discussing convergence here is that its recognition effectively 
undermines the main plank in Gould’s argument on the role of contingent 
processes in shaping the tree of life. … Contingency is inevitable, but unre-
markable. It need not provoke discussion, because it matters not. There are 
not an unlimited number of ways of doing something. For all its exuber-
ance, the forms of life are restricted and channelled. (Conway Morris 1998, 13)
Conway Morris went on to provide a systematic synthesis of convergence 
phenomena from different levels of organization across life’s phylogenetic 
tree: “the recurrent tendency of biological organization to arrive at the 
same ‘solution’ to a particular ‘need’” (Conway Morris 2003, xii). Icons 
such as the kiwi bird, which has well-developed senses of smell and hear-
ing, a face covered with “whiskers,” bones containing marrow instead of 
air sacs, and shaggy, hair-like plumage, help to illustrate how a common 
niche for ground animals in New Zealand—where there were no mam-
mals—originally facilitated such an evolutionary outcome. The implica-
tion from the evolutionary metanarrative giving meaning to human 
existence is stated forthrightly in the subtitle (“Inevitable Humans in a 
Lonely Universe”) and preface: “[my] aim is to argue that, contrary to 
received wisdom, the emergence of human intelligence is a near- 
inevitability” (xii).
Empirical warrant for Conway Morris’s argument is the existence of 
recurring patterns in evolutionary outcomes across diverse taxa, whether 
it is the camera eyes of cephalopods and vertebrates, the farming practices 
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of humans and ants, or the rodent-like features of the kiwi. These patterns 
show that the number of evolutionary possibilities is limited by the opera-
tion of natural selection in similar environments and therefore the explo-
sion of combinatorics that Gould appealed to with contingency per se is 
rendered moot. The restrictions and channels exhibited by these patterns 
make it possible to predict many evolutionary outcomes.
The constraints we see on evolution suggest that underlying the apparent 
riot of forms there is an interesting predictability. This suggests that the role 
of contingency in individual history has little bearing on the likelihood of 
the emergence of a particular biological property. (Conway Morris 
1998, 139)
These patterns also diverge from the expectations of both models of diver-
sity in the history of life discussed by Gould. Instead of a gradual increase 
of diversity or an initial burst of diversity followed by substantial pruning, 
Conway Morris favors a rapid increase of diversity in the Cambrian fol-
lowed by a slower general increase over time afterward (207). Notably, he 
does not take issue with the causal dependence thesis (contingent upon) 
because he acknowledges that the camera eye of a squid will be condi-
tioned by its molluscan heritage in a way that differs from the camera eye 
of a primate.
Conway Morris, similar to Gould, is explicit in emphasizing that an 
argument is being made from our understanding of the Burgess Shale—
successful paleontological science—to implications for what it means to 
be human.
The reality of convergence suggests that the tape of life, to use Gould’s 
metaphor, can be run as many times as we like and in principle intelligence 
will surely emerge. … we muddy the waters of the debate if we fail to 
acknowledge that the processes of evolution have metaphysical implications 
for us. (14)
However, the implications are dramatically different. For Gould, “perhaps 
we are only an afterthought, a kind of cosmic accident, just one bauble on 
the Christmas tree of evolution” (Gould 1989, 44). For Conway Morris, 
“there is inherent in our human situation the possibility of transcendence” 
(Conway Morris 1998, 14).
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7.2.3  Contemporary Coda
Since the initial articulation of these two evolutionary metanarratives, a 
number of relevant scientific developments have occurred (reviewed in 
Erwin 2016). These remind us that we should be cautious about drawing 
metaphysical implications from both successful scientific theories and 
practices because their fortunes can change. One example of this in the 
present context is a change in taxonomic methodology that prompted a 
revisionary understanding of the Burgess Shale fossils (Brysse 2008). The 
change occurred with the adoption of cladistic methods for reconstructing 
phylogenies within paleontology and included a key distinction between 
stem groups and crown groups. A crown group is a “monophyletic clade” 
(a group consisting of a species and all its descendants) of extant species 
that trace back to a last common ancestor and include extinct representa-
tives derived from this common ancestor. A stem group is a “paraphyletic 
clade” (a group consisting of some but not all descendants of the last com-
mon ancestor); it contains extinct members of a monophyletic clade that 
are not part of the phylogenetic branch of the crown group. The common 
ancestor of the clade is not part of either group. This distinction makes it 
possible for there to be unique and distinctive features in a stem group 
(e.g., the five eyes and stalked mouth of Opabinia), even though by virtue 
of other traits (e.g., body segmentation) it is part of an extant major taxon 
(e.g., arthropods). “Since 1989, cladistic analyses have accommodated 
most of the problematic Cambrian taxa as stem groups of living taxa” 
(Briggs and Fortey 2005, 96; cf. Brysse 2008).
This change in taxonomic methodology and reclassification of Burgess 
Shale fossils undermined Gould’s decimation-diversification model, which 
depended on interpreting the weird wonders as distinct phyla or major 
groups that went extinct in the Cambrian. However, this was not as cen-
tral as the other elements of Gould’s argument (two senses of contingency 
and contingency vs. convergence as mutually exclusive options). These 
remained intact and inspired a wide range of empirical tests (Blount et al. 
2018). Most prominent among these are experimental evolutionary stud-
ies (e.g., Good et al. 2017). In these experiments, replicate populations 
are propagated under highly controlled conditions (e.g., with a small set 
of known environmental variables and already characterized genotypes). 
These populations are monitored for evolutionary changes in gene fre-
quencies or the origin of an ability to metabolize a novel resource. Causal 
dependence (history), contingency per se (chance), and deterministic 
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processes (natural selection/convergence) can be evaluated quantitatively 
and repeatedly, effectively running life’s tape again and again on small 
scales. Adjustments can be made in the initial conditions and environmen-
tal circumstances modified in a precise manner. Biologists can scrutinize 
what happened at a particular stage of the experiment and possibly design 
additional experiments to test new hypotheses.
Other relevant empirical demonstrations involve natural experiments, 
such as evolutionary patterns associated with the repeated colonization of 
islands by Anolis lizards after severe weather events (Losos 2017; Stroud 
and Losos 2016), as well as documentation of repeatability in genotypic 
and phenotypic evolution (Orgogozo 2015). Overall, the message emerg-
ing from these different scientific studies does not support either evolu-
tionary metanarrative. Both contingency and convergence are present 
heterogeneously across taxa undergoing evolutionary change in different 
traits at a variety of levels of organization.3 If there is any tendency across 
the history of life, evolutionary repeatability and predictability are more 
reliably (though not exclusively) observed in closely related lineages, 
whereas contingency is more typical (though not universal) as historical 
depth, phylogenetic distance, and ecological difference increase (Blount 
et al. 2018). However, these experimental studies are not primarily about 
the fossil record and have focused on microevolutionary processes. 
Whether that means their results should count more or less (or the same) 
in the context of evaluating evolutionary metanarratives is an open point 
of debate (Desjardins 2016; Turner 2011). At a minimum, it is profitable 
to see how the evolutionary metanarratives are undermined by actual pale-
ontological practices—studies of the fossil record.
7.3  ChanCE and sElECtion in thE fossil rECord: 
suCCEssful PalEontologiCal PraCtiCEs
Paleontological practices have been in the foreground of Burgess Shale 
discoveries from the beginning. Infamously, the iconic taxon Hallucigenia 
sparsa was reconstructed incorrectly (Brysse 2008). Related difficulties in 
reconstructing and classifying Burgess Shale fossils resulted from a 
3 “Although Gould’s ideas on contingency have stimulated a great deal of productive work, 
his view that contingent effects were pervasive throughout evolution remains debatable. … 
Clearly, evolution can be both contingent and deterministic, and often in complicated and 
fascinating ways” (Blount et al. 2018, 8).
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standard problem for paleontology: the differential preservation or co- 
location of organismal parts. For example, Anomalocaris canadensis was 
first described based on a headless carapace in 1892 (Brysse 2008). Two 
other supposed fossil animals, the jellyfish Peytoia and the sponge 
Laggania, turned out to be isolated body parts from Anomalocaris. The 
situation was resolved only after a more complete specimen was recovered 
in 1981. This showed that the original “carapace” was a disarticulated 
frontal feeding appendage, the amorphous “sponge” a portion of the 
body, and the circular “jellyfish” its mouth. However, in many cases, there 
is not a complete specimen that resolves all of these parts into clarified 
locations within an organism and nearly all fossil specimens are incomplete 
(i.e., based off of a partial set of fossilized traits). This points us to a signifi-
cant aspect of how paleontologists operate as scientists.
All scientific practice involves using proxies—measurements of particu-
lar properties that stand in for something else. For example, phylogenetic 
systematic methods encourage treating taxa (wholes) as aggregates of 
traits (parts). In paleontological analyses, hard body parts are more avail-
able and abundant than soft body parts. The hard body parts serve as 
proxies for the lineages studied, frequently in the absence of any preserved 
soft body parts. This is applicable to both classification and testing hypoth-
eses about chance and natural selection in the fossil record. When scien-
tists are interested in evaluating questions about whether a lineage is 
convergent (due to natural selection) or contingent (due to chance fac-
tors), then an ambiguity can emerge between and among morphological 
and molecular parts and whole organisms or genomes of a lineage or clade 
that contain these parts. Does one body part (e.g., a skeletal element) 
represent the evolutionary dynamics of other characters in the lineage 
(e.g., a genomic element)? This is common practice in paleontology: sin-
gle size and shape characters are often taken to represent a species or lin-
eage in quantitative studies of evolutionary modes (Hopkins and 
Lidgard 2012).
Newer analyses where multiple characters are recorded for the same 
species or lineage frequently distinguish different evolutionary modes for 
different characters (Hopkins and Lidgard 2012; Hunt et al. 2015; Voje 
et al. 2018). This can be illustrated with a hypothetical lineage of fossil fish 
(Fig. 7.1). Many characters are available to represent the lineage. Of those 
available, a subset is selected to be measured and represent the lineage (in 
this case, eye width, tail fin length, and pectoral fin length). After doing 
the quantitative analysis, each of the three characters is best accounted for 
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by a different model of evolutionary change: gradualism for eye width, 
random walk for tail fin length, and stasis for pectoral fin length. If we had 
only used a single size or shape character, it would have generated a differ-
ent perspective on the evolutionary trajectory of the fossil fish lineage. 
More abstractly, there is a complicated relationship between parts and 
wholes through evolutionary time (Losos 2017).
Fig. 7.1 Distinct evolutionary trajectories of different traits in a hypothetical fos-
sil fish lineage exemplify results from hundreds of published studies (Hopkins and 
Lidgard 2012; Hunt et al. 2015). (a) Population samples are taken at successive 
intervals from sedimentary layers that contain fossils. (b) Characters are measured 
for each sample. Different evolutionary modes are seen in character trajectories 
plotted against stratigraphic positions for eye width (c), tail fin length (d), and 
pectoral fin length (e). Illustration: Monica Jurik. (Source: Lidgard and Love 
(2018). Reproduced by kind permission of Oxford University Press on behalf of 
the American Institute of Biological Sciences under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License [http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by- nc/4.0/])
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When this type of analysis is performed on marine invertebrate taxa 
with good preservation and well-sampled vertical distributions of fossils in 
the geological column, single traits frequently show different evolutionary 
modes in the same sequence (e.g., chance, then selection, then chance). 
This diachronic complexity of evolutionary change increases as a greater 
number of traits is measured. Mosaic patterns of trait evolution are com-
mon in the fossil record. Researchers can empirically detect both selection 
(in the form of directional change or stasis) and chance (in the form of a 
random walk), and both of these are present heterogeneously across the 
measured characters in taxa undergoing evolutionary change. Additionally, 
sequences of fossils with more representatives (i.e., more samples in a 
sequence) are more likely to display complex modes of evolutionary 
change (e.g., random walk followed by stasis) rather than simple modes 
(e.g., random walk alone or stasis alone) (Hunt et al. 2015). Thus, the 
same organismal part is subject to varying dynamics of evolutionary 
change over time in a lineage rather than being primarily the result of a 
single evolutionary mode (e.g., directional change).
Although there is an inevitable degree of uncertainty in using models 
to analyze these complex patterns, and these methods have biases that lead 
to particular kinds of errors (Voje 2016, 2018; Voje et al. 2018), the pri-
mary conclusion based on their success is unaffected. For example, in 
some cases the best model identified according to the criteria does not 
adequately describe the trait dynamics in a fossil time series (Voje 2018). 
However, the aggregated result of heterogeneous and complex modes 
without one predominating evolutionary trajectory remains. Overall, 
these methodological innovations in paleontological practice call into 
question the evolutionary metanarratives advanced by Gould and Conway 
Morris. And this conclusion is congruent with the consensus arrived at 
through natural and laboratory experimental studies of chance and natural 
selection (§2.3).
In a comprehensive review of the question of contingency versus con-
vergence in relation to the Burgess Shale and Cambrian Explosion, paleo-
biologist Doug Erwin captures this consilience of different perspectives 
acutely.
It seems unlikely that there will be any general answer to questions over the 
role of contingency versus necessity in evolution, either with the Burgess 
Shale fossils and the Cambrian radiation specifically, or more generally in the 
history of life, in large part because at such a coarse level the question is 
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wrongly specified. The relative importance of contingency depends upon 
whether one is interested in molecular processes, development, phenotype, 
or macroevolutionary patterns, and the answer may differ at these different 
levels, even for the same event. (Erwin 2016, 297)
This synthetic conclusion accents two key points about the adequacy of 
metanarratives for evolutionary history.4 The first is that empirical research 
yields a mixed message about the predominance of evolutionary mode: 
there is no “general answer to questions over the role of contingency ver-
sus necessity in evolution.” A framing of the two evolutionary metanarra-
tives as mutually exclusive and exhaustive options is undermined. To retain 
an inference from successful science to metaphysical implication, as is the 
desire in these evolutionary metanarratives, other options must be formu-
lated or the enterprise disbanded (e.g., because we cannot formulate rel-
evantly precise empirical models for the history of life). Second, these 
evolutionary metanarratives frame the question too coarsely. When the 
units of interest are more precisely specified (e.g., molecular processes vs. 
macroevolutionary patterns)—a move justified by the successful paleonto-
logical practices of modeling evolutionary change for traits instead of 
organisms or lineages (Hopkins and Lidgard 2012; Hunt et al. 2015)—
the patterns observed may be different and therefore new kinds of answers 
might become available (Lidgard and Love 2018). A natural question is 
whether different metaphysical implications might be warranted in light of 
this heterogeneous architecture of successful science.
7.4  PotEntial iMPliCations for divinE ProvidEnCE?
Does the argument from successful paleontological practices in recon-
structing evolutionary dynamics based on the fossil record imply some-
thing for conceptions of divine providence—a very different kind of 
metaphysical implication? This question is appropriate since the two com-
peting metanarratives both speak to what the history of life implies for the 
human species. However, it is not possible to review the entirety of pos-
sibilities for how divine providence has been understood historically (Flint 
4 One might resist drawing general conclusions from Burgess Shale fossils and the Cambrian 
Explosion because they are deemed non-representative. This would require deciding whether 
there are any independent, comparable cases that might validate their representativeness. 
Natural candidates might be recoveries after mass extinctions or the invasion of “unoccu-
pied” habitats, such as moving onto land or colonizing islands.
 A. C. LOVE
133
2010; Jowers 2011; Tracy 2010) or in relation to the sciences (Clark 
2014, ch. 2; Koperski 2015, ch. 4; Saunders 2002). Instead, I focus on 
discussions that have been motivated by contrasting evolutionary meta-
narratives from Gould and Conway Morris in theological contexts that 
speak to the metaphysical question of divine action generally and provi-
dence in particular.5
Consider a recent paper that tries to navigate between these evolution-
ary metanarratives by arguing that there is unpredictability due to ran-
domness in the world, but this is constrained within patterns of convergence 
due to natural selection (McCall 2019). This discussion is not informed by 
the scientific developments and successful paleontological methods 
described above. As a consequence, it retains a strict dichotomy between 
contingency and convergence, while seeking a hybrid conceptualization 
that adopts the major features of each metanarrative. The result is unclear 
and uninformative: how much randomness is there and how tightly is it 
constrained within patterns of convergence? These types of arguments, 
with explicit dependence on the dichotomy between contingency and 
convergence, have been advanced by a variety of authors: “The alternative 
positions are set out in Gould’s Wonderful Life (1989) and Conway 
Morris’ Life’s Solution (2003). … One or other of them must be mis-
taken” (Bartholemew 2008, 186–7). They are apropos in the context of 
evolutionary metanarratives that propose overarching interpretations of 
historical patterns to inform what it means to be human.
The first possibility is that there is no metaphysical implication of scien-
tific success relevant for understanding divine action in the world. If every 
conception of divine providence is a metanarrative, then the heteroge-
neous results of empirical studies exemplified in paleontological analyses 
of character evolution could be uniformly uninformative. For example, if 
providence is understood broadly as the claim that “the events of our 
world, no matter how chaotic or disturbing they might appear, unfold 
precisely according to the plan established eternally by our all-knowing 
and loving sovereign” (Flint 2010, 329), then a variety of combinations of 
chance (contingency per se), history (contingent upon), and natural selec-
tion (convergence) could be accommodated within such an overarching 
5 Metaphysical implications could be either positive or negative (e.g., providing reasons for 
or against a particular conception), but also can include the introduction of new questions 
(e.g., a previously unrecognized puzzle about how these successful practices comport with a 
particular conception of providence).
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plan. From our perspective, even though there is no reason based on pale-
ontological practice to see the arrival of the human species as either sheer 
accident or deterministically predictable, there also is no reason to think 
that one combination of chance, history, and natural selection means 
something different from another. Successful scientific practice offers 
nothing that discriminates between understanding one sequence of his-
torical events as going according to plan and another not.
What happens if we introduce concepts and distinctions from discus-
sions of divine providence, such as the difference between special divine 
action (SDA) and general divine action (GDA)? The former comprises 
“those actions of God that pertain to a particular time and place in cre-
ation as distinct from another,” whereas the latter can be characterized as 
“those actions of God that pertain to the whole of creation universally and 
simultaneously” (Saunders 2002, 21). Many putative occurrences of SDA 
are littered throughout the Tanakh, such as the account of Egyptian 
plagues prior to the Hebrew exodus. Exemplars of GDA might be regu-
larities associated with “laws of nature” such as gravitational attraction. 
Both SDA and GDA are pertinent to providence, though distinguishing 
the two cleanly is not easy. Assuming God could intervene or act in the 
world, then successful paleontological practices associated with recon-
structing evolutionary change in the fossil record suggest there is a wide 
latitude for achieving particular outcomes (e.g., humanoid species) in the 
history of life through judicious combinations of chance, history, and nat-
ural selection. Without a predominant deterministic trend (such as con-
vergence) or indeterministic lack of pattern (due to different forms of 
contingency), a plethora of options remain. And, even if one trend was 
empirically established as predominant, it is not clear that it would speak 
for or against any conception of SDA (Koperski 2015, ch. 4). Thus, this 
permissive inference is weak (i.e., there appears to be no contradiction) 
and arguably collapses into no metaphysical inference. GDA seems less 
relevant because the causal processes operative in geological history are 
not typically thought of as acting “universally and simultaneously” across 
all that exists. However, if GDA is cashed in terms of environmental 
changes, mutations, and natural selection (inter alia) operating through 
geological history, then we recover the same weak inference of consistency 
because the lack of an overarching signal in the fossil record makes it dif-
ficult to meaningfully detect providence in contrast to some other signa-
ture (or lack thereof), such as genuine randomness.
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Another way to probe possible metaphysical implications from success-
ful paleontological practice is to look for congruence or incongruence 
with major options for conceptualizing divine providence. One option—
divine omnicausality—is associated with traditional conceptions of provi-
dence from thinkers such as Augustine, Calvin, and Warfield, as well as 
many in the Muslim tradition (Helseth in Jowers 2011, ch. 1). On this 
view, God is the ultimate or primary cause of all events such that nothing 
occurs by “chance” (i.e., the causal structure of the world is fully ordered 
and arranged). However, secondary causes are genuine rather than epi-
phenomenal. These secondary causes are real but absolutely dependent on 
God’s preservational, primary activity. Neither causal dependence (contin-
gent upon) nor convergence (natural selection) pose difficulties on this 
view because both pertain to the realm of secondary causes. Chance (con-
tingency per se) might appear incongruent with this option but recall that 
contingency is cashed out as unpredictability (i.e., epistemic chance). 
Therefore, it need not be a challenge for divine foreknowledge (or a 
Laplacian demon), which can handle the explosion of possible combina-
tions, or if God’s relation to time is such that all of world and universal 
history is “seen” simultaneously from an atemporal vantage point 
(Ganssle 2001).
Divine knowledge handling an explosion of future possibilities is espe-
cially suited to divine omnidirectionality, which holds that God has hypo-
thetical knowledge of all counterfactuals about what would happen in any 
circumstance (Craig in Jowers 2011, ch. 2). On this view, so-called sec-
ondary causes need not depend on God’s primary causation for their exis-
tence, but the causal structure of the world remains fully ordered and 
arranged because divine knowledge can map out the complete space of 
possibilities from any chosen set of initial conditions (fully embracing both 
senses of contingency). The complex evolutionary outcomes of chance, 
history, and selection do not surprise God. On a third view, sometimes 
labeled “open theism,” the causal structure of the world is not fully 
ordered and arranged; there is no future causal order to foreknow (Boyd 
in Jowers 2011, ch. 4). In this case, there is not a “fixed” future of possible 
events for God to know counterfactually in advance. Thus, the actual 
causal path taken through history is only learned by God as it plays out. 
Whether this would lead to something broadly humanoid is less clear and 
any necessary exercise of omnipotence along the way to secure this type of 
outcome might need to be much more substantial.
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Finally, we can contemplate whether there are any ramifications from 
successful scientific practice for standard objections that drive differences 
in conceptions of divine providence. The most prominent of these are the 
problem of freedom and the problem of evil (Flint 2010). If divine provi-
dence involves meticulous foreknowledge, which is embedded in the 
clause “unfold precisely according to the plan established eternally by our 
all-knowing … sovereign,” then free will appears inconsistent with these 
commitments (at least according to open theists). If things “unfold pre-
cisely,” then God knows what I will do beforehand. This removes the 
possibility of me doing otherwise (since God could not be wrong in what 
is foreknown). However, in the present case, the question of freedom 
seems irrelevant, at least if we are attributing free will primarily to humans. 
That God could somehow “steer” evolutionary history through complex 
combinations of chance, history, and natural selection based on fore-
knowledge does not threaten human freedom; one might even argue that 
it makes it possible. Exercises of omnipotence are not prima facie implau-
sible since the primary reason against their use is the violation of genuine 
agential choice, which might be a non-issue for Burgess Shale animals 
(among others). Regarding the problem of evil, especially in its eviden-
tiary form, it is not clear that an evolutionary history governed primarily 
by natural selection versus one more commensurate with the empirical 
evidence (i.e., heterogeneous, complex combinations) would pose a 
greater threat in augmenting or diminishing the amount of purported evil 
present in the world. However, many argue that increased SDA exacer-
bates the problem of evil since it raises the specter of why God doesn’t 
more reliably remove or mitigate evil occurrences (Saunders 2002).
One might be concerned that these inferential offerings are meager. 
However, they help highlight one overlooked possibility. Although provi-
dence is typically conceptualized as a combination of SDA and GDA, 
many sacred texts associated with ideas about divine providence in Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam are directed at particular people in specific circum-
stances (e.g., the story of Abraham discovering a ram in the thicket, 
thereby making it possible to sacrifice something other than his own son). 
If our most robust and empirically grounded analyses of the fossil record 
tell complex stories about the interplay between chance, history, and natu-
ral selection, then we might seek to detail that story more locally for the 
geological sequence relevant primarily to the human species (not the 
entire history of life). Instead of worrying about Opabinia or Pikaia, we 
might concentrate our attention on Homo. Unfortunately, as has been 
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noted by many, the fossil record (and general empirical information avail-
able) for our lineage is notoriously incomplete (Antón et al. 2014). And 
since our most successful paleontological practices yield stable empirical 
generalizations precisely when there are more samples available, it is 
unlikely that we can (at this time) apply them with profit to the human 
fossil record (i.e., ascertaining the signature of chance, history, or selection 
for particular traits).
Yet we should not lose sight of the fact that there could be possible 
metaphysical implications of successful paleontological practice. If the fos-
sil record for Homo was sufficiently representative (i.e., contained enough 
sample sequences), then the application of successful practices for recon-
structing character evolution could have metaphysical implications for 
traits in the human lineage. The detection of a particular evolutionary 
mode for a character, such as bipedality showing an unambiguous random 
walk over millions of years, might suggest new reflections on what it means 
to be human (i.e., bipedality might be less central or “accidental” to our 
humanity). Only time will tell if we arrive at an adequate empirical situa-
tion in terms of fossil record data to ascertain this possibility. However, an 
emphasis on successful scientific practices where the empirical situation is 
better could point us to distinct records of the past where different kinds 
of traits can be analyzed in sufficient detail, such as lithic tools or other 
cultural artifacts (Tostevin 2019). Instead of paleontology, successful 
archeological practice might offer a more illuminating route to identify 
metaphysical implications.
7.5  ConClusion
My analysis has ignored a number of issues related to contingency and 
convergence in evolutionary biology. What exactly constitutes conver-
gence (Pearce 2012; Powell 2012)? The inability to distinctly specify con-
vergence makes it difficult to claim that it is more or less predominant in 
the history of life. Similar concerns exist for contingency (Desjardins 
2016; Turner 2011), as well as how best to characterize its evolutionary 
sources and effects, such as mass extinctions and adaptive radiations 
(McConwell and Currie 2017; McConwell 2019). In particular, there are 
good theoretical arguments for taking both contingency and convergence 
as domain relative in order to sufficiently distinguish them and compare 
their relative importance (Lewis 2018). Although it would require explicit 
demonstration, this argument is congruent with the conclusions about 
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character evolution drawn from successful paleontological practice, which 
are domain relative since the relevant modal profiles are in the empirical 
analysis. I also have ignored substantial empirical questions about the 
nature and status of directional trends in the fossil record and their con-
nection to contingency or convergence (Huang et al. 2015).
Both Gould and Conway Morris offer metanarratives of ultimate reality 
through divergent interpretations of the fossil record. These visions are 
akin to epic sagas that provide a global interpretation of evolution and the 
history of life on earth, from origins to apocalypse. The heroic deeds and 
adventures of the saga are either due to contingency or convergence over 
extended periods of time, with an accent on the achievements of these 
heroes at special junctures, such as the Burgess Shale and Cambrian 
Explosion. We noted at the outset that our propensity for narrative, and 
metanarrative in particular, means we should not be surprised at finding 
such attempts in the halls of science (Beatty 2017). They fit within the 
move from scientific success to metaphysical conclusions about what the 
world is ultimately like.
However, subsequent successes of paleontological analyses of character 
evolution in the fossil record demonstrate that neither epic saga is war-
ranted. Once the methodological shift of looking at parts instead of wholes 
is made, researchers find empirical signatures of both selection (in the 
form of directional change or stasis) and chance (in the form of a random 
walk), and both of these are present heterogeneously across the measured 
characters in taxa undergoing evolutionary change. One character can be 
under directional selection, while another displays a random walk at the 
same point in a sequence; a character can be under directional selection at 
one point in a sequence, while the same character is subject to a random 
walk at a later point in the sequence. Empirical studies inspired by Gould’s 
image of replaying the tape of life have yielded a similar conclusion: “evo-
lution can be both contingent and deterministic, and often in complicated 
and fascinating ways” (Blount et al. 2018, 8). The original framing of the 
question is a false dichotomy (Losos 2017). “It seems unlikely that there 
will be any general answer to questions over the role of contingency versus 
necessity in evolution, either with the Burgess Shale fossils and the 
Cambrian radiation specifically, or more generally in the history of life” 
(Erwin 2016, 297).
The metaphysical implications of successful paleontological practices 
for conceptions of divine providence are unclear, in part because concep-
tions of providence are intended as metanarratives of divine action. Since 
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the evolutionary metanarratives of Gould and Conway Morris break 
down, the connections between successful paleontological analyses of 
character evolution and understandings of divine providence are, if any-
thing, piecemeal.6 This piecemeal inferential potential leaves many options 
open. Apart from this permissiveness, we identified the possibility that 
empirically grounded analyses of the human fossil record might tell com-
plex but compact stories about the interplay between chance, history, and 
natural selection in our own lineage. Although the necessary representa-
tion in the fossil record is currently lacking, which means our best paleon-
tological practices cannot be deployed, this possible metaphysical 
implication and the structure of the argument point toward other success-
ful practices, such as from archeology, which might speak more directly to 
what it means to be human.
Assuming the successes of the sciences are a good place to work out the 
ultimate structure of reality and keeping in view appropriate concerns 
derived from the history of science, we might draw a different kind of les-
son. The metaphysical implications available from the sciences are not 
characterized most aptly in terms of metanarratives or epic sagas. Instead, 
the implications are suited to a different narrative form, such as a short 
story. A short story has a fully developed theme but is significantly shorter 
and less elaborate than genres of longer form, whether novels or epic 
sagas. Short stories might have less appeal for those seeking an overarch-
ing integration with systematic theology, but it is worth highlighting that 
short stories are a common genre in literature from different religious 
traditions. Thus, there may be a novel basis for exploring metaphysical 
implications from successful science within the context of these other 
genres embedded within theological understandings of diverse 
communities.
Do the exceptionally preserved fossils found in the Burgess Shale tell us 
something about chance, contingency, evolution, and history? Yes, though 
not in the form of an epic saga that Gould or Conway Morris argued for; 
instead, successful paleontological practices point toward rich short stories 
that are both heterogeneous and more circumscribed. Do the Burgess 
Shale fossils imply that we are here simply by chance or instead a 
6 This is does not rule out the possibility of metanarratives based on successful scientific 
practices, nor does it impugn the search for metanarratives per se. However, it is evidence 
that evolutionary metanarratives based on the fossil record are implausible, including but not 
limited to those of Conway Morris and Gould.
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predictable outcome? No, but both options in this dichotomy are evolu-
tionary narratives of comprehensive scope. There is much we can learn 
about chance, history, and predictability from the themes of the short 
stories that emerge out of successful paleontological practices involving 
the empirical study of evolutionary modes for traits in the fossil record. 
The Old Ones might be trying to tell us something, but we need to adjust 
our expectations before we can hear what they are saying.
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CHAPTER 8
Judaism and Providence
Tyron Goldschmidt and Samuel Lebens
8.1  The Basics of Judaism
This chapter concerns the treatment of providence in the Jewish tradition, 
and theological problems about randomness. First, some basics of Judaism:
• The central principles of Judaism include the doctrines that: (1) there 
is only one God, (2) God revealed the Torah to Moses, (3) the Torah 
is properly interpreted by the Rabbis, (4) God rewards the righteous 
and (5) punishes the wicked, and (6) will send a messiah and resur-
rect the dead (for more on Jewish principles, see Lebens 2020).
• The central practices of Judaism include: (1) observance of the 
Sabbath, (2) observance of dietary restrictions, (3) observance of 
menstrual purity rules, (4) three daily prayer services, (5) studying 
Biblical and Rabbinic texts, and (6) tithing for charity.
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• The central historical events of Judaism include the: (1) election of 
the Israelite patriarchs, (2) enslavement and redemption of the 
Israelites from Egypt, (3) revelation of the Torah, (4) kingdoms of 
Israel and Judah, (5) exiles of Israel and Judah, and (6) persecution 
of the Jews during the exiles.
• The central historical figures include the: (1) patriarchs and matri-
archs, (2) prophets, and the (3) classical, (4) medieval, (5) early 
modern, and (6) modern rabbinic sages.
Or so it is for Orthodox Judaism, which is the focus of this chapter. We’ll 
omit ‘Orthodox’ from here on.
8.2  Providence and randomness
Some believers take every detail of the universe to be directed by God 
toward a grand purpose. But science has supposedly discovered random-
ness in nature. Are religion and science in conflict regarding providence 
and randomness?
This problem seems to arise only on a specific understanding of ran-
domness. Following Kelly James Clark (2014: 108), we distinguish 
between:
• practical randomness: what’s going to happen cannot be predicted 
by us, in light of our limited knowledge about what’s happened 
so far; and
• principled randomness: what’s going to happen cannot be predicted 
by anyone, however much they know about what’s happened so far.
Principled randomness means that even God cannot predict what’s 
going to happen next, which seems at odds with God directing everything 
toward a grand purpose. If God is directing every event, then he’s direct-
ing what happens next. And so decides what happens next. And so pre-
dicts what happens next. Thus, principled randomness means that God 
does not direct every event. In contrast, practical randomness presents no 
such problem. Practical randomness means only that we cannot predict 
what’s going to happen next. But even if we cannot, God still might.
The first question is whether science has discovered principled random-
ness. The two main places where scientists have reputedly identified ran-
domness are in the:
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• genetic mutations at work in evolution; and
• indeterminism of quantum mechanics.
Whether randomness in either of these cases is principled is a tricky 
question. There is no scientific consensus. We leave the science to the sci-
entists, but as we ask: how should religious Jews react if scientific consen-
sus eventually decides on the existence of principled randomness? There 
are at least two possibilities.
First: so much the worse for providence. The religious Jew might deny 
that God directs every detail toward some grand purpose, but God might 
still direct some, many, or most details, to some grand purpose; but given 
the existence of principled randomness, God couldn’t direct everything. 
Second: so much the worse for science. The religious Jew might deny that 
science is always accurate.
There is precedent in the Jewish tradition for denying that God guides 
everything and that science always provides an accurate picture. Dati 
(“modern orthodox”) Jews tend to accept contemporary cosmology and 
evolutionary theory, and try to harmonize these with their understanding 
of Genesis. Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) Jews by contrast tend to accept a 
literal understanding of Genesis, and thus reject contemporary cosmology 
and evolutionary theory insofar as these posit a much older universe.
After a survey of the traditional Jewish approaches to providence, we 
present a response to principled randomness that should satisfy both 
Modern Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox sensibilities.
8.3  The QuesTion of Providence and five answers
According to the principles stated above, God interacts with the world—
revealing the Torah, electing the patriarchs, and so on. A preeminent 
commentator on the Torah and Talmud, Rabbi Moses ben Nah ̣man 
(Nah ̣manides or the Ramban, thirteenth century) states:
It’s clear and known that belief in God’s knowledge of the lower species and 
their individuals and his providence over their generalities and particulars are 
great cornerstones from the Torah of Moses. … Thus, the denier of provi-
dence … has no place in the world to come. (Naḥmanides 1963: 17)
Denying providence is heresy that can cost a Jew their afterlife. But 
questions about the details of providence remain. The big question 
remains: How much does God interact with the world?
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Medieval Jewish tradition often distinguishes between particular provi-
dence and general providence. Particular providence is God governing (at 
least some of) the details of an individual’s life. If you’re governed by 
particular providence, then God directs your life toward some grand pur-
pose. God cares about you and is busy with you. Whether you win the 
lottery or stub your toe, there’s a meaning to it (at least sometimes).
General providence is God governing the life of a species. If penguins 
are governed by general providence only, God preserves the species of 
penguins, but does not direct any particular penguin’s life toward some 
grand purpose. God does not care deeply about an individual penguin and 
is not busy with it. Whether a particular penguin survives or is eaten has 
no meaning. God cares about the species as a whole, and will direct its 
existence toward some purpose or other.
These descriptions are not precise. Unfortunately, most writers do not 
define exactly what they mean by particular providence or general provi-
dence. And note the ifs. We’re not yet saying that your life is governed by 
particular providence or that penguins are governed only by general provi-
dence. Again, the big question is about how far particular providence 
extends: Does it extend over everything? The book of Psalms (145:9) says 
that God’s mercy extends to all of his creatures. But does his providence? 
Does it extend over people but not penguins? Does it extend over all 
people all the time?
On these questions, there is disagreement. The prophets and classical 
rabbis do not teach  definitively how much of the world is governed by 
providence. Later rabbis reach different answers on the basis of this under- 
determined tradition. We’ll provide a series of answers in what follows 
(Leibowitz 2009 is especially recommended for more details).
8.3.1  Answer 1: Particular Providence Over Everything
This answer is suggested by many early rabbis. For example, from the 
Talmud, the sage Abba Arikha (Rav, second–third centuries) describes 
how God spends his day:
Rav Yehuda says [that] Rav says: There are twelve hours in the day. During 
the first three, the Holy One Blessed Be He sits and engages in Torah. 
During the second [quarter] he sits and judges the whole world. When he 
sees that the world deserves destruction, he rises from the throne of judg-
ment and sits on the throne of mercy. During the third [quarter] he sits and 
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nourishes the whole world, from the horns of oxen to the eggs of lice. 
During the fourth [quarter], he sits and plays with Leviathan, as it says: 
“This Leviathan you have formed to play with” [Psalm 104:26]. 
(Avoda Zara 3b)
This doesn’t look like abstract care—God preserves even the eggs of 
lice. Wouldn’t his particular providence extend then to everything else?
Rabbah Bar Naḥmani (third–fourth centuries) teaches:
“Do you know when the wild goats of the rock give birth? Can you mark 
when the hinds calve?” [Job 39:1] This goat is cruel to her young. When she 
squats to give birth she ascends to the top of the mountain so that [the kid] 
will fall from her and die. And I invite an eagle for her that receives [the kid] 
upon its wings and sets it before her. And if [the eagle] were a moment early 
or a moment late [the kid] would immediately die. … “Can you mark when 
the hinds calve?” The womb of this hind is narrow. When it squats to give 
birth, I invite a snake that bites her at the opening of the womb, and it 
becomes loose so she can give birth. And if [the snake] was a moment early 
or a moment late, [the hind] would immediately die. (Bava Batra 16a–b)
God invites eagles and snakes to help the baby goat. He watches and 
intervenes in real time.
There are many other examples. For just one other, Genesis Rabbah, a 
commentary compiled around the same time as the Talmud, includes a 
teaching from Rabbi Shimon Ben Yoḥai (second century):
Rabbi Shimon ben Yoh ̣ai and Rabbi Elazar his son were hidden in a cave for 
thirteen years at the time of [Roman] persecution. … At the end of thirteen 
years, they left, sat at the entrance of the cave, and saw a hunter trapping 
birds. And if Rabbi Shimon heard a heavenly voice proclaim “Pardon! 
Pardon!,” it escaped. And if he heard a heavenly voice proclaim “Execute!,” 
it was trapped and seized. He said “A bird is not caught unless it is decreed 
from heaven—how much more so with a person.” (79:6)
If God governs the lives of individual birds so closely, why wouldn’t his 
particular providence extend to everything else?
However suggestive, such passages are not definitive. Perhaps particular 
providence extends over lice eggs and goats, but not mosquitos and 
salmon. Perhaps particular providence extends over just some lice eggs, 
but not all of them. Perhaps these sources could be read as figurative 
8 JUDAISM AND PROVIDENCE 
152
expressions of general providence over nature. Nevertheless,  they have 
often been taken to teach that divine providence extends over everything. 
None emphasizes this more than the early rabbis of Hassidism. For exam-
ple, Rabbi Menaḥem Mendel of Vitebsk (eighteenth century) teaches that:
no person jams his finger, and grass dries and is uprooted, and no rock is 
strewn, except at the time and place fitting for it. … Everything is from God, 
according to the wisdom of his name and according to his glory, to reveal 
his divinity, and his wisdom, and his attributes. (1818: 15)
Aharon Roth (twentieth century) reports the following teaching from 
the founder of Hassidism, Yisrael Ben Eliezer (the Ba’al Shem Tov, eigh-
teenth century):
It happened that the lamp of great light, our master, the Ba’al Shem Tov, 
may his merit protect us, was with his students in a field. Suddenly, a strong 
wind blew and some leaves fell to the ground. He said, “My children, know 
that this wind that now passed suddenly was on account of one worm that 
was at the top of a certain left. The sun was shining exceedingly on it; it cried 
to God; and so God sent the wind …” [The Ba’al Shem Tov] said this to 
them to convey to them the scope of the Creator’s providence and his mercy 
upon all creation. (1998: 127)
The dominant view among orthodox Jews today might be that particu-
lar providence extends over everything. But it has not been the univer-
sal view.
8.3.2  Answer 2: Particular Providence Over People Only
The most distinguished proponent of this view is Rabbi Moses ben 
Maimon (Maimonides or the Rambam, twelfth–thirteenth centuries). 
After dismissing four alternative views about providence, he states his pre-
ferred view (his real preference may be hidden elsewhere):
Divine Providence does not extend to the individual members of species 
except in the case of mankind. It is only in this species that the incidents in 
the existence of the individual beings, their good and evil fortunes, are the 
result of justice, in accordance with the words, “For all His ways are judg-
ment.” But I agree with Aristotle as regards all other living beings, and a 
fortiori as regards plants and all the rest of earthly creatures. For I do not 
believe that it is through the interference of Divine Providence that a certain 
leaf drops [from a tree], nor do I hold that when a certain spider catches a 
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certain fly, that this is the direct result of a special decree and will of God in 
that moment. … In all these cases the action is, according to my opinion, 
entirely due to chance, as taught by Aristotle. (1956: 286–7)
Maimonides takes this theory to be motivated by prior Jewish tradition, 
and draws connections between human intelligence and providence:
Divine Providence is related and closely connected with the intellect, 
because Providence can only proceed from an intelligent being, from a 
being that is itself the most perfect Intellect. Those creatures, therefore, 
which receive part of that intellectual influence will become subject to the 
action of Providence in the same proportion as they are acted upon by the 
Intellect. (1956: 288)
Particular providence depends on intelligence. Insofar as humans are 
intelligent and other creatures are not, particular providence governs 
humans and not other creatures.
What of the sources mentioned in the previous section that point in an 
opposite direction? After quoting some of those and similar passages, 
Maimonides answers that:
they imply nothing that is contrary to my view. All these passages refer to 
providence in relation to species, and not to providence in relation to indi-
vidual animals. The acts of God are as it were enumerated; how He provides 
for every species the necessary food and the means of subsistence. 
(1956: 288)
The passage about, for example, the eagle means that God preserves 
the species of goat—perhaps by fixing a natural relationship between goats 
and eagles. But he need not have any special care for this goat. However, 
not all of the passages can so easily be interpreted away: Rabbi Shimon ben 
Yoh ̣ai claimed a specific divine decree for each bird.
A qualification of Maimonides’ view accommodates some particular 
providence over non-human animals—as a part of the providence over 
humans. Rabbi Moshe Cordovero (the Ramak, sixteenth century) 
explains:
If a lamb is found among the lambs in a field among the fields owned by one 
of the pious people, particular providence will engage with him, and that 
lamb will be saved from the death encompassing all the rest of its kind, like 
[from] wolves or the like. And it’s all for reason of the person, not on 
account of the lambs themselves. (1883: 114)
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God does not care so much for the lamb as for the man. The Talmud 
and Midrash similarly report cases where God protects and directs animals 
for the sake of people. For example, Genesis Rabbah (18:22) tells how God 
arranged for a scorpion to travel on the back of a frog across a river—in 
order to sting a wicked man. God’s particular providence over birds can be 
understood along similar lines. After all, the birds were being trapped by 
humans, and the decrees over them served a lesson about humans.
This qualification of Maimonides’ view is natural. Since people’s lives 
are intertwined with animals, particular providence over people would 
likely involve animals. Furthermore, the particular providence over the 
patriarchs mentioned by Maimonides also involves animals—for example, 
the ram discovered at the binding of Isaac (Genesis 22:13).
A problem: Maimonides draws a connection between human intelli-
gence and particular providence: particular providence extends to more 
intelligent people than to less intelligent people, and to some people not 
so much. Why did Maimonides have such an elitist view?
The short answer: it followed from his Neoplatonism. The central idea 
is that God’s creation and governance occur through a process known as 
“emanation.” In this process, intellectual content (something like God’s 
ideas) overflows into a series of “separate intellects” (which Maimonides 
identifies with angels), and finally become concrete as the overflow reaches 
all the way down into our world.
God’s wisdom, as it flows down to us, is manifest in natural laws gov-
erning the universe. This is God’s general providence. But because there’s 
a constant stream of intellectual information flowing from God down to 
us, the more intellectual we are, the more likely our minds will be recep-
tive to the flow. The prophets, for Maimonides, had so perfected their 
character and intellect that they could tune in to that stream of informa-
tion and, so to speak, hear the word of God.
How does this make sense of the connection between particular provi-
dence and the intellect? According to Maimonides, God never alters natu-
ral laws (even miracles Are written into natural laws at creation; see 
Maimonides 1948: ch 8). So, if God wants to save you from a shipwreck, 
he won’t do so by changing the weather. Instead, if your intellect is suffi-
ciently refined, you’ll receive a sudden apprehension against boarding. 
This isn’t prophecy; you’re receiving an inclination rather than a message. 
Still, it’s a form of communication. You’ll only receive heavenly commu-
nication to the extent that your intellect is properly prepared. Prophets 
receive more vivid communication, but others can receive apprehensions 
and inclinations—that’s how particular providence works.
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8.3.3  Answer 3: Particular Providence Over Righteous 
People Only
Rabbi Ovadya Seforno (fifteenth–sixteenth centuries) on Leviticus 13:47 
writes that providence extends only to a few righteous Jews:
When he awakens to contemplate the existence of his creator, and His great-
ness and His goodness … he will walk in His ways, making His will as his 
will. Behold—he doubtless resembles his creator more than the rest of cre-
ation, and he is the intended purpose of the Creator who bestows being, as 
they say, “the righteous is the foundation of the world” (Proverbs 10:25). … 
But those who slumber who do not know at all and are not all awakened to 
the knowledge of any of this—they are all the gentiles and the majority of 
the Israelite nation, except for precious individuals—they are doubtless 
under the governance of nature. … Those people are like animals, upon 
whom divine providence does not fall individually but only on the species, 
for through them [the species] is the purpose of the creator fulfilled. 
(Seforno ad loc)
By fulfilling God’s will, righteous Jews realize God’s special purpose for 
humanity. God cares for them and looks over them closely. Those who do 
not realize God’s purpose for humanity are left to the same natural forces 
governing the rest of creation. The Jewish tradition even gives some righ-
teous individuals power over what God does (see, e.g., Berakhot 32a; 
Taanit 23a).
Seforno’s division seems objectionable: it discriminates between righ-
teous Jews and righteous non-Jews. Aren’t righteous non-Jews just as 
deserving of particular providence? Perhaps we shouldn’t be disturbed. 
Just as the election of the Jewish people was for “all of the families of the 
earth” (Genesis 12:3), perhaps the good that their election will bring to 
humanity requires a special form of providence (Deuteronomy 9:5). 
Thinking in these terms can mitigate the sting of Divine discrimination.
Leibowitz (2009) proposes that Seforno is not discriminatory. Just as 
the vast majority of Jews are not excluded in principle from divine provi-
dence, so too non-Jews are not excluded in principle. It’s just that Seforno 
held that the vast majority of Jews and all non-Jews happen not to be 
righteous!
Other sources have non-Jews—especially Christians and Muslims—
helping to realize God’s purpose for humanity. For example, Naḥmanides 
writes that those who follow the Torah realize God’s purpose for human-
ity. While the Torah was revealed to the Jewish people, it has reached 
Christians and Muslims too:
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Don’t make a mistake about the [non-Jewish] nations, for even they are 
inheritors of the Torah—those who are close to the center of civilization, 
such as the Christians and the Muslims, since they copied the Torah and 
learnt it. And when Rome expanded to some of the outskirts, they learned 
Torah from it, and made statutes and laws like the Torah out to the distant 
lands, then made laws and statutes comparable to Torah. (1963: 143)
Similarly, Rabbi Menaḥem ha-Meiri (thirteenth–fourteenth centuries) 
also has an inclusive view about Jews, Christians, Muslims, and others who 
follow a decent moral code (see Leibowitz 2009).
Other sources hold that righteous Jews pay a price in that they are sub-
ject to more punishment for their fewer sins (at least in this world; see Ibn 
Ezra and Radak on Amos 3:2; Ohr HaHayyim on Deuteronomy 8:5). 
Perhaps this could be extended to righteous non-Jews. Perhaps the idea is 
this: a person is only going to fall under God’s direct purview if their way 
of life resonates with God’s purposes. But coming under God’s purview 
has its costs as well: God might subvert nature to protect the righteous, 
but also punish them more harshly when they fail.
8.3.4  Answer 4: Particular Providence in the Land 
of Israel Only
According to the Torah, God is especially at work in the Land of Israel, “a 
land that the Lord your God searches over; the Lord’s eyes are constantly 
over it, from the beginning of the year till the end of the year” 
(Deuteronomy 11:12). For example, Rabbi Nissim ben Reuven (the Ran, 
fourteenth century) writes:
The sin [of idolatry] is more appropriate to fear in the wilderness [of Sinai] 
than in the land of Israel, since [the nation of] Israel knew that the other 
lands are apportioned to the governance of the stars and constellations … 
except for the miraculous [interversions]. (1530: 23a)
If Israel is more directly under God’s providence than other places are, 
shouldn’t we be even more careful there regarding idolatry? But the idea is 
this: in other lands, you might come to worship the constellations that 
really do have some sort of power over you; because God delegates the 
running of the world to various forces of nature (see Shabbat 156a). In 
Israel, by contrast, there’s only God. The Ran takes this to explain the 
recommendation of the sages in the Talmud:
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One should always live in Israel, even in a city where most of the inhabitants 
worship idols, rather than outside of Israel, even if most of the inhabitants 
are Jews. That is because whoever lives in Israel is considered that he has a 
God, but whoever lives outside of Israel is considered as one who doesn’t 
have a God. … In fact one who lives outside of Israel is considered as one 
who worships idols. (Ketuvot 110b)
This view is problematic because providence seems to extend beyond 
the land of Israel. Isn’t God described as deeply involved in the lives of 
patriarchs and sages even outside of the land? In reply, Baḥya ben Asher 
(Rabbeinu Baḥaye, thirteenth–fourteenth centuries) teaches that provi-
dence outside of the land somehow flows from the providence over the 
land. He comments on the verse in Deuteronomy cited above:
According to the plain meaning, the basis of his providence is in this land, 
since he certainly searches out every land, but the point is that the basis of 
his searching and providence is here, and from here it extends to the other 
lands—like a person’s heart is placed in the middle of the body, since it’s the 
basis of vitality, and from there the vitality extends to the rest of the limbs. 
Scripture teaches that the Land of Israel isn’t placed under the governance 
of the stars and constellations like the other lands. … Rather, the Holy One 
Blessed Be He in his essence and in his glory searches over it constantly, and 
does not appoint over it from among the other powers, any rules or gover-
nor. (Baḥaye ad loc)
How this flow of providence works is not clear. Rabbi Judah Halevy 
(eleventh–twelfth centuries) argues that prophecy only happens in or con-
cerning the land of Israel (HaLevi 1964: 90–1). Even though Moses never 
set foot in Israel, for example, his entire prophetic career was aimed at 
bringing the people back to their land (see also Mekhilta on Exodus 12:1; 
Moed Katan 25a). Perhaps God’s particular providence only spills over the 
borders of the land of Israel when the needs of the land and its residents 
require intervention elsewhere.
8.3.5  Answer 5: Philosophical Transcendence
A fifth answer denies particular providence altogether. This radical view is 
rejected by  virtually all orthodox Jews. But Rabbi Levi ben Gershom 
(Gersonides or the Ralbag; fourteenth century) comes close to the view. 
Gersonides requires a grasp of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. A summary:
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Aristotle sets out a surprisingly ambitious set of requirements for knowledge 
(epistêmê). For our affirmation of a proposition to count as knowledge, that 
proposition must be grasped through a demonstration (Post An I.2). There 
can be demonstrations only of propositions that are necessary, and only uni-
versal propositions can be necessary (Post An I.4). (Aristotle adds even more 
conditions that do not concern us directly, for example that I can only know 
B on the basis of A if A is ‘better known’ to me than B.) This has the upshot 
that there can be no demonstrative knowledge, which strictly speaking 
means no knowledge at all, of particulars. (Adamson 2005: 274)
What we call knowledge of particular things (like our knowledge that 
London is in England) doesn’t really count as knowledge because it can’t 
be demonstrated as necessary. Only general principles can. If God’s knowl-
edge is perfect, then he wouldn’t bother with our sub-par knowledge-lite. 
He’s aware only of the real deal—general facts.
God, then, would not have knowledge of “particulars as particulars.” 
He’d know the laws of nature but he wouldn’t be bothered to take note 
of any of their particular instances in the concrete universe; he’d know 
what it means to be a human being but he wouldn’t know any individual 
humans. Furthermore, as Seymour Feldman explains:
Gersonides argues that the Divine nature is such that He is precluded from 
having knowledge of particulars. To have such knowledge one must have 
the appropriate cognitive equipment, such as sensory organs. But to have 
sensory organs is to have a body, and God does not have a body! Nor should 
one think that by denying knowledge of particulars to God we are imputing 
to Him an imperfection or deficiency. God is simply not the kind of entity 
that could have such knowledge, just as a wall is not the kind of entity that 
could talk. In neither case do we have a real deprivation, since to deprive an 
entity of something is to imply that this entity could, under the appropriate 
conditions, have that feature. (1987: 81)
But if God had no particular knowledge of Abraham, how did God 
speak to him? If God had no particular knowledge of the Israelites, how 
did he free them from Egyptian slavery?
Gersonides first explains how prophecy is possible despite God’s igno-
rance of particulars: God broadcasts only general messages, but particular 
people in particular circumstances will hear those messages in different 
ways. God is always broadcasting a message that will be heard by people 
like Abraham in like circumstances: “Go forth from your native land and 
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from your father’s house to the land that I will show you” (Genesis 12:1). 
But only a few will grasp the message.
Gersonides then extends his account from prophecy to particular 
providence:
[T]he kind of providence that guides the righteous by means of the com-
munication given them concerning the benefits or evils that are to befall 
them can occur even though the giver of this communication does not know 
the particular individual receiving this communication, and despite the fact 
that the giver of this communication does not know the particular events, 
concerning which this communication is given, as particulars. … The type 
of providence that results in a fear that saves the recipients from evils and 
produces in them instincts that direct them toward the acquisition of bene-
fits and that enables them to avoid harm. (1987: 180–1)
For example, perhaps God inscribed into the laws of nature that before 
any sort of disaster occurs a message be broadcast to warn people to keep 
away. We’re not all tuned in enough. But we can say that God has saved 
those who are from a disaster, even though God had no particular knowl-
edge of the events in question.
The view is similar to Maimonides’, except that Gersonides does not 
take God to know who receives his messages and when. That’s about as 
distant as God can get within a recognizably Jewish framework.
Some argue that Maimonides is more radical than Gersonides—
Maimonides’ true position is not the one above, and he hides it because it 
is so radical. According to this secret theory, God never involves himself 
with particular individuals. While miracles may be written into natural laws 
for the benefit of whole nations, God is uninvolved in the day to day life 
of individuals, however intelligent or righteous they are. Here (suppos-
edly) is the hint:
Divine Providence is constantly watching over those who have obtained that 
blessing which is prepared for those who endeavour to obtain it. If man frees 
his thoughts from worldly matters, obtains a knowledge of God in the right 
way, and rejoices in that knowledge, it is impossible that any kind of evil 
should befall him while he is with God, and God with him. (1956: 389)
Because “those who possess the knowledge of God, and have their 
thoughts entirely directed to that knowledge, are, as it were, always in 
bright sunshine,” God provides for all the needs of the perfect but 
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only because they have no needs. They don’t want health. They don’t 
want wealth. If they’re basking in the vision of God, they have no 
worldly desires at all. So God has provided for all of their worldly 
needs, since they have none. When a person loses that state, they’re no 
longer provided for. They might start to feel hungry, but food will not 
miraculously materialize. The light of “providence” will not shine on 
them, at that moment, as “the cloud … intervenes between them and 
God” (1956: 389).
We doubt that Maimonides has a secret, more radical theory of provi-
dence than the one advertised earlier on. If we’re wrong, Maimonides is 
more radical than Gersonides (see Raffel 1987).
8.4  an idealisT inTerlude
With this map of Jewish answers in place, we defend a particular view 
about God’s relationship with the world. This view is neutral on four of 
the theories outlined above, though it might appear to conflict with 
Gersonides. Like the first answer to the question of providence, God ends 
up having his fingers on everything. But, like the later answers, God has 
more of his fingers on certain creatures than others.
We begin with a philosophical argument that is not part of Jewish tradi-
tion. But nothing in it is at odds with Jewish tradition, and the argument 
will help make sense of some Jewish sources.
The argument is based on what was first seen clearly by the Christian 
philosopher George Berkeley (1685–1753). There’s nothing especially 
Christian about his view, and most Christians disagree with him. You will 
likely disagree with his view too. But you might see why we accept it and, 
then, what follows from it for the question of providence.
Berkeley’s view is that everything is a mind or an experience (or sensa-
tion or ‘idea’) in a mind (see Berkeley 1982: sections 1–24). This view is 
known as idealism.
How could anyone deny that there are tables and chairs? Berkeley does 
not deny that there are tables and chairs. What he denies is that they exist 
outside of any mind (see Berkeley 1982: sections 34–40). He takes his 
view to be simple, common sense:
I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours tend only 
to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was before shared 
between the vulgar and the philosophers: the former being of opinion, that 
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those things they immediately perceive are real things; and the latter, that the 
things immediately perceived, are ideas which exist only in the mind. Which 
two notions put together, do in effect constitute the substance of what I 
advance. (1979: 94)
To understand Berkeley, focus on an apple. You perceive something 
red, sweet, and hard. Berkeley takes the redness, sweetness and hardness 
you experience to be nothing other than sensations in your mind. Why 
think that? To see that redness, sweetness, and hardness do not exist 
beyond the mind, consider that scientists can generate vivid experiences by 
stimulating parts of your brain—neurosurgeons sometimes do generate 
sensations by touching certain parts of the brain.
Imagine scientists tinkering with your brain so that you experience red-
ness, sweetness, and hardness. There’s nothing in the external world cor-
responding to these experiences. They’re just sensations in your mind. 
But, since the experiences you would have are intrinsically identical to the 
experiences you actually do have when you see an apple, experiences of the 
apple are also nothing other than sensations in your mind.
Or consider more realistic cases: hallucinations. Hallucinations of an 
apple are intrinsically identical to real experiences of an apple. What is 
experienced in each case is just something in the mind.
One reply insists on a difference: the sensations might be intrinsically 
identical, but they have different external causes. The stimulated or hal-
lucinatory experiences are not caused by and do not correspond to a real 
apple outside the mind. When you see the apple, by contrast, your experi-
ences are caused by and correspond to a real apple outside the mind.
This strategy bifurcates the world. What we originally took to be the real 
apple—red, sweet, and hard—is now a combination of sensations in our 
mind. What actually turns out to be the real apple would be something 
totally different. Since redness, sweetness, and hardness are in our minds, 
and the apple is outside our mind, it could not really be red, sweet, or 
hard. What would the real apple be like then? We have no clue, except that 
it is something that causes and corresponds to what is in our minds—and, 
since we know nothing about one side of the equation, we have no clue 
about what that correspondence is like either (see Berkeley 1982: sec-
tions 18–22).
The strategy of bifurcating the world into appearance and reality mires 
us in deep ignorance about the real world. Berkeley has a more optimistic 
proposal: the real world is nothing over and above the appearances. The 
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apple is a real thing, and it is constructed out of the sensations of redness, 
roundness, and hardness. The real world is just the whole collection of 
experiences. There are only minds and the sensations or experiences in 
those minds.
Three immediate problems:
• How does idealism distinguish between the real world and hallucina-
tions? After all, they are equally constituted by sensations.
• What causes our experiences if not material objects? After all, they 
don’t pop into our minds uncaused. This question is pressing if more 
than one mind can experience the same “object.”
• Where do objects go when no one is experiencing them? The apple 
doesn’t disappear when we stop looking at it.
Berkeley’s answer to the first question: sensations constituting the real 
world and those constituting hallucinations differ—not in being sensa-
tions, but in their stability and organization. For example, the real world 
is intersubjective. You and I will have very similar sensations of an apple, 
whereas I will not experience the pink elephant you’re hallucinating (see 
Berkeley 1982: sections 34–41).
Berkeley’s answer to the second question is that God causes our (non- 
hallucinatory) experiences. Since there are no material objects, our experi-
ence would have to be caused by another mind. And since our intersubjective 
experiences are so detailed and complex, that mind would have to be 
extremely impressive (see Berkeley 1982: sections 25–33).
So the answer to the third question: when we are not experiencing the 
real world, God could keep it in being. When we turn away from the apple, 
God could keep the sensations of the apple in his own mind, and so the 
apple does not disappear (see Berkeley 1982: sections 45–8).
The opposite view is that there are two fundamentally different kinds of 
stuff: mind and matter. But the nature of matter and how it interacts with 
mind is obscure from us, and must always be since it lies forever beyond 
the reach of the mind. The bifurcated picture is uneconomical and myste-
rious. The view that all reality is fundamentally mental is economical and 
transparent.
If you aren’t convinced, here’s the clincher. Whereas Berkeley tried to 
prove the existence of God from the truth of idealism, we can go the other 
way round: we derive idealism from religious belief.
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Religious readers take God to be perfectly rational. This means that he 
would not do anything useless. If Berkeley’s picture is possible, then God 
could create experiences exactly like ours without creating any material 
object. But if God could have created a world that looks just like ours 
without creating any material objects, then material objects would be use-
less. So, if idealism is possible, then material objects are useless. So, if 
idealism is possible, God would not create material objects. You must 
admit that idealism is a possible way for God to have created a world. Since 
idealism is possible, God would not have created material objects, and 
thus idealism is true (see Goldschmidt and Lebens 2020).
We cannot fully convey the beauty and plausibility of Berkeleyan 
Idealism (also see Adams 2007). But we must say something since idealism 
is crucial for understanding God’s role in the world: God causes all experi-
ences of natural objects and events, and since there is nothing more to 
these objects and events than those experiences, God is thereby keeping 
them in existence. The dependence of all natural objects and events on 
God is radical and intimate. God has his fingers on everything, and noth-
ing exists without immediate dependence on God.
As God is the immediate cause of everything in nature, natural things 
do not immediately cause other natural things. After all, it would be 
unnecessary and silly for God to immediately cause all natural things and 
to give those things their very own causal powers. How could one experi-
ence cause another experience anyhow? When cotton is placed in a fire, 
then, the fire is not the real cause of the cotton burning. When one billiard 
ball smashes into another, then, the billiards do not cause any of the noises 
and motions. God causes the cotton to burn, and the billiard balls to move 
by causing the relevant sequence of sensations and all the patterns of order 
in nature that science discovers (compare al-Ghazali [eleventh century] 
2000: Discussion 17).
8.5  radical reducTions
Our Jewish form of idealism comes equipped with a response to random-
ness. Idealism is the view that everything is a mind or an idea in a mind. 
Let’s distinguish a few versions. First:
• Berkeleyan idealism: Everything is a mind or an idea in a mind. Some 
material objects are ideas. But no minds are ideas and no ideas 
are minds.
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On this view, there is: (1) the infinite divine mind, (2) finite creaturely 
minds and (3) ideas in these minds. Ideas in the mind of God come 
together to make up material objects (e.g., our apple). But God’s ideas 
never come together to make up a mind. Minds are independent ingredi-
ents of reality. Contrast:
• Tame Hassidic Idealism: Everything is a mind or an idea in a mind. 
Some material objects are ideas, some minds (indeed, all finite minds) 
are ideas, and some ideas are minds.
There is, once again: (1) the infinite divine mind, (2) finite creaturely 
minds, and (3) ideas in these minds. Ideas in the mind of God come 
together to make up material objects (our apple). Now add that some of 
God’s ideas come together to make up minds too. In fact, all finite minds 
are just ideas in the mind of God. Just as the apple is a bundle of God’s 
ideas, so too our minds are bundles of God’s ideas. Finally, a more radi-
cal view:
• Radical Hassidic Idealism: Everything is a mind or an idea in a mind. 
But no material object and no mind is an idea.
There is: (1) the infinite divine mind, and (2) ideas in this mind. There 
is nothing else. Everything other than the divine mind is an idea in the 
divine mind. But no material objects and no minds could be ideas. Just as 
the idea of a vacation is not itself a vacation, God’s ideas of minds are not 
themselves minds. And so nothing other than the divine mind and its ideas 
exist. No material objects and no finite minds exist. What then of our 
apple? What of ourselves?
Radical Hassidic Idealism seems absurd. Are you not here? What could 
be more obvious? But distinguish between an author writing a story, and 
what happens in that story. There are two levels of reality. The one is 
Conan Doyle’s level of reality. The other is Sherlock Holmes’ level of real-
ity. On one level—the level of what happens in the story—Sherlock 
Holmes exists, lives at 221B Baker Street, and so on. On another level—of 
what happens outside the story—Sherlock Holmes does not exist, does 
not live on 221B Baker street, and so on.
Now imagine that the author is a divine author, and the story is a his-
tory of the world. These are two levels of reality. Radical Hassidic Idealism 
concedes that on one level—the level of the story—our minds do exist, but 
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that on another level—the level where God is author—our minds do not 
exist. Or distinguish between God imagining a world and what God imag-
ines. Radical Hassidic Idealism tells us that on one level of reality—the 
level of what God imagines—finite minds and material objects, people and 
apples, exist, but on a more fundamental level—the level where God is 
merely imagining a world—they do not exist. At this fundamental level, 
only God and his ideas of minds and his ideas of material objects exist.
We’re not sure whether Hassidic Idealism is best framed in terms of a 
divine fiction or a divine dream, or whether there is any difference between 
divine fiction and divine dream. But the result is much the same: in one 
way—at the fundamental level of reality—we do not exist. But in another 
way—in the divine story, the divine dream—we do exist. We are God’s 
imaginary friends (see Lebens 2015).
We call the last two views hassidic idealism because they capture the 
theology of the early Hassidic masters. For example, the founder of 
Hassidism teaches that when reciting the Shema prayer, which declares the 
unity of God, the worshiper must understand that:
there is nothing else in the entire world, other than the Holy One, Blessed 
be He; that all the world is filled with his glory [alluding to Isaiah 6:3]. And 
the fundamental principle of this intention, is that the person should con-
sider himself as empty and void, and he has no fundamentality other than 
the soul that is within him, which is a portion of God above [alluding to Job 
31:2]. Consequently, there is nothing in the world other than the one, Holy 
One, blessed be He. (Ben Eliezer 1938: Parashat Va’Etchanan 13)
Insofar as we exist at all, we exist derivatively. Insofar as we exist at all, 
we have no independence. We are swallowed up by the divine. We are 
about as close to nothing as possible (for more on the association between 
Hassidism and what we call Radical Hassidic Idealism, see Goldschmidt 
and  Lebens 2020;  Lebens 2020). Now we return to the question of 
providence.
8.6  idealism and Providence
In some theological pictures nature functions somewhat independently of 
God. God winds up the machine, and then lets it go. God creates initial 
conditions and natural laws, and then lets the universe unfold (except for 
the occasional miracle). But on Berkeleyan Idealism, the universe cannot 
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unfold without God’s constant intervention. The universe is just a patch-
work of experiences knitted together by the will of God. The experiences 
don’t cause themselves. And we don’t cause them. The experiences are 
caused by and exist in the mind of God. This puts a gloss on Genesis Rabbah:
‘He encountered the place’ (Genesis 28:11)—Rav Huna in the name of 
Rabbi Amei said: Why do… we call Him ‘Place’? Since he is the place of the 
world, and the world is not his place—from what is written, ‘Behold! There 
is a place at me’ (Exodus 33:21). (68:9)
On Radical Hassidic Idealism, the universe isn’t even a patchwork of 
experiences knitted together by the will of God. The universe is a divine 
fiction or a figment of divine imagination. But it is not a human fiction or 
figment. Nothing slips mistakenly through the pen of an omniscient 
author. Nothing wanders unexpectedly through the imagination of an 
omnipotent mind.
God is the immediate cause, the immediate author, or the immediate 
dreamer of all natural things. But that does not mean that he is the imme-
diate cause (or author or dreamer) of all things in the same way. For exam-
ple, he might bring about some things in more miraculous ways than 
others. When he causes an event that follows the usual pattern of events—
for example, making cotton burn in fire—that’s no miracle. When he 
causes an event that does not follow the usual pattern—for example, mak-
ing cotton freeze in fire—that’s a miracle.
Idealism, we can safely say, rules out perfect divine transcendence. God 
has his fingers on everything. Nevertheless, idealism—Berkeleyan or 
Hassidic—does not tell us how much particular providence there is. How 
do the fingers of God move things? How does God imagine things?
Berkeleyan Idealism does not tell us which of the five answers of Sect. 
8.3 is correct, although it rules out Gersonides’. Hassidic idealism by con-
trast, divides the question of providence into two, and answers half of it. 
That is to say, Hassidic idealism transforms the question of the extent of 
providence into two questions:
 1. How far does God’s particular providence extend in the world as it is 
fundamentally?
 2. In the story of our world (i.e., at the level of reality in which we’re real 
people), how far does God’s particular providence extend?
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Now, the answer to question 1: God’s particular providence extends 
over everything that exists, even though the only things that exist, besides 
him, are his ideas. As an omnipotent being, he has complete control over 
his ideas. But question 2 is more interesting, and is left unanswered by 
Hassidic idealism.
Question 2 asks how often God, a character in his own story, appears 
on the scene, in the story itself. Hassidic idealism is compatible with 
any of the five answers of Sect. 8.3, even Gersonides’. Within the story 
God tells, Hassidism might still be partial to answer 1; it might think 
that God is always, even as a character in his own story, in the story 
itself, intimately involved in every event that transpires. However, the 
basic ideas are consistent with a wide array of theories of providence, 
so long as we restrict our attention to question 2. And though the 
Hassidim tend to see God’s hand everywhere, Hassidic idealism makes 
room for any of the medieval views, so long as they are restricted to 
what’s going on within the story of the world. We can now deliver on 
our original promise: a benefit of Hassidic idealism is that it sees no 
conflict between an event being both completely random and com-
pletely determined by the will of God.
E. E. Cummings wrote a poem, “Nobody loses all the time.” It tells us 
of an uncle, Sol, who suffered a series of business disasters. His vegetable 
farm failed because chickens ate the vegetables. So, he started a chicken 
farm, which failed when skunks at the chickens. He started a skunk farm, 
which failed because the skunks died of cold. Sol “imitated” the skunks 
“in a subtle manner” by “drowning himself in the watertank.” Eventually, 
Sol was buried, and so “started a worm farm.”
Let’s assume that Sol is a fictional uncle, that Cummings is not telling a 
true story. Here’s a question: was Sol a victim of dumb luck? In the poem, 
it seems as if Sol’s life was a series of mishaps, a statistical anomaly, a 
counter-example to the general rule of thumb that in a world of pure 
chance, “Nobody loses all the time.” Let’s assume that in the story of the 
poem, Sol’s life was governed by random forces. That doesn’t undermine 
the fact that every experience that Sol ever had was, from a different per-
spective, determined by the will of Cummings, his creator.
For the Hassidic idealist, whether principled randomness is a real fea-
ture of the world we live in doesn’t matter. It wouldn’t undermine the 
religious significance of any event. We can now adopt two perspectives at 
once. Just as random events in a story are truly random within the story 
but also wholly determined by their author, random events in our world 
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can be both random within the divine story in which we live, and deter-
mined by God from a more fundamental perspective. Just as random 
events in Sol’s life could (and perhaps should) be read as carrying meaning 
and significance (it’s a poem after all), we’re invited to see each moment 
of our life from the perspective of the author, as pregnant with religious 
significance, even if the moment was also a product of principled 
randomness.
8.7  conclusion
We have canvassed various Jewish views of providence: (1) God extends 
particular providence to all creatures; (2) God extends particular provi-
dence to those intelligent enough to receive it; (3) God extends particular 
providence to those who deserve it; (4) God extends particular providence 
in the land of Israel; (5) God extends general providence which we can 
particularize; and (6) there is no particular providence (according to the 
secret-theory-theory).
All of these theories can be adopted by Hassidic idealism, but only in 
relation to our second question of providence: In the story of our world 
(i.e., at the level of reality in which we’re real people), how far does God’s 
particular providence extend? But what of our first question: How far does 
God’s particular providence extend in the world as it is fundamentally? 
The Hassidic idealist can answer that however random events might be 
within the story of the universe, they are nevertheless entirely determined 
by the divine will. Hassidic idealism renders randomness theologically 
harmless.
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Mossad HaRav Kook.
Nissim of Gerona. 1530. Shnayim Asar Derashot. Constantinople: n.p.
Raffel, Charles. 1987. Providence as Consequent Upon the Intellect. Association 
for Jewish Studies 12 (1): 25–71.
Roth, Aharon. 1998. Shomer Emunim (Volume 1). Jerusalem: Toldot Aharon.
Vitebsk, Menah ̣em Mendel. 1818. Pri HaAretz. Mogilev: n.p.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the 
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copy-
right holder.
8 JUDAISM AND PROVIDENCE 
171© The Author(s) 2022
K. J. Clark, J. Koperski (eds.), Abrahamic Reflections on 
Randomness and Providence, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75797-7_9
CHAPTER 9
Randomness and Providence in Christian 
Thought
Karen R. Zwier
9.1  Goals and orientation
In this chapter, I will show that the problem of randomness and provi-
dence is not a new one that has only become apparent in the modern era, 
with Christian thinkers scrambling to contort theology to accommodate. 
Rather, there is a long history of sophisticated thought in response to this 
problem, and it can be called upon to address the problem in its modern 
scientific variant.
The chapter will be organized as follows. In Sect. 9.2, I will give a basic 
overview of Christian belief. The overview is sweeping and is intended 
mostly for those who are unfamiliar. Section 9.3 covers the concept of 
divine providence in Christian thought, concentrating on relevant pieces 
of Christian scripture and passages from some of the Christian Fathers. In 
Sect. 9.4, I cover, in historical fashion, how Christians at various points in 
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history have grappled with the question of randomness in relation to 
God’s providence. Finally, in Sect. 9.5, I propose my own way of thinking 
about randomness and providence.
9.2  introduction to christianity
In order to address the relationship between providence and randomness 
within Christianity, I first need to give an introduction to Christianity. I 
can only make an attempt at an introduction, and it will necessarily be 
brief. There are many things I won’t be able to mention or explain, but I’ll 
do my best to lay out the “fundamentals” of Christianity in a way that will 
hopefully illuminate some of the core ideas that will matter for Christian 
views on providence and randomness.
This introduction (and the entire chapter, for that matter) will be col-
ored by my own perspective as a Christian of a particular denomination. I 
am a Catholic Christian. I’ll do my best to represent the breadth and 
diversity of Christianity, but my Catholic perspective will at times influence 
the way I present things here. One way in which this influence will come 
out is in my emphasis on history. I will be employing a broadly historical 
approach here, and that is because I tend to see theology and history as 
strongly tied to one another. The historical continuity of Christian beliefs 
and institutions is of great importance (and comfort) to me. I ground my 
beliefs in a tradition and a community. To separate tradition and commu-
nity from Christian theology removes, for me, one of the main reasons to 
take it seriously.
9.2.1  The Person of Jesus
The Christian faith centers on Jesus of Nazareth, who lived in the first few 
decades of the Common Era. The Common Era is, of course, dated 
roughly to the time of his birth, which is why we have the abbreviations 
“B.C.” (Before Christ) and “A.D.” (Anno Domini, Year of our Lord) 
(though his actual birth may have been a few years B.C.).
Jesus was born into a devout Jewish family in Nazareth in the region of 
Galilee in Northern Israel, which had its own distinctive political and reli-
gious context. The separation of the tribes of Israel had left Galilee geo-
graphically removed from Judea and, most importantly, Jerusalem. As a 
devout Jew, Jesus had something of an insider status, but as a Galilean, he 
would have also been regarded as an outsider by Judeans.
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Jesus lived a quiet life until, at around 30 years of age, he began travel-
ing around both Galilee and Judea, preaching publicly and healing the 
sick. The Jewish faith served as the background of his preaching: one God 
who is Creator, God’s special covenant with the Jews as his chosen people, 
and the Torah as a set of sacred moral precepts. But there were also dis-
tinctively new elements to his preaching which went beyond literalist read-
ings of the Torah and called for a higher standard of morality. For example, 
he condemned divorce, discouraged “eye for an eye” justice, and broke 
Sabbath rules in order to heal.
One of Jesus’ central messages was the coming of God’s kingdom. The 
meaning of this message appears to have been just as mysterious and 
ambiguous to Jesus’ contemporaries as it sounds to us today. Those who 
interpreted him as a political revolutionary who would free the Jews from 
Roman rule would later be quite disappointed. It appears to have meant, 
for Jesus and his followers, that God was present and active in the world 
right then and there, and that God was calling his followers into a new 
kind of relationship with him.
Jesus’ teachings earned him the consternation of some of the Jewish 
elite, who eventually brought him to the Roman authorities who had him 
executed by crucifixion. He was crucified on a Friday, right before the 
Passover feast began. On Sunday morning (after Passover had ended), 
when some of his followers went to his tomb to anoint his body, they 
found the tomb empty. Jesus later appeared to his disciples on a few occa-
sions, in bodily form. The death and resurrection of Jesus became the 
focal point of celebration for the earliest Christians.
9.2.2  Early Christianity
The story of the first few decades and centuries of Christianity is a story of 
gradual self-definition. The earliest Christians—those who had known 
Jesus and walked with him—were deeply impacted by their experiences. 
These close followers carried with them a conviction that Jesus was inex-
pressibly different from ordinary human beings. They believed that he was 
the Christ, the messiah that God had promised to the Jews. But contro-
versies arose, and these controversies led to efforts to further define 
Christian belief. What we inherit in our modern concept of Christianity is 
a result of early councils in which the members of the church sought to 
define who they were and what they believed.
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Jesus’ followers began as a community in Jerusalem and began to 
spread to other cities across the Roman Empire. In the beginning nearly 
all were Jews, seeing themselves as a sect within Judaism. But increasing 
numbers of non-Jews (called Gentiles) began to convert to the way of 
Jesus, which led to their first big controversy: to what extent was the way 
of Jesus linked to the ways of the Jewish faith? Specifically, did the Gentile 
converts have to steep themselves in the Jewish traditions and observe 
Jewish practices (e.g., circumcision, dietary regulations)?
After a council in Jerusalem, it was decided officially that Gentile 
Christians were not lesser than Jewish Christians. In fact, not only were 
the Gentile followers relieved of obeying Jewish law, but no Christian—
even a Jewish Christian—was required to obey Jewish law in its entirety. 
The council directed followers to merely abide by certain minimal rules 
(i.e., avoiding unchastity, avoiding idolatry, and abstaining from blood). 
Jesus’ death and resurrection carried redemptive power and the forgive-
ness of sins, and as followers of Jesus, obedience to the Jewish law was not 
considered redemptive. Jesus the Messiah come into the world meant a 
transformation in the way that God’s people were called to live. Jesus’ 
death was the one and final sacrifice, and his resurrection signaled the 
birth of a new era of life with God. Jesus offered a new “law”—a law of the 
spirit. Jews and Gentiles alike were elevated to status as children of God.
The Jerusalem council was the first major self-defining decision, and 
there were more to come. Amid these early controversies, it’s important to 
note that there was no accepted set of authoritative texts (later called the 
canon) of Christian scripture other than the Jewish scriptures. (The first 
written gospel, for instance, is thought to be Mark, which was written 
shortly before the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D.) The churches throughout 
the Roman Empire communicated primarily through letters and traveling 
missionaries and representatives. These letters, which began to take on a 
special importance, were read at church gatherings. A special importance 
was assigned to the writings of those who had the status of Apostle (those 
who has been personally commissioned by Jesus). The canon of Christian 
scriptures (consisting mostly of these letters) came into place only gradu-
ally. The set of scriptures that we now call the “New Testament” was 
mostly settled by the early decades of the second century, with the defini-
tive finalization around 380/390 A.D.
Structures of Christian authority also evolved gradually from the early 
days in Jerusalem. Apostolic succession (an unbroken chain of authority 
passed down from the apostles and transmitted by the laying on of hands) 
marked those who had the special status of bishop. Bishops were 
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effectively “custodians” of the truth of the Christian faith, a duty passed 
on to them by the apostles.
I’ve now covered two of the three main doctrinal loci of the early 
Christian faith: the set of writings that would later form the canon of the 
New Testament and the teaching of the bishops. The third source of early 
doctrine was presented in various creeds. These creeds summarized the 
teaching of the apostles and were taught to followers of Jesus. Although 
these creeds varied slightly by region, they were in substance quite similar 
to the modern-day Apostles’ Creed.
The central elements of early Christian doctrine still define core 
Christian belief today. I’ll briefly describe three core doctrines that will 
shape some of my discussion below. These are: the incarnation, the Trinity, 
and salvation by Christ.
The Incarnation
Belief in the incarnation (enfleshment) is the belief that God became 
human in Jesus Christ. Although there was great controversy over the 
nature of Jesus, the accepted view is that Jesus is both fully human and 
fully divine—two natures (human and divine) united in one person. He 
existed as a divine person (the second person of the Trinity—see below) 
from all eternity, but at the moment of the incarnation, he took on a 
human nature as well. “And the Word became flesh and lived among us, 
and we have seen his glory, the glory as of a father’s only son, full of grace 
and truth” (John 1:14). The incarnation, the revealing of God to human-
ity, is particularly significant against the backdrop of Jewish history. God 
had attempted to reveal himself to his people by a series of covenants, by 
law, and by prophets. But none of these could be as definitive (and effec-
tive) as God’s own coming into the world. Is the incarnation mysterious? 
Absolutely. But “God so loved the world” (John 3:16) that he did the 
impossible—he bridged the gap between human and divine by becoming 
human himself, in order to reveal himself to humanity.
The Trinity
As if the incarnation were not mysterious enough, Christians also believe 
that God is a Trinity. God is one God in three persons: Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit. Christianity sees itself as an emphatically monotheistic con-
tinuation of Judaism, but also carries with it the belief that Jesus, as God 
incarnate, revealed previously hidden aspects of the inner life of God. 
Christians understand each of these—Father, Son, and Spirit—as a distinct 
person of the Trinity, perfectly united in an eternal exchange of love.
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Salvation by Christ
Humans (and the world as a whole) are fallen. The story of Adam and 
Eve’s temptation and fall in the Garden of Eden (Genesis 3) is interpreted 
in a variety of ways by Christians, but the fundamental truth it communi-
cates is that humans have an inherent tendency toward sin. Christians 
share the belief that Christ’s death and resurrection effect our salvation 
from sin. His death on the cross is interpreted in the New Testament as 
the fulfillment of the tradition of sacrifices under Jewish law. As God-Man, 
he is uniquely capable of serving as the final and eternal high priest offer-
ing himself up in sacrifice to God (see Hebrews 7:11–28). His resurrec-
tion affirms his victory over sin and evil and the beginning of God’s new 
creation (see Isaiah 65:17).
The details of how Christian salvation works are matters of substantial 
disagreement among Christians and, regrettably, a source of many divi-
sions. Some Christians believe that salvation is obtained solely by faith in 
Jesus; others by a combination of faith and good works. Some believe that 
salvation requires explicit faith in Christ, while others hold that it has a 
more counterfactual character (i.e., salvation is extended to those persons 
who would accept Christ’s offer of salvation if they were to have a deep 
encounter with Jesus and his teachings). Some Christians believe that sal-
vation is attained once and for all by one’s statement of faith; others believe 
that salvation is a lifelong process. Some Christians believe that Christ’s 
sacrifice is a payment of the debt that humanity has incurred through sin, 
while others believe that Christ’s sacrifice is a victory over the power of sin 
that offers a transformative power to Christians. And there is a variety of 
combinations of the above views.
I will say something about my personal stance on Christian salvation, 
because it is operative in my thoughts on providence and randomness. I 
believe that salvation is a gradual and lifelong process of transformation. 
While Christ’s sacrifice makes such transformation possible, it also requires 
faith and participation on the part of the Christian herself.
9.3  christian thinkinG on divine Providence
God’s providence has been of central theological concern from the earliest 
moments of Christianity. Both the New Testament authors and a group of 
early church leaders (called “church fathers”) concerned themselves with 
the nature of God’s providence, as well as the theological problems and 
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puzzles that arise when God’s providence is affirmed. These teachings 
developed over time into a set of robust philosophical positions.
9.3.1  Providence in Scripture
The first and most obvious place to examine the Christian understanding 
of providence is the Bible. Consider the following passage from Psalm 104:
10. You make springs gush forth in the valleys;
 they flow between the hills,
11. giving drink to every wild animal;
 the wild donkeys quench their thirst.
12. By the streams the birds of the air have their habitation;
 they sing among the branches.
13. From your lofty abode you water the mountains;
 the earth is satisfied with the fruit of your work.
14. You cause the grass to grow for the cattle,
 and plants for people to use,
 to bring forth food from the earth,
15. and wine to gladden the human heart,
 oil to make the face shine,
 and bread to strengthen the human heart.
16. The trees of the Lord are watered abundantly,
 the cedars of Lebanon that he planted.
17. In them the birds build their nests;
 the stork has its home in the fir trees.
18. The high mountains are for the wild goats;
 the rocks are a refuge for the coneys.
19. You have made the moon to mark the seasons;
 the sun knows its time for setting.
20. You make darkness, and it is night,
 when all the animals of the forest come creeping out.
21. The young lions roar for their prey,
 seeking their food from God.
22. When the sun rises, they withdraw
 and lie down in their dens.
23. People go out to their work
 and to their labor until the evening.
This psalm gives a beautiful characterization of what Christians call general 
providence—the idea that God created the structure of the world in such a 
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way that it provides for the well-being of his creatures. The psalm affirms 
that God has created the world in which we live and that God is both 
directly and indirectly active in providing for his creatures. On the one 
hand, he acts directly, making springs gush forth, watering the mountains, 
planting cedars. On the other hand, he acts indirectly by granting exis-
tence and making things what they are, to operate in certain regular pat-
terns, such that the very things of creation provide with regularity. He 
causes grass to grow so that the cattle might eat it, plants so that people 
might use them, trees so that birds might build their nests in them. He 
makes the sun and moon to rise and set so that there might be seasons and 
daily rhythms from which animals take their cues.
The author of the psalm makes these assertions plainly, as if they are in 
need of no evidence. Although the passage is itself scripture, it claims the 
clear and straightforward knowability of God’s providence. Accordingly, 
Christians take general providence to be evident in the world itself via 
“natural revelation,” and as such, evident to all people. “Natural revela-
tion” refers to the ways in which God reveals himself in and through the 
workings of nature (independent of any special revelation, like Scripture). 
Speaking to the Athenians, St. Paul attributes to them a vague recognition 
of the Jewish and Christian God, “the God who made the world and 
everything in it, he who is Lord of heaven and earth … [who] himself 
gives to all mortals life and breath and all things. From one ancestor he 
made all nations to inhabit the whole earth, and he allotted the times of 
their existence and the boundaries of the places where they would live” 
(Acts 17:24–26). Elsewhere, in his letter to the Romans, St. Paul affirmed 
that “what can be known about God is plain to them [those who do not 
acknowledge God], because God has shown it to them. Ever since the 
creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though 
they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made” 
(Romans 1:19–20).
The Christian scriptures also affirm providence in another sense. Over 
and above God’s providing for his creatures by placing them within an 
overall structure designed to meet their needs, God also cares and pro-
vides for individuals in particular, detailed ways. This distinct type of prov-
idence, called special providence, holds that God’s care is individualized in 
the form of plans for each person. Just as God had plans for the nation of 
Israel (Jeremiah 29:10–11), so he has plans for each person. And these 
plans are better than we, in our limited state, can possibly imagine: “What 
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no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the human heart conceived, what God 
has prepared for those who love him” (1 Cor 2:9; cf. Isaiah 64:4).
God has a special providential care for the quotidian needs of each of 
his creatures. In the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus says, “Are not two sparrows 
sold for a penny? Yet not one of them will fall to the ground apart from 
your Father. And even the hairs of your head are all counted. So do not be 
afraid; you are of more value than many sparrows” (Matthew 10:29–30). 
Here we see that God’s providence is not merely a general care to provide 
a structure by which creation is sustained, but extends to the meticulous 
level of providing for sparrows and counting the hairs on our heads.1
Alongside scriptural affirmations of special providence are warnings to 
not be overly concerned with the needs of the body.
Therefore do not worry, saying, ‘What will we eat?’ or ‘What will we drink?’ 
or ‘What will we wear?’ For it is the Gentiles who strive for all these things; 
and indeed your heavenly Father knows that you need all these things. But 
strive first for the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things 
will be given to you as well. (Matthew 6:31–33)
There is, therefore, a hierarchy of goods to be expected from God, with 
eternal spiritual goods being of higher value than the transient goods per-
taining only to this life. St. Paul’s letters develop a theology in which 
special providence reaches its highest and purest form as God’s grace, 
which provides for the spiritual needs of humanity. If the ultimate goal and 
destiny of people is salvation, then the utmost form of providence is that 
by which God, through grace, grants righteousness and elevates a person 
to a shared life with him. While the providence that leads toward salvation 
is extended to all (cf. 1 Timothy 2:3–4), it is also particular to each indi-
vidual (cf. 2 Thessalonians 2:12–13).
Inasmuch as salvation is the highest form of providence, it is the pri-
mary concern of God for us, and will sometimes outweigh our specific 
transient needs. In times when the Christian is afflicted with suffering and 
may be tempted to think that God does not care, St. Paul entreats them to 
recall the purpose of God’s providence for them:
[S]ince we are justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord 
Jesus Christ, through whom we have obtained access to this grace in which 
1 See also: Matt 6:26–34, 7:7–11; Luke 11:5–13; John 16:23.
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we stand; and we boast in our hope of sharing the glory of God. And not 
only that, but we also boast in our sufferings, knowing that suffering pro-
duces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces 
hope, and hope does not disappoint us, because God’s love has been poured 
into our hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us. 
(Romans 5:1–5)
It is through a firm confidence in God’s highest form of providence, his 
love, and his grace, that St. Paul exhorts the Christian to persevere in times 
of suffering. In such times, God’s providence may appear to be absent, but 
in reality is not.
Who will separate us from the love of Christ? Will affliction, or distress, or 
persecution, or hunger, or nakedness, or peril, or the sword? For thy sake, 
says the scripture, we face death at every moment, reckoned no better than 
sheep marked down for slaughter. Yet in all this we are conquerors, through 
him who has granted us his love. (Romans 8:35–37)
In light of the scriptural texts above, I propose a third distinct label as we 
grapple with the Christian understanding of God’s providence: redemptive 
providence. “Redemptive providence,” in the case of a human being, 
denotes God’s care for their eternal life and salvation as an individual. 
More generally, it refers to God’s will to transform all of creation:
For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children of 
God; for the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the 
will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set 
free from its bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of 
the children of God. We know that the whole creation has been groaning in 
labor pains until now; and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have 
the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly while we wait for adoption, the 
redemption of our bodies. (Romans 8:19–23)
Akin to the hierarchy of goods, we might affirm that there is a correspond-
ing hierarchy of providence in which redemption is paramount. That is to 
say: redemptive providence is the most highly valued form of providence 
because it is oriented toward the highest good, and it will often outweigh 
special providence, which is oriented toward more transient goods. 
Furthermore, special providence will sometimes outweigh general provi-
dence, inasmuch as God’s care for an individual creature’s transient needs 
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sometimes outweighs God’s care for maintaining the overall structure by 
which the needs of creatures are ordinarily met. This hierarchy will inform 
some of the problems and questions we will encounter later.
9.3.2  Fathers of the Church on Divine Providence
The term “Christian Fathers” or “Church Fathers” refers to a set of par-
ticularly influential and authoritative Christian writers over the first several 
centuries of Christian history. The exact set of authors is ill-defined; 
Christian denominations disagree to some extent on which authors are to 
be included in the list, and whose writings should be emphasized. But 
despite differing views on the exact body of authors and texts, the need for 
some kind of category of authoritative early Christian thought is clear. For 
Christians, the set of Old Testament and New Testament scriptures con-
stitute the revealed word of God. But scripture doesn’t always carry its 
meaning on its face, and it lends itself to a wide variety of theological read-
ings. As the early church faced a variety of controversies and disagree-
ments, a core identity of shared belief and practice emerged and was 
gradually made explicit through various writings and councils. Thus, the 
writings of the Church Fathers over this crucial time period of develop-
ment and definition stand as an important reference point for identifying 
core Christian beliefs.
Where scripture leaves certain questions about providence unanswered, 
therefore, we can turn to the fathers for more insight. The scriptural 
themes noted in the last section—of general providence, special provi-
dence, and redemptive providence—are further emphasized and rein-
forced by the Church Fathers (Fig. 9.1).
General providence is mentioned time and time again by the early 
Church fathers. Clement, writing around the turn of the second century, 
explained general providence in the following way:
The heavens are moved by His direction and obey Him in peace. Day and 
night accomplish the course assigned to them by Him, without hindrance 
one to another. The sun and the moon and the dancing stars according to 
His appointment circle in harmony within the bounds assigned to them, 
without any swerving aside. The earth, bearing fruit in fulfilment of His will 
at her proper seasons, putteth forth the food that supplieth abundantly both 
men and beasts and all living things which are thereupon, making no dissen-
sion, neither altering anything which He hath decreed. Moreover, the 
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inscrutable depths of the abysses and the unutterable statutes of the nether 
regions are constrained by the same ordinances. The basin of the boundless 
sea, gathered together by His workmanship into its reservoirs, passeth not 
the barriers wherewith it is surrounded; but even as He ordered it, so it 
doeth. For He said, So far shalt thou come, and thy waves shall be broken 
within thee. The ocean which is impassable for men, and the worlds beyond 
it, are directed by the same ordinances of the Master. The seasons of spring 
and summer and autumn and winter give way in succession one to another 
in peace. The winds in their several quarters at their proper season fulfil their 
ministry without disturbance; and the everflowing fountains, created for 
enjoyment and health, without fail give their breasts which sustain the life 
for men. Yea, the smallest of living things come together in concord and 
peace. All these things the great Creator and Master of the universe ordered 
to be in peace and concord.2
Here we see an emphasis on the regularity, rhythms, and laws of creation 
as directly ordained by God. John Chrysostom, four centuries later, wrote 
similarly:
[I]f you doubt [that God cares for all things], inquire of the earth, the heav-
ens, the sun, the moon; ask the various irrational beings, the seeds, the 
2 1 Clement 20, from Joseph Barber Lightfoot, tr. The Apostolic Fathers (London, 
Macmillan and Co., 1898).
Fig. 9.1 Types of providence
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plants, the speechless fish, the rocks, the mountains, the valleys, the hills, the 
night, the day. For God’s providence is as plain as the sun and its rays. In 
each situation and place, in the wilderness, in inhabited regions and unin-
habited, on earth or sea or wherever you might go, you will observe the 
clear and sufficient, ancient and new, reminders of this providence; voices 
which speak more clearly than our rational voice and are conveyed from all 
places, teaching those who are willing to listen about his constant concern.3
And Theodoret of Cyrus, writing in the middle of the fifth century:
Consider now at least, if you have not done so before, the nature of visible 
objects, their position, order, situation, movement, rhythm, harmony, 
gracefulness, beauty, splendor, utility, charm, variety, diversity, changeability, 
their regular return to the same place, their permanence in corrupt natures. 
[…] Behold providence manifested in the heavens and the heavenly bodies, 
the sun, the moon, and stars. Behold it also in the air and in the clouds, on 
land and in the sea, and in everything on the earth, in plants, grasses, and 
seeds; in animals, rational and irrational, footed and winged, swimming, 
creeping, and amphibian, tame and wild, domesticated and savage. 
(Theodoret 1988, 13–15)
In these passages, providential care and control of the regularities of cre-
ation are taken to be readily apparent. General providence is “plain,” 
something to “behold,” and in need of no rational argument or defense. 
The picture painted is beautiful and poetic.
But general providence poses a set of problems. We might wonder: why 
does God provide for us in this general way rather than a different general 
way? Some features of creation seem to be rather indirect or inefficient 
ways of providing for us. For example, why should God have created a 
structure in which thunder and lightning accompany the rain, which falls 
to the earth and waters the plants, so that we might have food? Why 
should he not instead have created a system in which food spontaneously 
pops into our hands, or for that matter, why not create our bodies in such 
a way that they automatically generate their own sustenance? Why this 
system rather than a better one, in which we are provided for more effi-
ciently or more directly?
3 Hall, Christopher Alan, tr. (1991). John Chrysostom’s ‘On Providence’: a Translation and 
Theological Interpretation, p. 193.
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Such questions suggest two objections to the idea of general provi-
dence. On the one hand, given that the structure of creation provides for 
us only in an indirect and inefficient manner, we might be led to think that 
there is no providence. We might think that these features of the world on 
which we depend are not the result of a provident God, but rather are 
products of chance, and it just so happens that we are resourceful beings 
who make use of them. On the other hand, we might admit that there is a 
providential design built into creation by God, but given its indirect and 
inefficient nature, conclude that human beings are not privileged with 
respect to that providential design. We are provided for, but no more so 
than God’s other creatures. The rain falls equally on all: oceans, rocks, 
plants, animals, human beings.
These worries were confronted by Origen, a third-century Father, in 
a response to the philosopher Celsus, a critic of Christianity. Origen 
identified both of the aforementioned objections to general providence 
as serious affronts to Christian piety. To believe on the basis of the indi-
rect way in which our needs are met that there is no divine providence 
is to have a small and selfish view. Why, Origen asks, should we be sur-
prised that human beings are not the only objects of God’s care? Why 
should God not be allowed to create an entire system of care that pro-
vides for the needs of all his creatures, without making us doubt his care 
for us? Should we not be all the more in awe of his providence in light 
of his care for other creatures, rather than less so? (Origen 1980, 
bk. IV 75).
Yet, for Origen, it is equally an error to focus so much on God’s provi-
dence with respect to non-human creatures that we cease to believe in his 
special care for humans. In Origen’s view, God’s choice to provide for us 
in an indirect way is itself a way of fostering the development of our 
human capacities. Were God to provide for us directly, by simply placing 
food in our hands every day and meeting all of our needs, we would not 
be driven to garden, to care for livestock, to build, to create art, to invent, 
to philosophize. God “created man a being full of wants,” Origen tells us, 
and accordingly placed us within a system where our capacities would be 
realized only through a process of fulfilling those wants. He does not do 
so for the irrational animals, who do not need to garden and who are 
given natural coverings such that they do not need to build shelter for 
themselves. And so the fact that he provides for us in this particular way 
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(i.e., indirectly and inefficiently, such that we must work for our welfare) 
is precisely the proof that God has a special care for humans (Origen 
1980, bk. IV 76).
What are we to make of Origen’s suggestion? If God’s providence man-
ifests itself toward humans in this indirect and inefficient way, and if indeed 
this form of providence is purposefully oriented toward our good, then 
how exactly are we to understand that good? What is the nature of this 
good that God chooses for humans?
To answer these questions, we need to move from general providence 
into issues of special and redemptive providence. In the scriptural texts 
related to providence, we saw these varying “levels” of providence emerge, 
and we can see this again in the writings of various church fathers. 
Chrysostom, for example, expresses an idea similar to Origen’s, where 
general providence is somehow especially suited for meeting human needs, 
both natural and spiritual:
He created this praiseworthy and all-harmonious universe for no one else 
but you. For your sake he formed it so beautiful and so great, diverse, costly, 
completely sufficient for every need, useful, profitable in every way, apt for 
the sustenance and formation of the body, the growth of the spiritual life, 
and as a pathway toward the knowledge of God. (Hall 1991, 221)
But what does it mean, specifically, for the world to be created for the sake 
of human spiritual growth and knowledge of God?
The present life is a wrestling school, a gymnasium, a battle, a smelting fur-
nace, and a dyer’s house of virtue. Therefore, just as tanners grasp the hides 
and first work them vigorously, stretching, striking, and dashing them 
against walls and rocks, and by countless other treatments render them fit 
for the reception of the dye—in this way they bring out the prized color; just 
as goldsmiths throw the gold into the fire to purify it, delivering it over to 
the testing of the furnace; just as coaches train the athletes in the wrestling 
schools with much hard work, attacking them more viciously than their 
opponents, so that every part of their bodies might be adequately prepared 
by exercise for the grasps of their enemies and for an easy escape; so in the 
same way God acts in the present life. Desiring to transform the soul into a 
serviceable condition for virtue, he works it, melts it, and delivers it over to 
testing of trials, in order to strengthen those who have lost heart and who 
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have let themselves go, in order that those who have already been tested 
might be even more approved and unconquered by the plots of the demons 
and the snares of the devil, completely worthy for the reception of the good 
things to come. (Hall 1991, 366–67)
Chrysostom describes God as active in this process of salvation, redemp-
tive providence, whereby God makes use of the trials and tribulations of 
this life to transform and redeem the Christian who undergoes the process.
9.4  What about randomness?
I have now described most of the core ideas concerning God’s providence 
that emerged over the first five centuries of Christianity. On the Christian 
understanding, God’s providence is oriented toward a hierarchy of goods 
for creation: at the lowest level, the regular and orderly operation of the 
cosmos; at an intermediate level, the health and well-being of living crea-
tures; and at the highest level, the salvation of human individuals. I have 
avoided one complicating issue: randomness. (Apparently) random events 
seem to present a challenge to the notion of providence. God’s plan for 
providing this hierarchy of goods seems to require a certain degree of 
control, and randomness seems to oppose control.
9.4.1  Grappling with Preexisting Thought
Before discussing randomness and providence, we need to acknowledge 
the everyday phenomena that all people (Christian or otherwise, theist or 
otherwise) must grapple with. On the one hand, there is much in the 
world that is stunningly orderly and predictable. In the sky we see the stars 
and planets orbit with the utmost regularity; on the earth, biological 
organisms of every kind produce marvelous and intricate structures. On 
the other hand, apparently random occurrences present themselves as 
stark contrasts to order: leaves fall from trees every which way, with no 
obviously predetermined destination; a young child is unpredictably struck 
with cancer; a tornado spontaneously forms with little warning.
Since order and chance are obvious and seemingly contradictory, the 
dueling pair stands in need of explanation. The ancient Greeks and Romans 
grappled extensively with the problem. Popular explanations came from 
poetry and myth: unpredictable Tyche, goddess of chance and fortune, 
visited her whims upon the world, while the Moirai (the fates), who 
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determined human destinies, established order and purpose. Both order 
and chance existed side by side in a world ruled by whimsical gods or 
forces. Plato, on the other hand, told a story of a Divine craftsman, the 
Demiurge, forming the world out of chaotic preexisting matter, in imita-
tion of a perfect eternal realm. Thus, Plato attributed the order in the 
world to the Demiurge and the eternal realm that served as a model, while 
random and disorderly events were attributed to the recalcitrant material 
that the Demiurge was constrained to work with. Later Stoic philosophers 
argued that chance is illusory; the world is governed and determined by a 
divine order that is immanent in the world; the appearance of chance was 
the result of causes that were not understood.4
Early Christians grappled with this explanatory challenge against this 
backdrop of thought: how to reconcile God’s creation in which order and 
randomness exist side by side, and how to explain how God can carry out 
his plan despite the random features of the world. In contrast to Plato’s 
proposal of a Demiurge who shapes preexisting matter, Christians held 
that God created the universe ex nihilo (out of nothing), not out of preex-
isting matter. Since they could not attribute chance happenings to the 
chaotic and recalcitrant nature of matter, Christians found it difficult to 
explain chance as a phenomenon. After all, if God was not constrained by 
preexisting recalcitrant matter, why would God create matter with such 
recalcitrant properties? Could he not have created a more docile matter 
that naturally fell into order? If randomness is real, it would have to be part 
of God’s design.
Some would reject genuine randomness. Perhaps events that appear to 
be random are actually determined and ordered at some imperceptible 
level. Perhaps a person’s heart attack, even if it appears random, is actually 
the result of a series of hidden but determinate causes. Some Christians 
sympathized with this sort of a Stoic proposal. St. Augustine of Hippo, 
who was influenced by Stoicism, took something like this position.
9.4.2  The Augustinian Model of Providence
Augustine rejected the view that the earthly realm (as opposed to the 
celestial realm of the stars and planets) is subject to “the sport of chance 
and fortuitous motion.” He responds to this philosophical view by intro-
ducing a commentary on Psalm 148:7–8.
4 See (Miller 2016).
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Praise the Lord from the earth,
monsters of the sea and all the deeps,
fire, hail, snow, and ice,
and storm winds fulfilling His command.
Nothing seems to be so much driven by chance as the turbulence and storms 
by which these lower regions of the heavens (rightly included also under the 
term “earth”) are assaulted and buffeted. But when the Psalmist added the 
phrase, fulfilling His command, he made it quite clear that the plan in these 
phenomena subject to God’s command is hidden from us rather than that it 
is lacking to universal nature. (Augustine 1982, 175)
Augustine believes that chance is incompatible with nature’s being subject 
to God’s command; apparently “chancy” phenomena are ruled by a plan 
of God that is hidden from us. After all, there are many places where 
God’s plan and providence are obvious:
What more absurd or foolish opinion can be maintained, therefore, than to 
hold that the will of God and the ruling power of HIs providence are lacking 
in that whole region whose lowliest and smallest creatures are obviously 
fashioned by such a remarkable plan that a moment’s serious attention to 
them fills the beholder with inexpressible awe and wonder? (Augustine 
1982, 175)
But what does it mean for the world to fulfill God’s command or follow 
his plan? In the chapter immediately following the above passages, 
Augustine argues there is a sort of finality inherent in God’s creative act 
“in the beginning.” But God’s creative act is also gradual and continuous. 
He uses the analogy of a seed.
In the seed … there was invisibly present all that would develop in time into 
a tree. And in this same way we must picture the world, when God made all 
things together, as having had all things together which were made in it and 
with it when the day was made. (Augustine 1982, 175)
So God’s initial creative act, like the planting of a seed, instills God’s plan 
into the world. (In fact, Augustine thinks of the six “days” of creation not 
as a succession of periods of time, but rather as the causal plans that he has 
established within the universe.) But there is more to God’s creative act: 
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he continues to bring forth the metaphorical fruit over time. Just as a seed 
gradually grows into a tree, which in turn produces fruit, so the initial 
creative act of God instills in the world a set of causal plans that gradually 
give rise to all manner of goods: stars and planets, land and water, plants 
and animals, humans.
Augustine’s view is not unlike Stoic determinism. There is a hidden 
plan that is responsible for all things, even when those things appear ran-
dom. And while the transcendent Christian God differs from the imma-
nent Stoic God, Augustine retains a strong sense of immanence. This 
seems to be an appropriate way of understanding the creative act of the 
God of Jesus Christ, who is both transcendent and immanent.
But puzzles remain with the Augustinian view.
Firstly, Augustine’s seed-model need not be deterministic. Couldn’t the 
natural tendencies implanted as seeds in creation be, well, tendencies that 
sometimes, but don’t always, produce a certain result? For example, a hen 
might tend to lay an egg daily, but that doesn’t mean that she will every 
day. Seeds of creation, so it seems, might evolve in “chancy” ways.
Secondly, it’s not clear how God’s causation relates to the natural cau-
sation of “seeds” on Augustine’s model. If an efficacious (and determinis-
tic) causal power is planted within creation itself, God needn’t continually 
act and bring forth. Why couldn’t he—or why doesn’t he—just sit back 
and let creation act as it is wont to do? The model sounds like a case of 
“overdetermination,” as it is called in contemporary philosophy. The 
setup seems redundant.
But perhaps that’s the point. Perhaps it is redundant, because God isn’t 
concerned with efficiency. Perhaps God simply wants to be present in the 
world in an intimate and causal way. Such a desire would be consistent 
with his overabundant love for creation, after all.
This ambiguity in Augustine’s ideas becomes a locus for later Christian 
reflection.
9.4.3  Enter Aristotelianism
While Platonism and Stoicism exerted influence on Christian thought, 
many classical Greek texts, including the majority of Aristotle’s writings, 
were lost to Christian Europe throughout most of the medieval period. 
During this period, Islam’s so-called Golden Age of intellectual and 
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technological flourishing found Muslim scholars studying and comment-
ing extensively on many Ancient Greek texts, including Aristotle’s works. 
Through the Islamic world a Christian Europe “rediscovered” Aristotle. 
From the mid-twelfth to mid-thirteenth centuries, many texts and their 
Islamic commentaries were gradually translated from Arabic into Latin. 
This became a momentous occasion for the development of Christian 
thought, particularly on the subject of God’s causal relation to nature.
The most famous Christian thinker to engage with these new texts was 
Thomas Aquinas. I will focus on the aspects of his thought that are most 
relevant to providence and randomness. In the context of an interfaith 
book, it is worth noting that Aquinas was heavily influenced by the Muslim 
philosopher Ibn Rushd and the Jewish philosopher Maimonides.
Recall that, in our examination of Augustine’s model of creation in the 
last section, we came to a puzzle over how God’s causal power relates to 
the natural causal powers within creation. In particular, it seemed that the 
two causal powers were redundant, and that one or the other might be 
entirely superfluous. Aquinas developed an answer to this puzzle.
On Aquinas’ view, every agent in the natural world has certain powers 
inherent to it because of the kind of thing it is. For example, fire has the 
power to heat and to burn, and a knife has the power to cut. However, just 
as every created being owes its existence to God, every created being also 
owes its causal powers to God. In other words, God’s creative act is so 
powerful that it does more than simply bring a thing into being—it also 
imbues that thing with certain powers.
Therefore, God causes each action inasmuch as he bestows the power to act, 
preserves it, and applies it to action, and inasmuch as every other power acts 
by his power. (Aquinas 2012, 58)
This is Aquinas’ well-known teaching on primary and secondary causa-
tion. God is a primary cause of all of creation. Primary causation is creative 
causation; it is the power by which God gives existence and essence to all 
created things, including all of the causal powers inherent in those created 
things. The powers granted by God are called secondary causes, the causes 
built into creation itself.
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But why the redundancy, when God could do things more simply by 
causing everything directly? According to Aquinas:
Nor is it superfluous, even if God can by Himself produce all natural effects, 
for them to be produced by certain other causes. For this is not a result of 
the inadequacy of divine power, but of the immensity of His goodness, 
whereby He has willed to communicate His likeness to things, not only so 
that they might exist, but also that they might be causes for other things. 
(Aquinas 1991, sec. III.70.7)
God gifted his creatures with their own causal efficacy. As such, God relin-
quished some control over the exact results of that empowerment. Since 
God chooses not to “exclude from things the power of falling from the 
good,” (Aquinas 1991, sec. III.71.3) God does not always prevent evil 
and corruption from occurring (possible consequences of the causal power 
he has granted to created things).
What about chance? Just as God does not prevent all evil from occur-
ring, he likewise does not exclude contingency and chanciness from cre-
ation (Aquinas 1991, sec. III.72.1). Aquinas holds that chance events are 
possible because of creaturely limitations. Creatures control and deter-
mine their effects in varying degrees, and when their causal powers inter-
sect, their effects may not be determined or intended (Aquinas 1991, sec. 
III.74.4–6).
Aquinas wrestles with the compatibility of chance with providence:
Either, then, we must say that not all effects are subject to divine providence 
and, thus, that providence does not apply to all—but we showed earlier that 
it does; or else it is not necessarily so, that, granted providence, its effect 
must be granted, and thus providence is not certain; or, finally, it is necessary 
for all things to happen by necessity. For providence is not only in present or 
past time, but in eternity, since nothing can be in God that is not eternal. 
(Aquinas 1975, sec. III.94.3)
But Aquinas makes a startling claim: it is good that God has created crea-
tures that are contingent in their action. He goes on to say: “It would be 
contrary to the meaning of providence, and to the perfection of things, if 
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there were no chance events” (Aquinas 1991, sec. III.74.3). How could it 
possibly be contrary to providence for there to be no chance events? This 
puzzling assertion is worthy of consideration.
Aquinas’ argument relies on his understanding of contingency: since 
contingency is contrary to necessity, something with no contingency 
would be necessary and incorruptible. A world without contingency 
would be a world without generation and corruption, birth and death, 
or any type of change, including motion. Such a world would be terri-
ble, one that God would never will into being (Aquinas 1991, sec. 
III.72.4–6).
The reason that Aquinas thinks this way lies deep in the foundation of 
his philosophy. Aquinas holds that action follows being. This principle states 
that the behavior of a thing is always grounded in what it is; the essence of 
a thing determines the scope of possible actions and behaviors. Therefore, 
a contingent being is bound to act in contingent ways, and a being that 
does not act in contingent ways would not be a contingent being.
Those who are not convinced by this principle—and I admit to being 
one of them—may not find Aquinas’ reasoning here altogether convinc-
ing. There seems to be nothing logically contradictory in the idea of a 
created thing being contingent—that is, radically dependent on God for 
its existence—while also having a temporal tendency to change. A lack of 
contingency does not have to preclude change. Moreover, it seems per-
fectly possible for a being to change, albeit in perfectly predictable and 
deterministic ways that are not subject to chance.
But might there be another way to defend Aquinas’ claim that God’s 
providence wills that there be chance in creation? I think there is, but it 
requires stretching a bit beyond Aquinas’ thought.
9.4.4  Modern Science
Christians were wrestling with issues of chance and providence long before 
the advent of modern science, with a great deal of openness to the possi-
bility of randomness in the world. But in the early modern period, with 
new scientific theories like those of Galileo, Boyle, and Newton, it seemed 
that more and more of the world could be explained through mathemati-
cal laws; randomness looked increasingly like an illusion that would be 
explained away with enough detailed information about the world. In one 
of the most grandiose moments of deterministic theorizing, Laplace 
hypothesized:
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We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its 
anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one 
instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which 
nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose 
it an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis it would 
embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the 
universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain 
and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes. (Laplace 
[1814] 1902, 4)
This god-like intelligence (later called “Laplace’s Demon”) symbolized 
the idea of complete predictability and deterministic causation. Intellectuals 
(including Christian thinkers) increasingly accepted a mechanistic and 
deterministic worldview. A single formula that governed everything in the 
world seemed just a matter of time.
Many Christian thinkers used the mechanistic and deterministic world-
view as evidence of God’s design and craftsmanship. Perhaps providence 
and randomness was a non-issue. Yet other problems lurked. The new 
worldview left little room for free will, and the problem of evil appeared to 
have worsened. For evil could not be an artifact of chance, but rather part 
of the predetermined design of God. A variety of “solutions”—from pre-
destination to occasionalism—to these problems were proposed.5
In 1859, randomness dramatically re-entered scientific conversation 
with the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species. 
Darwin proposed that chance was at the heart of biological forms and 
their history. Random variation in the characteristics of organisms, 
when paired with natural selection, explains the gradual changes that 
were apparent in the various patterns of biological diversity. His idea 
was controversial but compelling, and over the next century, as more 
details about inheritance were discovered, culminating in the discovery 
of the structure of DNA, evolution by natural selection became widely 
accepted by the scientific community.
Modern scientific theory also revived the problem of randomness 
through quantum mechanics.6 Quantum mechanics emerged from a num-
ber of puzzling discoveries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
5 For more on this topic, see (Brooke 2016).
6 There were other theoretical affirmations of randomness, including chaos theory and the 
statistical foundations of thermodynamics. Here I concentrate on the two most prominent 
loci in which modern scientific theories involved randomness.
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centuries. It is currently our best physical theory for describing the energy 
and movement of systems at the smallest scale of atomic and subatomic 
particles. According to the theory, Laplace’s thought experiment is wrong: 
the complete description of a given physical system does not determine a 
specific outcome. It can give us only a set of possibilities and probabilities, 
not a specific certain outcome. Unless scientists are mistaken, the world is 
ontologically random.7 We can no longer determine what specific event 
will evolve from another.
Are these theories a problem for a Christian understanding of provi-
dence? Many modern Christians have thought so. Christian reactions to 
Darwin’s theory in particular were negative. While some objections per-
tained to interpretation of the creation story in Genesis, others pertain to 
our topic here, rejecting the role of chance in Darwin’s theory. What 
could random variations (or “mutations”), which provide the raw material 
on which natural selection acts, mean for God’s plan? How could God 
have a plan for the world—a plan that culminated in human beings—yet 
leave the basic mechanism up to chance? With respect to quantum theory, 
how could God govern everything else if there is indeterminism at the 
most fundamental level of the world?
For Christian intellectuals who had become accustomed to a determin-
istic vision of the world and a narrowed notion of providence that required 
God’s complete control over every event, the chanciness of this scientific 
picture was hard to swallow.
9.5  a Possible solution
My goal in covering this sweeping history has been to give a broader con-
text for the questions that modern Christians ask about God’s providence 
and its relation to scientific randomness. Within this broader context, 
these questions are not new. They may have taken a new form, often 
expressed in technical and scientific language, but they are not new. These 
are not easy problems; they are not and never were easy to solve. But mod-
ern Christians can take some comfort in the fact that we are confronted 
7 This appears to be a strong possibility. Even if there is a hidden variable that renders the 
evolution of a quantum system deterministic, it has been proven that the hidden variable 
would have to be nonlocal, meaning that it violates the strongly-held principle of spatiotem-
poral locality. Such a hidden variable would require a revision of other fundamental theories, 
in particular the General Theory of Relativity.
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with the same difficulties as Christians of every era; we have not encoun-
tered a new and unprecedented problem. And we can make use of the 
thought of earlier Christians as we confront the problem in our own his-
torical time.
What is that age-old problem? Simply put, it is the question of how 
God can be provident over his creation while also relinquishing some con-
trol over it and allowing it to run its course in ways that are sometimes 
random. If God wills certain specific events to occur, and wills the good of 
his creatures, how can he relinquish control? How can he allow random-
ness to affect the course of events?
There are many ways of thinking about this problem and responding to 
it. Some are more satisfying than others, and individual Christians are 
bound to disagree, as there is much mystery in God’s intentions and our 
speculations are bound to get things wrong. But to conclude this chapter, 
I will now propose my way of thinking about this problem. To do so, I will 
highlight various points that I have mentioned earlier in the chapter and 
try to weave them together.
 1. God sees it as a great good for creatures to have a kind of autonomy in 
their own actions. Contingency (chanciness) of action is one manifesta-
tion of this autonomy. Just as God grants to humans free will, he grants 
to all creatures analogous degrees of autonomy. This extends all the 
way down to subatomic particles. (Subatomic particles do not have 
wills or intentions, but the analogy holds: their possibilities for behav-
ing this way or that are genuine possibilities, and God allows their 
inherent indeterminism rather than impose his own outcome.) God is 
that generous with creation, through and through.8
 2. From his eternal perspective, God can love and foreknow every detail 
about an individual human being (i.e., you or me). But that he loves 
and foreknows a person does not require that he controls every single 
event that led up to that person’s existence and subsequent develop-
ment. Again, he loves creation that much, to grant it some autonomy.
 3. God allows evil things to happen in the world. This is consistent with 
the autonomy that he bestows on creation and the randomness that he 
allows to be a part of the causal structure of creation. The tradition of 
8 This point is inspired by Aquinas and his robust belief in secondary causation, but I have 
taken Aquinas’ thought a bit further than he himself might like. He might object to the 
degree of indeterminism in the inanimate world that I suggest here.
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Christian spiritual practices also presumes that he does choose to pre-
vent some evils, according to his wisdom. We don’t have any way of 
knowing how many evils he chooses to prevent or his specific criteria 
for doing so. However, redemptive providence is his utmost form of 
care for creation. And because salvation/redemption is a more impor-
tant good than other transient goods, there are evil events that he 
allows creatures to endure in working out their redemption.
 4. The Christian message consistently affirms that the means of our salva-
tion is directly tied up with suffering. Jesus’ death on the cross is the 
means of our salvation and furthermore, we are to emulate him by 
offering up our own sufferings. That a certain degree of randomness is 
inherent in creation is not only consistent with God’s redemptive prov-
idence, but conducive to it. The struggle with a world that is sometimes 
random and unpredictable is an efficacious means of our coming to 
know God more deeply and be transformed in his image. God wills for 
us a life that is a “wrestling school” like the one that Chrysostom 
describes, as it brings about our redemption.
Therefore, my beloved, as you have always obeyed, so now, not only as 
in my presence but much more in my absence, work out your own 
salvation with fear and trembling; for God is at work in you, both to 
will and to work for his good pleasure. (Philippians 2:12–13)
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CHAPTER 10
God, Cosmos, and Humanity: Muslim 
Perspectives on Divine Providence
Sajjad Rizvi
Consider this famous set of pronouncements concerns the nature of God, 
divine providence, and the human yearning for God and their inability to 
grasp God’s transcendence:
Praise is God’s whom speakers cannot eulogise, and whose bounties cannot 
be enumerated by those counting, nor can one give Him His due despite 
the attempts of those striving to do so; the heights of intellectual endeavour 
cannot perceive Him, nor can the depths of understanding fathom Him. No 
standard can be established to describe Him, nor praise, neither in space nor 
in time that encompasses Him. He originated creatures through His power, 
dispersed the wind with Him mercy, and fixed His trembling earth 
with rocks.
The beginning of the faith is acknowledging Him, the perfection of 
acknowledging Him is bearing witness to Him, the perfection of bearing 
witness to Him is belief and making Him One, the perfection of making 
Him One is sincere faith in Him, the perfection of sincere faith in Him is 
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negating attributes of Him, because every attribute is recognisably distinct 
from what it attributes and what is attributed is conceptually distinct from 
the attribute. Whoever describes God ascribes a like to Him, and whoever 
ascribes a like to Him makes Him two, and whoever makes Him two divides 
Him into parts ….
A being but not after becoming, an existent but not after being privative, 
with everything without being identical to them, unlike everything without 
being distinct from them, acting without movement or instrument, seeing 
even though there is nothing in creation that gazes upon Him, absolutely 
One such that there is none that keeps Him company nor anyone whom He 
may miss in his absence. (al-Rad ̣ı ̄2015, 39–40)1
This was uttered by ʿAlı ̄b. Abı ̄Ṭālib, the cousin and son-in-law of the 
Prophet Muh ̣ammad (and the first Imam in the Shiʿi tradition) in a ser-
mon from his time as caliph on the creation and the nature of God. They 
reflect the creative tension between the transcendence and immanence of 
God in the Islamic context; either the former can be stressed to the extent 
that causality is denied to other than God in an occasionalist cosmos as 
envisaged in the Sunnı ̄Ashʿarı ̄theological traditions, or the latter may be 
emphasized such that the mediation of ‘divine humanity’ is expressed in 
the worship and adoration of the mediating friends of the divine as one 
finds in the Nusạyrı-̄ʿAlawı ̄traditions. If God were so utterly unknowable, 
how could humans make sense of their cosmos, their purpose, and even 
understand God’s purpose, wisdom, and theodicy? Similarly, if God were 
fully human, how could one understand the suffering of the divine within 
a world that suffers? This relatively short text could in itself become the 
basis for a theological reflection on the relationship between what Islam’s 
sapiential traditions calls the three realities of God, the microcosmic 
human that is both the face of the divine and the reflection, the mirror, of 
the cosmos back to God, and the cosmos that manifests the signs of God 
in the horizons. Insofar as divine providence calls for humans to make 
sense of God, it nudges us toward both the horizons of the cosmos and 
the depths of our own souls so that we may know that ‘He is the Real’ 
1 Al-Raḍı ̄ (d. 1016), himself a descendent of the Prophet and ʿAlı,̄ compiled this work, 
Nahj al-bala ̄gha on literary parameters to collect the sermons, homiletic sayings and letters 
of ʿAlı.̄ The gendered pronoun for God accords to the grammatical normativity of the mas-
culine in Arabic, and some might assume that the male is privileged in Islam but there is also 
a gendered complementarity, the yin-yang in the famous postulation of Sachiko Murata 
1992, between the divine names of majesty and of beauty, the masculine and the feminine.
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(Qurʾan 41.53). One might even describe this as a phenomenological 
approach to the question of divine providence, human purpose, and theo-
dicy. I will return to this. The purpose of this article is neither to provide 
a thick interpretation of a singular text nor to focus on the occasionalism 
that is often found in discussions of Islamic theological positions on provi-
dence (reflecting a Sunnı ̄normativity) but rather to show ways in which 
Islam(s) are claimed in different theological contexts and philosophical 
accounts given for divine providence and theodicy.
One of my critical points is the plurality of Muslim voices, of interpreta-
tions on scriptural and rational grounds to understand the three realities. 
One key desideratum of the contemporary field of Islam (within religious 
studies) is to decolonize our ways of understanding by critiquing not only 
the master narratives of what Islam is and is not (that arise from the orien-
talist practice) but also to provincialize notions of the ‘Islamic’ by empha-
sizing the plurality of voices, claims, and contestations within the house of 
Islam historically. This involves a re-centering and re-presenting philoso-
phies and rationalist theologies from the margins as well as taking seriously 
those doctrinal and hermeneutical positions not associated with hege-
monic forms of Sunnı ̄Islam, either in their historical or modern forms. 
The case of how the nature of God is understood and related to the nature 
of the cosmos and its nurture and development is a useful topic for that 
decolonization.
The Hellenic concept of providence (πρόνοια) as God’s plan for cre-
ation, God’s continuing care for creation and a theodicy to explain evil 
was quickly naturalized in Islamic thought by philosophers and theolo-
gians, mainly through the influence of Proclus (d. 485). Providence 
became a site for contestations within philosophies and theologies and 
scriptural exegesis, of engaging God’s plan, understanding the human 
condition, and the problem of evil and suffering. What exactly is the func-
tion of divine providence? What does it help us to understand? Does it 
account for the problem of evil? Is there an incommensurability between 
these accounts and the broader theological accounts of the relationship 
between God, cosmos, and humanity and what we wish to understand in 
our contemporary age? I shall begin with a brief account of an Islamic 
system of metaphysics, cosmology, the nature of moral obligation, and 
eschatological implications that arise from scriptural and early canonical 
texts in order to provide a wider frame for the discussion of providence. 
One ‘scriptural’ model will be presented for understanding Islam and 
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providence. I will examine two philosophical models for understanding 
divine providence: the first is the philosophers’ account in Avicenna/Ibn 
Sın̄ā (d. 1037) in which providence explains how and why creation comes 
about and how we can explain the existence of evils and the significant 
mediation of prophecy as an expression of providence and God’s facilitat-
ing grace; the second is the Safavid account of Mullā Ṣadrā Shır̄āzı ̄ (d. 
1636) and his theodicy of divine love. I cannot imagine that we can solve 
the problem of providence and evil once and for all, but I hope that we can 
understand the questions more adequately and some of the historical 
solutions.
10.1  What Is Islam? Or InferrIng PrOvIdence 
frOm scrIPture
I present a model for how we might understand Islam as a holistic way of 
life, an imaginative metaphysics, praxis, and affective community, a dın̄ as 
it is described in the Qurʾān (Q. 3.19: truly the religion [dın̄] in the sight 
of God is submission [isla ̄m]),2 as a religion in the term that we often use. 
While I recognize that the totality of the conceptual language used in the 
study of religion and indeed in philosophy of religion depends upon a 
normative basis in the study of Christianity, one needs to be aware of how 
elastic the concepts of theology, mysticism, religion, dogma, even provi-
dence and scripture might be. Here, I will use dın̄ instead of “religion” 
because it is a central term in Islamic discursive traditions. There are two 
ways of understanding dın̄: the first focuses on etymology, the second 
focuses on antonyms. On the former, a number of possibilities are put 
forward: dın̄ derives from the Arabic root d-y-n which connotes mutual 
obligation and debt and stems from the idea that it is the response and 
relationship to God that is morally entailed by the recognition of God as 
creator and sustainer of the cosmos, a notion known in Islamic theological 
traditions as taklıf̄ (moral obligation) (Frank 1983). A related sense of the 
same root is that of judgment (e.g., the Qurʾan talks of God as the ‘Master 
of the day of judgement (dın̄)’ 1.4), of paying one’s dues for the accumu-
lation of one’s actions (Q. 24.25: ‘on that day, God will pay them their 
just due in full’). The terms “urbanity”, “civility”, and “being human” 
come from the same root and dın̄ connotes these senses as well. Thus, dın̄ 
2 All translations are taken from Nasr et al. 2015, here 135.
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concerns the civil and affective ways in which we live our humanity through 
what we owe to God and to each other.
On the other hand, dın̄ is not dunya ̄. While much recent ink has been 
spilled on the implications on this distinction for the religious-secular 
divide and for an understanding of divine and human sovereignty and 
indeed of political theology in modern Islam, there is little quibbling that 
mutuality of dın̄ with the world and intimacy of our attachments that arise 
from embodiment remains such that the two cannot be truly distinct inso-
far as they construe facets of our humanity. Dın̄ is thus as complex a term 
as any used in any culture that might be classed under the term ‘religion’. 
For our purposes, one point worth bearing in mind is how one might 
distinguish dın̄ and its propositional and ethical commitments to philoso-
phy (insofar as, following Pierre Hadot (1993, 1995), it is a way of life and 
a set of spiritual practices as well); for many of the thinkers in the Islamic 
traditions that I will consider, the distinction is not categorical or essential 
but a matter of degree ranging from perhaps ‘philosophical religions’ to 
‘religious philosophies’ (Fraenkel 2012; Corbin 1972).
The scriptural model for understanding Islam and divine providence is 
based on a purported saying of the Prophet and references the Qurʾan as 
the privileged signifier in theological reasoning. It provides a metaphysical 
explanation of the relationship between the three realities of God, the 
cosmos, and humanity, and puts forward understandings of the way in 
which the human acts as a mirror of the divine, as a microcosm through 
which one can infer the creative agency of the divine and the divine’s sus-
taining relationship, as well as the cosmos as a mirror, as a macrocosm in 
which one understands God’s existence and providential care for the cos-
mos and humanity.
The famous hadith of Gabriel describes the three dimensions of Islam—
ım̄a ̄n (faith), isla ̄m (acts), and iḥsa ̄n (virtue or making beautiful) (Nawawı ̄ 
n.d., 4–6).3 The story is set in the mosque of the Prophet. An unknown 
young man comes and asks the Prophet three things and then asks him 
about the portents of the hour (to indicate the eschatological and soterio-
logical significance of understanding these three dimensions); once he’s 
left, the Prophet turns to his companions and says, ‘That was Gabriel who 
3 The text is found in numerous sources such as the Ja ̄miʿ al-Ṣaḥıḥ̄ of al-Bukha ̄rı ̄(d. 870) 
(Ja ̄miʿ al-sạh ̣ıḥ̄, Kita ̄b al-ım̄a ̄n hadith §50, I: 36–37) and Muslim b. al-Ḥajja ̄j al-Nıs̄ābūrı ̄ 
(d. 875) (Ja ̄miʿ al-sạḥıḥ̄, Kita ̄b al-ım̄a ̄n hadith §1, I: 36–38).
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came to teach you your dın̄’. The three questions constitute the three 
dimensions of Islam as a dın̄.
What is isla ̄m?
Isla ̄m is that you testify that there is no deity but God and that Muḥammad 
is his messenger, that you establish and perform the prayer, that you 
give alms, that you fast the month of Ramaḍa ̄n, and that you perform 
the pilgrimage to the house of God if you have the means to do so.
“Isla ̄m” is used in different senses in the scriptural traditions from sub-
mission, to the primordial faith and to the specific historical religious dis-
pensation of Muh ̣ammad. Here it indicates what a Muslim ought to do 
given their assent to God’s existence and creation and his communication 
to humanity through the Prophet. It is the Prophet who teaches humans 
how to fulfill what they owe to God in terms of ritual prayers, fasting, 
alms, and pilgrimage. In the Shiʿi context, the list of ‘five pillars’ is differ-
ent: prayer, fasting, alms, pilgrimage, and the wala ̄ya of the Imams who 
succeed the Prophet (al-Kulaynı ̄1972, II: 18–24). Wala ̄ya is the continu-
ation of the mediating role of the Prophet and the recognition that in 
every age there must be a proof (ḥujja) for the existence of God, a protec-
tor of the Prophetic mission who guides humanity in their performance of 
what they owe God and indeed it is the recognition of their rank with God 
that gives meaning to the performance of those ritual acts and moral obli-
gations that enact what is owed. God’s commissioning of the prophets and 
the Imams as mediators is an expression of divine providence and care for 
humanity and for the cosmos, in order that humans may realize their true 
nature through their acts of piety.
What is ım̄a ̄n?
I m̄a ̄n is that you believe and trust in God, his angels, her prophets, and 
the afterlife, and believe and trust in the divine measuring, both the 
good and the bad.
The scope of faith concerns those truth claims about God, the cosmos, 
divine providential communication of revelation and commission of pro-
phetic missions, and the compensation in the afterlife as well as the fact 
that God creates what is good and what is evil and decrees the good and 
bad that befall humans in terms of moral and natural evils and goods. The 
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mention of prophets in the plural and of angels indicates that revelation 
and God’s communication to humanity is a continuous process from the 
beginning of humanity; the faith that the term Islam connotes therefore is 
a primordial one and hence previous Biblical prophets and extra-Biblical 
messengers are part of the same unfolding of God’s plan for humanity. 
Significantly here is the mention of trust in God’s ‘measure’ (or destiny as 
some would put it) with both elements of divine provision, the good and 
the bad. In a sense this is a tradition-based notion that divine providence 
leads to belief and trust even when things seem bad and suffering chal-
lenges our good opinion and comfort in God.
What is iḥsa ̄n?
Iḥsa ̄n is that you worship God as if you see God; and if you do not see 
God, know that God sees you.
This is the most important element for the spiritual traditions and has 
been much beloved of Sufis who find in this term the essence of their prac-
tice that goes beyond the moral obligations of the practice of the dın̄. 
Acting and living in the presence of the divine as a comfort and as a guide 
to one’s moral being lies at the heart of the notion of a spiritual path from 
and to God, of the desire to do and act for the best in the world, and espe-
cially to beautify one’s world; the aesthetic element of life should not be 
ignored here and often explains the artistic impulses in and around the 
practice of ‘religion’. Taken together this three-dimensional approach 
constitutes a popular providential account for the why, how, whence, and 
whither of the dın̄.
10.2  avIcenna: dIvIne creatIve agency 
and the medIatIOn Of the PrOPhet
Avicenna’s theodicy is predicated on the Neoplatonic notion that provi-
dence concerns the intelligible design and order of the cosmos, God’s 
creation and production of the good, and God’s satisfaction with the best 
of all possible worlds (Ibn Sın̄ā 2005, 339; Inati 2000, 128). Providence 
concerns God’s care for the cosmos or lesser beings such as us through the 
mediation of prophecy. Following the Proclean tradition, metaphysical (or 
essential) evil is a privation that is entailed by the lower status of matter as 
passivity and the source of discord (Inati 2000, 67–81). Moral evils, on 
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the other hand, are accidental and existent, partly arising out of the fact of 
our embodiment:
This existing apprehended thing is not evil in itself but in connection with 
this thing. As for the thing’s lack of perfection and wholeness, this is not an 
evil simply in relation to [the thing] such that [this imperfection] would 
have an existence that is not an evil for [that thing]. Rather, its very exis-
tence is nothing but an evil in it, and in the [very] manner of its being an 
evil. For blindness can be only in the eye; and, inasmuch as it is in the eye it 
can only be an evil, having no other aspect in terms of which it would be an 
evil. As for heat, if, for example, it becomes an evil relative to the sufferer 
from it, it has another aspect in terms of which it is not an evil. Thus, evil in 
essence is privation, though not any type of privation but only privation of 
that to which the nature of the thing necessarily leads in terms of the perfec-
tions that belong permanently to its species and nature. Accidental evil [on 
the other hand] is the non-existent, or that which keeps perfection away 
from that which deserves it. (Ibn Sın̄ā 2005, 340)
Thus, (relative, broadly moral) evil is an accidental existence, as we see 
in this preceding discussion from the Metaphysics of the Healing (al-Ila ̄hıȳa ̄t 
min al-Shifa ̄ʾ), book IX, chapter 6 on ‘providence, showing the manner of 
the entry of evil in divine predetermination’. But he also mentions one 
important point that was raised in the Neoplatonic tradition, and as we 
shall see, was addressed by Mullā S ̣adrā, namely that there is on balance 
more good than evil in the cosmos because humans have free will as ratio-
nal agents to choose to act and because often evils are relative entities that 
a good soul may choose with good intentions to good ends (Ibn Sın̄ā 
2005, 341–42, tr. Inati 2014, 133, 144–58). This best of all possible 
worlds could not be otherwise even if we may conceive of a perfection 
existence that is devoid of evil. Avicenna states:
This is not permissible in the likes of this pattern of existence, even though 
it is permissible in absolute existence as being one mode that is free from 
evil, which, however, is not this mode. This mode is among the things that 
have emanated from the First Governor and hence have [come] to exist in 
intellectual, psychological, and celestial things. This other mode, would, 
then remain in the realm of the possible. Refraining from bringing it into 
existence would not have been the same as in the case of that which exists 
because of what may be mixed with it by way of evil [that is such] that, if its 
principle did not exist to begin with, and [if the existence] of this evil is left 
out, this would result in a greater evil than it, so that its existence is the bet-
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ter of two evils. Moreover, if this mode were not confined to the realm of 
possibility, it would then follow necessarily that the good causes prior to the 
causes leading accidentally to evil would not exist. For the existence of [the 
former causes] renders the others consequential on them. In this there 
would be the greatest fault in the universal order of the good. (Ibn Sın̄ā 
2005, 343; see also Inati 2000, 147)
Avicenna therefore establishes a typology. Metaphysical evils are priva-
tive and derive from being a receptacle of matter and possibility, as well as 
dynamic realities that are necessary for the production and completion of 
the cosmos as it is. Moral evils are more relative and accidental, even con-
textual, some of which arise out of the desire of an evil soul afflicted by 
ignorance and inordinate concern for the pleasures of the flesh, and others 
out of the desire of a godly soul that intends the best.
Avicenna further addresses providence and the problem of evil at the 
end of namat ̣ VII of his Pointers and Reminders (al-Isha ̄ra ̄t waʾl- 
tanbıh̄a ̄t). Providence for him is God’s knowledge of the whole cosmos 
(partly resolving the problem of God’s knowledge of particulars) and its 
order and that knowledge is the producer of the good in the cosmos (Ibn 
Sın̄ā 2002, 333).
Remark
Things that are contingent in existence (al-umu ̄r al-mumkina fı ̄ʾ l- 
wug ̌u ̄d) include [1] things whose existence can be altogether free from evil, 
deficiency, and corruption; [2] things that cannot give their advantages 
except if they are such that a certain evil proceeds from them at the jamming 
of motions and the clashing of movable things. Further, in the division there 
are also [3] things that are evil either absolutely or for the most part (imma ̄ 
ʿala ̄ l-itḷa ̄q wa-imma ̄ bi-h ̣asab al-g ̇alaba).
If pure benefit is the principle of the emanation of good existence and 
befitting existence, then the existence of the first division must necessarily 
emanate, such as the existence of the intellectual substances and the like. 
Also, the second division must necessarily emanate. This is because in the 
privation of abundant good (ḫayr kaṯır̄) and in the nonproduction of it, as a 
precaution against slight evil, there is great evil, illustrated by the creation of 
fire; for fire would not give its advantages and would not complete its assis-
tance in perfecting existence unless it is such that it harms and hurts what-
ever animal bodies happen to collide with it. The same is true of animal 
bodies. They cannot have their advantages unless they are such that it is 
possible [A] for their states in their motions and rests, as is the case with the 
states of fire also, to lead to the coming together of clashes that harm; [B] 
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for their states and the states of things in the world to lead to the occurrence 
of error from them in the knotting of harm for the afterlife and for the truth; 
or [C] for an excess of an acting predominant agitation, such as desire or 
anger that harms the possibility of the afterlife. The above-mentioned pow-
ers [such as fire] do not enjoy their richness unless they are such that acci-
dental error and predominant agitation occur to them on the occasion of 
clashes. This is so in individuals that are fewer than those who are safe and 
at times fewer than those of safety. Because this is known in the prior provi-
dence, it is as if intended incidentally. Thus, evil enters the divine measuring 
(al-qadar) incidentally (biʾl-ʿaraḍ), as if it were, for example, pleasing [to 
God] incidentally. (Ibn Sın̄ā 2002, 333–35, tr. Inati 2014, 177–78)
Note evil accidentally pertains to the divine measuring or destiny (qadr) 
and not to the divine decree (qaḍa ̄ʾ); the latter concerns the divine realm 
of eternality while the former measures out what exists in the sub-lunary, 
temporal world of generation and corruption. The second division of con-
tingents that are mixtures of good and evil must exist for the good to be 
done (Ibn Sın̄ā 2002, 336–37, tr. Inati 2014, 180). This is because of the 
erotic motion of the cosmos (as articulated in Avicenna’s Risa ̄lat al-ʿishq), 
a point that Mulla ̄ Ṣadrā picks up when he argues that God decrees that all 
existents—whether intelligible, psychic, sensible, or natural—have 
ingrained within them a desire for perfection and movement toward com-
pleting the perfection appropriate to them; all these contingents lack per-
fection as such from their inception but all have the potentiality and the 
disposition to love and desire it and recognize the one who is higher in the 
hierarchy of being who can help them fulfill it (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 197).
The account of how this providence provides for us as individuals takes 
us to the last chapter of his Metaphysics and the account of prophecy in 
which the prophet is a mediating figure, without whom nothing can be 
fulfilled or come to its full realization. Providence ensures that the act of 
grace and mercy that is the mediating prophet is available for humanity 
and the cosmos at large. The human mediation of the prophet and his 
historical contingency and particularity is also what ensures providence is 
particularized and not just universal, and reflects the specific care that God 
has for believers as well as the totality of humanity and the cosmos. God’s 
providence does not leave humanity remote from divine transcendence 
but ensures a link through the ‘divine humanity’ of the prophet.
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10.3  mullā ṣadrā On PrOvIdence, evIl, and lOve
We now turn to the Shiʿi thinker Mullā Ṣadrā Shır̄āzı ̄(d. 1636). Providence 
pertains both to cosmological and epistemological approaches to under-
standing the nature of reality. It also provides a structured and ordered 
way of considering the question of why there is something rather than 
nothing and how things in phenomenal reality relate to one another hier-
archically and how they seek their principle through the motivation of 
love. First, it might be worth contextualizing Mullā Ṣadrā’s theodicy 
within the structure of his magnum opus The Transcendent Philosophy of 
the Four Journeys of the Intellect (al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿa ̄liya fı ̄ʾ l-Asfa ̄r 
al-ʿaqlıȳa al-arbaʿa). The third ‘journey’ on theology proper is divided 
into ‘stopping-points’ (mawa ̄qif) of which there are ten: the first provides 
the proof for the existence of God drawing upon the Avicennian tradition; 
the second considers the broad issue of the divine names and attributes; 
stopping-points III–VIII consider the ‘essential’ divine attributes such as 
omniscience (ʿilm, where the problem of God’s knowledge of particulars 
is broached as well as his solution based on the identity thesis and presen-
tial knowledge), omnipotence (qudra), life (that God is ḥayy), perceiving 
and ever watchful (that God is samı ̄ʿ  and bası̣r̄), and God’s revelation and 
speech (that God is mutakallim). Stopping-points nine and ten pertain to 
extensions of providence: the former relates to the nature of the emana-
tion of existence from God and the way in which the chain of being is 
related through the principle of ‘nobler contingency’ (imka ̄n ašraf), and 
the latter is on the continuous care and munificence of the divine in the 
order of being as an expression of God’s sempiternal power (azalıȳat 
qudratihi).
At the beginning of Mawqif VIII on providence, Mullā Ṣadrā provides 
this crucial definition:
There is no doubt that the Necessary Existence is the perfection of reality 
and above perfection, as is the case with some of the cherubim, the holy 
intellects perfect in their essences with their very ipseities conjoined with the 
True One. They do not do what they do out of purpose for what is below 
them in this cosmos. In sum, it is not proper for the higher causes to ema-
nate actions purposes that would return those actions to them based on 
motivations prior to the act. If they were not perfect in word and essence 
but rather deficient relying for their perfection in a sense upon their effects, 
then this would be highly impossible. It is established that they do not have 
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a care for their actions nor any motivation that propels them nor any need 
that intervenes in their essences or a will additional to them; they are only 
led by the highest good and the loftiest most perfect light.
As for the True One, there is no purpose above him to which he looks for 
the effusion of the good and the radiance of the comprehensive mercy. In 
fact we witness in the existents of this cosmos and the parts of the order and 
the individuals of things—especially the flora and fauna, even in the univer-
sal archetypes among the spheres and the celestial principles—the beauty of 
governance and the generosity of hierarchy and the care for the optimal and 
the beneficial and the creation of powers and causes inclined to ends, repel-
ling afflictions and corruptions. One cannot bear to deny the wondrous 
effects in the particulars of things, so how can one deny them of their 
universals?
Providence is the being of the One knowing through his essence what is 
in existence in the greatest good and the perfect order and being a cause 
through his essence of the good and of perfection to the greatest extent pos-
sible, and being pleasing. These three meanings—knowledge, causation and 
being pleasing—together constitute what providence means, all of them 
being his very essence, in the sense that his essence is knowledge of the order 
of the good and the same as the perfect cause for that order and the same as 
the pleasure from it—this is the eternal desire. His essence by his essence is 
the form of the order of the good in the loftiest and most noble sense 
because the True Being has no purpose, no limit in perfection beyond him. 
As it is so, then one can intellect the order of the good in the most complete 
form in the order and its perfection in contingency, so what one intellects as 
an order and as a good is emanated from Him.
This is the meaning of providence unadulterated by doubt and imperfec-
tion. Whoever believes otherwise such as those who claim that all is by 
chance as it attributed to some of the ancients or such as those who claim 
that the divine will is free of wisdom and end as is attributed to al-Ashʿarı ̄or 
such as those who claim that there is a lowly end reverting to the creation, 
they have all been led far astray and are ignorant of the transcendence and 
simplicity of God the exalted: ‘They do not consider God as is his due’ 
(Q. 6:91). (Šır̄a ̄zı ̄2004, VII: 81–83)
Here one finds the definitions of providence already found in Proclus 
and Avicenna that stress why creation cannot be motivated by God’s desire 
for what is ontologically lesser and how providence captures the intelligent 
design, the creative causation, and the satisfaction with the cosmos on the 
part of God. The stress in this passage upon divine wisdom (and not a pas-
sible desire for what is lower) for creating a providential order in the 
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cosmos as it exists, is further glossed in five short chapters that are replete 
with scriptural citations in the middle of Mawqif VIII (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 
146–96). These chapters rehearse elements of cosmological and teleologi-
cal arguments for the existence of God. Central is the discussion of the 
creation of the human in the most base of form as pure potentiality and 
matter but placing within that base thing a potentiality and disposition to 
seek perfection and perfect itself, drawing upon his principle of ‘substance 
in motion’ such that the human can be the best of the cosmos and its most 
noble aspect (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 173–80). This is a deliberate play upon a 
reversal of the Qurʾanic formula in su ̄rat al-tı̣n̄ (Q. 95.4–5): ‘verily we 
created the human in the best of form (aḥsan al-taqwım̄), then we ren-
dered him into the lowest of the low (asfal al-sa ̄filın̄).4
In a critical chapter on the principle that the sensible and intelligible 
worlds are both created in the best of forms possible, Mullā Ṣadrā says:
The Necessary Being (wa ̄g ̌ib al-wug ̌u ̄d) is the god of this cosmos (ila ̄h 
al-ʿa ̄lam) dissociated from any manner of deficiency, his existence is his 
essence and his reality is the most excellent of the modes of existence and the 
most perfect one (wug ̌u ̄duhu allaḏı ̄ huwa ḏa ̄tuhu wa-h ̣aqıq̄atuhu afḍal 
anḥa ̄ʾ al-wug ̌u ̄d wa-atammuha ̄). In fact, his is the reality of existence and 
its quiddity. All save him is a ray and spark or shadow of him ….
God knows everything other than Himself in the best manners because 
the knowledge-forms of things are His very essence. Things, therefore, have 
divine knowledge-forms before their actual existence, and these forms have 
a divine sacred existence. Whatever is a divine being is of necessity the most 
beautiful and magnificent (fı ̄g ̇a ̄yat al-ḥusn wa-l-baha ̄ʾ). When the simili-
tudes (mitha ̄l) of these forms are actualized in the world of generation [and 
corruption] (ʿa ̄lam al-kawn), they must necessarily be the most magnificent 
and noble of what can be in the world of generation [and corruption]. 
(Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 142–44)
The supra-perfection and goodness of God and his non-teleological 
provision of existence and goodness constitute providence that is not self-
ish (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 81). Divine providence requires each entity to arrive 
at its own perfection and the path that it may take is through prior short-
comings and ‘evils’.
4 For example, see Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 172–73, citing Q. 23.14, 40.67, and 76.1–2 on the 
way in which God’s providential and wise creation of the human fluctuates between the two 
ends of the most base and the most perfect.
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An explanation that existents that revert and actual beings in the ranks of 
ascent in this world of composition are the most bountiful and in the most 
excellent order.
The order of actualized things in this world pertain to the motions of the 
spheres and their positions and the order of the spheres is a shadow of the 
order of the world of the divine decree which as you have learned is the most 
perfect and complete. As it has been repeated and realized, these existents 
do not emanate by coincidence and by chance … nor by way of an arbitrary 
will … nor due to an incomplete will or an additional motive … nor due to 
nature or a consciousness that it has in its essence above its consciousness 
upon which it was emanated as the filthiest of materialists and atheists hold. 
Rather, the rational order which the philosophers call providence emanates 
from this existing order and it is the best and most excellent possible. (Šır̄āzı ̄ 
2004, VII: 150)
Everything in this order is necessary and natural to its disposition and 
neither arbitrary nor coincidental or by chance. Goodness in this sense is 
not the rational good of moral acts whose opposite is evil. Because the 
One is perfection and glory and ecstasy and pure light, everything is 
geared toward it especially since they are contaminated by evils. For Mullā 
Ṣadrā, evil as such, following the Neoplatonists, constitutes a privation in 
the essence of the thing or a privation or absence of perfection in a thing. 
Therefore, in itself, evil is privative even though we conceive of it as exis-
tent. He concludes the basic definition in this syllogistic form: If evil were 
an ontological thing, then evil would not be evil. Since the subsequent is 
false, therefore the antecedent is as well (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 85–86). But 
what of those things that we consider to be evil such as death and igno-
rance and grief and pain and so forth? These are of two kinds, the first 
pertain directly to the one affected and harmed in the form of moral evils, 
and the latter are indirectly affected such as the clouds blocking the sun 
from benefiting us. Mullā Ṣadrā is more concerned with the former. They 
are so with respect to what the intellect and religion dictate (al-ḏamm 
al-ʿaqlı ̄ wa-l-sharʿı )̄ but in and of themselves they are not evil. Mullā 
Ṣadrā says:
The condemned moral characters that prevent human souls from reaching 
their intellective perfection, like avarice, cowardice, wastefulness, pride, and 
vanity, and such wicked acts as injustice, wrongful killing, adultery, theft, 
calumny, defamation, obscenity, and the like, are not evil in themselves but 
rather states of goodness emanating from being (al-khayra ̄t al-wuju ̄dıȳa). 
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They are [states of] perfections for natural entities and animal or vegetative 
powers that we find in the human. Their evilness is only in comparison to a 
higher and nobler power which, in its perfection, has command over the 
disobedient and noncompliant powers under it. (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 88–89)5
In fact, some of the passions can be a good thing—we consider anger 
to be a negative trait and a passion. But insofar as it reflects the wrath of 
God it can be a good. Similarly, desire can be an evil if it leads one to for-
nication; but it is a good if it propels the soul toward what is better and 
acts as an erotic motivation (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 140). He contends at the 
end of that discussion that there is nothing that is purely in existence or in 
the good that is condemnable, but it can only be considered so in a relative 
manner. What this raises is the distinction between two senses of evil: 
ontological evil or what we normally call šarr, and a rational consideration 
of moral acts that are called qubḥ.
Similarly, in his discussion of the meaning of the bounty of God in his 
exegesis of su ̄rat al-Fa ̄tih ̣a, Mullā Ṣadrā considers a relative and perspec-
tival approach to the question of good and evil. He begins by arguing that 
one can divide goods into those that are affected by themselves, those that 
are affected by another, and those that are affected by both themselves and 
others. An example of the first is the pleasure that arises from contemplat-
ing God and the felicity of meeting God. An example of the second is 
money because it is a means to something else. An example of the third is 
health. The second and the third must contain within the bounty and 
good a deficiency and an evil. From another perspective, he says that 
goods are of three types: beneficial, beautiful, and pleasurable. The first of 
these is ultimately useful, the second of these is good in all states, and the 
third is fleeting. Similarly, evils can be divided into harmful, ugly, and pain-
ful. Both good and evil are further divided into the absolute and the lim-
ited, with the former covering all three possibilities. An absolute good is 
knowledge which is beneficial, beautiful, and pleasurable. An absolute evil 
is compounded ignorance because it is harmful, ugly, and painful. 
However, on the limited side, we can have various compositions. For 
example, you can have something that is beneficial but painful such as the 
amputation of a diseased finger, or something which is beneficial but ugly 
such as stupidity because the stupid person feels contented (Šır̄āzı ̄2010, I: 
159–60). Similar to the latter case, in his exegesis on Su ̄rat Ya ̄sın̄ is his 
5 See Kalin 2007, 199.
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contention that something such as a satanic whispering may be a good in 
the here and now because it might be pleasurable but is an evil in the after-
life because acting in accordance leads to negative effects there (Šır̄āzı ̄ 
2010, VII: 362, 612).
Critical to Mullā S ̣adrā’s notion that this is the best of all possible worlds 
with its mixture of perfections and imperfections in phenomenal reality is 
his notion of monism and the simple reality of the divine that is manifest 
in the role of the microcosmic human as the simple reality that brings all 
together. The totality of the cosmos as a singular person is the one thing 
that emanates from the True One; however, one can also consider the 
totality of the cosmos to be hierarchically arranged and gradually created 
as well. This goes to the heart of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of how the cosmos is 
contingent as a whole and a logical product of God but also in a process 
of gradually being created:
If you were to claim:
If the cosmos in its totality—I mean the macroanthropos (al-insa ̄n 
al-kabır̄)—is one person who is the noblest of contingent beings because 
the cause of its instauration and the cause of its perfection is one thing, 
namely the Truth, then we would claim: this judgement applies to the first 
effect and in reality it applies to its similitude, therefore it follows that from 
the True One two things emanate which is impossible. It also entails that the 
existence of the two are of one species above the level of [the world of] 
generation [and corruption] and that also opposes the principle of 
philosophy.
Its refutation is that from that it does not follow that there is multiplicity 
in reality, as we have previously verified that the perfection of the reality of a 
thing can only pertain to the level of its distant differentia which is the form 
in which all of its features are constituted. And you know that the thing in 
its form is that very thing and not in its matter. What emanates from the 
Truth is one thing which is the macroanthropos in its very personhood, but 
it can be considered in two senses—a holistic one and a more detailed one. 
And the only difference between these two modes of consideration is the 
mode of perception and not the actual thing perceived. If you consider the 
totality of the cosmos insofar as it is a simple reality you will judge that it 
emanates from the true One in a singular emanation and a simple instaura-
tion (g ̌aʿlan basıt̄ạn). And if you consider its detailed features one by one 
then you judge that what emanates from Him first is the most noble of its 
parts and the most perfect of its constituents which is the first intellect; since 
the intellect is all things—as has been mentioned—then all remaining things 
one by one are a hierarchy of nobler and nobler and more perfect and more 
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perfect and similarly towards the more base in existence and the more weak 
in it [existence]. (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 155–56)
Both the microcosm and the macrocosm are theophanies and one way 
to resolve the problem of evil is to consider this aspect of the created 
order. For Mullā Ṣadrā, it does not matter whether one considers the 
entirety of the cosmos as identical to the first thing emanated, the first 
intellect, or whether one looks at the detailed hierarchy and gradation 
within the order of the cosmos. Ultimately those ‘rooted in knowledge’ 
understand that the phenomenal multiplicity and the different stages of 
space and time do not violate the ultimate unity of what is created. It is the 
divine governance of the rational order of the cosmos that the lower and 
the imperfect seeks the higher and the more perfect, and that later plays a 
critical role in the perfecting of the former. So, for example, form perfects 
matter, and the intellect perfects the soul. Thus,
[T]he manner of the True One with the intellect and the soul and the nature 
and all things in their constitution and bringing into existence and guidance 
and direction and providence and facilitating grace and mercy and munifi-
cence and grace is above all that. (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 158)
It is because God is above the totality of the rational order that the 
goodness and perfection of that order reflects that of the divine. Thus far, 
Mulla ̄ Ṣadrā’s theodicy seems akin to other Neoplatonic attempts to 
explain how evil can intervene in divine providence. But what makes his 
position more interesting is not only the further solution which re- 
introduces the role of eros into the cosmos but also his monism that arises 
from a deeper contemplation of divine simplicity.
In Theophanies (al-Maz ̣a ̄hir al-ila ̄hıȳa), Mullā Ṣadrā contemplates the 
Avicennian notion of providence as an intelligible approach to the creation 
and knowledge of the entirety of the cosmos, because the ‘simple intellect’ 
(al-ʿaql al-basıt̄)̣ that is the divine intellect encompasses all things and 
through its emanation of forms, it creates discrete knowledge that pertains 
to the essences of things that have issued from that simple intellect in their 
nature, in a manner that they—those things—are ‘from it’ and not ‘in it’ 
(Šır̄āzı ̄1999, 46). This draws upon the presentation of the simple intellect 
in the Theologia Aristotelis and the notion of the perfection of the intellect 
(and indeed of it being above perfection—fawq al-tama ̄m) (ps-Aristotle 
1947, 110, 139–40, 156). In this context—as he often does—Mullā Ṣadrā 
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quotes a Qurʾanic verse to justify: ‘and with him are the keys to the unseen 
(mafa ̄tıḥ̄ al-ghayb) none knows them but he’ (Q. al-Anʿām 6.59) (Šır̄āzı ̄ 
1999, 47). The mediation is provided by the ‘calamus’ (al-qalam)—
equivalent to the Neoplatonic nous—which like the divine is a simple intel-
lect and a pure simple reality (wa ̄ḥid ḥaqıq̄ı ̄basıt̄)̣. It is this that fashions 
the realities of things on the ‘tablets of the souls and on the scrolls of 
hearts’ (fı ̄ alwa ̄ḥ al-nufu ̄s wa-sạḥa ̄ʾif al-qulu ̄b). Although it is a lesser 
being than the true One, once again with reference to the revelation: 
‘there is nothing but that we possess its treasures’ (Q. al-Ḥijr 15.21). 
Mulla ̄ Ṣadrā explains the synonyms of this first emanation: ‘the first intel-
lect, the great soul, and angel brought near and the most noble contin-
gent … the Mother of the Scripture’—and as we have already seen, the 
perfect human, the microcosm. He relates this to the dual nature of provi-
dence that is explained in terms of the two aspects of who God decrees 
what exists in the created order through the theological notions of the 
‘measuring out’ and the decree.
There are … two levels to the functioning of the divine providence and its 
apportioning of the lot of contingents. The first is the intellectual measuring 
(al-qadar al-ʿilmı )̄ out of the lot, which determines the forms of existents in 
specific spaces and times. The second is the extra-mental measuring (al- 
qadar al-h ̮a ̄rig ̌ı )̄ that pertains to the actual places and times of contingents. 
The higher intelligible realm of the calamus and the first nous is the locus of 
the divine decree (al-qad ̣a ̄ʾ) but the lower level of the world of generation 
and corruption is where the measuring out takes place. (Šır̄āzı ̄1999, 49)
In the Wisdom of the Throne (al-Ḥikma al-ʿarshıȳa), Mullā Ṣadrā puts 
forward a view that conflates the notion of divine providence with mercy 
that encompasses all things in his attempt to explain the existence of pun-
ishment in the hellfire—and we know that the ontological mandate of 
mercy is something dear to his version of apocatastasis. Just as the cosmos 
cannot exist without ‘crude and rough souls, and extremely hard and cruel 
hearts’, similarly because of the diversity and hierarchy of human souls, 
there is punishment in the hellfire that abides consistent with divine wis-
dom and providence (Šır̄āzı ̄1981, 235–40). So it turns out that Mullā 
Ṣadrā collapses his understanding of divine knowledge and will, through 
the recourse to divine simplicity, into his presentation of providence.
For Mullā Ṣadrā, the created order is a monistic theophany.
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Every simple reality is all existential things except what pertain to all defi-
ciencies and non-existences [in themselves]. The necessary Being—exalted 
is he—is a simple reality, simple in every sense and he is all existence just as 
the totality of him is existence. (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 100)
The final section of the discussion of providence relates to the nature of 
love that God has made innate to all existents so that they desire and 
return to their principle. This section owes much to Ibn ʿArabı ̄and earlier 
Sufi thinkers as well as the notions of Neoplatonic sympathy and motion 
inherited through Avicenna. Everything in the world of generation and 
corruption, every deficiency and imperfection has inbuilt the desire and 
love for what perfects and completes it. All beings are aware of this. As 
Mullā Ṣadrā puts it:
It is necessary in divine wisdom and lordly providence and in the beauty of 
governance and the generosity of the providential order that in every exis-
tent there is love so that through that love it may acquire the perfection 
appropriate to it and a desire to acquire what it lacks. This is the cause for 
the whole of the order and the beauty of the hierarchy in the governance of 
every single individual. This love exists in every one of the things that exist 
necessarily such that it is concomitant to it and cannot be separated from it. 
If it were possible to separate it from it from one, then it would have need 
for another love which would preserve the first love. … So, love flows in all 
existents and in their parts. (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 210–11)
Every beloved is the face of the divine and all love and desire for the 
beloved reverts back to God (Šır̄āzı ̄ 2004, VII: 214–24). Love—erotic 
motion—accounts not only for the descent of being from God but also for 
its ascent and reversion. It also demonstrates the principle of accord and 
connection against discord and strife, overcoming plurality in search of 
unity. It resolves multiplicity as well as the problem of relative and parasitic 
evils. Mystics and Sufis have a major role in understanding this and indeed 
in teaching such a theodicy. It is therefore not surprising that Mullā Ṣadrā 
culminates his discussion with the grades of love and desire for God that 
the mystic has.
Human love is of three kinds: the greatest, the middling and the lesser. The 
greatest is the desire for meeting God and yearning to grasp God’s essence, 
God’s attributes and God’s acts. This yearning only occurs in mystics and 
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the comparison of the loves, desires, and yearning of people to mystics is like 
the comparison of children’s love and desire for games to adults in their 
pleasures and motivation. (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 252)
All humans have love innate in their disposition as well as desire and the 
wish even to be dominant. The task is then to realize one’s humanity to 
perfect one’s rational soul so that one can achieve the highest sense of 
love. The mystic who has realized this then considers his paradise to be in 
the here and now—as well as in the afterlife—because his love has internal-
ized the divine presence and therefore at times, he appears like the wise 
fool laughing at the commonality for their follies, their sins, their fear of 
punishment and of the hellfire and especially the folly of chasing after the 
material but fleeting pleasures of the world—false beloveds (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, 
VII: 254–55). The task of the person who has realized her humanity in 
this life is to become like the lover who is purely focused on the beloved 
and does not become distracted by this world and its ephemeral attach-
ments and carnal desires (Šır̄āzı ̄ 2004, VII: 256–57). The lover under-
stands that true pleasures are disembodied. It is not worthy of a creature 
of intellect and love to be like the beasts of the earth and desire the life of 
this world that will perish:
The person of knowledge knows that the ways of the afterlife are more lumi-
nous, more ecstatic and more intense than the pleasures of this world since 
those things are real and everlasting while these this-worldly things are vain 
and perishing. The Prince of the Believers (ʿAlı)̄, peace be with him, said: 
The hoarders of wealth die but the knowers are alive, everlasting over the 
duration of time, even while their persons are missed, their effect remain 
found in the hearts. (Šır̄āzı ̄2004, VII: 258)
This quotation and the reference to ʿAlı ̄brings us to the role of the 
mediation of the Prophet and the Shiʿi Imams as expression of divine love 
for humanity and the cosmos and the way in which our human attempts 
to love are channeled through love for them.
10.4  cOncludIng remark
What can we draw from these historical accounts and from the archive of 
diverse Islamic thought? The neat coherence of these philosophical 
accounts do not necessarily speak well to most of us today. Perhaps, and 
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this has been exacerbated by the current COVID-19 situation, the notion 
of a powerful loving God with care for the cosmos even in the face of the 
existence of moral and natural (and even horrendous) evils is a comfort 
more so if it attunes us to ethical imperative about care for self and for the 
other, for those around us and our communities. This is precisely where 
the notion of iḥsa ̄n comes back and remains a powerful idea that our 
agency remains in the sight and presence of the divine and the good in it 
is guided by that principle. The aspiration to do the best, to be the best, 
and to do what is beautiful becomes a moral inspiration that guides the life 
of a Muslim, that in a sense defines what is the best in the dın̄, as a direct 
unfolding of divine providence in a motion back to God, ever-proceeding 
from Him and every-reverting to Him.
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al-Nawawı,̄ Yaḥyā b. Sharaf. n.d. al-Arbaʿu ̄n al-nawawıȳa, ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd 
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CHAPTER 11
Reconciling Meticulous Divine Providence 
with Objective Chance
Robert C. Koons
11.1  IntroductIon
In the philosophical literature there are essentially two ways of defining 
randomness (Eagle 2018): as a characteristic of a chancy process and as a 
result with certain intrinsic characteristics (algorithmic or Kolmogorov 
randomness). In this chapter, I want to focus on the first way: an event is 
random just in case and insofar as it is the product of an objectively chancy 
process. By a chancy process, I mean one that has an objective probability 
of resulting in one of several alternative outcomes. This definition might 
be consistent with determinism, depending on our definition of objective 
chance: that is, it might be the case that a process is determined to have 
one specific result and yet also has an “objective chance” of having a dif-
ferent, counterfactual result. However, there is at least a prima facie ten-
sion between determinism and objective chance: it would seem reasonable 
to assign probability one to the result that is determined to occur and 
probability zero to all incompatible results.
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Some quantum physicists and philosophers of physics hope to do with-
out objective probability altogether. This includes Quantum Bayesianism 
or QBism (Caves et al. 2002; Fuchs 2010). QBism builds on the work of 
earlier work of Jaynes (1968), de Finetti (1972), and others. The main 
problem for QBism lies in the interpretation of Born’s rule, which directs 
us to assign a certain probability to certain outcomes, given a known 
quantum wavefunction. Jaynes tried to rely exclusively on symmetry con-
siderations to derive their probabilities from quantum theory. However, as 
Fuchs explains, quantum probabilities go beyond classical probability’s 
Principle of Indifference, since it constrains our judgments about both 
actual and counterfactual likelihoods (Fuchs 2010, 12). In addition, 
QBists face a dilemma. If probabilities are merely subjective—just autobio-
graphical statements about our mental states—how can we “discover” 
probabilities by empirical study of external, physical processes? If, alterna-
tively, QBists identify Born’s probabilities with the normative probability 
of an ideal agent, we confront the similar problem of explaining how we 
can discover a normative truth through empirical method (Bacciagaluppi 
2014). Fuchs even compares Born’s rule to the Ten Commandments 
(Fuchs 2010, 8–9)! My own proposal (to be laid out in section 5) can be 
thought of as a way of making sense of QBism: identifying Born probabili-
ties with normative truths anchored in God’s intentions, and providing an 
account of how we can uncover facts about those divine intentions through 
empirical investigation.
Finding a satisfactory philosophical account of objective chance is a 
problem for everyone, but it is also a special problem for theists, especially 
theists who hold that God exercises a certain degree of meticulous provi-
dence over creation, that is, that God has in mind certain very specific, 
particular events that He intends, effectively, to bring about. Suppose, for 
example, that God intended for the astronomical, geological, and biologi-
cal processes of creation to bring into being one particular human being, 
say Abraham, at a particular point in time. Since God is omnipotent, his 
intention could not fail to succeed. How, then, could Abraham’s existence 
be, even in part, the product of chancy processes, processes with an objec-
tive chance of not resulting his existence (or the existence of any human 
beings, for that matter)?
There are two reasons for thinking this a serious question. First, it 
seems to be true that nature, as science reveals it to be, is filled with genu-
inely chancy processes. Quantum mechanics supports this idea in an espe-
cially acute fashion, since Bell’s theorem rules out the most natural 
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“ignorance” interpretation of quantum probabilities (i.e., the existence of 
local hidden variables). Second, many branches of science, including sta-
tistical mechanics and evolutionary biology, rely on statistical explanations 
of observed phenomena, explanations that presuppose that the phenom-
ena in question are the products of chancy processes. If human beings 
exist because God effectively intended that they, specifically and in par-
ticular, should exist, in what sense could statistical explanations in evolu-
tionary biology also explain why such a species as humanity should exist?
In a recent unpublished paper (Pruss 2016), Alexander Pruss discusses 
five ways of reconciling meticulous chance and meticulous providence that 
fail—or, at least, that fail in the absence of significant supplementation. 
These five ways are determinism, generalized Molinism, Thomism, divine 
luck, and the multiverse. We can also consider Peter van Inwagen’s model 
for the existence of chance in a world sustained by God, which suffers 
from some of the same problems identified by Pruss. I will discuss these six 
failed reconciliations in Sect. 11.2. Pruss’s own solution is a theistic ver-
sion of David Lewis’s best-fit theory of probabilistic laws. I present Pruss’s 
solution in Sect. 11.3 and raise several objections to it in Sect. 11.4. My 
own proposal appears in Sect. 11.5: a divine command theory of rational 
credences, combined with the identifying of objective probability with a 
particular physical parameter (the square of the wave amplitude of the 
quantum wavefunction). I argue that this solution preserves the advan-
tages of Pruss’s account while avoiding my objections to it.
11.2  SIx FaIled reconcIlIatIonS
11.2.1  Determinism
We might first try a deterministic model of the universe. On this model, 
meticulous providence is easy to explain: God has simply to set the right 
initial conditions for the universe in order to obtain any possible history 
that he prefers. Given deterministic laws, his intentions are certain to suc-
ceed. But, as we saw, determinism seems prima facie inconsistent with 
objective chance.
However, this inconsistency might be only apparent. As Pruss points 
out, classical (pre-quantum) statistical mechanics made use of objective 
probabilities and statistical explanations, despite the fact that Newton- 
Maxwell dynamics were (almost) perfectly deterministic. Such classical 
statistical mechanics presupposes that we can identify objective probability 
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with something like volume in a natural phase or state space: the larger the 
volume taken up by a set of states in that space, the greater its objective 
probability.
However, this underlying picture is inconsistent with meticulous provi-
dence. If God intentionally sets the initial conditions of the universe in 
order to achieve a set of preferred outcomes, then there is no sense in 
which volumes of initial conditions that would lead to outcomes incom-
patible with God’s intentions had any finite probability. Pruss asks us to 
imagine a perfectly skilled coin-flipper, who is able to produce Heads or 
Tails at will. If the flipper produces a sequence that is close to 50% Heads, 
then the only explanation of this fact must go through the flipper’s actual 
intentions. The fact that the Heads-producing and Tails-producing sets of 
initial conditions are approximately equal in volume is completely 
irrelevant.
11.2.2  Molinism
Molinism is the theory (based on the work of Luis Molina) that God 
knows all of the “counterfactuals of freedom,” despite the fact that human 
free choice is always the result of an indeterministic process. That is, if C 
fully describes the relevant features of a possible human free choice F, then 
God knows (from all eternity) whether or not it is true that, if C were to 
obtain, F would result. Molinism also extends such divine “middle knowl-
edge” to the realm of chancy processes. As in the case of determinism, it 
is easy to use Molinism to explain meticulous divine providence: God can 
once again obtain any specific result He wants, so long as the result is fea-
sible (i.e., actually obtainable via chance processes, given the actual truth- 
values of the relevant counterfactuals of chance) by simply fixing the right 
initial conditions. But, also once again, generalized Molinism fails to 
secure the reality of statistical explanation for exactly the same reason that 
determinism fails to do so.
11.2.3  Thomism
We might reasonably suppose that the whole problem can be dissolved 
simply by relying on a central notion of Thomism: the distinction between 
primary and secondary causation. A result could be simultaneously chancy 
in the order of secondary causation (as produced by created causes) and 
completely determined in the order of primary causation (as specifically 
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intended by God). I will argue in Sect. 11.5 that a variant of Thomism is 
part of the correct reconciliation, but Pruss points out an oddity that must 
be confronted.
For Thomists, the event that is C’s causing E (for any creaturely cause 
C and effect E) coincides with metaphysical necessity with the event of 
God’s willing that C cause E: any world containing one must also contain 
the other. Hence, if the objective chance of C’s causing E is x, then the 
objective chance of God’s willing that C cause E must also be x. Thus, we 
seem to be forced to attribute a kind of probabilistic propensity to God’s 
own volitions, as though God contained a kind of chancy causal mecha-
nism, like an internal dice-throwing process, which is surely inconsistent 
with God’s simplicity and arguably inconsistent with divine aseity, free-
dom, and perfection. It is surely the case that God acts indeterministically, 
but to project a mathematical measure onto God’s alternatives would 
seem to subordinate his decision-making process to something both inter-
nally complex and distinct from God’s essence. It is also implausible, as 
Pruss observes, that any such internal divine propensities would coincide 
perfectly with physically based propensities discoverable by empirical 
science.
11.2.4  Divine Luck
On this model, God intends to bring about a particular event E. He sets 
up initial conditions that lead to a chancy process P, a process which has 
some probability of producing E spontaneously and some objective prob-
ability of not doing so. God intends to intervene miraculously if P does 
not produce E spontaneously. If God is lucky, E will result from P, in 
which case E’s occurrence will have been, unproblematically, overdeter-
mined. If God’s intentions are highly specific and if the processes involved 
have propensities that are associated with probabilities significantly less 
than one, then God would have to be very lucky for this reconciliation to 
be successful.
11.2.5  Multiverse
The last model could be improved by adding many universes. With each 
additional universe, the chances of God being sufficiently lucky in at least 
one of them improve. With enough universes, the chance of sufficient luck 
in at least one approaches certainty. This would work, but it makes it very 
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unlikely that we inhabit a universe in which God’s intentions are realized.1 
In addition, we might well suppose that God intends particular events to 
occur in each universe, in which case the existence of additional universes 
is irrelevant.
11.2.6  Peter van Inwagen’s Model
Peter van Inwagen (1988) argues that God can decree that the created 
world contains chancy processes, while simultaneously decreeing that 
these processes will eventuate in very specific outcomes. To simplify, sup-
pose that there is just one process P, which undergoes a series of chancy 
transitions, T1, T2, …, Tn, with each Ti having a range of possible out-
comes Ei,1, Ei,2, …, Ei,m associated with objective probabilities P(Ei,1), 
P(Ei,1), …, P(Ei,m). These transition probabilities are particular, single-case 
facts about the outcomes—as we shall shortly see, they are not fully deter-
mined by the underlying physical or psychological symmetries. Ordinarily, 
we would think that the probability of the occurrence of some final 
(n-stage) outcome En,j would be the product of the probabilities, 
P(E1,j)·P(E2,j)·…·P(En,j). However, in van Inwagen’s model, these joint 
probabilities can deviate significantly from the corresponding products 
(i.e., objective probability is non-Markovian in van Inwagen’s universe).
Suppose that God intends a disjunction of final events (En,1 ∨ En,2 ∨ En,3 
∨ … ∨ En,m). Ordinarily, we would take the probability of this disjunction 
to be the sum of the probabilities P(En,1) + P(En,2) + … + P(En,m) = ∑ P(E
n,i), which will be much less than one. However, van Inwagen imagines 
that God’s decree can provide this disjunctive event with a probability of 
one (thereby elevating the probability of one or more of the disjuncts, and 
lowering the probability of contrary histories). Thus, God can decree that 
some event in the set En,i occurs, without decreeing which member of the 
set it is that occurs. God can leave it up to chance, in effect, leave it up to 
the chancy process P, to determine which member of the disjunction is 
actualized.
1 As Enis Doko has pointed out (in correspondence) this depends on assuming that each 
of the universes is equally real. God could create an infinity of simulated universes and then 
decide which of them to realize. This suggestion raises a new problem: what is it for a fully 
detailed simulation to become “real”? What are the unreal universes lacking? Can we tell that 
we have this indefinable element of “reality”?
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Van Inwagen does succeed in giving us a world in which there are both 
objective chance and a limited degree of meticulous providence. It is 
essential to van Inwagen’s model that God does not decree every detail of 
history. He can decree that specific types of events (although not, perhaps, 
particular events) occur at particular junctures in the history of the world, 
while leaving it to chance how these event-types are brought about. There 
is, however, a serious drawback to van Inwagen’s model. The actual objec-
tive probabilities depend in a very sensitive way to God’s specific inten-
tions and might therefore deviate in some (and perhaps in very many) 
cases from the objective probabilities as we would ordinarily determine 
them in empirical science, that is, from observed frequencies of similar 
setups. It is hard to see how empirical science can incorporate into the 
boundary conditions facts about divine intentions relating to the remote 
future. In addition, the van-Inwagen-objective-chance of a particular 
event would not always be determined solely by the volume of a corre-
sponding region in a natural state space but would rather also depend on 
which further events that event is likely to lead to and whether those fur-
ther events are subject to God’s decrees. This would seem to lead to a 
pervasive skepticism about objective chance.
Finally, we might reasonably suppose that God’s decrees include the 
occurrence of particular events with particular participants and not just 
disjunctions of such particular events. For example, it seems plausible to 
suppose that God intended Abraham himself to exist, and not just Abraham 
or some Abraham-like counterpart. Such particular intentions would be 
incompatible with van Inwagen’s model (except for intentions about the 
initial state of the universe).
11.3  PruSS’S SolutIon: a theIStIc VerSIon 
oF lewIS’S BeSt-FIt Model
11.3.1  Lewis’s Best-Fit Model
Pruss’s new solution to the reconciliation problem builds on David Lewis’s 
best-fit model of objective chance (Lewis 1980, 1994). Lewis’s model was 
an extension of his own earlier work (Lewis 1973) on the Mill-Ramsey 
best-system theory of the laws of nature (Mill 1947; Ramsey 1978). 
According to the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, a law is a theorem 
of the best axiomatic system of the particular natural facts of the actual 
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world—the “Humean mosaic” of intrinsic qualities distributed across 
space and time. A system is best just in case it achieves the best combina-
tion of three values in relation to the actual mosaic: accuracy, comprehen-
siveness (strength), and simplicity.
The best-fit model of objective chance extends this model to include 
probabilistic laws. A probabilistic statement is a statement of objective 
chance (relative to the Humean mosaic of the actual world) just in case it 
achieves the best combination of intrinsic simplicity and fit to actual fre-
quencies. The degree of fit between a probabilistic law and a corresponding 
frequency is simply a measure of the deviation between the two: the 
smaller the deviation, the closer the fit.
Lewis’s best-fit model is a modification of the theory of frequentism of 
Hans Reichenbach (1949) and Richard von Mises (1957). Frequentism 
identifies objective chance with long-run relative frequencies. The funda-
mental problem with the simple frequentist model is that we expect there 
to be some deviation between objective chance and relative frequency, 
especially if the relevant class is relatively small. We would not be surprised 
if it turned out that 50.0000001% of radium 223 atoms decayed in 
11.43 days, even if the objective probability of decay in 11.43 days was 
exactly 50%. However, the frequentist must insist that objective probabili-
ties always coincide exactly with relative frequency. On Lewis’s best-fit 
model, this conclusion is not forced on us. We can trade a slight deviation 
for a simpler probabilistic law.
11.3.2  The Explanatory Weakness of Lewis’s Chance
However, Lewis’s best-fit model does inherit another central problem for 
frequentism: Lewisian objective chance cannot explain actual frequencies, 
since it ultimately depends on them. Suppose we observe a relative fre-
quency F that is very close to the Lewisian best-fit probability r. Can we 
use the Lewisian probability to explain why F is close to r? No, because the 
fact that F is close to r is part of the metaphysical explanation of why there 
is a probabilistic law assigning r (and not some other number) to the rel-
evant class of events. To use Lewisian probabilities to explain statistical 
frequencies would thus be viciously circular.
Here Pruss and I are rejecting accounts (like those of Loewer 2012) 
that draw a sharp separation between scientific and metaphysical explana-
tion. The two modes of explanation are probably distinct, but it is hard to 
accept mixed cases of circularity, that is, cases  in which the fact that p 
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scientifically explains the fact that q, while the fact that q metaphysically 
explains the fact that p. Realists about explanation have to suppose that 
any case of an explanatory relation involves a form of real, asymmetric 
dependency. (Thanks to Aaron Segal for bringing this to my attention.)
Here is where theism can help, as Pruss observes. Let’s say that we have 
a probabilistic law of nature assigning an objective chance r to some class 
of outcomes E just in case God intends for the frequency of E to be close 
to r, as close as possible given his other aims and constraints. In other 
words, let’s suppose that God intends for S (a system of laws, both deter-
ministic and probabilistic) to be the best system of laws for the world as it 
actually comes to be. If it is a theorem of S that event E has probability r, 
then r is in fact E’s objective chance of occurring.
Pruss imagines that we can talk meaningfully about the internal struc-
ture of God’s intentions. God intends that certain facts should obtain for 
the sake of certain other facts. In the case at hand, God intends certain 
particular facts in the mosaic for the purpose of making a certain system of 
laws (S) the best system of laws for the resulting world. God has intentions 
about what laws the world exhibits, and not just about individual events, 
taken one at a time.
In Pruss’s revised model, we can use objective chance to explain actual 
frequencies. The frequencies are (typically) close to value of the corre-
sponding objective chance, and they are close to those values because the 
values represent objective chance, since God arranges things so as to make 
the fit as close as possible. The value of the objective chance depends on 
God’s intention, not on the actual frequencies. The actual frequencies, in 
turn, depend on the chances.
11.3.3  Saving the Principal Principle
Pruss’s revision also solves a serious problem that Lewis (1980) noted 
with his own best-fit model: it comes into conflict with a widely accepted 
principle that constrains the relationship between rational credences and 
objective chance, the “Principal Principle” of probability.
 
The Principal Principle. / &Credence E H Chance E( ) =( ) ( ) =r r  
Let’s suppose that r is significantly greater than 0, for some event-type 
E. Let E* represent a very large and improbable ensemble of n occasions 
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for E-type events in the future (beyond the scope of H), in which the rela-
tive frequency of E-type events is much lower than r—for simplicity’s sake, 
let’s set it at zero. The chance of E*’s occurring should be small but finite, 
something like (1 − r)n, assuming independence. Now, apply the Principal 
Principle. We can infer that our credence in E*, conditional on 
Chance(E*) = (1 − r)n and H, must itself be (1 − r)n.
However, given the best-fit theory, it seems that E* is actually inconsis-
tent with Chance(E*) = (1 − r)n. It is metaphysically impossible for both to 
be true. In a world in which E* occurs, the relative frequency of E must be 
much lower than r, since the actual frequency of E in such world must be 
far less than r. The laws of probability ensure that the probability of one 
proposition conditional on a proposition inconsistent with it must be zero. 
Hence, the credence of E*, conditional on Chance(E*) = (1 − r)n and H, 
must be zero. But 0 ≠ (1 − r)n and H. Contradiction.
Pruss’s model differs from Lewis’s in this respect. It is not impossible in 
Pruss’s account for the frequency of E and the chance of E to be far apart. 
Pruss’s model stipulates that God must intend to make the frequency of E 
as close as possible to the chance of E, given God’s others aims and inten-
tions. It is certainly conceivable that in certain cases God might have over-
riding reasons, reasons that would lead him to permit a wide deviation of 
frequency from chance. We might even be able to conceive a world in 
which every frequency deviates widely from its objective chance.
Lewis (1994) thought that he had overcome this problem (or “bug”) by 
focusing on the “admissibility” of the proposition Chance(E*) = (1 − r)n. 
The Principal Principle can be applied only if the information on which the 
credence of E* is being conditioned is admissible at the time to which it is 
being applied. That is, we cannot condition on a proposition that contains 
(even implicitly) future information relevant to the occurrence of E*. But, 
given the best-fit model of chance, that is just what Chance(E*) = (1 − r)n 
does—it implicitly provides information about the future frequency of E, 
since a proposition encoding an objective chance is covertly a proposition 
about a global relative frequency (including the future).
But, as Lewis recognized, to his temporary dismay (Lewis 1994, 
485–6), this seems to make any application of the Principal Principle falla-
cious, given the constraint on inadmissible information and the best-fit 
theory of chance. Lewis argued (Lewis 1994, 486–7) that he could get 
around this by seeing that admissibility is a matter of degree. The Principal 
Principle is never strictly and exactly correct, but it can be approximately 
correct, so long as the proposition about chance does not provide too 
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much information about the future. And that is exactly what the proposi-
tion that Chance(E*) = (1 − r)n does in our present case, explaining the 
total failure of the application of the Principal Principle.
This was an ingenious solution but ultimately an unsatisfying one. As 
Lewis admitted, the Principal Principle is central to our concept of objec-
tive chance. Such a constitutive principle must be exactly correct—mere 
approximation is just not enough. Lewis’s approximate solution is a bug, 
not a feature.
11.3.4  Pruss’s Reconciliation of Providence and Chance
Pruss’s model can be fruitfully combined with three of the attempted rec-
onciliations: determinism, generalized Molinism, and Thomism. I prefer 
the combination of Pruss’s model with Thomism. As Pruss points out, his 
model resolves the oddity that we noted earlier: the fact that the objective 
chance of an event’s occurrence corresponds with the objective chance of 
a corresponding divine intention. Now we can ask: what is the truthmaker 
for the claim that the objective chance of God’s intending E on occasion 
C is r? The answer is this: the divine intention has chance r because God 
intends that the frequency of such intentions be as close to r as is possible. 
This clearly does not involve attributing to God some peculiar, sub- 
personal machinery within his decision-making process. Hence, the oddity 
is resolved in a satisfactory manner.
The Pruss-Thomist model can now reconcile meticulous providence 
with objective chance quite easily. We can now see why it is possible to 
explain a particular event (like the existence of Abraham) both as the result 
of an effective divine intention and as the result of a certain chancy pro-
cesses. God intended (and caused it to be the case, in a primary mode) 
that Abraham’s existence be explained in terms of secondary causation, 
including statistical explanations involving objective chances. Objective 
chances do really explain actual results, via God’s intentions that they 
should do so (i.e., his intentions that the actual frequencies should approx-
imate chances as closely as possible).
11.4  SoMe oBjectIonS to PruSS’S account
Pruss’s account is clearly an improvement over Lewis’s, and I believe that 
it is at least on the right track. Nonetheless, there are two problems or 
apparent problems, which should motivate us to look for a revised model.
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11.4.1  The Gambler’s Fallacy
The Pruss model would seem to license a version of the Gambler’s Fallacy. 
Suppose that I know that there are only k possible occasions for the occur-
rence of an event of type E, and suppose that I have observed the first 
k – 1 occasions. Suppose further that, on these first k – 1 occasions, an 
E-type event has occurred exactly k/2 times. Thus, I know that the rela-
tive frequency will be very close to ½. Given the value of simplicity, that 
gives me good reason to think that the objective chance is exactly ½, that 
is, that God has intended for the relative frequency to be as close to ½ as 
possible. If an E-type event occurs on the last occasion, the frequency will 
be somewhat over ½—it will be ½ + 1/k. If instead a non-E-type event 
occurs, the frequency will be exactly ½. Thus, I have good reason to 
expect that we will not see an E-type event on the last occasion, even 
though the objective chance for the occurrence of such an event is ½. This 
reason need not be conclusive—any reason at all to prefer the non- 
occurrence of the E-type event to its occurrence on the last occasion is 
sufficient to falsify Pruss’s model.
The Pruss model might be salvaged if we could identify a higher-order 
law or regularity that applies in this case. The first thing to note is that we 
should distinguish between objective chance and objective probability. An 
objective probability is a chance only when it is the conditional probability 
of an event-type conditional on all causally prior facts. See Pearl (2000) 
for details, especially chapters 1 and 2. So, in the aforementioned example, 
we need to consider the objective probability of an E-type event occurring 
on the last occasion, given that it has already occurred k/2 times on the 
previous k – 1 occasions. This defines a new event-type, which we can call 
type E+. Given the hypothesis, there is only one possible occasion on which 
an E+-type event can occur, so its relative frequency must be either 0 or 1. 
However, we might be able to find a more general class of event-types, call 
it F, that subsumes E+ along with a large number of other, relevantly simi-
lar event-types. The objective chance of the occurrence of an F-type event 
will also be ½, so God will have good reason to make the relative fre-
quency of F-type events as close to ½ as possible. Once I realize that the 
E+-type event is a member of this F class, I have good reason to anticipate 
its occurrence with a credence of exactly ½, as required to avoid the 
Gambler’s Fallacy.
Nonetheless, there still seems to be some grounds for being biased 
against the occurrence of an E-type event on this last occasion, given the 
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value of matching perfectly a simple probability. But any bias will lead to a 
rational deviation of subjective probabilities from known objective chance, 
in contradiction to the Principal Principle.
11.4.2  The Credence/Chance Conceptual Gap
Finally, we can ask whether the Lewis-Pruss model is able to explain the 
normative bite that the Principal Principle represents. Why is it rational for 
us to apportion our credences according to the weights of objective 
chance? For both Lewis and Pruss, objective chance corresponds (at least 
approximately) to long-run, global relative frequency. But why should my 
subjective probability about any particular event correspond to global, 
long-run relative frequencies of similar events in similar circumstances? As 
John Maynard Keynes is supposed to have quipped, “in the long run, 
we’re all dead.” What would be irrational about setting my subjective 
probabilities about particular cases in a way that disregards such long-term 
facts and symmetries?
11.5  a dIVIne coMMand theory 
oF ratIonal credence
11.5.1  The Model and Its Advantages
Robert M. Adams’s divine command metaethics built upon earlier work in 
philosophical semantics by Keith Donnellan (1966), Saul Kripke (1972), 
and Hilary Putnam (1975), work which demonstrated the existence of 
necessary truths that are neither analytic nor knowable a priori. For exam-
ple, it is a necessary truth that Venus is identical to Venus, and so it must 
also be a necessary truth that the Morning Star is identical to the Evening 
Star, since both phrases are simply names of Venus (Kripke 1972, 97–105). 
Similarly, since water is necessarily identical to water, water must be neces-
sarily identical to H2O, since both “water” and “H2O” are names for the 
very same substance (Putnam 1975, 196–290). Nonetheless, these truths 
are not analytic or knowable a priori. No amount of reflection on the 
meaning of “the Morning Star” or our concept of water could ever have 
led to the discovery that the Morning Star is the Evening Star, or that 
water is H2O. These discoveries were empirical, learned a posteriori. Thus, 
we have a posteriori necessities and identities.
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In a similar way, Robert Adams (1979) proposed that the property of 
being morally wrong is identical to the property of being forbidden by 
God.2 Adams does not suppose that we can infer this identity by mere 
reflection on our concept of moral wrongness. The identity is discovered 
through a kind of theological and metaphysical inquiry that could be 
labeled “a posteriori” in relation to metaethics. Despite this conceptual 
novelty, Adams proposed that the property we are in fact thinking of when 
we think of moral wrongness is the property of being forbidden by God.
I propose adapting Adams’s metaethics to the case of a certain cogni-
tive or intellectual deontology, that is, the rational necessity of conforming 
our subjective credences to certain normative principles. In our intellec-
tual lives, as in our moral lives, we encounter certain categorical impera-
tives (to use Kant’s phrase): things that we must do or not do, regardless 
of their consequences in particular circumstances. We ought always to 
avoid logical inconsistency, and we ought to modify our credences in order 
to bring them in conformity to standard axiomatizations of probability 
(such as Kolmogorov’s or Popper’s). And, to come to the present case, we 
ought to conform our credences to our expectations of objective chance. 
On my theory of meta-normativity, these rational imperatives are in fact 
divine commands—things we are commanded by God to do in our intel-
lectual lives.
I am assuming, for this model, that the relevant credences are subject 
to our voluntary control—that they consist in our making certain judg-
ments of probability. Once we see that our judgments of probability are in 
conflict with the axioms of probability or with the Principal Principle, we 
are obliged (in a special, non-moral sense) to alter them in order to avoid 
the conflict.
How are these commands promulgated by God and known by us? Not, 
of course, by being carved in stone on Mt. Sinai. Rather, they are promul-
gated by being incorporated into certain normal operations and inclina-
tions of the human mind. In this way, atheists and agnostics can be aware 
of the normative facts, without correctly understanding their metaphysical 
basis. In this respect, the laws of correct probabilistic thinking are like the 
natural moral law of Thomas Aquinas (see Summa Theologiae I–II, 
q90, a4).
2 Adams actually writes “forbidden by a loving God,” but since I assume that God is neces-
sarily loving, I can omit this qualification.
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In order to connect rational credence with objective chance, we have to 
suppose that objective chance corresponds to some real (possibly physical) 
parameter. In other words, God’s command is that we apportion our cre-
dences to correspond to this chosen parameter. Since God is rational and 
benevolent, he has good reason to make the relative frequencies match the 
objective chance as closely as possible, since otherwise he would be issuing 
general commands that would lead rational agents to act suboptimally in 
the long run.
What is this special parameter? In classical mechanics, it would corre-
spond to the volume of an event in a natural state space. In quantum 
mechanics, there is an even simpler and more concrete parameter: the 
square of an event’s quantum wave amplitude.
Thus, the model has a three-step structure:
 (A) God creates a special physical parameter (e.g., wave amplitude, in the 
case of quantum mechanics, or a coarse-graining of a state space, in 
the case of classical statistical mechanics).
 (B) God commands that all rational creatures apportion their credences 
in accordance with some fixed function of that parameter (e.g., the 
square of the amplitude—the amplitude times its complex conjugates).
 (C) God has good reason to make the corresponding relative frequencies 
fit the rational credences as closely as possible, so that rational crea-
tures who conform to the divine command would act optimally in 
the long run.
As in Pruss’s model, my model can use objective chance to explain 
actual frequencies, thanks to step C of the model. Step A clearly closes the 
chance/credence conceptual gap. The model also avoids the Gambler’s 
Fallacy, since we have good reason to conform to sound probabilistic prin-
ciples (in order to conform to divine commands), and God has good rea-
son to make frequencies optimal for rational agents in all circumstances, 
including the peculiar ones outlined in my scenario. Finally, there is no 
problem with the Principal Principle, since the correspondence of cre-
dence and chance is guaranteed immediately by the identity of chance 
with divine commands.
Why is step (A) necessary? Couldn’t God have simply issued commands 
concerning our rational credences, without introducing a particular physi-
cal parameter? (Thanks to Aaron Segal for raising this point.) In my model, 
step (A) is needed to provide the particular content of God’s commands 
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in step (B). Here’s an analogy. Suppose God commanded us to love our 
neighbor, that is, to aim at promoting our neighbor’s welfare. Such a com-
mand presupposes that there is such a parameter as individual welfare. In 
a similar way, step (B) presupposes that there is some variable, physical 
parameter upon which our rational credences are supposed to be based.
11.5.2  Objections
First, one might object that any divine command theory of normativity 
suffers from a vicious circularity. We would have to assume that there is a 
norm enjoining us to obey God’s commands, but how can such a norm 
exist if all norms depend on God’s commands? Robert Adams considered 
this objection in his essay, and he responded that his theory does not need 
any deontic norm directing us to obey God: it is sufficient if we have good 
reason to value such obedience. Not all reasons to act are constituted by 
deontic norms: there are also non-normative values to consider. In the 
case of God’s commands, there are many reasons, independent of both 
morality and cognitive normativity, for valuing obedience. We value a 
good relationship with God, and, given the asymmetry in knowledge and 
character, such a good relationship depends on our obedience to his com-
mands. Given God’s creation of us and his subsequent generosity, we 
value our obedience as an expression of gratitude. It is aesthetically fitting 
that we should defer to God’s commands, given the ontological asymme-
try involved.
None of these reasons for obeying God’s commands need be active in 
cases in which we feel bound by cognitive norms. It is sufficient that there 
exist good reasons to conform to those norms, whether or not we grasp 
what those reasons are. It is enough if we grasp the somewhat inchoate 
fact that there must be some good reason for us to conform to the norms 
we recognize, like the Principal Principle.
Second, there are grounds for worrying that my step C will not apply 
to cases that are beyond all human knowledge and concern. God’s benev-
olence for us may give him reason to make relative frequencies stick close 
to objective chances within the bounds of human knowledge and concern, 
but what could motive him to do so beyond those bounds? In response, I 
could argue that human beings do form beliefs in the form of unbounded, 
global generalizations. Physicists may well form the belief that the cosmic 
relative frequency of physical events matches closely the probability ampli-
tude of those events. If we assume that God cares about whether we 
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believe or have high confidence in truth or falsehood, regardless of whether 
we are ever able to verify these beliefs empirically, and regardless of whether 
these beliefs are of any practical import to us, then God does have suffi-
cient reason to bring all relative frequencies close to the corresponding 
objective chances.
Third, Jeff Koperski has raised (in correspondence) the following worry. 
What can I say about people who are ignorant about the relevant divine 
commands? Didn’t people assign probabilities rationally (or irrationally) 
prior to the discovery of quantum mechanics, and even prior to the discov-
ery of classical statistical mechanics? Certainly, they did. Remember, first, 
that I am building on Robert Adams’s account of divine command theory, 
which is explicitly a theory of a posteriori identity. Probabilistic rationality 
and irrationality do not depend on being aware of God’s epistemic com-
mands as such (i.e., under that theological description). Moreover, one 
cannot be even materially (so to speak) in violation of God’s commands 
relating to quantum wave amplitudes without being aware of those ampli-
tudes. Thus, the discovery of quantum mechanics involved the uncovering 
of new norms, norms that are as a matter of metaphysical fact (but not as a 
matter of a priori intuition) grounded in divine intentions. Prior to the 
discovery of the physical foundation of statistical mechanics, people could 
still violate other norms of probability (such as those encoded in the 
Kolmogorov axioms), but obviously they could not act contrary to God’s 
intentions vis-à-vis quantum wave amplitudes or state space volumes. 
Progress in normative knowledge is possible in empirical science, just as it 
is possible in moral or political theory. As I mentioned in the Introduction, 
my proposal can be seen as providing metaphysical foundations for the 
similar claims made by Quantum Bayesians.
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CHAPTER 12
Creatio Continua and Quantum Randomness
Emil Salim and Shoaib Ahmed Malik
12.1  IntroductIon
What does the doctrine of creation have to do with the issue of random-
ness? Orthodox Christian and Islamic traditions hold that God initially 
created the universe out of nothing. By itself, creation out of nothing 
doesn’t dictate whether randomness exists or not in the universe. It is not 
God’s act of creation that seems to be directly relevant to the existence of 
chance or fortune in the world, but God’s governance.
Some schools of thought in the Christian and Islamic traditions, how-
ever, hold that God also continuously creates the universe after its initial 
creation out of nothing. In its most radical version, the doctrine says that 
God continuously recreates the universe out of nothing in each successive 
instant (Edwards 1970, 401–404). Although the doctrine of creation out 
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of nothing (creatio ex nihilo) may not have a direct impact on the issue of 
randomness, the doctrine of continuous creation (creatio continua) 
surely does.1
This paper will discuss what we call The Common View of the doctrine 
of continuous creation that we offer as a common denominator between 
the Christian and Islamic traditions.2 It will also discuss whether there is a 
place for ontological quantum randomness in the universe if the doctrine 
of continuous creation is true. Ontological randomness is different from 
epistemic randomness. The latter has to do with human cognition and its 
limitations. Events appear to be random because our minds do not have 
the necessary information to understand why things happen the way they 
do. By contrast, ontological randomness is independent of human cogni-
tion, but concerns the causal nexus of entities that is deprived of efficient 
or final causation. In this paper, we argue that The Common View of the 
doctrine of continuous creation would preclude ontological randomness.
For clarity, let’s first distinguish two interpretations of the doctrine of 
continuous creation. First, “the doctrine of continuous creation qua rec-
reation” (CCRec) says that continuous creation is conceptually equivalent 
to continuous conservation, but interprets continuous creation as contin-
uous recreation. In this interpretation, objects constantly go out of exis-
tence and come into being by God’s continuous ex nihilo recreation. 
Second, “the doctrine of continuous creation qua sustenance” (CCSus) 
also says that continuous creation is conceptually equivalent with continu-
ous conservation, although it rejects that objects continuously vanish and 
are being recreated by God. In CCSus, continuous creation is merely con-
tinuous sustenance, without repeated ex nihilo creation. We also stipulate 
CCRec/Sus as a blanket term for “continuous creation,” which can be speci-
fied further into CCRec or CCSus.
1 Pannenberg suggests that the concept of divine providence has three aspects: conserva-
tion, concurrence, and government (Pannenberg 1988, 8–9). In some theological traditions, 
conservation is considered equivalent to continuous creation. For this reason, the doctrine of 
continuous creation is very relevant to the issues of randomness and providence.
2 This paper will not discuss the steady-state theory of Bondi and Gold, which was dis-
counted by the presentation of the cosmological microwave background radiation that favors 
the Big Bang theory. This theory is sometimes called the “continuous creation” theory 
(Bondi and Gold 1948; Karimi 2011). For a panentheist-idealist version of the doctrine of 
the continuous creation, which will not be considered here, see Schultz and D’Andrea-
Winslow 2017. Karl Svozil uses the term “creatio continua” to refer to “indeterministic” 
generation process that results in quantum randomness (Svozil 2016, 28). Svozil’s usage of 
“creatio continua” is not how we understand the phrase in this paper.
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Definition 1.1 CCRec3 God continuously recreates everything ex nihilo in 
successive instant. Objects continuously come into being and go out of 
existence. Continuous creation is not simply continuous sustenance.
Definition 1.2 CCSus God continuously creates everything, but objects 
don’t continuously come into being and go out of existence. Continuous 
creation is simply continuous sustenance and not ex nihilo recreation of 
objects.
Definition 1.3 CCRec/Sus God continuously creates everything, but “con-
tinuous creation” can be interpreted as either continuous ex nihilo recre-
ation (CCRec) or merely continuous sustenance (CCSus).
We also need to note that when we use the word “conservation” without 
further specific information, we utilize it as a general term without specify-
ing it as conservation qua continuous recreation or conservation qua mere 
sustenance.
12.2  the chrIstIan tradItIons
The Christian tradition has a long history of the doctrine of continuous 
creation, especially during the medieval and early modern periods. The 
doctrine also finds a way into contemporary analytic philosophy of religion.
12.2.1  Nicolas Malebranche
Malebranche (1638–1715) argues that God’s continuous creation (CCRec/
Sus) ranges over both (a) the existence and (b) the determinate properties 
of objects, including their spatiotemporal coordinates. His argument for 
(a), namely, for the continuous creation (CCRec/Sus) of objects, is the argu-
ment from dependence: since creatures are metaphysically dependent on 
their creator, there isn’t a possible world in which creatures exist but their 
creator (per impossibile) no longer does.
3 In Sect. 12.4, we will stipulate that CCRec is identical to what we shall call “The Edwards-
Ash’arite Thesis.”
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For Malebranche, continuous creation (CCRec/Sus) ranges over the 
determinate properties of objects, such as their location.4 His argument is 
that because the universe and its complete features are immediately cre-
ated by God in every successive instant, there couldn’t be a previous (or a 
subsequent) time-slice in which the properties of an object can be deter-
mined by God other than in the very instant the universe is created (Miller 
2011, 5). Instead, the imparting of all of the objects’ determinate proper-
ties must be done by God simultaneously with the objects’ coming into 
being, that is, at the moment of creation. It is simply inconceivable, 
according to him, that a chair exists unless it exists “somewhere, either 
here or elsewhere” (Dialogues VII.VI).5
12.2.2  René Descartes
Descartes (1596–1650) is another author who believes in the doctrine of 
continuous creation (CCRec/Sus). The Cartesian argument for continuous 
creation (CCRec/Sus) is an argument from the impotence of the objects to 
persist on their own over time. In the Third Meditation, he argues that an 
extended body does not have the power to ensure its existence in a future 
time. Because time is divisible into countless parts which are completely 
independent of one another, there is simply no guarantee that an object at 
time t1 can assure its existence at time t2 where t2 > t1. The existence of an 
object, then, must be caused by something external, “which as it were cre-
ates me afresh at this moment—that is, which preserves me” (Descartes 
1984, 33). To continue existing, at every successive instant, objects must 
be recreated by God. Descartes concludes that conservation and creation 
are different only by virtue of a distinction of reason. Nevertheless, we do 
not have a way of deciding between the literal and non-literal reading of 
Descartes’ aforementioned sentence. That is, we don’t actually know 
whether Descartes embraces CCRec or CCSus.
4 See Lee 2008, 557 and Pessin 2000, 420. As a side note, Pessin argues that Malebranche’s 
version of continuous creation (which Pessin interprets as CCSus) doesn’t entail occasionalism 
because continuous creation (CCSus) is consistent with God’s having volitional incomplete-
ness (432). Roughly speaking, occasionalism is the view that God is the only real efficient 
cause in the universe, while secondary causation is merely an occasion for God’s causal 
activity.
5 If Pessin is correct, then for Malebranche, all of God’s volitions have particular content, 
including his will about the locations of each extended body (Pessin 2001, 86).
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12.2.3  Jonathan Edwards
Like Descartes, Edwards (1703–1758) believes that existences are onti-
cally bound to a particular time and place. Because of this fact, Edwards 
strongly argues that things cannot cause their own existence at a later 
time. Hence their existence at a later time must be immediately caused by 
an external agent, namely, the Creator.
What is absent in Malebranche and unclear in Descartes, however, is 
Edwards’ explicit thought that objects continuously come into being and 
vanish, only to be recreated by God with gradual changes. In other words, 
Edwards clearly endorses continuous creation qua recreation (CCRec).6 
Since created objects (sometimes called “nature”) are impotent to sustain 
their own existence, God must literally recreate them at every successive 
instant in their entire life span. Moreover, God not only recreates their 
existence, but also their “properties, relations, and circumstances” 
(Edwards 1970, 403).
12.3  the IslamIc tradItIons
There are several groups and thinkers in the Islamic traditions7 but our 
focus will primarily be the Ash’arite school of thought because they 
famously offer a unique combination of occasionalism and atomism, both 
of which will be useful to think about our continuous creation model. We 
primarily discuss and utilize the works of al-Juwayni (1028–1085) and his 
student, al-Ghazālı ̄ (1058–1111), both of whom are well-known in the 
Ash’arite household.8 Each of them wrote treatises that explicate the 
6 Compare this view to McCann and Kvanvig’s, which suggests that the doctrine of con-
tinuous creation doesn’t need to mean that the universe always appears anew every moment 
at its existence (McCann and Kvanvig 1991, 590). McCann and Kvanvig, however, still think 
that God determines both essential and accidental properties of objects (597). Another 
Christian historical figure other than Edwards who believes in the literal, “strong” view of 
continuous recreation of bodies (CCRec) is Leibniz’s contemporary Pierre Bayle (Anfray 
2019). One can also find a similar view in the early Leibniz’s doctrine of transcreation 
(White 2000).
7 For excellent references on the various schools, see Wolfson 1976; Jackson 2014; 
Taftazani 1950; Muhtaroglu 2017; Frank 1966.
8 A caveat needs to be pointed out. In the contemporary literature there is a healthy debate 
over Al-Ghaza ̄lı’̄s metaphysical worldview. Some maintain, as we do provisionally in this 
article, that Al-Ghaza ̄lı ̄was an Ash’arite, while others argue he was a covert Neoplatonist. To 
familiarize oneself with the advocates and references for either side, see footnote 8  in 
Malik 2019.
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Ash’arite doctrine. Al-Juwayni wrote A Guide to Conclusive Proofs for the 
Principles of Belief (Al-Juwayni 2000) and al-Ghaza ̄lı ̄wrote Moderation in 
Belief (Al-Ghazālı ̄2013).
12.3.1  The Ash’arite Worldview
The initial bifurcation in their worldview is between Creator and the 
world, that is, anything other than God, where the former is a necessary 
being and the latter being entirely (and radically) contingent. The 
Ash’arites provide a systematic taxonomy on the metaphysics of the world. 
First, the world is divided into atoms (jawhar9) and modes (‘arad). Atoms 
are indivisible, self-subsisting, space-occupying (mutahayyiz) units, while 
modes are properties that adhere in atoms. These properties include things 
like color, taste, odor, life, and death.10 Modes cannot exist on their own 
and they need a locus to manifest themselves, which is why they subsist in 
atoms. In effect, atoms are simply indivisible scaffolds, similar to building 
construction. When atoms aggregate into various combinations, they 
form a body (jism).11 Second, the Ash’arites classify four states or manners 
of being (akwan). These include (1) movement, for example, rotational or 
translational; (2) rest, where an entity remains in the same position for two 
or more moments of time; (3) combination or aggregation of atoms or 
bodies; and (4) separation of atoms and bodies (Al-Juwayni 2000, 11; 
Al-Ghazālı ̄2013, 27).12 This forms the basic ontology of the Ash’arites 
upon which everything else is built.13
9 In the kalamic texts, the word “jawhar” is sometimes equally used to refer to the atom 
and a body.
10 These may seem archaic, which they are. It seems that macroscopic properties have been 
imposed on the microscopic world, something which modern physics may not agree with. 
For example, textures of macroscopic entities can be rough, but atoms themselves aren’t 
“rough.” By contrast, atoms have various properties specific to them which aren’t visible in 
the macroscopic world, e.g., spin, charm, and strangeness.
11 There is a disagreement among the mutakallimun over how many atoms are needed to 
combine to make a body.
12 Al-Ghaza ̄lı ̄doesn’t discuss the akwan the same way that al-Juwayni does, but he has a 
discussion about rest and motion in general. See al-Ghazālı ̄2000, 31–33.
13 For more information on this paradigm, see Erasmus 2018, 53–63; Sabra 2009; and 
MacDonald 1927. One could ask where the soul, angels, and demons fit in this scheme since 
they aren’t material entities. To our knowledge, neither Al-Juwayni nor al-Ghazālı ̄explicitly 
addresses the concern.
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12.3.2  Motivation and Justification
There are two main reasons for why the Ash’arites hold such a worldview. 
For one, the Ash’arites are strongly opposed to anything that contradicts 
the laws of logic because God is bound by them, that is, God can do every-
thing except the logically impossible. This is the full extent of God’s capa-
bilities (Al-Ghazālı ̄2000, 175).
This is important because it explains how and why the Ash’arites take 
atomism seriously. They hold atomism, or more broadly a discrete-based 
worldview, to avoid infinities in creation as they can lead to contradictions, 
and God cannot produce contradictions. A common example is the com-
parison of the seed and the mountain. If both these very different entities 
can be divided into smaller and smaller entities ad  infinitum, it would 
result in an infinite regress, which would be illogical as it suggests that 
both the seed and the mountain have the same (infinite) parts (McGinnis 
2018). Accordingly, there must be a limit to nature and a fundamental 
unit which forms the basic building blocks of the natural world.14 For 
similar reasons, they hold discrete interpretations of space and time (Arthur 
2012; Bulğen 2018; Altaie 2016, 17).
On this point, al-Ghaza ̄lı ̄ outlines three problems with an actual 
infinity. The first issue he raises with actual infinity is that it can never 
end, so to say infinity has passed is conceptually problematic (al-Ghaza ̄lı ̄ 
2013, 37). The second problem he raises is related to counting of 
celestial properties with the passage of time. If infinity has passed, 
then it makes no sense to say that a celestial body has rotated an even 
or odd number of times. In effect, counting in temporal terms would 
be useless (37). The third problem al-Ghaza ̄lı ̄ raises is, pace Cantor, 
the existence of different sizes of infinities (38). Given these issues 
with actual infinity “neither in space nor in time can there be an infin-
ity of extension, nor an infinity of subdivision, nor an infinity of suc-
cession” (MacDonald 1927).
The second reason for holding atomism is that atoms are the linking 
point between the natural world and God’s power. If the very basic enti-
ties are under the command of God, then by extension everything else is.15 
14 It is along these lines that al-Ghazālı ̄makes a distinction between atom and mode. A 
mode cannot subsist in another mode because then otherwise that second mode will need 
another mode and so on to infinite regress. There must be a stopping point or a locus within 
which a mode resides, which is the subsisting atom (Al-Ghazālı ̄2013, 34).
15 Unless and of course God designed a bottom-up kind of emergence.
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Though this isn’t a tight logical argument, as God could still be in abso-
lute control of everything in the absence of particles, it just goes to show 
how thoroughgoing the Ash’arites are in making sure that nothing escapes 
God’s control. It should be stressed that occasionalism is a predominant 
theme among the Ash’arites.16 The reason for this is because they don’t 
agree with autonomy or agency existing out of God’s control as it is seen 
to be theologically problematic (Jackson 2014; Farfur 2010). Everything 
outside of God relies on Him while He relies on no one. Furthermore, 
God doesn’t decide what to do from one moment to another. Rather, 
because God is outside of time and space, God has already “decided” past, 
present, and future in a single timeless act. So, God has already fully deter-
mined each moment’s existential posits, properties, relations, and 
circumstances.
12.3.3  Implications
The Ash’arite worldview has two very interesting implications. First, if 
everything exists momentarily in discrete time, and if everything in cre-
ation is contingent, that is, it could have equally existed or not existed, 
there must be a necessary being that wills it into existence over non- 
existence (murajjih) (and vice versa) at each moment in time (Al-Juwayni 
2000, 12; Al-Ghazālı ̄2013, 42).17 So it’s not just that that atoms and their 
modes are sustained from one moment to another, rather everything is 
brought into existence from nothing and then annihilated into nothing in 
the next one, that is, CCRec. Reality, then, is fundamentally ephemeral. 
This contrasts with mere conservationism (CCSus) in which God merely 
sustains existences while nature/creation has some independence (Moad 
2018), and process theology in which God evolves alongside nature in 
manifesting the development of nature/creation (Ruzgar 2016). In short, 
16 Plantinga 2016 distinguishes between strong and weak occasionalism. Strong occasional-
ism is the position that nothing in creation has any real authentic causal efficacy, including 
human free will. Weak occasionalism is the position that everything has no causal efficacy 
except the human will. The former was occupied by the Ash’arites and Maturidites but the 
latter was occupied by Mutazilites. See Jackson 2014.
17 The reason is that any dependent series of contingent creations must rely on a neces-
sary being.
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Ash’arite metaphysics sees the entire universe being continuously recre-
ated like the refresh rate on a computer screen.18
Second, nothing in the world is intrinsically necessary. Since God is 
literally recreating every atom and mode everywhere in each time-slice, it 
implies that that there are no internal potentialities to things. It is simply 
God’s will that manifests reality moment by moment. That is why 
al-Ghazālı ̄(and Ash’arites in general) famously denies any kind of inherent 
necessity in creation, be they in the form of passive powers (Al-Ghazālı ̄ 
2000, 170) or active ones (166). That said, according to the Ash’arites 
God has chosen to manifest certain nomological laws in place (sunnatAl-
lah), but there is nothing refraining Him from changing those laws if He 
chose to do so for the sake of performing miracles. So it is not impossible 
for God to convert a staff to a snake or split the seas or perform any other 
kind of nomological changes since they are all under the realm of logical 
possibilities.
12.4  the common VIew
Both the Christian and Islamic traditions provide resources for construct-
ing “The Common View of the Continuous Creation,” which consists of 
five theses:
 1. The Conservation Thesis: God continually conserves the existence of 
created substances.
 2. The Equivalence Thesis: God’s conserving created substances is 
equivalent to the continuous creation (CCRec/Sus) of the universe.
 3. The Edwards-Ash’arite Thesis (CCRec): Objects vanish and are recre-
ated by God ex nihilo at every successive instant.19
18 Here it should be noted that there was (and still is) a debate about whether it was the 
atom and the modes that were being recreated or just the modes. For example, Altaie (2016, 
17), a contemporary scholar of physics and kalam, seems to suggest that atoms are recreated 
alongside modes. By contrast, Ibn ‘Arabi, a famous and classical Sufi theologian, is quite 
against the idea of substances as discussed by the Ash’arites as pointed out by Koca (2017). 
Regardless of what one makes of this debate, the key thing to remember here is that, at the 
very least, modes cannot endure more than a moment and are recreated. Interestingly, Adi 
Setia 2006, a contemporary scholar of Islamic intellectual thought, provides an explanation 
of this in that the atomism of the mutakallimun cannot but be thought of as a concep-
tual limit.
19 Kim calls this sort of divine causation “vertical determination.” He then uses the phrase 
“Edwards’s Dictum” to describe the incompatibility between God’s causation and creaturely 
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 4. The Bottom-Up Thesis: God’s creation of objects includes the cre-
ation of all of the objects’ properties or modes.
 5. The Determinacy Thesis: God immediately wills the determinate 
properties or modes of objects.
We will now assess the consequences of this view for the issue of 
randomness.
12.4.1  Conservation Without Determinacy
It is possible to adopt The Conservation Thesis, but not The Determinacy 
Thesis. That is, it is possible to think that God conserves the world with-
out determining every single property that created objects have. At most, 
The Conservation Thesis entails The Partial Determinacy Thesis, which 
says that some properties of an object x are instantiated in virtue of x’s 
existence being sustained. In the same way, one might think that God only 
conserves the existence of the world without determining all of the count-
less properties that created objects have.
12.4.2  The Equivalence Thesis
The Equivalence Thesis says that there is no difference between God’s act 
of continuous creation (CCRec/Sus) and his act of continuous conserva-
tion.20 It is possible to adopt The Equivalence Thesis without embracing 
The Edwards-Ash’arite Thesis, and to claim that continuous creation is 
merely continuous sustenance, but not continuous recreation. This would 
result in CCSus. Kvanvig and McCann, for example, think that there is 
equivalence between conservation and continuous creation. They claim 
that what is proposed in The Edwards-Ash’arite Thesis should be rejected, 
and suggest that the use of the word “creation” in the phrase “continuous 
creation” is a terminological infelicity (Kvanvig and McCann 2005, 15).
diachronic causation (Kim 2005, 36–39).
20 Craig, however, insists that creation must be distinguished from conservation (Craig 
1998). Accordingly, he would reject The Equivalence Thesis.
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12.4.3  The Edwards-Ash’arite Thesis
The Edwards-Ash’arite Thesis or CCRec might run into problem on the 
assumption that God is timeless. If we agree with Malebranche that there 
is a single and undivided act of creation, in what sense does God continu-
ously or repeatedly recreate (CCRec) the world? Does The Edwards- 
Ash’arite Thesis require the assumption that God is actually in time instead 
of outside of time? If one assumes that God is in time, the doctrine of 
continuous creation (CCRec) seems to be unproblematic. God can simply 
recreate the world in each time-slice. If God is timeless, however, the con-
tinuous recreation (CCRec) of the world would have a different picture, 
perhaps one that includes space and time themselves to be a part of cre-
ation that constantly goes in and out of existence. At any rate, the problem 
about God’s timelessness and its relation to God’s creating act is not a 
problem unique for the doctrine of continuous creation (CCRec), but for 
the doctrines of creation and divine action in general. Even if one doesn’t 
subscribe to the doctrine of continuous recreation (CCRec), one has to 
explain how a timeless God acts in the temporal world.
Another worry with The Edwards-Ash’arite Thesis is that it denies the 
persistence of objects and personal identity through time. The intuition is 
that an object never persists since at every moment it immediately van-
ishes. Quinn points out that this is problematic because if humans don’t 
persist, they do not perform actions at all, which is contrary to both com-
mon sense and theistic orthodoxy (Quinn 1983, 63–67). One other sig-
nificant worry here is that if there is no personal identity through time, 
then there is no conservation happening. If an object were to vanish, by 
definition, it would not have been conserved. If this were the case, then 
one couldn’t equate continuous creation (CCRec) with conservation.
The claim that the doctrine of continuous creation (CCRec) precludes 
personal identity through time assumes either of the following premises. 
First, an object that has vanished cannot come into being again. Second, 
even if it could, it would not be identical to the vanished object. One way 
to address this issue is to adopt the exdurantist or stage theory view of 
persistence, in which objects persist in stages of short-lived entities 
(Haslanger 2003, 321).21 In exdurantism, objects persist in virtue of hav-
ing counterparts in other temporal stages. In each stage of its life, the 
21 Crisp thinks that Edwards’ metaphysics of persistence is either the stage view or four-
dimensionalism with temporal parts (Crisp 2016, 202). However, Edwards actually denies 
that there is identity or oneness in the successive instants of recreated substances (Edwards 
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object (i.e., a counterpart) is wholly present, although it comes into and 
goes out of existence at every successive instant. If identity requires that an 
object must continually exist through time, then exdurantism must bite 
the bullet and say that persistence doesn’t require identity. As such, pro-
ponents of continuous creation (CCRec) must say that although conserva-
tion requires persistence, it doesn’t require identity.
However, instead of conceding that identity is absent in exdurantism, 
perhaps it is better to say that only a less robust notion of identity is 
required for persistence, which is a theory of identity that doesn’t require 
seamless continuity in existence. Two analogies might be useful here. 
First, a film roll has many frames, which depict objects. The objects 
depicted in one frame are strictly speaking neither identical to nor spatio-
temporally continuous with the objects depicted in another frame. When 
the film is played, however, viewers (and the exdurantists) see that objects 
persist and maintain personal identity over time. In this way, there is no 
robust ontological identity in objects, but only in the perception or the 
mind of the viewers. This view is sometimes called “the cinematographical 
view” of identity.22 Second, a patch of color persists through time but 
doesn’t maintain identity due to the constant supply of photons needed.23 
A person, upon seeing a color patch, can say that the color patch persists 
over time. In reality, nevertheless, the color patch is constantly refreshed 
as new photons enable it to be perceived. In these ways, exdurantism can 
maintain persistence with identity, although the notion of identity is less 
restrictive.
One immediate question that might arise here would be of moral 
responsibility. How are persons morally responsible if they persist without 
a robust sense of identity? The cinematic image would be helpful to invoke 
again. Human beings that are recreated continuously are morally respon-
sible for their action to the extent that villainous film characters are in a 
sense responsible for their actions, although they are in reality a bundle of 
different film frames.
Admittedly, the philosophical problems discussed earlier are indeed dif-
ficult to address satisfactorily. The solutions require the acceptance of con-
troversial intuitions about change, rigid designation, existential inertia, 
1970, 403). This seems to point us toward the stage theory of objects. Crisp himself says in 
his later piece that for Edwards, objects exdure (Crisp 2018, 12).
22 See Bergson 1911, 304–311 and Crisp 2016, 203–204.
23 See Edwards 1970, 404 and Descartes 1984, 254–255.
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identity, and moral responsibility. However, we contend that seeing The 
Edwards-Ash’arite Thesis as a stage view can still be metaphysically 
defensible.
12.4.4  The Bottom-Up and the Determinacy Theses
The Bottom-Up Thesis says that God creates not only x, but also x’s 
modes or properties. The Bottom-Up Thesis, however, is not explicit 
about whether God meticulously determines the properties of x. The 
Determinacy Thesis strengthens The Bottom-Up Thesis by asserting that 
God not only creates the properties of objects, but also meticulously 
determines them. On this view, theistic determinism thoroughly reigns in 
the world. Every property of objects is determined by God, including the 
properties of quantum particles.
12.5  contInuous creatIon 
and Quantum mechanIcs
The intersection of The Common View of the doctrine of continuous 
creation (CCRec) and randomness includes the issue of the determinateness 
of properties. Suppose that God recreates the universe at every successive 
instant. Suppose that he also wills the determinate properties of each 
object, including its physical properties. How, then, would The Common 
View explain quantum weirdness in which particles sometimes are neither 
somewhere nor nowhere, but in a superposition? If The Common View is 
true, then the place of ontological randomness in the universe is question-
able. Although there are two kinds of interpretations for quantum mechan-
ics, namely, deterministic and indeterministic ones, in the following, we 
will only review the indeterministic Copenhagen interpretation.
Under the Copenhagen indeterministic interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, the wavefunction and its probabilistic character provide com-
plete specification of a quantum state (Bohr 1935).24 On this view, how-
ever, one can’t always say that a particle has a determinate location or 
momentum, particularly when it is in a superposition. According to 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, a system cannot simultaneously pos-
sess perfectly precise values of position and momentum. Heisenberg 
24 The term “Copenhagen interpretation” is used loosely here because we would associate 
not only Bohr with it, but also von Neumann.
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contends that there is something inherently indeterminate in the system. 
What is happening, then, when God recreates (CCRec) the world at every 
successive instant, including when some particles are in a superposition?
Two metaphysical strategies are available here to maintain that God 
recreates (CCRec) objects and properties. The first strategy is to see 
quantum properties as vague properties. Some philosophers think that 
there are problems in individuating macro-objects such as mountains 
and forests, for one doesn’t always know where a mountain or a forest 
begins and where it ends. Sometimes there is no way to tell which 
trees can function as the exact boundaries of mountains and forests. 
The boundaries, in other words, are vague. Vagueness problem doesn’t 
only plague objects, but also properties. Might quantum objects have 
vague properties? Lowe argues that quantum indeterminacy with 
respect to electrons is an example of real ontic vagueness in the prop-
erties of quantum objects such as positions and momenta (Lowe 1994, 
114). Bokulich suggests that ontic vagueness in the properties of 
quantum particles obtains because they lack “space-time trajectories” 
and value definiteness in their positions, momenta, and so forth 
(Bokulich 2014, 463ff.). Unlike classical particles, quantum particles 
do not always have a determinate location, a definite spin, or an exact 
charge. This is especially true when they are in an entangled or super-
posed state. Perhaps some indeterminate quantum properties are 
vague properties and indeed display genuine ontic indeterminacy.25
The second strategy to maintain that God recreates (CCRec) objects and 
properties in quantum events is to posit holism in the quantum states. 
Holism is the view that “a whole is something more than the sum of its 
parts, or has properties that cannot be understood in terms of the proper-
ties of the parts” (Maudlin 2013, 46). Perhaps quantum states are irreduc-
ible to any smaller parts. Unlike the first strategy, the recognition of holism 
doesn’t require one to posit vague properties in the quantum state. Rather, 
the quantum state itself has properties that might be determinate, although 
the properties of its parts are themselves unspecifiable or even are lacking 
of a physical state (58). Juxtaposed with the doctrine of continuous cre-
ation (CCRec), one can say that at some instants, particles become a part of 
a holistic quantum state. While no one could know for sure the nature of 
25 A metaphysical concept like vague properties might also be useful for the Ghirardi-
Rimini-Weber (GRW) interpretation of quantum mechanics, where during collapses, 
 wavefunctions are not completely localized. See Monton 2000.
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quantum states, God would determine that some quantum states would 
contain a certain number of particles whose properties are not specifiable 
further. It is true that The Determinacy Thesis says that God wills that 
particles have determinate properties, but it doesn’t follow from this that 
those determinate properties can be more determinate than being super-
posed in quantum state Q.
Adopting both the second strategy and The Common View might offer 
an explanation of how God acts in quantum events given the measure-
ment problem in quantum mechanics. Von Neumann identifies that there 
are two processes by which quantum states evolve: the indeterministic and 
probabilistic process when a measurement occurs (Process 1) and the 
deterministic process in accordance with the Schrödinger wave equation 
(Process 2) (Neumann 1955, 417–418). In von Neumann’s “orthodox” 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, the wavefunctions would “collapse” 
or “jump” during observations or measurements of particles, and the 
quantum states would undergo a process change from deterministic 
(Process 2) to indeterministic (Process 1) evolution.26 The measurement 
problem is a problem because one doesn’t know how and when a wave-
function collapse would occur.
Let’s situate the measurement problem within the current discourse of 
how “non-interventionist divine action”—assuming the necessitarian 
reading of the natural laws—plays a role in quantum events. Saunders lists 
the four possibilities of such divine action:
 1. God alters the wavefunction between measurements.
 2. God makes God’s own measurements on a given system.
 3. God alters the probability of obtaining a particular result.
 4. God controls the outcome of measurement. (Saunders 2002, 149ff.)
Saunders argues that these four possibilities are unsatisfactory because 
they require some kind of intervention on God’s part (156).27
We argue that adopting The Common View and positing quantum 
holism can provide a better account of non-interventionist divine action in 
quantum events. To begin with, the strategy of positing quantum holism 
is not the same as altering wavefunction between measurements or 
26 The designation of Process 1 as indeterministic and Process 2 as deterministic follows 
Everett’s exposition of the universal wavefunction in Everett 1973, 3.
27 See different responses to Saunders’ critique in Wildman 2008, 162ff.
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manipulating probability distributions (options 1 and 3). In contrast to 
option 1, God doesn’t have to change the wavefunction to ensure that the 
outcome accord with his will. The reason is that in continuous creation 
(CCRec), he can simply pick the initial quantum state to ensure it evolves 
into some later state via the Schrödinger equation (Process 2). In contrast 
to option 3, accepting quantum holism is not claiming that God quirkily 
manipulates the probability distribution of a quantum state to achieve a 
certain outcome. In continuous creation (CCRec), God only needs to cre-
ate a certain holistic quantum state. Afterward, God will be able to deter-
mine the outcomes that fall within the probability distribution in the 
quantum state. The strategy is not the same as option 2 either because no 
measurements of the particle properties are made by God in the quantum 
state. Quantum holism concedes that some parts of the system are unspec-
ifiable not because there is a lack of knowledge on anyone’s part, but 
because of the very holistic character of the state.
Option 4 is only half-right. The strategy does say that God controls the 
outcomes of measurements because God creates the universe (CCRec) at 
every successive instant. Saunders is worried about this option, saying that 
if it is taken, then we need to move ontologically backward, namely, from 
the outcomes of measurements to the determination of the ontological 
probability of the quantum state (Saunders 2002, 154–155). But The 
Common View can escape this worry. First, in God’s continuous creation 
(CCRec), the determination of the quantum state and its probability distri-
bution at time t1 is independent of the outcome at time t2 where t2 > t1. 
Second, the outcome is entirely according to God’s determination and 
needn’t violate any regular scientific laws because God can ensure that the 
outcome falls within the acceptable probability range (Tracy 2008, 273). 
God can work within the physical parameter such as wave amplitude that 
God himself has established.
The strategy of falling back metaphysically to quantum holism, then, 
fulfills Saunders’ requirements for a reasonable “non-interventionist spe-
cial divine action” that the quantum probabilities must:
 1. be ontologically prior to the measurement and thus represent some 
feature of the system in question; and
 2. be modifiable by God without an intervention in the quantum wave-
function itself (which evolves deterministically under the Schrödinger 
equation). (Saunders 2002, 154)
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We argue that embracing The Common View and adopting quantum 
holism allow us to fulfill the first requirement, since in God’s continuous 
creation (CCRec), there is no need for a proleptic manipulation of the 
quantum wavefunction to match the outcomes. The probabilities can 
ontologically be determined before the measurements. The second 
requirement to modify probabilities is not applicable, since in continuous 
creation (CCRec), God can determine the outcome of the measurements 
simply to be within the range of the logical probability distribution in the 
preceding quantum state. However, from the physicist point of view, there 
can still be epistemic randomness.
12.6  objectIons and replIes
One objection to our discussions would be to point out the obvious of the 
fact that the Christian and Muslim thinkers discussed in this paper lived 
before modern physics arrived. Why bother with juxtaposing the doctrine 
of continuous creation (CCRec) with quantum randomness? Isn’t this an 
anachronistic endeavor?
Indeed, The Determinacy Thesis was proposed by the thinkers before 
the quantum revolution. However, the theological position under scrutiny 
is still relevant, that God is the meticulous ruler of everything. It is impor-
tant to show that traditional theological understanding can be reconciled 
with new sciences. While we appreciate that the sciences keep evolving, it 
is important to observe how theology stands in their light, as well as to 
ponder the theological implications of the new sciences (Vanney 
2015, 751).
Another objection would be to point out that our solution to reconcil-
ing continuous creation (CCRec) with quantum randomness (under the 
standard interpretations) is simply to move the problem to a different 
metaphysical plane, namely, by saying that ontic quantum randomness is 
precluded because there are new metaphysical entities such as vague prop-
erties and holistic quantum states.
In response, we argue that both the notions of vague properties and 
quantum states are independent of the issue of randomness itself. Our task 
is to provide ways for reconciling the doctrine of continuous creation 
(CCRec) with quantum randomness, which we have proposed already with 
these plausible metaphysical apparatus. It is also important to underline 
the fact that quantum states are weird and that the behaviors of particles 
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might appear to be metaphysically beyond determinacy simply because 
they have an uncharted ontology.
A third objection might be that adopting quantum holism in which 
some properties such as spin, position, and momentum are momentarily 
inapplicable to particles is questionable. How is it the case that an electron 
at time t1 has a position, but at time t2 where t2 > t1, when it is in a quan-
tum state, locative properties can’t be attributed to it?
To answer this objection, one should remember that the assertion 
about the inapplicability of properties such as spin and momentum to 
particles when they are in a quantum state is something of a common 
acceptance already in physics. It is simply a weird quantum phenomenon. 
However, perhaps we can persuade the reader to consider that there is a 
sense in which objects momentarily lose their property applicability. 
Imagine a ball that is vertically thrown up toward the sky. In the initial half 
of the trajectory it has a property of moving up. There is a point, that is, 
the vertex, however, when the ball will momentarily stop and lose the 
property of moving before it starts moving down due to its gravitational 
pull. There is nothing odd here. Also, the doctrine of the resurrection of 
the body might require that persons in the intermediate state do not have 
any spatial location while still existing. While these two analogies may not 
be satisfactory, they can be a starting point for further discussion.
12.7  conclusIon
Our paper finds common ground between orthodox Christian and Islamic 
thoughts on the doctrine of continuous creation (CCRec). We reconcile the 
doctrine with the issue of quantum randomness and argue that if the doc-
trine is correct, there can’t be ontic quantum randomness in this world. 
Under the standard indeterministic interpretations, the ontic quantum 
randomness is precluded if we buy into either the notion of vague proper-
ties or quantum holism, both of which are plausible metaphysical concepts 
to utilize. Lastly, we have also suggested that embracing The Common 
View of continuous creation (CCRec) provides a way to show that a non- 
interventionist special divine action is possible in quantum events, for God 
would be able to determine both the wavefunction of quantum states and 
the outcomes of the measurement that fall within a reasonable probabil-
ity range.28
28 Our thanks go to Kelly Clark, Robert Koons, Jeffrey Koperski, Isra Yazicioglu, Karl 
Svozil, Michael White, and David Glick for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.
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CHAPTER 13
Causality, Indeterminacy, and Providence: 
Contemporary Islamic Perspectives from Said 
Nursi and Basil Altaie
Isra Yazicioglu
13.1  IntroductIon
In a treatise written for the elderly, Muslim theologian Bediuzzaman Said 
Nursi shares how getting old provoked an existential awakening/crisis. 
Worried about the transience of life, he asks, “since my physical self is 
mortal, what good can I expect from fleeting, mortal things? Since I am 
weak, what can I expect from these powerless things? I need an Eternal, 
Enduring One and an Everlasting, Powerful One who can solve my prob-
lem [of transience].” He seeks to turn to God for help, but notices some 
resistance:
[m]y ego said to my heart: ‘We live in a universe where natural causes effect 
things by their very nature. Everything is connected to a particular material 
cause. Therefore, for instance, you should expect the fruits from tree, and 
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the harvest from the land. So, what is the point of praying to God for things, 
especially small things?’ (Nursi 2021, 72)1
In a world governed by natural causes, Nursi asks, how can one pray to 
God to attend one’s personal needs? If natural causes and laws of nature 
are the powers running the world, how can we talk about divine provi-
dence? In this chapter, I will engage the issue of divine providence in Islam 
in a way that is attentive to such questions.
The Quran repeatedly talks about signs/indications/clues in the world 
that point to the oneness of God and His eternal qualities such as power, 
wisdom, and knowledge (al-asma al-h  usna). In Quranic discourse, claims 
about unseen reality are based on these ‘signs’ (ayat̄) from the world. A 
robust Islamic understanding of divine providence, therefore, needs to be 
based on these signs in the world. Two salient features of our world signify 
divine providence: its regularity and its irregularity/inherent unpredict-
ability. On the one hand, our world is extremely ordered, which allows us 
to conceptualize ‘laws of nature’ and predict phenomena in advance. On 
the other hand, we notice irregularity, uniqueness, and unpredictability. 
How do we make sense of these two intertwined aspects of our world? 
How can we understand divine providence in such a world? At first sight, 
it seems as if we must choose between two interpretations: determinism or 
‘God of gaps.’
Determinism claims that the regularity and consistency of natural 
phenomena result from necessary and unchanging ‘laws of nature.’ 
Apparent spontaneity or exceptions are actually events necessitated by 
laws, which we are unable to predict due to our imperfect understand-
ing of nature. Determinism is often considered a good ally for religion: 
a God that created the world as a perfect and immutable system of laws 
seems more reasonable than a God who makes exceptions to the way 
He governs the world. On this view, genuine unpredictability and inde-
terminism (i.e. the idea that exact same conditions may not have same 
consequences) are threats to religion. Yet, determinism has been 
rejected by the majority of scholars in the Islamic context, though a 
small minority such as Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) 
supported it.
1 For an alternate translation of this text see Nursi 1995, 306.
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A deterministic interpretation has a major existential cost: the inability 
to relate the ‘details’ and unpredictable aspects of the world and our lives 
to God. Some Aristotelian Muslim thinkers even claimed that such messy 
aspects on the individual level are unfit for divine agency so, as such, God 
does not know the particulars.2 Such a deterministic approach also has dif-
ficulty making room for human freedom or freewill. The existential price 
is too high: How do I cry out to a Creator who cannot know or care about 
my ‘small’ world of needs, yearnings, worries, and choices?3 Moreover, 
disconnecting particulars from the Creator faces serious intellectual chal-
lenges. In an interconnected universe, the ‘details’ can’t be neatly sepa-
rated from the major things (Nursi 1995, 307–309). Furthermore, 
determinism is inconsistent with the empirical data that indicate indeter-
minism, for instance, as discovered in quantum physics. Finally, a religious 
endorsement of determinism sits uneasily with Quranic passages according 
to which God’s will and choice encompass the smallest details and 
particulars:
God’s alone is the dominion over the heavens and the earth. He creates 
whatever He wills: He bestows the gift of female offspring on whomever He 
wills, and the gift of male offspring on whomever He wills. (Q. 42:49)
And among his signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the 
diversity of your tongues and colors: for in this, behold, there are messages 
[lit. signs (ayat̄)] indeed for all who would know! (Q. 30:22)4
In contrast with determinism, some people regard irregularity as easier 
to connect with the divine. On such view, regularity makes the world seem 
less wonderful and less connected to the Transcendent. Our needs being 
met in consistent ways (say, our need of energy met through the regular 
movement of the sun) is not a sign of Transcendent power and care, but 
our needs being met in miraculous ways (say, a baby surviving in a hurri-
cane against all odds) is a sign. But such focus on irregularity also has a 
hefty price: giving up regularity as a domain worthy of awe (a sign). Such 
an approach voids much of ordinary life of significance. It also contradicts 
2 Ghazali (2000) strongly criticizes them in 11th Discussion of his Tahaf̄ut.
3 For a discussion of how God’s all-encompassing will and power make human freewill 
possible in light of Nursi’s approach, see Yazicioglu 2017, 138–142.
4 All translations from the Quran are based on Muhammad Asad’s translation (1984).
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the Quranic perspective that considers the ordinary as filled with 
signs of God.
Contra both views, this paper takes both the regularity and irregularity 
of the world seriously and interprets them in a coherent and existentially 
meaningful way. (I use the term ‘irregularity’ as an umbrella term for phe-
nomena from a human perspective, in the sense of unpredictability, ran-
domness, and spontaneity.) I explore how two contemporary Muslim 
scholars offer good examples of such an approach. I start with Nursi 
(1876–1960),5 an important theologian who insightfully reads the Quran 
in light of nature and vice versa.6 Next, I turn to Muhammad Basil Altaie, 
a contemporary quantum physicist interested in Islamic theological reflec-
tion and whose work I interpret in light of Nursi’s. I find their approaches 
promising for several reasons. First, they offer a holistic understanding of 
reality, attending to both its regularity and irregularity, attending to both 
its general features and unique particularities. Second, they hold that 
Quranic discourse offers cues to make sense of our experience of the 
world. Taking the Quran seriously, they reflect on the world and see how 
it bears witness to the Transcendent, rather than adjudicating theological 
statements ‘top-down’ or as assumptions accepted without empirical evi-
dence. I start with Nursi, whose theological insights provide a helpful 
framework for enhancing Altaie’s contribution.
13.2  SaId nurSI: cauSalIty, lawS of nature, 
and IndetermInacy aS SIgnS of god
This section offers a closer look at Nursi’s views on natural causality, laws 
of nature, and Divine will, paying attention to his understanding of regu-
larity and irregularity in the world in light of the Quran.7 According to 
Nursi, one of the main purposes of the Quran is to cut through the ‘veil 
5 While Nursi’s works are extremely significant, political censorship, along with other 
issues, has limited the transmission of Nursi’s scholarship. Nursi’s works were been banned 
in Turkey for much of his career, and after his death, he was often left out of the histories of 
exegesis and theology of the late Ottoman/early Republican period in Turkish universities. 
See Tuna 2017, 313–318.
6 For a background on Nursi and his Quranic hermeneutics, see Bouguenaya and 
Yazicioglu 2017.
7 I am indebted to Dr. Yamina Bouguenaya for explaining Nursi’s views as well as her clari-
fication of points on quantum physics, including her lecture on Islam and quantum physics 
at St. Joseph’s University (March 2019).
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of familiarity’ (ulfa) to make human beings recognize the agency and 
attributes (such wisdom, power, and the compassion) of the Creator.8 
Many Quranic passages invite reflection on nature, the way things come 
into being, and the way they are arranged and ordered so as to see how 
things point to and praise their Maker. The Quran offers encouragement 
and cues for such reflection to see the signs/traces/clues of the Divine in 
the world (Mermer 1996, 279–283).9
Nursi seems to start with the ‘causal maxim,’ the assumption that 
every new existent requires a cause. If something happens, especially in 
an orderly fashion, it must have a cause (Nursi 1995, 233–234). On the 
basis of the ‘causal maxim,’ we seek causes of events happening around 
us. Almost by default, we identify certain events or objects as the causes 
of other events that consistently follow them in time. For instance, 
when there is water, we see that the seed grows; when there is no water, 
it does not grow; therefore, we conclude, water gives life. While such 
inferences are common in everyday life, Nursi suggests that they are 
mistaken.
Nursi suggests, with other Muslim theologians and mystics, that the 
Qur’an invites us to dig beneath the surface for an accurate understanding 
of causation. When people take the time to reflect on the cues provided by 
the Qur’an, they will realize that what we regard as a causal relationship in 
nature is a mere conjunction (iqtiran̄) between natural events, not causa-
tion. Put in classical Islamic terminology, what we often regard as a cause 
is a seeming cause (al-sabab al-z  ahirı)̄, which points to the real cause (mus-
abbib al-asbab̄, ‘causer of all causes’):
Heedless people are confused by the conjunction (iqtiran̄) of things. They 
assume that if two things appear together, it must be that one is causing and 
producing the other. This erroneous perception is reinforced by the fact that 
when the supposed cause is removed, the blessing that came with it disappears, 
leading people to mistakenly infer that the supposed cause must have cre-
ated the blessing. With this misunderstanding, they direct their love and 
gratitude toward the supposed cause rather than to the Real Giver of bless-
ings. (Nursi 1996, 182, emphasis added)
8 The famous Muslim scholar, Rumi, Jalal al-din (1207–1273), says that the main message 
of the Quran and the prophets is to challenge and correct our mistaken understanding of 
causality (see, for instance, Mathnawi, Book 3, 2525).
9 For an analysis of Nursi’s view of causation in the context of Western thought and Islamic 
history, see Mermer 1996, 243–82.
13 CAUSALITY, INDETERMINACY, AND PROVIDENCE: CONTEMPORARY… 
270
Suppose we call such misunderstandings as ‘argument from absence,’ 
since it is built on the fact that when A is absent B is also absent. We 
employ such arguments from absence both in everyday life and in scientific 
theorizing. Most contemporary accounts of causality in Western thought—
regularity accounts, probabilistic accounts, counterfactual accounts, inter-
ventionist accounts—are versions of this reasoning; they seek to define 
causality focusing on either the coexistence of two things (regularity and 
probabilistic accounts) or on the absence of one in the absence of the 
other (the counterfactual account). In contrast, Nursi finds such reasoning 
flawed. Why?
Argument from absence is misleading because what leads to absence of 
something is not the same as what leads to its existence. For instance, a 
garden flourishes when many conditions are present, such as, air, bacteria, 
sunlight, minerals, gravity, and so forth. Yet when only one of these condi-
tions, say water, is absent, the garden does not flourish (Nursi 1996, 
181–182). Therefore, co-absence of two things does not necessarily prove 
that one produces the other. In other words, the argument from absence 
is misleading, which shows that the fact that a garden does not flourish in 
the absence of many things cannot prove that these many things cause the 
garden. Nursi, here, makes a distinction between ‘conditions’ and ‘causes’: 
the fact that a garden comes into existence under certain circumstances is 
something we observe. But this observation does not demonstrate that 
the garden is caused or produced by these conditions (either one or many).
In both classical Islamic theology and post-Humean philosophy, the 
consistent appearance and disappearance of two things cannot demon-
strate that one produces the other. It is possible and consistent with empir-
ical evidence that the presence of all these natural things (e.g., sunlight, 
air, soil, water, certain temperature range, bacteria, movements of the 
earth and sun, etc.) are only ‘a customary condition’ for the real cause or 
agent to create the result.
According to Nursi, the evidence for inferring that divine will and 
power as the real cause is in the ‘mismatch’ between ‘seeming causes’ and 
their effects. The ‘seeming causes’ (e.g., sunlight, air, soil, water, certain 
temperature range, etc.) fall short of bearing responsibility for a well- 
ordered, well-balanced, alive thing, such as a garden:
to attribute a well-ordered and well-balanced being which has unity such as 
[a living being] to the jumbled hands of innumerable, lifeless, ignorant, 
aggressive, unconscious, chaotic, blind and deaf natural causes, the  blindness 
and deafness of which increase with their coming together and intermin-
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gling among the ways of numberless possibilities, is as unreasonable as 
accepting innumerable impossibilities all at once. (1995, 236)
In other words, ‘seeming causes,’ even when taken together, do not dis-
play the necessary knowledge, contrivance, power, mercy, or life observed 
in their effects. Nursi offers this reasoning as an exegesis of the Quranic 
verse: “Those you call on beside God could not, even if they combined all 
their forces, create a fly” (Q. 22:73).
In a treatise reflecting on nature as sign of God, Nursi summarizes his 
interpretation of natural causality in light of the Qur’anic discourse:
We look at things which appear to be causes and effects in the universe and 
we see that the most elevated cause possesses insufficient power for the most 
ordinary effect. This means that causes are a veil, and something else makes 
the effects. To take only a small example out of innumerable creatures, let us 
consider the faculty of memory, which is situated in man’s head. … We see 
that it is like a book so comprehensive—indeed, like a library—that within it 
is written without confusion the entire story of a person’s life. What cause 
can be shown for this miracle of power? The grey matter of the brain? The 
simple unconscious particles of its cells? The winds of chance and coinci-
dence? [Rather] that miracle of art can only be the work of an All-Wise 
Maker. … Thus, since they are comparable to man’s faculty of memory, 
make an analogy with all eggs, seeds, and grains, and then compare other 
effects. (Modified translation, Nursi 2004, 711)10
While brain’s gray matter is observed in conjunction with memory, it can-
not be the creator of memory because of the mismatch between the seem-
ing cause and the result. Conjunction and ‘co-absence’ (i.e., absence of 
the consequent upon the absence of the precedent) are factual: (1) one’s 
memory comes into existence with the existence of certain conditions, 
such as brain cells, and (2) the memory is lost or damaged when any of 
these conditions is absent (e.g., if certain brain cells get damaged). But 
this observation does not prove that these natural conditions collectively 
produce a memory. In order to be the proper cause, one must also con-
sider the alleged cause’s attributes. An orderly and powerful result indi-
cates purpose and is interconnected with the rest of the body and a person’s 
lifelong experience in the world; so, either these natural causes are utterly 
10 Nursi claims that what we regard as ordinary is in fact extraordinary in that it goes 
beyond the capacity of natural causes. Altaie likewise suggests that the normal course of 
nature is miraculous in the sense of being constantly created and recreated.
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wise, knowing, and powerful on their own (which they are not) or the 
cause is a real agent who has comprehensive knowledge, power, and care. 
Needless to say, Nursi’s reasoning rejects the Darwinian claim that the 
purposefulness and organization in nature is the result of unintentional 
forces blindly interacting over time.11
Nursi also talks about the interconnectedness of created beings. He 
emphasizes that things come into existence in relation to most, if not all, 
things in the universe. Nursi notes, for instance, that the eye is in a con-
stant organic exchange with the entire body (including the digestive, 
respiratory, and urinary systems) as well as with what is outside the body 
(such as sunlight, visible objects, air pressure, etc.). If things and events in 
the universe are interconnected, then what is required for the production 
of a thing or event is not just any knowledge and power but an all- 
encompassing knowledge and power (Nursi 1996, 307). Nursi again gets 
his cue for this argument from the Qur’an: “Creating and resurrecting all 
of you is only like creating or resurrecting a single person: God is all hear-
ing and all-seeing” (Q. 31:28).
Nursi suggests that our observation of nature discloses that the Creator 
creates in two ways:
The first is through origination and invention [ibda’]. That is, He [the 
Creator] brings a being into existence out of nothing, out of non-existence, 
and creates everything needed for it, also out of nothing, and places those 
provisions in its hand.
The second is through composition, through art [insha]. That is, He 
forms certain beings out of the elements of the universe in order to demon-
strate subtle instances of wisdom, like displaying the perfections of His wis-
dom and the manifestations of many of His Names. Through the law of 
Providing [qan̄un al-razzaqiyya], He sends particles and matter, which are 
dependent on His command, to these beings and employs the particles in 
them. (Nursi 1995, 253, italics added)
According to Nursi, these two forms of creations are observed within 
each other.
11 Altaie also rejects this “blind watchmaker” claim by saying that “if a blind person can 
make a watch, certainly he is not blind” (Altaie 2014, 79). The endless evidences of purpose-
fulness and comprehensive knowledge in nature is a major reason why the theory of evolu-
tion is received with much criticism in the Muslim world, including by many respected and 
sophisticated Muslim thinkers and scientists in the contemporary era, such as S. Hossein Nasr 
and Muzaffar Iqbal. For critical analysis of the theory, see Nasr 2009, 184–197, and 
Bouguenaya et al. 2018.
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13.2.1  Nursi’s Approach to Natural Causality in the Context 
of Contemporary Theories of Causation
Relying on the observation that A and B appear consistently together and 
B disappears in the absence of A, there are three options for explanation:
 1. The regularity is a mere coincidence.
 2. A and B are intrinsically/necessarily connected and A has the neces-
sary qualities to produce B.
 3. There is an agent outside of A and B that connects the two 
consistently.
Medieval Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn Rushd, considered only the 
first two options; the third option didn’t seem to exist for them (Kukkonen 
2000, 492). The first option didn’t make any sense because if the order 
were “coincidental or accidental, it would not have continued always or 
for the most part without deviation” (Marmura 1965, 195). So, this 
minority of medieval Muslim scholars, such as Ibn Rushd, affirmed the 
second option: A and B go together consistently because A has the powers 
to necessitate or produce B (Yazicioglu 2013, 35). In contrast, Ghazali, 
and the majority of Muslim scholars, opted for the third option. Divine 
will (and power, and wisdom, etc.) connects seeming causes with their 
‘effects.’ Nursi supports this explanation, as we have seen, because of the 
mismatch between a natural effect and its cause; natural causes cannot be 
real causes because they lack the knowledge, power, and purposefulness 
needed to produce their effects.
Steven Nadler notes that Hume’s argument that there is ‘no necessary 
connection’ between a natural cause and its effect is fundamentally the 
same as Ghazali’s critique of option 2.12 However, having rejected 2, 
Hume did not affirm 3, either. Ultimately, Hume shied away from any 
explanation. Contemporary (Hume-influenced) theories of causation 
offer no alternatives to the three main options as they limit themselves to 
mapping the coexistence and co-absence of things.13 Despite their sophis-
tication and technical detail, contemporary theories of causation show that 
there is nothing new under the sun.
12 Steven Nadler, Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians, New  York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011, 167. Hume’s account is also similar to Autrecourt and Malebranche’s.
13 That is why, a variety of contemporary philosophical accounts, such as regularity theories 
of causation and counterfactual theory, are compatible with the occasionalist explanations 
(Quinn 1988, 55–64).
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A common worry is that if we were to accept 3, we would lose scientific 
inquiry. Such worry is mistaken. Science is possible in 3 because divine 
agency isn’t opposed to ‘seeming causes.’ Rather, ‘seeming causes’ are 
understood as conditions under which the Wise Creator chooses to create 
consistently. Finding out seeming causes remains important. In fact, Nursi 
suggests that obeying the ‘protocols’ of the natural order with the aware-
ness that God is the causer of all causes is a form of worship (Yazicioglu 
2013, 144–145), and having recourse to ‘seeming causes’ is a form of 
‘prayer’ to God, who alone creates the results (Nursi 2021, 116–119). 
Can one accept 3 without inferring God’s continuous act of creation? 
Could something else other than divine agency connect A and B consis-
tently? We shall explore this in the next section.
13.2.2  Nursi on Laws of Nature
Few contemporary thinkers defend the notion that natural causes have 
intrinsic, agential powers to create things. Similarly, modern scientific the-
ories assume natural laws, rather than essences, make things burn or the 
law of gravity makes things fall—an  explanation often misconstrued as 
an alternative to divine agency.
According to Nursi, attributing agency to laws of nature is mistaken 
because laws of nature are theoretical constructs that describe—or attempt 
to describe—regularities observed in nature; they do not cause those regu-
larities. Indeed, a natural law is a description of a regularly occurring event 
and the description cannot be taken as the cause of the event itself (Mermer 
1996, 244). Consider a mother who makes pancakes every Sunday morn-
ing. Her child, noticing the regularity of this event, infers a “Sunday pan-
cake rule” by which he successfully predicts the Sunday breakfast menu. 
However, the “Sunday pancake law” is not independent of the mother’s 
agency; the law has no efficacy on its own. It would be folly for the child 
to suggest that the “Sunday pancake law,” not his mother, makes the pan-
cakes. Nursi would agree with American philosopher Charles S. Peirce 
(1839–1914) who noted that “No law of nature makes a stone fall, or a 
Leyden jar to discharge, or a steam engine to work.” As Peirce puts it:
a law of nature left to itself would be quite analogous to a court without a 
sheriff … let a law of nature—say the law of gravitation—remain a mere 
uniformity—a mere formula establishing a relation between terms—and 
what in the world should induce a stone, which is not a term nor a concept 
but just a plain thing, to act in conformity to that uniformity? (Peirce [1903] 
1931–58, 5.48, emphasis added)
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Regularity in the world needs an agent to make things happen: either the 
stones know the formulas and have the power to act accordingly or an 
agent with comprehensive knowledge, will, and power puts these ‘laws’ 
into effect. Laws of physics are descriptions of the regularities by which the 
world is governed by the Creator; while such formulations are helpful for 
making predictions, they cannot replace the need for a Creator.14
In addition to arguing that ‘laws of nature’ cannot operate on their 
own, Nursi notes that they do not describe the world completely. That is, 
exceptions to the laws of nature are not impossible; all laws of nature, 
Nursi notes, have exceptions (say, the virgin birth, a miracle, to the ‘law of 
reproduction’). Nursi’s approach here is reminiscent of Peirce’s principle 
of ‘tychism,’ according to which there is a degree of ‘spontaneity’ in 
nature, and that natural laws are not absolute. Peirce notes that the empir-
ical data, such as diversity, consciousness, and growth, support tychism 
rather than determinism or necessitarianism (Yazicioglu 2013, 110–111).
Nursi states similar points when responding to a question about a 
Quranic verse, known as ‘the verse of the five unknowns’ (al-mughayyabat̄ 
al-khamsa): “Truly, with God alone rests the knowledge of the Hour, and 
it is He who sends down the rain; and He knows what is in the wombs. No 
soul knows what it will earn tomorrow, and no soul knows in what land it 
will die. Truly, it is God who is all-knowing, all-aware” (Q. 31:34). Nursi 
contends that there are two types of occurrences in the universe: (1) the 
ones that come into existence according to a regular pattern, like the sun-
rise; and (2) the ones that come into existence without a regular timetable, 
like rainfall. Regular events in the universe point to God’s power and 
wisdom and show that things do not happen haphazardly, that there is a 
purposeful and wise creator creating them in order. At the same time, the 
irregularity and diversity in the world point to divine choice and will. In 
other words,
The All-Powerful & All-Knowing One, the All-Wise Maker, shows His 
power and His wisdom and that chance can in no way interfere in His works 
through the order and regularity with which he governs the world. Such 
order and regularity manifests in the form of laws [in nature.] At the same 
time, through exceptions to the laws, the breaks in established patterns, 
14 Otherwise, we would have to explain how “mindless bits of matter behave in a consistent 
and coordinated way” (Frederick 2013, 269). The minority who claim that laws of nature do 
have agency (such as Nancy Cartwright) acknowledge that such a view makes sense only if 
there is a divine agent.
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changes in appearances, differences in individual characteristics, and changes 
in the emergence [of blessings], He shows His volition, will, choice, and that 
He is an agent with choice, and He is under no restrictions whatsoever. (Nursi 
2004, 217, emphasis added)15
Using the example of a baby in the womb, Nursi explains how regularity 
and uniformity complement the irregularity and uniqueness of phenom-
ena in the world which together point to the names of God. On the one 
hand, there is a uniform aspect, a regular pattern to the growth of a fetus, 
from which we reliably predict that a human fetus will share basic features 
with other human beings. On the other hand, there is a non-uniform 
aspect to each fetus, such as her specific features, personality, and unique 
potentials. These special aspects of the fetus, which cannot be known in 
advance, point to the free will and choice of its Maker. In sum, from a 
Quranic perspective, irregularity in the world—such as the timings of rain-
fall, the particular life journey of a human being, the hidden potential of a 
baby in the womb, or the life span of each individual—discloses the special 
will and choice of their Maker and shows that His mercy and power are 
not limited.16
After having explored Nursi’s approach to order and irregularity in 
nature in light of the Quran, let us now engage with Muhammad Basil 
Altaie’s work.
13.3  Quantum PhySIcS InterPreted: altaIe on lawS 
of nature, IndetermInISm, and cauSalIty
As a quantum physicist, Altaie holds that quantum indeterminacy supports 
Islamic theism.17 According to Altaie, like for Nursi, our world is both 
highly predictable—hence we are justified in talking about ‘laws of 
nature’—and indeterministic—which enables us to appreciate that these 
laws are not absolute.18 He sees the order of nature as a sign of Divine 
15 Modified translation. See original text in Nursi 1996, 76.
16 What are the implications of continuous creation for ‘the problem of evil’? For a discus-
sion of classical Islamic theology in this context, see Yazicioglu 2017, 137–138. For Nursi’s 
views, see Bouguenaya 2014. See also Yazicioglu 2021.
17 Altaie uses “indeterminacy” similar to my use of “irregularity” or “spontaneity” when 
discussing Nursi’s approach. Altaie means indeterminate in the sense of not being predictable 
by human beings, not in the sense of being uncaused by any agent.
18 Altaie seems not to have read Nursi as there are no references to Said Nursi in his book.
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wisdom and the unpredictability as an indication of continuous creation. 
In what follows, I unpack how he arrives at these conclusions.
13.3.1  Genuine Indeterminacy in Nature
Altaie interprets indeterminacy of nature in light of an Islamic theologi-
cal framework.19 According to most quantum physicists the world is in 
some ways genuinely irregular, not just apparently so due to our ignorance 
of relevant laws (Koperski 2015, 160–161). Altaie agrees, noting that 
quantum indeterminacy is well-established on the basis of empirical data:
This indeterminism is not an artifact of the theory, it is something that is 
inherent in natural phenomena. … For example, the observation that par-
ticles behave like waves is an experimental fact that has been shown through 
particle diffraction experiments in laboratories. The fact that electrons tun-
nel through potential barriers that are higher than their energies is a fact that 
is observed in semiconductor devices, without which our mobile phones 
and computers would not work. Even the superposition of states and their 
non-locality, entanglement and the most bizarre phenomena have all been 
observed in laboratories. (Altaie 2016, 75)
While some physicists resist the indeterministic implications of the empiri-
cal data, Altaie affirms the dominant view that the natural world is genu-
inely ontologically indeterminate (not simply epistemically 
indeterminate).
Quantum mechanics, Altaie notes, applies both to microscopic and 
macroscopic reality. Indeed, he writes, “on a highly detailed scale, all sys-
tems behave quantum mechanically, it is only that we cannot feel the 
quantum effects on a large scale” (Altaie 2016, 77). Macro- and micro- 
level physics are perspectives on the same reality. Noting this is helpful 
from an existential perspective in that, as Nursi suggested earlier, the entire 
universe including its details must be connected to the same Creator.
According to Altaie, quantum indeterminism suggests that the world 
needs more than just an agent to get it all started (unlike Aristotle’s prime 
mover). Indeed, indeterminism indicates that the world needs to be cre-
ated and recreated at every moment. According to determinism, the prior 
19 Altaie’s method of starting with scientific data and exploring their metaphysical implica-
tions reminds me of Peirce’s search for “a properly executed metaphysics” or “scientific 
metaphysics.” See Yazicioglu 2013, 152–156.
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conditions necessarily determine the events that take place; once the prior 
conditions are set, the next steps issue from them without need for an 
agent.20 In contrast, “by moving away from classical determinism, we dis-
cover that the making of an event or a process takes much more than the 
required conditions and goes beyond the power of the individual entities that 
contribute to the event” (emphasis added). In other words, through quan-
tum physics we recognize that prior conditions are insufficient to deter-
mine what comes next and that reality is interconnected with the rest of 
the universe. Therefore, there must be “an agent that dominates the 
whole universe with a plan and … power that makes it possible to have an 
ordered world ruled according to present laws that we recognize by watch-
ing the world’s phenomena” (emphasis added). Since a simple ‘operator’ 
to switch between several options would prove inadequate, we need an 
all-knowing and all-powerful being to sustain the world within this 
dynamic, indeterministic, and yet overall consistent reality (Altaie 
2016, 37).21
In order to appreciate Altaie’s interpretation of quantum indeterminacy 
as indicating an all-powerful and all-knowing God, we must understand 
what he makes of natural laws and natural causes. Would he agree with the 
view that the laws of nature and causal powers of the objects decrease or 
even obviate the need for a Creator to continuously create the world?
13.3.2  Altaie on Laws of Nature
According to Altaie, there are two problems with the claim that the laws 
of nature explain the world without the need for a Creator. First is “the 
problem of operation.” Like Nursi and Peirce who pointed out the laws of 
nature have no agency, Altaie notes that laws of nature cannot operate on 
their own: “Some agency has to drive these laws in accordance with the 
algorithm they describe” (Altaie 2014, 30). Second is “the problem of 
coordination” because physical laws “often contradict each other” and 
cannot coordinate each other, yet we see that they are coordinated for “a 
fruitful result” (Altaie 2005, 80). “Fruitful result” likely refers to 
20 Determinism may be why some claim that the nature is ‘autonomous’ or operates on its 
own after having been created. Such a view is difficult to reconcile with the theistic belief that 
the world is constantly dependent on the Creator. As Quinn suggests continuous creation is 
more compatible with theism than often assumed (Quinn 1988 and Freddoso 1988).
21 According to Altaie, while scientists need not to talk about such a being, human beings 
can and should (Altaie 2016, 37).
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purposeful results, as in the fine-tuning of the world for life and the wise 
planning of living beings. Laws of nature do not have “the power, intelli-
gence, planning and hindsight to act and produce the results that they are 
acting for” (Altaie 2016, 43).
Altaie also makes an interesting distinction between ‘laws of nature’ 
and ‘laws of science’ (e.g., laws of physics). He uses ‘laws of nature’ to 
refer to the regularities in the world, while ‘laws of science’ are human 
attempts at representing the former in mathematical terms. While there is 
a correspondence between the two, the latter is always an incomplete task 
due to what humans do not—or cannot—know. There is also sometimes 
dissonance between the two. For instance, mathematical equations in laws 
of science are time-reversible but the phenomena they describe are not 
time-reversible (Altaie 2016, 34). Similarly, a formula may be determinis-
tic but its represented reality may not be, such as the Schrodinger equa-
tion describing indeterministic quantum phenomena (Altaie 2016, 47).22 
While the distinction between ‘laws of science’ and ‘laws of nature’ is not 
essential for this paper, it is still helpful. It enables caution about meta-
physical claims. Just because a scientific theory works well by allowing us 
to predict things accurately and build new technology, does not mean that 
it provides a good understanding or explanation of reality.
13.3.3  Causality: First and Second Level of Analysis
For Altaie, seeking causal connections between events is the business of 
science, and without identifying causes and effects we would not be able 
talk about the order in the world. We infer causal connections on the basis 
of the regularities we observe in world events, such as “the free fall of a 
stone toward the center of the earth, the igniting of a material as it nears a 
source of heat, or the recovery from illness after taking medicine,” which 
indicate that there are “essential parameters and conditions [which] are 
causes of the occurrence of the related effects” (Altaie 2016, 51). Yet, it is 
clear to me that Altaie goes beyond such first-level discussions of causality, 
in which he uses the term “cause” in a practical sense (as a superficial 
understanding of causality), and addresses a deeper level, where he explores 
22 Just because our formulas are helpful doesn’t mean naturalistic assumptions we happen 
to hold are true. Moreover, theistic interpretations need to be humble because our limited 
and imperfect representations of nature in mathematical formulas should not be taken to 
represent ‘the mind of God’ (Altaie 2016, 48).
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the “real” cause that produces or creates the effects. If the first level were 
explanatory, deeper or second-level analysis would not be needed, but, 
according to Altaie, the first level is not satisfactory as explanation, even if 
it may be useful in predicting events and obtaining benefits.
According to Altaie, the identification of an object or event as a cause 
of another is never certain, because it is hard, if not impossible, to identify 
all the contributing causes to an event (Altaie 2016, 55). Besides, the 
regular association of A with B and temporal precedence of A to B do not 
necessarily equal causation, as there are cases where this obtains and yet A 
is not the cause of B (when both are caused by something else, as in the 
case of celestial positions and climate) (Altaie 2016, 57–58). Moreover, if 
by ‘causality’ we mean identifying a prior set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for an event, such identification is always open to revision. For 
instance, according to Newton’s theory of gravity, the necessary condition 
for two bodies attracting each other is that “both should have a mass and 
that they should be separated by finite distance.” Such conditions are not 
necessary in Einstein’s theory of gravity. Therefore, while the cause of 
attraction between bodies is the masses of the objects in Newton’s theory, 
in Einstein’s theory the cause is the spacetime curvature (Altaie 2016, 55). 
From a technical perspective (the ‘first level’ or superficial analysis of cau-
sality), such revisions are not a problem. Newton’s theory has served us 
well and continues to serve well in dealing with macro structures, while 
Einstein’s theory serves us well in predicting cases where the object—such 
as a light wave—has no mass. However, from an interpretive (deeper/
explanatory analysis of causality), such revisions are instructive. Such shifts 
in identifying causes, or seeming causes, illustrate that the helpfulness of 
identifying them does not prove that they are the actual cause. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that Altaie raises the question whether natural causes 
are the ‘real’ causes: “Without [natural] causality, the universe becomes a 
chaotic one where nothing is predictable. However, the most important 
question in this topic is: Do causes produce their effects directly? Is the 
cause just a representation of the reason for what happens, without being 
effective itself, or is the cause actually the agent producing the resulting 
effects?” (Altaie 2016, 56, emphasis added).
In other words, Altaie is affirming causes in the practical, superficial 
sense (al-asbab̄ al z ah̄iriyya)—as ways of mapping the order of nature and 
as a heuristic device for predicting and making use of the natural order—
and asking the core question of Islamic context: are these causes effica-
cious on their own or are merely conditions/formalities/occasions within 
which the real cause (‘Causer of all Causes’) creates?
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From a determinist perspective, a cause acts necessarily. The idea is that 
“once an efficient cause exists, all things being equal, its characteristic 
effect must occur. This means not only that the effect does occur as a mat-
ter of fact, but that it cannot fail to do so, because it is necessitated or 
compelled to occur” (Kogan 1985, 3, emphasis added).23 Similarly, Hume 
highlighted that necessity is part of the definition of cause; cause is that 
which precedes the effect and necessarily so. Within  such deterministic 
framework, therefore, indeterminacy is considered a major challenge: how 
can the same conditions not yield the same results?
In contrast, according to Altaie, natural causes are not effective on their 
own but are simply conditions under which God chooses to create certain 
results. By God’s sunna or custom of creating order we can expect regu-
larity—without claiming that particular order is absolute. The fact that 
certain things are indeterministic is therefore not a problem, rather it is 
instructive; indeterminacy teaches us that the Creator is a free agent. 
According to Nursi, recall, the indeterminacy of events discloses the choice 
and will of the Creator. Similarly, according to Altaie, the indeterminacy 
of quantum mechanics provides reason to believe that the universe is con-
tinuously created and recreated at every moment by divine will—as prior 
conditions are unable to determine what happens next.
13.3.4  Re-creation: An Interpretation of Indeterminism
Altaie suggests that puzzling features of quantum physics such as the mea-
surement problem, quantum entanglement, non-locality, and quantum 
coherence comport well with the classical Islamic notion of continuous 
creation, according to which the world is recreated by God at every 
moment. He suggests that if we were to form postulates inspired by con-
tinuous creation, we would make better sense of the quantum world and 
may even find venues to further our exploration of it. He offers two such 
postulates: “all physical properties of microscopic systems are subject to 
continued creation” and “the frequency of re-creation is proportional to 
the total energy of the system” (Altaie 2016, 105). Altaie discusses how 
23 Ghazali (and Nursi) questioned such an approach and argued that such necessity cannot 
be proven only on the basis of constant conjunction. What we take to be causes are merely 
the conditions under which God consistently creates certain results; if God so wishes, He can 
disconnect the two—though given His wise plan for this world (ijra al-‘ad̄ah), God seldom 
does. For a discussion of the possibility of science and common sense in Ghazali’s thought, 
see Yazicioglu 2013, 32–26.
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the explanatory power of such postulates is stronger than current interpre-
tations of quantum theory, such as ‘the hidden variables interpretation’ or 
‘multi-world interpretation,’ both of which also make metaphysical 
assumptions—assumptions that lie beyond observation (Altaie 2016, 116).
In interpreting indeterminacy, Altaie proposes the term ‘contingent’ to 
replace the term ‘random.’ This switch suggests that events in the quan-
tum world are not random in the sense of being uncaused, haphazard, or 
unintended. Instead, they are contingent, in the sense of being dependent 
on Divine will and power at all times. As the metaphysical explanation that 
“provides the driver for these laws [of nature], God is not a spectator but 
a fully active driver who re-creates, prescribes laws that He respects, and … 
selects the outcome” (Altaie 2016, 110). Altaie rightly concludes, that 
God “is not playing dice, but the outcome of His actions causes the dice 
play” (Altaie 2016, 114).
13.4  concluSIon
Understanding divine providence requires understanding the natural 
order and our place in it. Such inquiry leads to a rethinking of what we 
usually construe as explanation, especially the causal explanations we 
employ in everyday life and in modern science. Nursi offers an insightful 
example of how to do that rethinking and Altaie’s analysis of quantum 
mechanics supports it. In light of cues from the Quran, one can pay atten-
tion to empirical data and offer interpretations that are intellectually and 
existentially compelling.
Nursi and Altaie analyze both the capacities of natural causes and the 
‘agency’ of laws of nature. They interpret the regularity and predictability 
of the world as a sign of a Transcendent agent with comprehensive wis-
dom, knowledge, and power. They also resist reifying regularity into abso-
lute laws. Instead, they welcome the unpredictability of the universe as a 
sign that reveals divine will. Certain things are inherently unpredictable 
from our perspective because they are dependent on the will of God.24
24 Ghazali (on divine will) 2000, 22–24. Similarly, Nursi notes that choice without a deter-
minant is possible, the “function of will is precisely that” (Nursi 2004, 365, modified transla-
tion). In the context of making hard choices, Ruth Chang suggests the same: our freewill 
means our ability to choose without any reasons, which “frees us from the dictatorship of 
given reasons” (Chang 2017, 20).
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Consider the existential implications. Divine freedom frees us from 
slavery to impersonal, deterministic laws of nature. We can turn to the 
Creator in our everyday circumstances with our particular needs. This is a 
world which is governed according to “universal laws and general princi-
ples” so as to manifest Beautiful Names (al-asma al-husna) and there is 
also room for flexibility because “within those universal and general prin-
ciples [the Creator] has special favours, special succour, special manifesta-
tions, so that everything may seek help from Him and look to Him at all 
times for every need” (Nursi 2004, 684–685, modified trans., emphasis 
added). To answer Nursi’s question that the paper started with: yes, it 
makes sense for human beings to cry out to God about their particular 
needs. Indeed, from an Islamic perspective, only the one who sustains the 
world in its details can hear and respond to human heart’s yearning for 
eternal happiness.25
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CHAPTER 14
Divine Action and the Emergence of Four 
Kinds of Randomness
Robert C. Koons and Rana Dajani
14.1  Modes of divine Action
We suppose that God intends particular events and outcomes in the his-
tory of the world: God’s interests are not limited to general facts or pat-
terns. Nonetheless, it seems clear that God does value the preservation of 
regular patterns—if He had no such interest, science would be impossible. 
As many philosophers and theologians (e.g., Thomas Aquinas, C. S. Lewis) 
have pointed out, the valuing of regular patterns does not preclude the 
possibility of miracles, in the sense of pattern-breaking interventions. 
Lewis argued in Miracles: A Preliminary Study (Lewis 1947) that in some 
cases it is the breaking of the pattern that is the central point of divine action.
If miracles involved the “violation of natural law,” as David Hume 
argued, that might count as a powerful objection to them. However, it is 
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easy to agree with Thomas Aquinas that no such violation of the laws of 
nature is required, since it is built into the very nature of every creature to 
respond concordantly with every divine intention, whether general or par-
ticular (Summa Contra Gentiles 3.100).
Nonetheless, even if miracles are a real option, it makes sense to explore 
non-miraculous possibilities for particular divine interventions. Since God 
obviously values the uniformity of microphysical patterns, we can expect 
that He would act wherever possible in ways that preserve that uniformity. 
One alternative is the front-loading of His specific intentions into the uni-
verse’s initial conditions. This is a real possibility also, but it does face 
certain potential difficulties. First, a thoroughly deterministic world would 
rule out creaturely free will or autonomy (unless we assume compatibil-
ism). If we preserve free will and incompatibilism by allowing rational 
creatures to interfere with the deterministic pattern of the physical world, 
then we again face a world in which the beautiful microphysical patterns 
are often spoiled. Second, any dramatic event produced by such fine- 
tuning of initial conditions (like the simulation of an audible voice from 
thin air) would involve such dramatic departure from average, statistically 
expected processes as to constitute a disruption of thermodynamic and 
other macroscopic regularities.
Consequently, there is good reason to explore the possibility of a third 
option. Philip Clayton (2006) and Arthur Peacocke (2006) have argued 
that the phenomenon of emergence provides such an additional option for 
divine action. What is emergence, and how might it be relevant to the pos-
sibilities of divine action?
Our three-way distinction divides divine actions into those (i) that 
break the laws of physics, (ii) that use the laws of physics (by setting initial 
conditions), and (iii) that transcend the laws of physics (through emer-
gence). This distinction should not be confused with a more traditional 
distinction between different definitions of “miracle.” Thomas Aquinas 
defined a miracle as a direct divine action that exceeds the causal power of 
every created agent (Summa Theologiae I, Q100, a4). Peter van Inwagen 
(1988) has defined a miracle as God’s acting indirectly by altering in an ad 
hoc, lawless way the fundamental causal powers of some created thing. A 
third possibility would be to define a miracle as God’s building (in an ad 
hoc, lawless way) a special or extraordinary event into the causal powers of 
particular things from the very beginning (e.g., giving certain fundamen-
tal particles at the Big Bang the power to sustain the weight of Jesus when 
they form some water in the Sea of Galilee). Our distinction is largely 
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independent of these categories. Miracles in any of these three senses 
could be cases either of breaking or of transcending the laws of microphys-
ics. God’s using the laws of physics (our second category) would be non-
miraculous (by all three definitions).
14.2  the MetAphysics of eMergence
“Emergence” is a term that dates back to Samuel Alexander (1920) and 
that was used to label the group of thinkers called The British Emergentists 
(McLaughlin 1992), which included, especially, C. D. Broad (1925).1 The 
germ of the idea can be found in J.  S. Mill (1872 [1843], Book III, 
Chapter 6, section 1). The term is currently used by both philosophers 
and scientists in a variety of meanings, many mutually exclusive. The 
notion of emergence is supposed to indicate both a measure of depen-
dency on the microphysical (the higher level emerges “from” the micro-
physical) and a measure of independence (the higher “emerges” from the 
microphysical). The confusion enters in trying to make sense of how to 
combine these two elements without contradiction.
Some philosophers and scientists speak of a merely epistemological, 
computational, or conceptual emergence of higher domains (like chemis-
try, biology, and psychology) from microphysics, where this means simply 
that we are incapable of reconstructing or predicting the higher from the 
lower, due to limitations in our abilities to observe, measure, and (espe-
cially) compute higher-level facts from lower-level ones. Such epistemic or 
anthropocentric emergence is real but irrelevant to our concerns in this 
paper. What we need is ontological emergence, implying a measure of real 
independence and autonomy of the “higher” levels from microphysi-
cal facts.
The most common approach to making sense of ontological emergence 
is to suppose that higher-level facts supervene with nomological but not 
with metaphysical necessity upon the lower-level facts. The modern notion 
of supervenience was introduced by G. E. Moore (1922) and R. M. Hare 
(1952) to describe the relationship between evaluative and descriptive or 
1 Although the concept of emergence is a relatively late arrival, philosophers in the 
Abrahamic tradition have long been influenced by and contributors to an Aristotelian tradi-
tion that attributes real natures and causal powers to organisms and other relatively large- 
scale entities. Philosophers like Avicenna, Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas exemplify this 
tradition.
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“natural” facts: the evaluative facts supervene on the natural facts, in the 
sense that, once all of the natural facts are given, the evaluative facts follow 
with metaphysical necessity. In this version of supervenience, there are no 
two metaphysically possible worlds with the same natural facts but differ-
ent evaluative facts.
It is possible, however, to have a weaker notion of supervenience: one 
in which there may be metaphysically possible worlds that agree in the 
base facts but disagree in the supervening facts, but there can be no pairs 
of “nomologically” possible worlds that do so. In other words, we have to 
suppose that there exist “laws of emergence” of some sort, which are 
metaphysically contingent but which nonetheless impose some kind of 
regular dependency of the higher levels on the lower.
However, this form of ontological emergence is still of no help to us in 
the present context, since higher-level facts are still tied rigorously and 
inflexibly to the lower-level laws or patterns, the breaking of which would 
constitute miraculous intervention. Consequently, ontological emergence 
of this kind introduces no third option for divine action.
In the last thirty years, a new form of ontological emergence has 
appeared—a causal notion, which dispenses entirely with the constraint of 
supervenience altogether. Timothy O’Connor (O’Connor 1994; 
O’Connor and Wong 2005) and Paul Humphreys (1997) are the leading 
figures in this movement. In this model, the higher-level facts are causally 
dependent on the lower-level for their initial appearance in nature, but 
they can subsequently evolve with independent causal power. If the higher- 
level causal powers are indeterministic in character, then the domain of 
higher-level facts can evolve into states that violate supervenience (in both 
senses).
This sort of causal emergence might seem to provide a third option for 
divine causation, if we can assume that God can directly influence the 
exercise of the causal powers at the higher level or directly add or subtract 
causal powers at the higher level. However, on reflection, this mode of 
divine causation is once again easily assimilated to the category of the 
miraculous. Nothing in the O’Connor-Humphreys model rules out the 
possibility that causation at the higher levels is deterministic, in which case 
God would once again have to disrupt regular patterns in order to inter-
vene. It is the indeterminism, if there is any, and not the emergence, that 
is doing the real work in making space for divine action.
We can, however, modify the causal model of emergence slightly in 
order to secure a genuinely new route for divine action. We have to focus 
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on the causal laws by which the lower-level facts determine the higher- 
level facts. We will argue in Sects. 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, and 14.6 that there is 
good reason to suppose that the causal joints between the lower and 
higher levels are genuinely random and un-patterned. If so, God would be 
free to fine-tune this nexus in such a way as to produce particular events at 
will without disrupting any regular or general patterns.
What do we mean by random in this context? We propose using recent 
mathematical definitions of product or algorithmic randomness, and then 
we apply these definitions to the causal “laws” or constraints by which the 
lower-level facts cause and sustain higher-level facts. That is, we will seek 
to define what it is for a causal law to be random. A random causal law is 
one that does not impose any general or regular pattern on the causal 
nexuses that it underwrites. Consequently, God is free to jury-rig a ran-
dom causal law in such a way as to produce specific and particular events 
in history, without sacrificing any regularity of pattern.
Random sequences of events are much more common than non- 
random ones. The set of random sequences has measure one in the space 
of possible sequences. A measure one randomness property corresponds 
to the absence of a measure zero property (a property had by only the mem-
bers of a special or unusual subclass of sequences). Martin-Löf (1966) 
proposed that we could define a random sequence as an infinite sequence 
that cannot be effectively determined to violate any measure one random-
ness property. By effectively determined, Martin-Löf meant determined by 
a computationally effective (recursive) procedure. So, a random sequence 
is one that cannot be effectively proved to belong to any such special sub-
class (Dasgupta 2011).
Random sequences are highly incompressible. The only effective 
description we can give of such a sequence is simply to list the members of 
the sequence one by one.
We can now state that a causal law (such as the law by which lower-level 
states cause and sustain higher-level ones) is random if and only if there is 
an infinite sequence of ordered pairs of states (the first belonging to the 
lower level and the second to the higher level) such that each pair instanti-
ates the law and such that the sequence as a whole is Martin-Löf random. 
A pair of states instantiates a causal law just in case it represents a causal 
transition that conforms to the law, and neither state includes any features 
that are causally irrelevant to the transition. For example, suppose that we 
assign numbers to possible states of a system by means of an effective 
code—something like Gödel numbers for the description of the state in an 
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appropriate scientific language. A causal law is random if there is an infinite 
random sequence of pairs of numbers (one for the lower-level states and 
one for the higher-level states) that instantiate the law.
Non-random causal laws reflect real regularities or patterns in nature. 
Newton’s laws, Einstein’s laws of general relativity, the dynamics of quan-
tum mechanics—all of these are highly non-random. Sequences of the 
kind mentioned in the last paragraph that conform to these laws would be 
highly compressible, if we let the ordered pairs represent prior and poste-
rior conditions of an isolated system. Given the first number in any ordered 
pair, we could use the general equations of force and motion to deduce 
the second member. In the case of random laws, this would be impossible. 
The correct result in each case would be entirely ad hoc, not computable 
from any more general law.
If the causal laws by which lower-level facts cause higher-level ones are 
random, then God would have been free to jury-rig these laws in order to 
produce very specific outcomes in the history of the world without dis-
rupting any regularity or pattern, since the laws of emergent causation are 
in any case pattern-free, whether jury-rigged in this way or not. We can 
suppose that the random laws of emergent causation are also highly non- 
local, that is, the emergent higher-level state depends on the totality of 
lower-level states at the time in question throughout the universe (or 
throughout the backward time-cone of the higher-level state, if we take 
relativity into account). This would give God maximum flexibility in 
adjusting the laws of emergent causation to produce in particular cases the 
precise higher-level fact that He intends—so long as exactly the same 
lower-level condition (at the cosmic scale) never recurs, the adjustment of 
the random law in each particular case would have no implications for any 
past or future case of emergent causation. God could have arranged “in 
advance” (i.e., from eternity) for a vast menu of possible interventions, in 
anticipation of the variety of future contingent events. Alternatively, God 
could intervene directly or indirectly at the emergent level without violat-
ing any non-random pattern, since the laws of emergence are in any 
case random.
In order to give God a truly free hand, one more condition needs to be 
added. If, as on the O’Connor model of causal emergence, we allow for 
horizontal causation at the higher level (i.e., the direct causation of some 
later higher-order facts by other, earlier ones), then we will have to stipu-
late that at least some of the horizontal higher-order causal laws at each 
level must be themselves random (and perhaps also indeterministic). 
 R. C. KOONS AND R. DAJANI
293
Otherwise, there would be exhaustive and deterministic patterns at the 
higher level that would exclude non-miraculous divine action.
There is one more difficulty to consider: the threat of epiphenome-
nalism. A domain of emergent facts is epiphenomenal if its members lack 
the capacity to influence lower-level facts. Where the emergent facts are 
epiphenomenal, all causation goes in one direction: from the lower level 
to the higher, and not vice versa. If the emergent levels are epiphenom-
enal, then jury-rigging the random laws of causal emergence gives God 
some real control over the higher levels of facts, but the influence would 
remain very subtle, non-public, and probably ephemeral and modest, 
since the influence could never precipitate down to influence the flow of 
physical events without disrupting the regular and deterministic pat-
terns at that lowest level. We will suggest a way around this problem in 
Sect. 14.7, exploiting certain facts about emergence in quantum 
mechanics.
To summarize, we can define a precise model of emergence—causally 
random emergence—that would provide God with a third option for action 
in particular cases. The world exhibits CR (causally random) emergence if 
and only if there are two disjoint class of possible facts, the “lower-level 
facts” L and the “higher-level facts” H such that:
 1) Both sets of facts are fully real—they are not merely useful fictions.
 2) Neither set supervenes on the other with metaphysical necessity.
 3) Whenever a fact f from H is realized at time t, it is either caused by 
some plurality of facts from L (if there were no other H-facts in f’s 
immediate backward time-cone) or caused by some other fact from 
H and sustained at time t by a plurality of facts from L.
 4) The lower-to-higher (bottom-up) emergent causal laws (the vertical 
laws of emergence) that underwrite condition (3) are Martin-Löf 
random (in the sense described earlier).
 5) If there are any horizontal higher-level causal laws (laws connecting 
higher-level facts at one time to later higher-level facts), these are 
also random.
Is there any reason to think that causally random emergence actually 
occurs? In the following four sections, we will provide four cases that sug-
gest that it does.
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14.3  the eMergence of MeAning, intentionAlity, 
And MAtheMAticAl Knowledge
There is good reason to think that the behavior of human organisms (con-
sidered biologically) is finite in complexity, whether considered individu-
ally or collectively. That is, the total set of our behavioral dispositions 
(including our linguistic dispositions) is finite. There are only finitely many 
internal states that our brains can be in, only finitely many perceptually 
distinguishable situations a human community could find itself in, and 
only a finite number of muscular contractions that could result from inter-
nal decisions. Thus, human society at any point in time could be modeled 
as a finite automaton.
It is well known that no finite set of linguistic dispositions can fix the 
semantic meaning of our languages, so long as our language includes the 
basic notions needed for arithmetic: natural number, 0, successor, +, ×. 
Thanks to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, we know that no effectively 
computable axiom system can capture all of the truths of arithmetic. And, 
thanks to Gödel’s completeness theorem, we know that any consistent 
system that is incomplete can be given non-standard models, models in 
which “number,” “successor,” or other terms are given disparate mathe-
matical interpretations. Thus, our behavioral dispositions are not sufficient 
to provide unique interpretations to our arithmetical notions, as was 
observed by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) and developed by Saul 
Kripke (1982).
Since the sub-intentional realm, if we include within it all biological, 
chemical, and physical facts, is not causally connected with the Platonic 
realm of natural numbers, there is nothing in that realm that is sufficient 
to ground determinate mathematical meaning. Nonetheless, it seems 
obvious that we know what we mean by terms like “number” and “succes-
sor.” All of mathematics, including mathematical logic and formal seman-
tics, presupposes that we are able to think determinate mathematical 
thoughts. Consequently, there must exist a higher-order domain of mean-
ing and intentionality, a domain that cannot supervene with metaphysical 
necessity upon the sub-intentional domain. Moreover, the causal laws by 
which the sub-intentional domain causes and sustains this domain of 
mathematical intentionality must be Martin-Löf random, since if those 
laws were computable, the non-intentional domain would be, contrary to 
our demonstration, sufficient to fix determinate meanings. Thus, the 
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realm of mathematical intentionality must be CR-emergent, relative to the 
realm of sub-intentional facts.2
There is, in addition, another argument based on Gödel’s theorems, an 
argument introduced by J.  R. Lucas (1961) and defended by Roger 
Penrose (1994). Gödel’s incompleteness results show that any consistent, 
computable axiomatization of number theory is incomplete. In particular, 
no such consistent, computable axiomatization can be capable of proving 
its own consistency or soundness. Suppose, for reductio ad absurdum, that 
human mathematical cognition is computational, that is, it can be accu-
rately modeled by a Turing machine, by a system of recursive functions. If 
so, human mathematical insight would be recursively (effectively) axi-
omatizable by some formal system S. Now, suppose further that if such a 
system were to exist, we could in principle recognize that S axiomatizes at 
least some of our mathematical insight. Suppose, finally, that our mathe-
matical insight represents real knowledge and that we can know that it 
does so. From these assumptions and Gödel’s theorem, we can prove a 
contradiction. If we can recognize that S axiomatizes (some of) our math-
ematical insight and we know that that insight constitutes knowledge, 
then we can also recognize that S is sound (i.e., that all of the theorems of 
S are true). This implies that S is consistent (since any set of truths is con-
sistent). Hence, we can prove that S is consistent. But, by hypothesis S 
axiomatizes all of our mathematical insight, then S itself must prove that 
S is consistent. By Gödel’s theorem, this is possible only if S is inconsistent. 
Contradiction.
There are only three possible ways to avoid this contradiction. We have 
to suppose that at least one of the following theses is true:
 1. Human mathematical intuition is not in fact computable (and so 
cannot be modeled by a recursively axiomatizable system).
 2. We cannot know that we have any mathematical knowledge.
 3. We cannot know that the system that actually and exhaustively axi-
omatizes our mathematical intuition is a representation of any of our 
mathematical knowledge.
2 Our argument would suggest that machine learning and artificial intelligence are intrinsi-
cally limited, because they lack the sort of ontological emergence required for true insight. 
Artifacts like computers can only emulate or mimic the knowledge of truly rational creatures 
with emergent natures.
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Thesis 1 supports the CR emergence of human cognition from the 
computational functioning of the nervous system. Thesis 2 seems utterly 
implausible. So, the only real alternative is thesis 3. However, it is hard to 
believe that if our mathematical insight is generated by an algorithm, it is 
generated by one that is utterly alien and unrecognizable—one that does 
not correspond in any intelligible way to mathematical truths that we can 
recognize.
Mathematical intentionality is plausibly connected with the human 
capacity for free will. There is a long tradition within the Aristotelian tradi-
tion that includes ibn Sın̄a and Thomas Aquinas of associating free will 
with the rational soul, and the rational soul with our capacity to grasp 
universals, including the universals of mathematics. From a reductive 
point of view, human behavior can be described as random, which on the 
level of intentionality can be redescribed as “free.”3
14.4  the eMergence of phenoMenAl QuAliA
In an important but often overlooked essay, Robert M. Adams (1987) has 
argued that the phenomenal qualities (called “qualia” in recent philosophy 
of mind literature) of sentient experience are emergent relative to the non- 
phenomenological facts of physics and chemistry (and biology, for that 
matter). As it turns out, the sort of emergence that Adams adumbrates fits 
precisely to our definition of CR emergence.
Adams points out that we believe both that there are certain ways that 
things appear to us in vision, smell, taste, hearing, and touch, ways that 
correspond to our perception of colors, flavors, sounds, and so on, and 
that these ways of appearing are correlated with and caused by certain 
biophysical facts, such as brain states. Red things appear in vision in a cer-
tain way to us, a way that differs from the way yellow things appear in 
vision, and from the way roses appear in smell. Moreover, red things tend 
to look the same way over time, and they do so because our experiences of 
red are somehow caused by the same sorts of physical and biophysical 
conditions.
However, Adams points out, when we try to explain these facts, we find 
that any causal laws that we can imagine will turn out to be random laws, 
3 Such freedom need not contradict God’s perfect knowledge, because He is outside the 
dimensions that restrict human life, including the dimension of time. We are constrained by 
the dimension of time, but He is not, so He can know the future without interference.
 R. C. KOONS AND R. DAJANI
297
in the sense defined in Sect. 14.2 (i.e., algorithmically random). According 
to Adams, a more general, non-random causal law would have to take 
something like the following mathematical form L (Adams 1987, 255):
 
L p q if F p S q , then pcausesq( ) ∀( ) ∀( ) ( ) = ( )( )
 
Here “p” would be a variable ranging over a class of physical (non- 
phenomenological) states, and “q” a variable ranging over the entire class 
of phenomenological facts. “F” would have to be a function that, when 
applied to an arbitrary physical fact, yields in an effectively computable 
way some number or other mathematical value (vector, matrix, or what-
ever). Similarly, “S” would have to be a computable function that, when 
applied to an arbitrary phenomenological fact, yields a mathematical value 
of the same kind. When the two values match, for some p and q, the gen-
eral law would enable us to deduce the particular causal law that p- situations 
cause q-situations.
However, as Adams convincingly argues, it is simply impossible to 
believe that there is any function like S.
There is no plausible, non-ad hoc way of associating phenomenal qualia in 
general with a range of mathematical values, independently of their empiri-
cally discovered correlations with physical states. The independence require-
ment is crucial here. … [In its absence, the “explanation”] would merely 
restate the correlation of phenomenal and physical states. (Adams 
1987, 256–7)
In other words, a function like S would be possible only if we used the 
specific correlation facts to associate the phenomenal facts with such a 
mathematical value, but in that case, S itself would be algorithmically ran-
dom, not effectively computable.
So, we have reason to suppose that phenomenal qualia are CR-emergent, 
relative to the class of biophysical, non-phenomenological facts. If this is 
right, we face an interesting question: what is the relationship between the 
domain of meaning and cognition, on the one hand, and sensory phe-
nomenology, on the other? It seems pretty clear that sensory phenomenol-
ogy could not help in fixing the meanings of our mathematical sentences 
or in guiding our mathematical intuitions. It’s also hard to see how facts 
about meaning or cognition could determine the phenomenal qualia asso-
ciated with biophysical conditions. It seems that we have here two distinct 
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domains of CR-emergent fact: the domain of thought and intentionality 
(especially mathematical thought) and the domain of phenomenology and 
sensation.
We could think of the sentient soul as the causally emergent product of 
interactions of millions of neurons in the organ (the brain) of an organism. 
As species evolved to produce evermore complex organisms with higher 
number of neuron cells and higher connectivity between the cells, the 
sentient soul as an entity appeared. This entity, the soul, does not exist in 
a single cell. These single cells or small groups of cells are “alive” but do 
not contain a soul (as the seat of sentience). If the brain is dead through 
the loss of a sufficient number of cells and their connections, the organism 
is a vegetable, that is, without such a soul. The organism in this case is alive 
only. Animals have souls, but plants don’t because they lack the connectiv-
ity between cells to reach the threshold of the creation of the sentient soul.
It can be observed that as the number of cells increase in any one organ-
ism the complexity increases along with the cellular division of labor 
(Herculano-Houzel 2009). Most notably in higher forms the brain is the 
one organ whose number of cells increases logarithmically compared to 
other organs relative to body size. This increase in number of brain cells 
can be seen in mammals and in primates. The increase is not only in num-
ber of brain cells but more importantly in the connections between these 
neurons and how they are organized, that is, the architecture or neuronal 
wiring (Hoffman 2014). Our hypothesis is that the entity what we call a 
soul emerges as a result of the complex numbers and interactions and 
architecture among the brain cells. When an organism dies, the cells are 
still alive by definition, since they are still metabolizing, dividing, and 
interacting with the environment, but no one would claim the cell has a 
soul. The difference between multicellular life and the life of the individual 
cells is a case of random emergence. Similarly, as the number of brain cells 
and connections increase within mammals the rational consciousness 
emerges in humans and their species compared to other forms. This also 
can be lost when a person’s higher brain functions are destroyed, even 
when the sentient soul persists.
There is a further emergence of certain rational or superrational feel-
ings or attitudes and their manifestation, such as love and altruism. These 
emerge again as a result of increased connections between cells. All of 
these emergent features appear gradually in evolutionary history. It is not 
a matter of all or none, although there may be a go/no-go threshold 
within the evolutionary tree of species that are now extinct. We 
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hypothesize that there are random mathematical functions that describe 
this emergence, similar to the use of fractal scaling to describe the brain’s 
organized variability. An important feature of fractal objects is that they 
are invariant, in a statistical sense, over a wide range of scales (Hoffman, 
Evolution of the Human Brain). Such invariance or regularity at one level 
of description is consistent with the randomness of the complete func-
tional relationship.
14.5  the eMergence of life
Teleological language and concepts are ubiquitous and ineliminable in 
biology. Enzymes are proteins with the natural function of catalyzing cer-
tain chemical reactions. Genes are chains of nucleic acid with the function 
of coding for the production of certain enzymes. A nucleus is a molecular 
structure with the function of housing and facilitating the function of 
genes, and so forth. If we suppose that these teleological functions are 
merely “heuristic,” we have to ask, heuristic for what? To what further 
discoveries do teleological models lead? Only to still more biological 
knowledge, that is, to more teleological knowledge. It would be crazy to 
suppose that all of biology is merely a fiction, useful only as a tool for 
additional chemical and physical discoveries. In fact, physics and chemistry 
can do quite well on their own: they stand in no need of biology. Biology 
exists for its own sake, and biological inquiry never escapes from the teleo-
logical domain.
As Georg Toepfer has put it:
teleology is closely connected to the concept of the organism and therefore 
has its most fundamental role in the very definition of biology as a particular 
science of natural objects. … The identity conditions of biological systems 
are given by [teleological] functional analysis, not by chemical or physical 
descriptions. … This means that, beyond the [teleological] perspective, 
which consists in specifying the system by fixing the roles of its parts, the 
organism does not even exist as a definite entity. (Toepfer 2012, 
113, 115, 118)
This was recognized by the Neo-Kantians of the early twentieth century:
We even have to define this science [biology] as the science of bodies whose 
parts combine to a teleological ‘unity.’ This concept of unity is inseparable 
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from the concept of the organism, such that only because of the teleological 
coherence we call living things ‘organisms.’ Biology would therefore, if it 
avoided all teleology, cease to be the science of organisms as organisms. 
(H. Rickert 1929 [1902], 412, cited and translated by Toepfer 2012, 113)
The chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi (1967, 1968) also recog-
nized the emergence of life from physics and chemistry.
Evolution itself presupposes a strong form of teleology in the very idea 
of reproduction. No organism ever produces an exact physical duplicate of 
itself. In the case of sexual reproduction, the children are often not even 
close physical approximations to either parent at any stage in their devel-
opment. An organism successfully reproduces itself when it successfully 
produces another instance of its biological kind. This presupposes a form 
of teleological realism (Deacon 2003).
The most plausible attempt to remove teleology from biological science 
is that of functionalism, as developed by F.  P. Ramsey (1929), David 
K. Lewis (1966), and Robert Cummins (1975). In this tradition, biologi-
cal functions are identified with complex, recursively specified behavioral 
dispositions. In a recent paper, Alexander Pruss and one of us argued 
(Koons and Pruss 2017) that such an identification cannot succeed. We 
made use of a thought experiment that was created by Harry Frankfurt 
(1969) to refute the idea that freedom of choice can be analyzed in terms 
of the availability of alternative actions: namely, the thought experiment of 
the potential manipulator. We are to suppose that we have an organism 
with certain biological teleo-functions. We introduce into the thought 
experiment a potential manipulator who (for some reason) wants the 
organism to follow a certain fixed behavioral script. If the organism were 
to show signs of being about to deviate from the script, then the manipu-
lator would intervene, altering the organism’s internal constitution and 
causing it to continue to follow the script. We are to imagine that in fact 
the organism spontaneously and fortuitously follows the script exactly, 
and, as a consequence, the manipulator never intervenes.
Frankfurt introduced such a thought experiment to challenge the idea 
that freedom of the will requires alternative possibilities. Koons and Pruss 
used it to show that the existence of biological functions is independent of 
the organism’s functional organization—its system of behavioral disposi-
tions, which links the dispositions to inputs, outputs, and each other. It is 
obvious that the presence of an inactive, external manipulator cannot 
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deprive the organism of its biological functions. However, the manipula-
tor’s presence is sufficient to deprive the organism of all of its normal 
behavioral dispositions: under the circumstances, it is impossible for the 
organism to deviate from the manipulator’s script. If the manipulator’s 
script says that at time t + 1 the organism is to be in state S, then that is 
what would happen, no matter what state the organism were in at time t.
Moreover, biological malfunctioning is surely possible as a result of 
injury or illness. A functionalist reduction of biological teleology cannot 
incorporate the effects of every possible injury or illness, since there are no 
limits to the complexity of the sort of phenomenon that might constitute 
an injury or illness. Injury can prevent nearly all behavior—so much so, as 
to make the remaining behavioral dispositions (both internal and external) 
so non-specific as to fail to distinguish one teleological function from 
another. Consider, for example, locked-in syndrome, as depicted in the 
movie The Diving-Bell and the Butterfly. Therefore, the true theory link-
ing teleology with behavioral dispositions must contain postulates that 
specify the normal connections among states.
Without resorting to realism about teleology, our only account of nor-
malcy would be probabilistic. Thus, a system normally enters state Sm from 
state Sn as a result of input Im provided it is likely to do this. However, 
serious injury or illness can make a malfunctioning subsystem rarely or 
never do what it should, yet without challenging the status of the subsys-
tem as, say, a subsystem for visual processing of shapes. And, again, an 
inactive but potential Frankfurtian manipulator, whether external or inter-
nal, can change what the system is likely to do without actually manipulat-
ing the system in any way.
So, we have good reason to think of biological teleology as something 
both real and non-supervenient on the underlying physics and chemistry. 
We can, therefore, reasonably adopt the thesis of the causal emergence of 
biology. Moreover, the possible existence of a wide variety of environ-
ments and evolutionary histories for any given biochemical structure, as 
well as the potentially infinite number and varieties of illness, defect, and 
injury that prevent any simple deduction of biological purpose from actual 
functioning, together make it very likely that the laws of causal emergence 
in this case are algorithmically random.
What is the relationship between the emergence of thought and sensa-
tion, on the one hand, and biological teleology, on the other? In this case, 
we have good grounds for seeing some kind of downward causation at 
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work: causation from mind to biology.4 The content of our mental states, 
the operations of mathematic cognition, and the phenomenal states asso-
ciated with neural functioning are all highly relevant to determining the 
true biological function of the relevant neural processes.
14.6  the eMergence of therModynAMics 
And cheMistry
Finally, we turn to the case of thermodynamics and chemistry, in light of 
the quantum revolution of the early twentieth century. One of us has 
recently argued (Koons 2018b, 2019, 2021) that quantum thermody-
namics provides some good reason for suspecting that chemistry and ther-
modynamics are causally emergent from the underlying quantum 
mechanical physics (whether traditional particle physics or quantum field 
theory).
We can plausibly derive the dynamical laws of quantum statistical 
mechanics from the dynamical laws of ordinary QM, but the space of pos-
sibilities defined by QSM is not reducible to the space defined by ordinary 
QM (Ruetsche 2011, 290). Hence, quantum statistical mechanics, and 
related quantum theories of thermodynamics, solid-state physics, and 
chemistry, are real and do not supervene (with either metaphysical or 
nomological necessity) on the quantum-mechanical facts of the constitu-
ent particles.
In classical mechanics, in contrast, the space of possible boundary con-
ditions consists in a space each of whose “points” consists in the assign-
ment (with respect to some instant of time) of a specific location, 
orientation, and velocity to each of a class of micro-particles. The totality 
of microphysical assignments in classical physics is both complete and uni-
versal with respect to the natural world. As long as we could take this for 
granted, the reduction of macroscopic laws to microscopic laws seemed 
sufficient to ensure the nomological supervenience of the macroscopic 
world on the microscopic. However, the quantum revolution has called 
4 Such downward causation is consistent with the randomness of the biological domain, so 
long as it is also governed by random causal laws. What we’re calling downward causation 
here is a form of what we defined as horizontal causation above: causation of some emergent 
facts by other emergent facts. In Sect. 14.7, we’ll address the problem of how far “down” 
such downward causation can go, consistent with our model.
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into question the completeness of the microphysical descriptions, opening 
up the possibility of causally emergent phenomena at other levels of scale.
In the case of quantum thermodynamic systems, the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts—in a very literal sense. Any mere collection of 
fundamental particles has, in itself, only finitely many degrees of freedom 
(as measured by the position and momentum of each particle), while ther-
mal systems (as modeled in quantum statistical mechanics) have infinitely 
many degrees of freedom (Primas 1980, 1983; Sewell 2002). In fact, the 
models of quantum statistical mechanics are infinite in any even stronger 
sense: they consist of infinitely many subsystems, represented by a non- 
separable Hilbert space. This inflation of degrees of freedom would have 
been extremely implausible in classical statistical mechanics, where we 
know that there can be, in any actual system, only finitely many degrees of 
freedom, since the particles (atoms, molecules) survive as discrete, indi-
vidual entities. In quantum mechanics, individual particles (and finite 
ensembles of particles, like atoms and molecules) seem to lose their indi-
vidual identity, merging into a kind of quantum goo or gunk. Hence, 
there is no absurdity in supposing that the whole has more degrees of 
freedom (even infinitely more) than are possessed by the individual mol-
ecules, treated as an ordinary multitude or heap.
In algebraic quantum thermodynamics, physicists add new operators 
that commute with each other (forming a non-trivial “center”). These 
new “observables” are represented by distinct representation spaces, not 
by vectors in a single Hilbert space, and are thereby exempted from such 
typical quantal phenomena as superposition and complementarity. The 
von Neumann-Stone theorem entails that only algebras with infinitely 
many degrees of freedom (and non-separable spaces) can contain such 
non-quantal observables (in a non-trivial center). These new observables 
can then be used to define key thermodynamic properties like tempera-
ture, phase of matter (solid, liquid, etc.), and chemical potential. The ther-
modynamic properties do not supervene with metaphysical necessity on 
the quantum wavefunction for the world’s fundamental particles and 
waves, since any model of the latter is separable and finite, lacking the non- 
quantal observables needed for thermodynamics and chemistry.
Are the causal laws by which thermodynamic states (modeled by infi-
nite algebraic models) emerge from pure quantum states random? 
Quantum statistical models depend on selecting an appropriate GNS 
(Gelfand-Naimark-Segal) representation, one based on a particular vector 
in the Hilbert space (Sewell 2002, 19–27). The discovery of an 
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appropriate GNS representation in each application involves an element of 
creativity and judgment on the part of the physicist: there is no simple and 
general recipe or algorithm. Hence, it is at least possible that the emergent 
causal law is random.
In the case of horizontal causation at the level of thermodynamics, 
Primas (1990) has shown that in the most important cases, we can show 
that the dynamics is nonlinear and stochastic. The horizontal causal laws 
are, therefore, random in the algorithmic sense, as required.
Is there downward causation from biology to thermodynamics and 
chemistry? Without a doubt, the general direction of biological thinking, 
from the time of the synthesis of urea by Friedrich Wöhler in 1828, has 
been to emphasis “upward” causation, explaining biological function in 
chemical terms. However, the holism of quantum mechanics provides a 
real avenue for the determination of chemical form by the wider “classi-
cal” environment of each molecule, including the biological environment. 
Molecules can “inherit” or “acquire” classical properties (including stable 
molecular structure) from their environments, despite the fact that they 
can be observed in superposed quantal states when isolated. It is only the 
molecule as “dressed” by interaction with its environment that can spon-
taneously break the strict symmetry of the Schrödinger equations, and it is 
only a partially classical environment that can induce the quasi-classical 
properties of the dressed molecule. In order to produce the superselection 
rules needed to distinguish stable molecular structures, the environment 
must have infinitely many degrees of freedom, due to its own thermody-
namic emergence (Primas 1980, 102–5; 1983, 157–9). It seems possible 
that the shape of such thermodynamic emergence could be molded in a 
top-down fashion by persistent biological structures and processes.
R. F. Hendry, a leading philosopher of chemistry, agrees that a mole-
cule’s acquisition of classical properties from its classical environment, 
thereby breaking its microscopic symmetry, should count as form of 
“downward causation”:
This super-system (molecule plus environment) has the power to break the 
symmetry of the states of its subsystems without acquiring that power from 
its subsystems in any obvious way. That looks like downward causation. 
(Hendry 2010, 215–6)
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14.7  downwArd cAusAtion in Modern 
QuAntuM theory
How far down does downward causation go? How far down does it have 
to go, for the RC-emergence model to provide a viable option for divine 
action? In order to answer these questions, we must first ask the following: 
What domain constitutes the lowest level of nature? One plausible answer 
would be that the lowest domain consists of the interaction of fundamen-
tal particles (electrons, quarks, photons, and so on) or of quantum fields. 
In order to distinguish this lower level from that of thermodynamics and 
chemistry, we would have to suppose that the correct models for the fun-
damental interactions would involve only finitely many degrees of free-
dom, as in standard, finitary models whose dynamics are defined by the 
Schrödinger equation. Quantum cosmologists contend that we should 
model the evolution of the entire cosmos by means of a single quantum 
“wavefunction.”
Such models are strictly deterministic (in fact, the Schrödinger evolu-
tion of the quantum wave is much more strictly deterministic than was 
classical, Newton-Maxwell dynamics). However, they face a serious prob-
lem: they define (via Born’s rule) the probability of detecting any particu-
lar result of any measurement, but such measurements seem to involve a 
kind of interruption (a “wave collapse”) in the seamless, deterministic evo-
lution of the wavefunction. The “measurement problem” concerns how 
to reconcile such apparent collapses with the underlying dynamics, and 
how to define when and how such collapses occur (if at all).
The Everettian or many-worlds interpretation attempts to do away with 
the measurement problem by denying that any such collapse ever occurs. 
Instead, the seamless evolution of the wavefunction according to 
Schrödinger’s law represents a constantly branching world, one in which 
all possible results of each measurement are observed on different macro-
scopic “branches.” Everettians have difficulty explaining the meaning of 
the probabilities generated by Born’s rule: it seems that every result occurs 
with probability one, not with a probability corresponding to the square of 
the amplitude of the wavefunction at a corresponding vector.
Alexander Pruss (2018) and one of us (Koons 2018a) have argued that 
the best way to fix this problem is to take all but one of the Everettian 
branches to represent mere potentialities (as Heisenberg 1958 had pro-
posed). The one actual branch is actualized by the exercise of causal pow-
ers by “substantial forms” at the chemical, biological, and personal levels. 
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The Pruss-Koons model can be called the “traveling forms” interpretation 
(the world’s forms travel together along the branches of the macroscopic 
tree structure of the Everettian model). The addition of the parameter of 
actuality renders the Everettian model consistent with causal emergence: 
although the whole system of branches supervenes on the microphysical 
quantum wavefunction, the fact of which branch is uniquely actual 
does not.
On the traveling forms interpretation, downward causation never 
reaches the level of the evolving quantum wavefunction, but this is rela-
tively innocuous, since that wavefunction represents only the physical 
potentialities of the world’s matter: it does not exhaust what is true of the 
actual state of the world. So long as God can influence the emergent lev-
els, He is free to determine which of the Everettian branches is actualized 
at each point in time. Hence, the influence of God’s action through causal 
emergence can be public, significant, and long-lasting.
14.8  soMe theologicAl reflections
Many miracles in the Abrahamic tradition might be best thought of as 
cases of emergent intervention. It is striking that many divine actions can 
best be thought of as altering only human intentionality or experience. 
For all three traditions, one of the most important divine actions is that of 
inspiring prophetic knowledge and proclamation. This can be realized at 
the purely intentional level, or, in the case of visions and audible voices, at 
the level of phenomenal qualia. Similar accounts could be given of such 
miracles as the prolongation of daylight at Jericho (Joshua 10) and for 
King Hezekiah (2 Kings 20), Moses’ burning bush (Exodus 3), Elisha’s 
floating ax-head (2 Kings 6), Balaam’s speaking donkey (Numbers 22), 
and the star of Bethlehem (Matthew 2).
In the Islamic tradition, prophetic inspiration is the most important 
and central form of miracle. Ibn Sın̄a (980–1037 C.E.) placed the empha-
sis on the purely intentional level: God provided Mohammed with knowl-
edge and discernment, and Mohammed’s own mind was responsible for 
transposing this information into the linguistic or symbolic level (Renard 
1994, 6). Other thinkers, such as Mulla Sadra (1572–1641 C.E.), insisted 
that divine action encompasses the symbolic or imaginative level as well, 
which would correspond to the emergence of sentience (Rahman 1973, 
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242). This combination of intellectual and imaginative action was proba-
bly also involved in Mohammed’s Night of Power, the Mi’raj, in which he 
had a vision of the fourth heaven.
Miraculous healings often occur at a bio-functional and teleological 
level: curing of paralysis, epilepsy, mental illness, blindness, and deafness. 
Many other healings, such as the elimination of leprosy, might also be 
purely biological in nature (via, perhaps, the re-tooling of the immune 
system). Alterations in animal behavior would be placed in this category, 
as in six of the ten plagues of Egypt in Exodus, and Daniel in the lion’s den 
(Daniel 6).
At the level of chemistry and thermodynamics, we could place Jesus’ 
turning water into wine, the manna in the desert of Sinai (assuming that 
this did not have a natural explanation), the rendering harmless of poison 
and snakebite (2 Kings 4, Acts 28), and the unburnable napkin associated 
with the life of Mohammed (Renard 1994, 143). Miraculous rain and its 
absence might be explained in thermodynamic terms, as might 
Mohammed’s transformation Muqawais’ stony ground into fertile soil 
(Renard 1994, 143).
The miracles that violate physical patterns are the exception rather than 
the rule: the three men in the fiery furnace (Daniel 3), Jesus’ walking on 
water, the feeding of the five thousand, the multiplication of the widows’ 
oil (1 Kings 17, 2 Kings 4), and the bottomless water skin of Mohammed 
(Renard 1994, 143). We would probably have to include all of the various 
resurrections: for example, the Shunnamite’s son (2 Kings 4), the widow 
of Zarephath’s son (1 Kings 17), Lazarus (John 11), the widow’s son at 
Nain (Luke 7), the daughter of Jairus, and Tabitha (Acts 9), since these 
would have involved more than merely chemical alterations (especially in 
the case of Lazarus, who had been dead for four days).
Clayton (2006) and Peacocke (2006) argue that emergent interven-
tion supports panentheism, a more naturalistic and immanent conception 
of God than is compatible with classical theism. This conclusion is based 
on the premise that God can alter emergent phenomena only by chang-
ing the ultimate, cosmic context of local events. However, we have argued 
that God can obtain these results by jury-rigging random laws of causal 
emergence. This model is fully compatible with the classical theism of ibn 
Sı ̄na or Thomas Aquinas, with their timeless and utterly transcen-
dent God.
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CHAPTER 15
God et al.— World-Making as Collaborative 
Improvisation: New Metaphors for Open 
Theists
Mark Steen
15.1  IntroductIon
The Qur’an, Hebrew Bible, and New Testament are full of metaphors. 
Theologians and philosophers frequently use metaphors to try to under-
stand God, as well as God’s relation to humanity and the created uni-
verse.1 Metaphors, thought experiments, and imagination have played 
crucial roles in the history of science, and are often used to understand 
1 I’d like to thank Sara Aronowitz, Kelly James Clark, Jeffrey Koperski, and Sam Lebens for 
helpful feedback on earlier (and unnecessarily corpulent) drafts. Special thanks go to Gabriel 
Solis, who helped me immensely. Special thanks to Irem Kurtsal for feedback on multiple 
drafts. Thanks also go to Tyler Denison, Curtis Erhart, Irem Kurtsal, and many more, for the 
improv and laughs.
M. Steen (*) 
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philosophical views2 and scientific theories.3 Scientific practice is informed 
by models which are, strictly speaking, fictional and imprecise (e.g., ideal 
gas laws, ‘selfish’ genes), and are useful partly because of imprecision.4 
Metaphors are important.5
Metaphors often play an ampliative role, acting as key components in 
arguments by analogy. If this is legitimate, then thinking metaphorically 
can not only help us grasp certain theories or phenomenon, but can extend 
our knowledge. If our metaphors are infelicitous (usually by being un- 
isomorphic), then they can lead us astray. So, while buyer beware, we may 
not be able to avoid shopping.
We should craft our metaphors to match certain presuppositions, pre-
vent certain key misconceptions, and so forth. But the point of developing 
metaphors is not just to act as heuristics or illustrations for the unlearned. 
Metaphors help develop theories at least as much as they can express 
theories.
Which metaphors should we employ in thinking about God, and His 
relation to us and our cosmos? I have witnessed the unsurprising fact that 
most of the metaphors about God and His relation to the world support, 
and are supported by, Classical Theism, as opposed to more unorthodox 
theories like Open Theism (OT). But I am an Open Theist and metaphor- 
lover, and think Open Theists should be invited to the Metaphor Party. So 
I decided to explore some novel metaphors after canvassing those for 
Classical Theism.
This paper is not a direct argument for Open Theism (OT). I rather 
hope to show how improvisational metaphors illustrate the OT picture, 
whereas traditional metaphors are unsuitable. I also will show how 
2 One example is the Crossword Puzzle analogy of Susan Haack for understanding 
‘Foundherentism.’ See Haack 1993.
3 Think of how Einstein imagined chasing photons or riding inside space ships in order to 
develop Relativity Theory, or how Galileo trounced Aristotle’s theory of gravitational accel-
eration being a function of mass (see Gendler, Thought Experiment, and Frigg “Models and 
Fiction”). Also, all of us who took high school physics remember Newtonian physics being 
illustrated by non-existent frictionless Euclidean planes, perfect spheres, and General 
Relativity by thinking of a planet bending space like a bowling ball on a blanket. There is also 
‘Hilbert’s Hotel’ with regard to mathematics, and so on.
4 A model must be simpler than what is a model of, given human limitations and our need 
for practicality. (C.f. Frigg 2010).
5 In ways both bad and good. Think of the result of depicting ‘the other’ as vermin, rats, 
viruses, contagion, and so on.
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understanding them makes OT more plausible and coherent with tradi-
tional models of God’s authority. Plus, they’re fun to think about.
15.2  classIcal theIsm and Its metaphors
Open Theism holds that God is (at least partly) temporal and does not 
know which future contingent events will occur. This includes free choices 
as well as undetermined natural events. This view is the combination of 
theism with the doctrine that the future is ‘open’ or not settled—either by 
God or by the laws of nature.
Classical Theism holds that God is outside of time (in ‘eternity’), and 
knows everything which will occur (even future contingents). The follow-
ing chart will give a somewhat caricatured flavor of the differences between 
these views.
Question Classical Theist Open Theist
Does God know 
everything that will 
happen?
Yes No
Is God temporal? No Yes (in some sense)
Does God change? No Yes (except in His character)
How sovereign is God? Meticulously so Allows free will and 
randomness
Will all of God’s 
purposes be fulfilled?
Exactly as planned (according 
to the most precise plan)
As planned (but not according 
to the most precise plan)
Does God take risks? No (no contingency plans 
needed)
Yes (with contingency plans)
15.2.1  The Bird’s-Eye View
Aquinas developed the theological metaphor of the Bird’s-Eye View.6 
While some travelers on a twisty mountain road can’t see around the cor-
ner ahead, a bird in flight can, with its privileged view from above. If we 
make the bird analogous to God, the road to time, and us to the travelers, 
then the result is somewhat obvious. God sees all of time, including the 
future, laid out at once, while we are bound to a road segment at a time.
6 Summa Theologica, part I., Article 13.
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Something like the road analogy, the notion of the ‘Block Universe,’ is 
employed in non-theological contexts. We are asked to view the Universe 
as shaped like a stick of butter, with 2D slices of the butter representing 
actual 3-dimensional “time-slices” of a world, with the length of the stick 
representing the fourth dimension, time.7 Space and time aren’t distin-
guished on this view—there is only space-time. The Block Universe view 
(also called “Eternalism”) is often held to be supported by Relativity 
Theory, not theology, but science-minded folk of a certain theological 
bent can find in this yet more support. On this kind of view the present is 
in no way privileged, all times are equally real, and time does not 
really ‘flow.’
This type of metaphor is ubiquitous, as it is simple, powerful, and visual, 
and the idea of God ‘above’ looking ‘down’ at all of space-time laid out in 
an instant gives an idea of God in eternity sufficient for most folk purposes.
According to this picture God does not act in time, nor does He need 
to. One act, sub specie aeternitatis, is sufficient to both create the world and 
commit all acts of particular providence, since He foreknows and responds 
accordingly beforehand.8
15.2.2  God as Instantaneous Author
A common metaphor for how God stands to the world is as how an author 
stands to their novel. ‘Author,’ etymologically overlaps ‘authority,’ and it 
has long been held that the author is the best authority on their work. Not 
merely in the interpretation of it, but, tautologously, in the writing of it. 
Authors just lay down, by fiat, what happens in their stories. And God 
speaks it, and it is. As Susan Lanser remarks, “It is not accidental that we 
use the term author to refer to God or that the root of the word ‘author-
ity’ links it to the notion of the creator or promoter” (1981, 84).
7 See, for example, Sider, Four Dimensionalism, or Heller 1990.
8 While sitting in a seminar of Eleonore Stump’s, I saw her use a pretty ingenious meta-
phor. Imagine a long table covered with a long tablecloth and place settings. By tugging on 
one end one can affect every object on the table at once, hence having causal effects where 
one is not present. Metaphorically, making times analogous to places on the table, God can 
‘tug’ the world just once and affect every subsequent time, without being ‘at’ those times.
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Sam Lebens, in “God and his imaginary friends: a Hassidic metaphys-
ics,” entertains the idea that the world is God’s lucid dream, or a story 
He’s imagining.9
I call it ‘Hassidic idealism,’ since the idea isn’t that the world doesn’t 
exist. …The idea is that for anything other than God to be real is for it to 
exist in the story that God is spinning in his mind. This is a radical form of 
idealism. (2017, 163, italics his)
It’s a gripping and rich analogy to compare world creation to book 
creation. Books, whether fictional or not, seem to describe some of the 
world.10 Anna Karenina may not exist, but she could have, and those fic-
tional events could have occurred.
Sometimes a novelist is called a ‘world-maker’, and we talk about 
“the world of Dickens” and such, and it has become common for fan-
tasy and sci-fi authors to construct ‘magic systems’ or extraterrestrial 
cultures.
While non-fictional works represent the actual world, what do fictional 
works represent? Many have thought they represent ‘possible worlds,’ or, 
ways the world could be. What are possible worlds? According to Leibniz 
they are compossible sets of possibilia (and possibilia are 'complete con-
cepts' in the mind of God), but many11 have treated “possible worlds” 
more metaphorically, as ‘World-Books,’ that is, maximally specific and 
exhaustive sets of propositions. The idea that ‘possible worlds’ are like 
Fictional World Books, whereas the Actual World’s Book is the only one 
representing a real thing, is an extremely popular one.12 There are many 
different views in this neighborhood, but the shared idea is that worlds are 
identical with, or represented by, consistent sets of sentences or 
9 In this he is inspired by Hefter’s (2013) interpretation of Rabbi Leiner (1995). Lucid 
dreams occur when one is aware that one is dreaming, and can consequently direct it to 
some extent.
10 An alien archaeologist, far in the future, finding a copy of Napoleon: A Life (by Andrew 
Roberts), could be forgiven from thinking this is fiction, or that Dangerous Liaisons (an 
epistolary novel by Pierre Choderlos de Laclos) is a collection of actual letters.
11 Mostly semanticists or modal logicians, who often regard ‘possible worlds’ in a merely 
functional or heuristic manner.
12 You can find over twelve theories comparing possible worlds to books (or linguistic enti-
ties). See Divers 2002, 178–179 for details.
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propositions. John Divers calls such proponents “Book Realists.”13 These 
possible worlds are not like those of speculative cosmology and physics. 
There is no spatiotemporal path from our world to these, and they are 
fundamentally different kinds of entities.14
For the Classical Theist Book Realist, God authors these books, outside 
of time. ‘The book’ which represents the world is authored instanta-
neously. God knows any way a world could be, since He knows all the 
possible objects and properties, aggregates every possible combination of 
them, and picks one world to ‘actualize,’ where every last detail is settled. 
Every possible world-book, including what will become the actual world, 
is already ‘written.’
15.2.3  God: The Lone World-Artist
A ubiquitous metaphor is that God stands the world as an artist to their 
work of art. But which kind of medium is the world best viewed as? Like 
a painting? A song? Maybe a film.
Regardless of the metaphor, the Classical Theist adheres to two main 
points. First, the World Artwork is not a collaborative project, and the 
only artist is God Himself. Second, the artwork is birthed complete and 
entire. God is in eternity; He does not fiddle about in time. His creations 
may exist in time, but their past, present, and future are all equally known 
to Him. His difference-making contribution to the world is completed 
upon creation.
15.2.4  Problems with the Metaphors
For the Open Theist these metaphors just won’t do: they don’t reflect the 
world as she sees it, God as she sees Him, nor do they capture the relations 
between Him, the world, and us.
For example, on the Bird’s-Eye View metaphor, the ‘journey’ is all laid 
out, and our future is just another part of the Block Universe, just as real 
as the present. A completed book is one where, while the protagonist is 
deciding on one page, the decision is already settled on a later 
13 Divers, Possible Worlds.
14 At least, according to most. Some people are ‘modal realists’ who think that all possible 
worlds exist in the same way, and ours is not privileged in any way. See Lewis, On the Plurality 
of Worlds.
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page—hence not free. Completed books, films, audio files—if made 
instantaneously—could not have evolved differently. By collapsing the dis-
tinction between completed films and filming, they end up with films 
whose constituents could not have made the film any different than it in 
fact is.
These concerns are used, not to argue against Classical Theism, but to 
help construct desiderata for metaphors amenable to the Open Theist. I 
believe the OT’ist should consider the following five desiderata which are 
in bold.
Metaphors for the Open Theist should shed light on how petition-
ary prayer can change God’s mind. That is, they should support a 
model where something occurs which would not have occurred had 
the petitioner not prayed, where it was open before the prayer whether 
it would be prayed or not. So, this leads to the open future desidera-
tum, which is also necessary in order to allow Libertarian free will in 
general.
The metaphors should also shed light on how providence works, both 
in general and in particular instances, whether miraculous or not. The 
metaphors should show both how God takes risks, while allowing us to 
have confidence in Him and His plans.
A corollary to some of the aforementioned for Open Theists who, like 
myself, accept quantum randomness is that randomness must be compat-
ible with, or illustrated by, the metaphors.
15.3  metaphors for open theIsts
I will briefly cover two discussed metaphors amenable to OT, but I’m 
mainly interested in the two I will propose, which share the feature of 
improvisation. The main point of this essay is that improvisational meta-
phors more accurately capture the spirit of OT, which sees God and free 
agents as unequal collaborators in making the world be the one that it is 
and will become.
15.3.1  The Shrinking Tree
Storrs McCall (1994) makes use of a branching model of time in order to 
lay out a hybrid 3D/4D view which invokes the metaphor of a ‘universe 
tree.’ The rough idea is that we can think of the past as like the trunk of a 
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tree, and all the possible futures are like branches.15 The present is the 
point of the trunk where the bottom-most branches join the trunk, and 
we can envision it like a saw blade. As it moves up the trunk, it lops off 
unactualized branches. Suppose that event e1 can be followed by (mutu-
ally exclusive) e2 or e3. If e2 occurs, e3 is simultaneously ‘lopped off’ by 
the saw of the present. It is no longer possible. As time moves on, the 
future possibilities get lopped off, and, while the ‘tree’ shrinks, the ‘trunk’ 
of the past expands.
Before the ‘saw of the present’ chops off the other branches, there is 
nothing ontologically privileged about the future which will come to be, 
since it was not determined that it would come to be. If it was determined 
that a branch would not occur, then it wouldn’t be a ‘choppable’ branch 
in the first place.
I find this model and metaphor extremely helpful and plausible, since it 
gives a surrogate for God’s knowledge of the future in Classical Theism, 
namely, God’s knowledge of all possible futures.
15.3.2  More Dynamic Metaphors: ‘Books-in-Progress’ 
and the ‘Growing Block’
Static Classical Theists don’t necessarily have a monopoly on the novel 
metaphor. A Dynamic Open Theist could employ it in a different way. 
They may have a different view of what novels are.
Static theorists see novels as sequentially ordered sets of propositions. 
But one could, and maybe should, see it differently. The writing of a book 
is an event, and the reading of a book is an event. Words, by themselves, 
just sit there, just like individual film cells on a motion picture reel. In 
order to work, the novel needs movement and perception just as much as 
the film does (and, arguably, more active imaginative involvement). Novels 
are a means to an end in a certain medium, the end of having certain expe-
riences.16 The squiggles on the novel’s pages are a means. Toward what 
end? The generating of certain imaginings and representations in the 
reader. One could view the writing of a book more dynamically. That is 
how authors experience the writing and readers the reading. Texts, when 
used as directed, move. Read, turn page, repeat.
15 Which themselves have branches, ad infinitum, unless there’s a final moment.
16 And thoughts, if you think the term ‘experience’ doesn’t capture propositional content.
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So, book metaphors need not be the sole province of Static Classical 
Theorists. God stands to the world as an author does to a book she is writ-
ing. Half-finished novels are no less real than finished ones.17 So, just like 
half-finished houses being built are not half-real completed houses, but 
rather real half-built houses, so are half-finished novels not half-real com-
pleted novels, but rather real half-finished novels, or, we could say, 
books-in-progress.18
And perhaps we are characters in the world-novel being written which 
could ‘possess’ God in the way that characters possess authors.19
One further metaphor which can act as an adjunct to the book-in- 
progress metaphor is a view of the nature of time—the Growing Block.
C.D. Broad thought of space-time in a way akin to Eternalism, but with 
a crucial caveat. The block is growing—growing into the future. “Fresh 
slices of existence” keep getting added to the block, which accounts for 
the flow of time.20 For Broad, the past and present are real, but the future 
is not. It does not yet exist. Combined with a denial of determinism, which 
slice will be added next is not settled.
The theistic Growing Blocker can see God as either adding each slice or 
setting up the block as grow independently, or some blended view. While 
a Growing Block theorist has flexibility with regard to dynamism and 
determinism, their view will invariably be more dynamic than any 
Eternalist view.
15.3.3  God as Collaborative Improvisational 
Director-Participant
According to the most apt metaphors I find for God in relation to the 
world, He is an improvisatory director and co-performer. I will examine in 
particular the metaphors of God as a jazz ensemble head, and as an impro-
visational play director-participant.
17 Relatedly, how one sections a long book or series is somewhat arbitrary, and so whether 
one is finished with a book or in fact working on a sequel is somewhat arbitrary too.
18 C.f. Szabo-Gendler 2008.
19 In terms of surprising the author. I’m not supposing that we are pushing God around. 
There is a well-known phenomenon that fiction authors deal with, called ‘character posses-
sion,’ where it seems that the characters are telling the author what they will do rather than 
the other way around. Just to be clear, I don’t think this is literal possession.
20 Broad 1923, 66. Note that the issue of determinism is orthogonal to the question of the 
growing block.
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Since it is a component of both metaphors, we can begin by laying out 
some of the elements of improvisation.21
Spontaneity
Spontaneity in performance is the soul of improv, even if an artifact is a 
goal. Something is improvised, in part, by being made up ‘on the fly,’ or 
not prepared beforehand. We can see it in dance, music, some painting 
(e.g., Pollock’s flinging of paint), film, theater, ‘automatic writing,’ 
William Burrough’s découpé,22 and so forth.
Some works are completely improvised, some partially improvised, and 
the improvised elements can be structured and prepared to different 
degrees.
Structured
Ad-lib does not mean ad hoc. Improvisation is not purely random behav-
ior or gobbledygook. In improv theater and jazz, the goal is a structured 
or coherent performance. There may, and perhaps must, be elements of 
randomness, but the whole should not seem completely random.
Collaborative Yes-And’ing
We are looking at collaborative improvisational forms. Improv theater and 
jazz bands work together to make a single work. One is a member of a 
team, and team goals trump personal ones. If someone in improv tries to 
stand out or works against their colleagues’ contribution, the work usually 
suffers. Scenes only work if the players focus on doing what’s right for the 
scene and characters, and build on, rather than deny, their colleagues’ 
introduced content.
Playfulness
Arguably, improvisation is playful. It is participated in for joy and recre-
ation, even if it has a serious purpose or application. One of the main 
draws for both artist and audience is that it is fun, even though (or partly 
because) it is difficult.
21 See Zaunbrecher 2011 for more detail.
22 Burroughs ‘wrote’ some pieces by cutting out words and randomly selecting them, while 
making some corrections for grammar and coherence.
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Aesthetics of Ephemerality in Live Performance
Improvised art forms have aesthetic novelty. The most ‘pure’ improv and 
jazz are made to be performed live. In improv, this has to do with audi-
ence participation. Usually the direction an improv game or play takes will 
start with audience suggestions. Audience members are often asked to 
participate, sometimes on stage. Audiences usually cut a lot of slack to the 
performance that they wouldn’t with a written play. Improv is self- 
consciously so, and that’s part of what makes it the practice it is. In both 
improv and jazz the mutual interaction between performers and audience 
often makes a difference to the performance.
The ontology of an improv play is arguably different from a written 
one, and the same goes for an improvised jazz performance versus a 
recording, or a fully composed piece.23 This has to do with entrenched 
Western ideas of what works of art are, as well as the distinction between 
composition and performance. With Western classical music, performer 
and composer are usually distinct, and the different performances are seen 
as different instances (or, ‘tokens’) of the same work (or ‘type’).
But the distinction between type and token breaks down with improv. 
In most cases, the performer and composer are one and the same, and the 
composition and the performance (to some extent) are one and the same. 
My friends Curtis Erhart and Tyler Denison, members of the improv 
troupe Ephemerata, begin every play by saying, melodramatically, “this 
play has never been performed before—and will never be performed again.”
While there still are kinds of improv, both ‘long-form’ play structures 
(La Ronde, the Harold) and ‘short-form’ games (Word-at-a-time, Film 
Dub, etc.), performances in these structures are not different instances of 
the same work of art. The games are merely rules employed to shape spon-
taneous composition of plays.
With the most avante-y of Avant-Garde Jazz, every performance and 
composition are the same. With mainstream jazz, there are indeed differ-
ent versions of the same piece, but some of the composition happens on 
the fly, so they are not instantiating a preexisting completed work.
Domenico Pietropaolo, while abstracting away from all the differences 
in the different schools of commedia dell’arte (the precursor of modern 
improv), analyzes commedia dell’arte as a “stochastic composition pro-
cess” (Pietropaolo 1989).
23 C.f. Solis, 316.
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We can look at the various jazz soloing conventions and the formats of 
long- and short-form improv as stochastic composition processes. These 
are rules for making pieces and plays, which rely on randomness as a con-
tributory agent. Randomness—it’s not a bug, it’s a feature!
15.3.3.1  Example 1: Jazz Band Leader
I am not the first to make a metaphorical connection between jazz and 
OT. Darryl Wooldridge on Sanders:
Open Theism … proposes that God‘s give-and-receive relationship with 
humans requires that they have freewill and that God’s actions are contin-
gent upon human unknown actions. It is freewill that may change God’s 
flexible strategies making macro predestination viable but micro predestina-
tion contingent, a bit like improvisational jazz solos within an overriding 
melody (Sanders 2007, 245). In other words, there is an unstructured or 
unknown polyphonic, improvisational element to human existence for 
which God accounts and responds, in real time, in harmonic kind.24
I am going to assume some familiarity with jazz25 and will mostly refer 
to mainstream jazz of the 1940s and 1950s (especially ‘Cool Jazz’). These 
works, like all jazz, have some amount of pre-arranged structure.26 A 
familiar structure is a standard bop format, which is as follows: “there is an 
introduction, followed by the head, a series of solos and finally a closing 
recapitulation of the head” (Solis, 317). The ‘head’ is the main theme or 
melody of a song, and, very often, the work has a 32-bar AABA structure.27
The head remains recognizable in the piece’s different versions, while 
improvisation provides for the difference. Every performance of an impro-
vised jazz piece is different.
Improvisation is so central to jazz that ‘covers,’ or replication, is impos-
sible. The band Mostly Other People Do the Killing (MOPDTK) did a 
painstaking, note-for-note reproduction of Miles Davis’ album Kind of 
Blue. How can an intrinsic duplicate of a jazz performance not be the same 
24 Wooldridge 2014, 65.
25 For those unfamiliar with the genre, here are some paradigmatic exemplars of the sub-
genres discussed in this paper: John Coltrane, “Alabama”: https://tinyurl.com/y343ef6s, 
Miles Davis, “So What?”: https://tinyurl.com/d3mack3, Thelonious Monk, “Don’t Blame 
Me”: https://tinyurl.com/ls2xlbh
26 Some Avant-Garde works excluded.
27 Solis, 317
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jazz composition? Because, as (band leader) Elliott puts “it, ‘the defining 
characteristic of jazz is improvisation,’ and that’s by definition precluded 
from this project.”28 Exact intentional replication is impossible since spon-
taneous creation is essential to the piece.
In jazz sheet music, there is often notation indicating when improvised 
solos should occur.29 So, if one is not improvising, one is not playing the 
piece. MOPDTK weren’t improvising “So What?,” so they weren’t play-
ing it. Copying is not improvising. They weren’t doing what Davis and 
crew were. Whether or not one is playing jazz is not intrinsic to the musi-
cal sounds, it depends on the intentions and preparations, or lack thereof, 
of the musicians.
Most small group jazz collaboration requires continuous simultaneous 
co-adjustment. They need to be playing with each other, not merely beside 
each other, and need to be creating something new as a group. Ingrid 
Monson colorfully describes how this fails in the following, even when the 
result sounds decent:
I hate hearing them bands where like … one cat’s playing some shit that he 
practiced. Another cat’s playing some shit that he practiced. Everybody’s 
playing some stuff that they practiced. … On a certain level there’s like a 
feeling, “Well, I like playing with you,” but … what does that mean? … You 
know, we didn’t play shit together. We didn’t do nothing together. I played 
my stuff, you played your stuff, we didn’t screw up the time.30
It would, however, be a misconception to think that jazz solo work 
comes ex nihilo out of the head of the composer, in the moment. David 
Sterritt shows (as should be obvious) how jazz improvisation is based on 
hours of practicing and learning the various ‘tricks’ for improvising perfor-
mances. “The allegedly inherent traits of improvisation—authenticity, 
spontaneity, individuality,” which can give the art, and the artist, an air of 
mystique, or an aura of cool, “are often exaggerated or misrepresented by 
its advocates,”31 Arguably, many improvised solos are pre-composed in 
part. As Thomas Owens states, all spontaneous performances “were 
28 See https://tinyurl.com/ybf875yh
29 Or, at least, there is always an assumed convention that solos should occur during 
the piece.
30 Monson 1995, 84. My source is Solis, 333.
31 Sterritt, 166.
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actually precomposed in part … no one can create fluent, coherent melo-
dies in real time without having a well-rehearsed bag of melodic tricks 
ready.”32 And Sterritt states that “the typical improviser’s mind … is 
‘stuffed with a congeries of motifs, instrumental sounds … scales, chords, 
modes, and the rest.’”33
This is not to denigrate jazz improvisation. While genuinely impro-
vised, we must understand that the performance comes from disciplined 
preparation, shaping novel sounds from familiar material. It’s the same 
with improv. Improvisers practice accents, character types, games, transi-
tions, and so on.
If God interacts with us like a jazz band leader, perhaps we should look 
at an example.
John Zorn, while not a paradigm jazz band leader, provides a good 
example. A saxophonist, he plays and composes in many different genres. 
In the piece I will discuss (at https://tinyurl.com/pa6ue3h34), Zorn is 
solely directing. The piece’s head is a simple guitar riff,35 a few bars long, 
together with a keyboard chord progression. It begins by the guitarist, 
Marc Ribot, improvising with notes echoing the main riff, and Zorn points 
to his head when he wants Ribot to start playing the head, and, as you can 
see, he directs changes in tempo, volume, and points in certain ways when 
he wants an individual to solo or cease soloing. The keyboard chords act 
as an ‘anchor’ to give continuity and coherence to the piece, and when it’s 
time for the keyboardist’s solo, the head is taken up by Ribot to keep 
things anchored while the keyboardist wanders. You’ll notice that at 3:29 
Zorn pokes Ribot’s leg to get his attention and points to his head to indi-
cate the solo should end and he should get back to the head of the song. 
Ribot doesn’t immediately go back to the head, but improvises a sensible 
way back, Zorn trusting Ribot to do this. You can see the constant micro- 
communications not just between the leader and band members, but 
directly between band members, and indirectly between members via the 
leader as a focal point.
This hopefully suffices to get the idea across how improvisational music 
is ‘dialogical,’ developing communicatively and communally among the 
32 Owens, 30. My source is Sterritt, 166.
33 Both quotes from Sterritt, 166.
34 The first piece, from the beginning of the video up until minute 9.
35 A riff is a short series of notes which are catchy, repeating, and rhythmic.
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musicians, usually coordinated through a leader. The emphasis is often on 
process over product, or perhaps, process as product. But, when a work is 
recorded, it can enter the popular culture as a work which is appreciated as 
an entity in and of itself, such as classics like Monk at the Five Spot, or Bill 
Evans at the Village Vanguard.
Gabriel Solis argues convincingly that jazz performances and record-
ings make it so that jazz has a kind of dual-life. Recently, he states, the 
emphasis on scholarship has focused on
The dialogic qualities of jazz, on the ways that performances are multiply 
authored, undermining the priority of the single author, and focusing on the 
emergent, processual aspects of jazz performance, rather than viewing jazz 
as simply a collection of texts.36
Perhaps the recent scholarship has swung too far away from the preced-
ing postmodern conception of jazz works, which regards them as ‘texts’—
the paradigm of completed, ‘frozen’ products.
Solis says
I would like to suggest that the protocols of action and imagination that 
people involved with jazz—musicians and audiences—use to engage jazz 
recordings allow for a coexistence of a dialogic-processual interpretation of 
jazz recordings alongside an understanding of them as products.37
Compare this to the earlier distinction between two kinds of entities: an 
entire world, as it is unfolding, versus the completed recording of a world. 
Extreme Static Classical Theists regard the world as only the recorded and 
completed artifact, whereas extreme Dynamic Open or Process theorists 
see it as only the unfolding (or ‘becoming’) itself.38
Those who embrace the improvisatory metaphor that I’m using can 
also say that the world has a dual-life, the present unfolding processual life 
and its static past history. And, just like how MOPDTK’s note-for-note 
intrinsic duplicate of Kind of Blue is not of the same kind as the original, 
so God, if He created a complete intrinsic duplicate of a ‘finished’ world 
36 Solis, op cit., 333.
37 Ibid.
38 An Open Theist thankfully does not have to embrace a process metaphysics a la 
Hartshorne or Whitehead (but they may have to embrace some form of process).
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with libertarian free will or randomness, would not be duplicating  the 
same kind of world as the original.
15.3.3.2  Example 2: Improv Troupe Director-Participant—Christopher 
Guest’s Model
With improv performance there is usually no ruler, just rules. While an 
improv instructor during class gives directions and instruction, this is con-
sidered practice, not rehearsal.
There are many forms of improv, and I’ll resign a short discussion to a 
footnote.39
In the metaphor envisioned, where ‘the play’ is all of history, I prefer to 
model it with Christopher Guest’s method, with some significant 
variations.
Guest, after starring in Rob Reiner’s This is Spinal Tap, a ‘mockumen-
tary’ about a heavy metal band, went on to make many improvised moc-
kumentaries himself.40 While Guest directed them, most were co-written 
with Eugene Levy. There wasn’t exactly a script in the usual sense. The 
scripts were between 10 and 20 pages that merely outlined the scenes and 
story arc. They would also write up some brief background material for 
each major character. After casting was decided, filmmaking would consist 
in just throwing the actors together to start improvising the planned 
scenes. How each scene would develop was broadly settled, but how they 
would get there was up for grabs. No dialogue was written, being entirely 
improvised.41
39 Improv plays are either short or long form. Short-form pieces are composed via the rules 
of improv games. Here’s a simple one–‘Questions.’ The players get on stage, and ask for a 
setting suggestion from the audience (e.g., ‘office,’ ‘beach’). Then they improvise, with the 
constraint that they can only ask questions. If someone fails, they are ‘out,’ until only one is 
left—the winner. Long form is much less constrained. Structures are provided to enable the 
players to create a play on the spot. One form, the La Ronde, works as follows. After an audi-
ence suggestion of a relationship, two of the players come out and start a scene. The other 
players form a line on the side of the stage. When it seems apt, the player next in line on the 
wall ‘taps out’ one of the players on stage, who exits to the back of the line, and a new scene 
begins. The next player will tap out the earlier of the two until everyone has had a turn, and 
it wraps up by a concluding scene with the first- and last-appeared characters. The goal is to 
develop the characters, their relationships, and to portray some alterations in the 
relationships.
40 They include Waiting for Guffman, Best in Show, A Mighty Wind, and others.
41 Usually they ended up with 30 hours of film, edited down to 1.5–2 hours for the final 
cut. Here’s a trailer for Waiting for Guffman, just to give you a taste: https://tinyurl.com/
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Guest frequently uses the same actors across films. Frequent co-star 
Parker Posey herself compares what they do to jazz:
“It’s like jazz,” says Posey … “Everyone is a different instrument and adds 
a different element. Guest is very much a maestro, an auteur. … On Waiting 
for Guffman we’d do these long improvisations until the mag would run 
out. For like seven minutes, we’re just lying on the floor, doing some acting 
exercise where everyone is talking and ‘Yes-and-ing’ each other.” … The 
director, she continues, “definitely created his own formula with actors that 
only worked in a specific kind of way. It had to do with the creating of a 
certain character or persona. And you don’t know what you’re going to 
say—you’re just going to be in the moment with someone else … and then 
something happens.”42
The Divine Improv
The Divine Improv is a live, one-shot performance, with no editing, no 
revision, and relatively minimal preparation. The Director has envisioned 
an improvised play with a broad story arc, but with unsettled fine details. 
Each player receives a description of their character, background, and rela-
tionships. But one thing the Director doesn’t do is tell the actors exactly 
what the story arc is. If the story strays too far from his vision, he has 
several tools at his disposal. For starters, he can enter the play whenever he 
wishes as a character.43
There are also some arranged prop and audio conventions. The Director 
is free to just throw a prop on stage whenever he wishes, and the actors 
must work it into the narrative in as plausible and seamless a way as pos-
sible. For example, he could throw an engagement ring in a box on stage 
when two characters who are lovers are out to dinner. Or, another time, 
he could play audio of a car crashing, and so forth.
The actors may discern where the action is going and can try to thwart 
matters. But this Director is so smart, with enough tools, that she will get 
from them roughly what she wants in any case. One thing she wants is 
what is best for each character, within limits set by logic, the demands of 
justice, and respecting each character’s autonomy.
y8v8x5nl. Musical numbers are usually not improvised.
42 From https://tinyurl.com/yb8kczah
43 Analogous to, for example, a voice on Mount Sinai, or, for Christians, as Jesus. Also 
angels or internal suggestions work as presence by proxy.
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These actors work on a “need-to-know basis.” They do not know 
where they are going, for if they did, they would not arrive. Some of them 
may begin to discern the Director’s benevolence for her characters, despite 
the play’s vagaries indicating otherwise. The actors may begin to have faith 
in the end, glimpsing an ending which is surprising yet inevitable, but they 
cannot see how they will arrive. But a good improviser in this case will 
have trust in the Director’s vision.
15.4  salutary upshots
And now for some explanations how these metaphors elucidate or support 
dynamic views of God and His interaction with the world.
 1. Prayer can change things
While improvisation is extremely flexible, the players are constrained by 
genre-specific considerations. A competent leader-participant will be 
responsive to changing facts ‘on the ground’ in order to meet the player’s 
needs. The Classical Theist cannot accommodate this—any contribution 
God would have as leader would be exhausted once the play or perfor-
mance begins. While His effects may be located during the present, this 
would only work if he foreknows everything which will happen—which is 
incompatible with OT. Blending an open future with the God of Classical 
Theism directing would be like Him delivering a video-recording of a 
conductor conducting a future performance—it would be unable to 
respond to changes.
According to Classical Theism, God responds affirmatively to prayer by 
actualizing a world where one’s prayer for x is followed by x. But on the 
Open view, if a prayer is free, it cannot be 100% predicted beforehand; 
therefore God must act in time in order to respond.
 2. The future is open
Improvisation would be much more boring and low stakes if what will 
happen is fixed beforehand. Regardless of our epistemic shortcomings, if 
it is somehow metaphysically determined what will happen for any par-
ticular improv, then the practice would lose some of the features that make 
improv uniquely good—a product of random associationist thought tem-
pered by improviser choice and skill. If we are engaged with God in a 
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project of realizing a good, just, kind, and interesting world with high- 
stakes difference-making choices, a model which is collaborative and 
open-ended seems more apt than a sole-composed static work entirely 
realized before time, where each player’s lines are all written.
 3. Illustrating Providence: Freedom through constraint
The ‘providence’ of the band leader or collaborative improv director- 
participant can be divided into the help before the performance and during 
the performance.44 First, the writing of the musical piece, or the develop-
ment of the story arc, helps narrow the space of possibilities within which 
the artists can flourish in their given roles, and assigns them guiding struc-
ture. A good improv leader does not craft a piece for generic artists, but 
crafts and customizes the work in light of the particular artists involved. 
That there even is a song or play to perform depends on the improv leader, 
and if it is a good one, then it is thanks to her.
In jazz, in order for some individuals to perform their best, to exhibit 
their individuality in improvisation in the most excellent way, they may 
have to be not merely guided, but also goaded, by the band leader. A good 
leader often pushes their performers and, somewhat paradoxically, makes 
them freer by constraining them.
Solis notes that in some cases
the need to come to a session prepared to ‘bring something’ to a dialogue 
with other musicians—the ability to make ‘musical conversation’—is clearly 
mediated by the authority (if not the authorship, per se) of the leader.45
He then describes a case where Charles Mingus, with his domineering 
personality, dominated his band members to get them
to bring every bit of themselves to the performance, so that the arrange-
ments would be reflective of the individuals involved, rather than a mere 
collection of instruments. This goal is a composerly one. … The perfor-
mance culminated in a performance of “Meditations on Integration.”46
Buddy Collete describes a great moment during this performance:
44 Henceforth, I will refer to both as ‘improv leader,’ and sometimes just ‘leader.’
45 Solis, 333.
46 Ibid.
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Everyone was getting into it, playing solos. Mingus had two other trumpet 
players (besides Bobby Bryant) … and he let them play. Bobby knew he 
wasn’t going to get a chance. It was getting louder, more intense, really 
screaming. Then Mingus looked at Bobby and said, “Now!” Bobby at this 
point was so angry he hadn’t played that he took his horn and blew the bell 
off it to show Mingus what he could do. And that did it. Mingus got the 
climax he wanted and the people just went crazy. … He had psyched Bobby 
out. He knew Bobby was strong as a bull and he wanted a killer punch. … 
There it was. Mingus had captured all these moods. He knew how to get 
them. He was like a little teaser: ‘Not yet’ or ‘Maybe you won’t get any’ and 
then ‘Okay, now!’ It does work. It’s what coaches do for fighters. Sometimes 
you need that little kick.47
I think what is analogous to aesthetic performance in the metaphor 
must be our moral performance or our will’s alignment with God’s. God 
is the jazz band leader or improvisational director of our moral behavior, 
according to this model, but many folk don’t know they are playing, much 
less playing in an ensemble, and much less that there is a leader. That’s 
why their songs stink and their solos detract from, rather than enhance, 
the communally produced piece. The way we are directed does not make 
us unfree—it makes us more free to be able to realize the flourishing we 
are intended for.
 4. God’s risks, assurances, and sovereignty
Most believers I know accept, and should accept, both of the following:
 a. God is looking after my welfare.
 b. Terrible things will happen to me.
While we think that God may test us and allow us to suffer, we believe 
that (a.) still holds despite our calamities, since we think that ultimately 
He will not abandon us.48
Given that the improv leader employs fallible humans, there is no guar-
antee that the composition will be as good as it can be. Given the freedom 
artists in the medium enjoy, and a fickle world, there is no guarantee that, 
for example, one’s solo will shine by being free from a distracting 
47 Collette 2000, 34–35. My source is Solis ibid., 334.
48 C.f., for example, Habbakuk 3:16–19.
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colleague, or that one’s presuppositions laid out in the improv will be 
noticed, remembered, and so forth. But you can nevertheless trust the 
leader since, if there is a track record, one has seen how the leader has 
often pulled the play/song back from the brink, such as by helping a char-
acter’s suffering make sense or tying together loose ends.
Many complain that views such as OT entail that God is not sovereign 
and is undermined by no longer being the sole author of the world. The 
correct response to this is nuanced.
How many authors are there for a jazz performance or improvised play? 
A case can be made for one, and a case for many.49
I think we can have it both ways. Solis mentions how, even though a 
jazz piece may be realized by a group collaborating and soloing, there can 
still be “reasonable individual authorial attributions” (Solis, 331). For 
example, the first recording of Monk’s “Evidence” features Milt Jackson 
on vibraphone. While other, later versions did not, they were nevertheless 
versions of the same piece. But if, on the first recorded version, the vibra-
phonist improvises—why is he not an author of the piece as well? Especially 
if it is true, as mentioned, that the composer/performer distinction 
breaks down?
The answer for why he is not an author is that the differences he brings 
do not make a difference to it being the piece that it is, while they essen-
tially bring to it something that makes it the version that it is. (The initial 
album was to showcase Jackson’s work).50
With jazz, the non-authorial improvising performers are what we could 
call ‘essential version-realizers.’ While their solos do not make the song be 
the one that it is, they do make it be the version it is, distinct from any 
other performance of it. Improvising band members, while less than co- 
authors, are more than merely instruments to instantiate the compos-
er’s vision.
So, if we are the musicians in God’s band, playing His piece, we also are 
less than co-authors but more than instantiating instruments. While the 
‘head’ or coarse-grained structure of the piece is settled, we determine the 
fine-grained details and hence complete the work. We, like the band mem-
bers, make a contribution to it being the piece it is.
Things are the same, mutatis mutandis, with improv. Maybe all the 
world is God’s stage, but we are not merely players. The structure is 
49 When there’s a single composer.
50 Milt Jackson and The Thelonious Monk Quintet (Blue Note BLP-1509, 12”, 1956).
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broadly determined, but we decide how some of the particulars go. We are 
more than mere actors given a script, yet less than co-authors. Below an 
author is a contributor. We contribute to the play, and if it weren’t for us, 
the play would be different—but not a different play. We may ‘author’ our 
lines totally, but this is not enough to make us a co-author. Maybe we can-
not choose our role, but can choose how we play it.
The point is that these analogies retain God’s sovereignty, while allow-
ing us to make a difference-making contribution to the world. And noth-
ing about this view denies that God could take over to any degree He 
wished, if He so wished. I don’t know how often He does, but we can see 
many things go on that are decidedly not what He wishes.
 5. How randomness fits in the picture
Randomness, non-determinateness, or chance plays a crucial role in 
improv. If improv is, as Pietropaolo says, a “stochastic composition pro-
cess,” then how does the stochastic part come in?
I don’t think the analogies provide much illumination into what ran-
domness is, but I do think they can illustrate how randomness is employed, 
both by us and by God. In improv, unexpected things (e.g., notes, chords, 
puns, actions) just ‘come to us,’ and to our colleagues, and from the audi-
ence, and we need to work with that. Concentrate on attempting to make 
a great plan pan out, come what may, or on preparing for any possibility—
and the whole thing falls apart. But, one can practice a lot beforehand so 
that more and better things come to one more easily, and actions under-
taken more skillfully. We can ask the leader to help hone our skills. 
Analogously, we will be put into situations where our morality and charac-
ter will be tested. At some point deliberation must end and action begin, 
and how we weigh and measure will be a somewhat intuitive and character- 
based matter. ‘Growing’ as a performer is analogous to forming one’s 
moral character. (These metaphors lend themselves somewhat to a ‘soul- 
making’ theodicy like that proposed by John Hick.51)
Another point about randomness—‘stuff’ happens, and it often seems 
to have no rhyme or reason. A bad split-second decision, or a slow reac-
tion time, which could be caused by lack of sleep (which may depend on 
the vagaries of that damn alley-cat’s estrous cycle), can make the difference 
between life and death. History is full of stories of battle where who lived 
51 Such as in Hick 1981.
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and died had nothing to do with a soldier’s skill, character, cleverness, or 
lovableness. There are many close calls, when we are happy that God is 
looking after us. Yet, sometimes other fine people aren’t so lucky, and 
we’d be terrible if we used that as evidence that God doesn’t care for them. 
We have to be careful with explanations of purpose and trying to explain 
away all randomness as actually pregnant with purpose. It could be that 
there is no reason some events occur,52 and a good improviser will often be 
hampered by seeking explanations when things go badly.
In a striking passage from Stephen King’s The Stand (not all of which I 
agree with, in characterization or tone) a narrator states:
The beauty of religious mania is that it has the power to explain everything. 
Once God … is accepted as the first cause of everything which happens in 
the mortal world, nothing is left to chance … or change. Once such incanta-
tory phrases as “we see now through a glass darkly” and “mysterious are the 
ways He chooses His wonders to perform” are mastered, logic can be hap-
pily tossed out the window. Religious mania is one of the few infallible ways 
of responding to the worldʼs vagaries, because it totally eliminates pure acci-
dent. To the true religious maniac, itʼs all on purpose.53
Is the reason you didn’t get the job over your less-qualified competitor 
because God is punishing you for not paying enough attention to your 
children? Or because of racism, sexism, or ableism? Or is it because in the 
interview you came off as arrogant? Or is it to save you from a commute 
where God was certain you would die? Or is it because a member of the 
committee forgot to set their alarm at that conference long ago, and in so 
doing and waking up late, happened to meet one of the future candidates 
in a cafe line and liked the cut of their jib? Likely you’ll never know. In any 
case, however, the answer of what to do is somewhat like the improvis-
er’s—we’ve got to roll with it.
This does not mean that you should not be perturbed by anything, nor 
seek to rectify injustice. Rather, that you should foster a resilient and flex-
ible disposition as much as you can—you’re going to need it.
52 Or that chance is the reason.
53 Book II chapter 48.
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15.5  conclusIon
If God constructs the world like how one directs an improvised play—
then what is the genre? Genres not only shape the plot and themes, they 
shape expectations. If it’s a comedy, expect some laughs. If it’s a mystery, 
expect a crime and expect some false leads. While many good works are 
genre-bending, usually genre-crossing leads to disaster, like if aliens landed 
halfway through the film Chinatown, or if a wizard was the main explana-
tion behind the aliens in Alien.
In improv, as in daily life, we may be terrified that we won’t know what 
to do. But if we have a good Director, or Muse, we should not worry. 
Stephen Pressfield relates the following:
Patricia Ryan Madson taught improv at Stanford for years. … Patricia has an 
exercise that she calls “What’s in the Box?” She asks her students to imagine 
a small white box. Imagine a lid on this box. Now lift the lid. What do you 
find inside? Sometimes students say a diamond. … Sometimes a pomegran-
ate. The trick is, there is always something inside the box. … Patricia was 
addressing her students’ seminal terror: that they would get up on stage and 
draw a blank. The professional trusts the mystery. He knows that the Muse 
always delivers. She may surprise us. She may give us something we never 
expected. But she will always put something inside the box.54
Alasdair MacIntyre also has written about genre, and, in After Virtue, 
he compares us to authors, but of our own lives, and stresses the impor-
tance of narrative:
thus the narratives which we live out have both an unpredictable and par-
tially teleological character. If the narrative of our individual and social lives 
is to continue intelligibly … it is always both the case that there are con-
straints on how the story can continue and that within those constraints 
there are indefinitely many ways that it can continue. … I can only answer 
the question ‘What am I to do?’ If I can answer the prior question, ‘Of what 
story or stories do I find myself a part?’55
It will help the players’ performance to discover what genre of play they 
are in. If they are acting like they are in a comedy, when in fact they are in 
a tragedy, aesthetic disaster will ensue. But it may well be that having to 
54 Pressfield, Turning Pro 117.
55 MacIntyre 1981, 216.
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discover themselves what genre they are in is instrumental toward it being 
the instance of the genre that it is.
We do not get to fully determine what genre we are in. Part of the 
scoundrel’s problem is that he believes he is in a heroic tale, where in fact 
he is in a tragedy, with himself as the anti-hero. A buffoonish blowhard 
may believe he is a stable genius and part of the greatest riches-to-greater- 
riches success story, whereas he is actually in a tragi-comedy about a 
spoiled rich boy and the soul-destroying effects of greed, power, and 
narcissism.
Maybe if we came to realize that we are all primarily in a love story, or 
collectively playing a love song, and are not composing, much less direct-
ing, on our own, we would come to change our expectations, attitudes, 
and show some real chops.
The world which is a love-themed improvised artwork is unique. This 
is the only love story wherein the very characters of the story can come to 
realize that they are both the story’s subjects, and the story’s collabora-
tors, and that the story is also about a perfect loving author, who wants to 
play with them—not as playthings, but as playmates. Hence the story of 
the world reaches outside of itself.
The love which the work is about is not only represented by the work, 
the work is constituted and sustained by the very love which it is about.
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CHAPTER 16
Saadia on “what is in the hearts of people 
when they reach the limits of endurance 
in a trial”
Josef Stern
Saadia ben Joseph Al-Fayyumi Gaon (b. Egypt 882, d. Iraq 942) is one of 
the best examples of the impact of Islamic civilization (which absorbed 
Late Ancient culture and thought) on medieval Judaism in the East. The 
most distinguished rabbinic scholar of his generation, he was “Gaon” 
(“His Excellency”), or Head, of the famous Talmudic academy in Sura 
and later in Baghdad (under the Abbasids), the author of important legal 
responsa and treatises, especially on procedural law and on the calendar, 
and a powerful opponent of the sectarian Karaites. He also wrote pioneer-
ing work on Hebrew linguistics and grammar, poetry, and liturgy; trans-
lated the Hebrew Bible into Arabic; and composed commentaries on 
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selected books, including the Book of Job. However, he is probably best 
known for his Book of Doctrines and Beliefs, a book of Jewish kalam, so- 
called dialectical theology, an attempt to systematize the beliefs of Judaism 
and, arguably, the first book of Jewish philosophy (in a broad sense of the 
term “philosophy,” although it is not Aristotelian falsafa).1 It was the first 
such text to initiate a tradition of Jewish thought.2
In the fourth and fifth treatises of Doctrines and Beliefs and, as we shall 
see, in the Introduction to his commentary on the Book of Job, The Book of 
Theodicy, Saadia discusses the constellation of metaphysical issues that 
revolve around providence, the problem of evil, free will and human 
responsibility, reward and punishment, suffering, and, in particular, unjust 
or undeserved suffering, which is known in rabbinic Judaism as the prob-
lem of zaddiq ve-ra‘ lo’ (the suffering of the righteous) and rasha‘ ve-tov lo’ 
(the prospering of the wicked). First, Saadia defends a libertarian concep-
tion of human freedom against strong Ash‘arite arguments that deny it in 
order to secure divine omnipotence manifest in occasionalism, the doc-
trine that there are no intermediate natural causes and that all natural 
phenomena, including human action, are directly causally dependent on 
the will of God. On Saadia’s view, God gave humans the freedom to act 
including the ability to commit moral wrongs. However, while He allows 
such evils—after all, the harm their free actions cause is not to Him but to 
themselves—at the same time He warns humans not to commit them out 
of His mercy for humanity. The fact that humans commit those evils is, in 
any case, neither incompatible with His power (to do only the good) nor 
does it show that He lacks power (over humanity). Second, in order to 
demonstrate the compatibility of natural evil, or suffering, with the 
1 Doctrines and Beliefs was not, however, the first book of Jewish kalam. That distinction 
goes to al-Muqammas 2016 (9th c.) which is also the first Arabic theological treatise we 
possess.
2 For the major works of Saadia, see Saadiah 1946/2002; 1948; 1972; 1973; 1988. All 
citations in the text to Doctrines and Beliefs are to Saadiah 1946/2002 (Altmann translation) 
and all citations in the text to the Commentary on Job are to Saadiah 1988 (Goodman trans-
lation). For Saadiah’s intellectual biography and especially the Islamic background to his life 
and thought, see Malter 1921; Brody 2016; and Stroumsa 2003. On the Commentary on 
Job, and its Islamic background, both in the Qur’an and tafsir literature, see Goodman’s 
introductory essay to Saadiah 1988, 4–109; Goodman 1990; Stump 1997; 2000; Rosenthal 
2001, 97–125; Eisen 2004, 17–41; and Cohen 2005, 243–253. On Saadiah’s general theory 
of providence, see Stump 1997 and Nadler 2009, 624–628. On Saadiah’s epistemology, see 
Heschel 1942–3 and 1944–5. On the significance of traditions in the characterization of 
Jewish philosophy and Saadiah’s place in a tradition, see Josef Stern 2017. 
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existence of God and, more important for Saadia, with divine justice, he 
offers a number of traditional theodicies: that natural evil is an illusion if 
one were only to know the “big picture,” that there are no goods without 
evils, and that evils are often corrective devices. However, the problem of 
evil that most concerns Saadia is that of the suffering of the righteous and 
the prosperity of the wicked. Not only is this unjust. According to Saadiah, 
it challenges the very idea of reward and punishment. His general reply is 
that while there is reward and punishment, we can never know who is 
truly deserving of either. Thus he attempts to disabuse us of one problem 
with evil—Why are we suffering and what did we do wrong?—by con-
structing an account that both affirms that there is a theodicy, or justifica-
tion for all evil, and delimits human understanding of how to apply such a 
theodicy to actual cases.
More specifically, Saadia’s theodicy to account for the suffering of the 
righteous distinguishes two kinds of suffering or evil: (i) punishment and 
(ii) trial or testing.
I find that suffering befalls the pious in this world in one of two ways: either 
as punishment for the relatively small number of their transgressions … or, 
alternatively, as a visitation from God in order to test them, provided He 
knows that they will be able to endure it. Later he compensates them for 
their suffering. (Saadiah 1946/2002, 137–8)
When sufferings and calamities befall us, they must be of one of two classes: 
either they occur on account of prior sins of ours, in which case they are to 
be called punishments, and we must search out the relevant shortcomings 
and remove them and improve our actions. … Or they are a trial from the 
Allwise, which we must bear steadfastly, after which He will reward us. 
(Saadiah 1988, 130)
The first justification for suffering is that it is punishment for past sins 
and wrongs. However, the function of the suffering is not only retribution 
but also purification of the sinner’s soul of lasting bad effects on his dispo-
sitions and character as a result of his individual sinful actions. People’s 
actions, good and bad, leave their traces on their souls, rendering them 
either pure or sullied. One function of suffering is to correct, purify, or 
cleanse the soul of any defect or unclean stain on the sinner’s character or 
personality, and to restore it to its pristine condition. But only God can 
discern the flaws in the soul and recognize whether there are long-term 
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effects on our dispositions and characters. Hence, humans can never 
know—especially about others—why in particular they suffer, although 
the fact that they suffer should be attributed to just desert.
Understanding suffering as punishment is complicated by the fact, 
Saadia argues, that no one is either purely righteous or purely wicked. If 
someone fell in a single category, the purely righteous or the purely 
wicked, there would be no difficulty in explaining why he prospers or suf-
fers, respectively. But generally humans are a mix of the righteous and the 
wicked. Thus divine justice demands that even the very wicked receive 
their due for good actions or virtues, and analogously for the very righ-
teous, for their sins. Therefore, reward and punishment cannot be mea-
sured as simple one-to-one effects of or reactions to individual actions; 
they require calculation and computation, balancing good with evil and 
the evaluation of punishment and reward in a more holistic fashion, look-
ing at the whole person, not just his isolated acts, one by one. Only God 
can know how to do this.
Saadia distinguishes two worlds: a “world of action,” this world in 
which we humans live and act, and a “world of reward,” a world in which 
human actions receive their compensation, reward or punishment. This 
second world according to Saadia is not necessarily “the world to come” 
in rabbinic terminology, the afterlife, paradise or hell. It is closer to a post- 
historical age like the messianic era in which it is humans (perhaps resur-
rected), not disembodied souls, who are compensated. However, the fact 
that there exists a dedicated world for compensation does not mean that 
there is no evidence of reward or compensation in this world, the world of 
action. The true rewards may all come in the world of compensation but 
there is also some reward or compensation in the world of action, both to 
signal to humans that there exists a future world of compensation and, 
more important, because individuals are typically a mix of righteousness 
and wickedness and therefore demand both reward and punishment. In 
other words, the innocent are never totally innocent, nor are the wicked 
totally wicked. If “entrance” to the (sub-?) world (only) of reward is only 
for those who are due reward exclusively (and analogously for the (sub-?) 
world of punishment), what of the mixed cases? They cannot enter either 
world. Therefore, the Divine Bookkeeper calculates each individual’s good 
and bad deeds and then rewards/punishes that class of deeds that are in 
the minority in this world of action in order to enable her soul to enter the 
(sub-)world of reward (or punishment, as the case may be) in a “pure” 
position. Because even the righteous have slight failings, given divine 
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bookkeeping, they are punished in this world and likewise for the wicked 
who are rewarded in this world. However, this explanation solves the 
problem only insofar as the punishments (and rewards) in this world of 
action are commensurate to the supposed minor acts of wickedness for the 
righteous (and minor acts of righteousness for the wicked). But most cases 
of the suffering of the righteous appear to be exactly the opposite: the 
more righteous the sufferer, the more incommensurate seem to be the evil 
acts that are called upon to justify her suffering. Thus, the overall moral of 
this quantified, economic model of suffering serves to underscore our 
human ignorance of how to calculate virtues and vices to determine reward 
and punishment. One should never draw inferences about desert and jus-
tice for any particular individual from either her prosperity or her suffering.
The second kind of justification for suffering and evil is what Saadia 
calls “trials and testing.” These are not correctives for prior sins, but show- 
trials enacted by God to reveal to the world at large the piety of those 
tested. Enduring such show-trials demonstrates the piety of the sufferer to 
the whole world. However, if that is the purpose of the trial, one might 
nonetheless object that the suffering is not deserved. No past wrongs that 
the sufferer committed justify why he should be subject to evil. In order 
to address this objection and thereby render the suffering just, or at least 
seem fair, Saadiah argues that the trial leads to compensation or a greater 
reward (gemul) in the future for the sufferer, either in the temporal future 
or in the afterlife. In return for suffering now, the victim, or sufferer, is 
compensated in the future.
This second justification, the so-called doctrine of compensation, which 
is also identified with the rabbinic notion of “sufferings of love,” is severely 
criticized by Maimonides in the Guide of the Perplexed, and Saadia is clearly 
his target although he is not mentioned by name (1965, 498, 471). “God 
sends down calamities upon an individual, without their having been pre-
ceded by a sin, in order that his reward be increased” (Maimonides 1965, 
497). But even if the victim is ultimately “paid back” for his losses and 
suffering with a greater reward at some time in the future, Maimonides 
objects that the suffering was undeserved at the time of the suffering and 
therefore it was unjust then. Nor is it obvious that any individual would 
willingly undergo suffering only for the promise of future compensation. 
So insofar as the suffering is not what the individual wants, even if the 
compensation is fair, it is not something the individual desires, hence, not 
good for him. In sum, although this explanation is, Maimonides grants, 
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“generally accepted among people” (498), no one “endowed with intel-
lect” (497) would believe such an impious opinion about God.
To recap, Saadiah offers two solutions, or theodicies, for the metaphysi-
cal problem of the suffering of the righteous human: punishment and trial. 
In addition, he gives a third account in the Commentary that suffering is 
simply part of, or constitutive of, being a created substance.
God created human beings in the first place to test them. (Saadiah 1988, 129)
The very reason for creating finite humans was to enable them to mani-
fest their ability to survive or endure suffering—and to endure it autono-
mously, that is, through their reason. To be sure, they will be compensated, 
but on this explanation suffering is the rule, not the exception, for cre-
ated life.
Saadia’s clearest example of such suffering built into createdness is what 
I will call epistemic evil: doubt and uncertainty. Saadiah tells us that he 
wrote Doctrines and Beliefs because of the pervasive doubt among his co- 
religionists at his time, his contemporaries’ lack of certainty and security in 
their beliefs, their many false or at least unjustified beliefs, and a kind of 
pervasive relativism due to their cosmopolitan culture.
When I considered these evils …, my heart grieved for my race, the race of 
mankind … as I saw in my time many of the believers clinging to unsound 
doctrines and mistaken beliefs. … I saw men sunk, as it were, in a sea of 
doubt covered by the waters of confusion. (Saadiah 1946/2002, 28–29, 
my emphasis)
This leads him to ask:
How can it be reconciled with the wisdom of the Creator … that he allowed 
errors and doubts to arise in the minds of His creatures? We may answer this 
question at once by saying that the very fact that they are created beings 
causes them to be subject to error and delusion. (Saadiah 1946/2002, 31)
That is, error and doubt are a natural evil that comes with being a 
human and one must learn to live with it. Indeed
To wish to have “knowledge that is free from doubt” is “to ask to be noth-
ing less than like God.” (Saadiah 1946/2002, 33)
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Being human is being subject to doubt and uncertainty. But doubt and 
uncertainty are themselves evils and forms of suffering, both epistemic and 
psychological.
With this background, I now want to turn to Saadia’s Commentary on 
the Book of Job, his Book of Theodicy. As I have already indicated, Saadia 
discusses the metaphysical problem of evil in his Introduction to his Arabic 
translation and commentary, more or less repeating the justifications he 
presents at greater length in Doctrines and Beliefs.3 However, I will argue 
that the main issue with which he is concerned in the commentary itself is 
not the metaphysical problem and its solutions, or theodicies. Rather the 
issue is what I shall call the existential problem of evil:
Knowing that throughout the ages the thoughts which pass before men’s 
minds when sufferings befall them are of four sorts, corresponding to those 
which arose in Job’s day, God required all this to be set forth for us. … Thus 
God caused the record of Job’s trials and afflictions to be set forth—his 
words, the words of his companions, the arguments of each, as well as 
Elihu’s rebuttal—with the purpose of revealing by this means what is in the 
hearts of people when they reach the limits of endurance in a trial. (Saadiah 
1988, 127)
What we learn from the Book of Job is not metaphysics—the compatibil-
ity of evil and suffering with the existence of God or with divine justice—
but what people enduring and witnessing suffering are thinking when they 
suffer, their experience of suffering, how they react to suffering—and, per-
haps, in turn, how we ought to react to our own suffering. Thus Saadiah 
wants to give us primarily a phenomenology of suffering although some-
times he seems to slip from the descriptive to the normative, from what 
people are thinking to what they ought to be thinking.
Saadia’s pursuit of this problem is itself highly original. I know of no 
other medieval Jewish thinker who poses such a question. As important, it 
is a problem that can be explored best, perhaps only, through a commen-
tary on a narrative like Job, not through discursive philosophical analysis 
and traditional forms of argument or proof. Saadia was not, of course, the 
only medieval Jewish, Muslim, or Christian philosopher to write both phil-
osophical treatises (or commentaries on earlier philosophical works) and 
philosophical commentaries on Scripture. However, when an author 
3 Weiss 2000 and Eisen take the Commentary primarily to recapitulate Doctrines and 
Opinions.
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engages in different genres of philosophical writing (like these), one natu-
rally wonders whether the one form enables her to address and explore 
issues that the other does not, or not as well or in different way. And how 
does the genre of writing affect how the author deals with the same prob-
lem in the different works? In particular, does a narrative or dialogue allow 
the author to address subtle questions from more perspectives than philo-
sophical exposition?4 For example, in the passage just quoted, Saadia 
writes that it is from the words of all the figures in the book, not from any 
one speaker, that we learn “the thoughts which pass before men’s minds 
when sufferings befall them.” The “record” of Job consists not only in 
Job’s words but equally in “the words of his companions, the arguments 
of each, as well as Elihu’s rebuttal.” No single character expresses what is 
revealed about “what is in the hearts of people,” only the totality of differ-
ent perspectives, each partial and even potentially in conflict with one 
another. The opportunities made possible by the dialogue form in Job are 
reminiscent of Hume’s explanation in the opening to his Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion in Hume 1779 (1993) of why he employs 
the genre of the dialogue: to explore a topic “where human reason can 
reach no fixed determination,” where “reasonable men may be allowed to 
differ,” and “where the variety of lights, presented by various personages 
and characters, may appear neither tedious nor redundant” (29–30). Is 
there something about the problem of evil, or God’s relation to the world, 
that makes it especially appropriate for treatment in the dialogue form?
The task Saadia sets for himself in the Commentary on Job is not only 
novel and original. The commentary is a seminal work of scriptural exege-
sis and interpretation for at least two additional reasons. First, Saadiah 
gives radically naturalistic interpretations, downplaying, if not eliminating, 
the fantastic, mythical, supernatural elements in the biblical text, features 
that were emphasized and expanded upon in earlier rabbinic midrashic 
exegesis. For example, the Leviathan becomes a crocodile in Saadia’s 
hands, and Behemoth, a hippopotamus or cattle. These are exotic animals 
but not mythical or fantastic creatures. And we will turn next to Saadiah’s 
most naturalistic de-mythicizing interpretation of the narrative frame of 
the book.
Second, Saadia was the first, to my knowledge, to reconstruct the ram-
bling, repetitious speeches of the three friends and of Elihu, Job, and God 
as philosophical arguments, identifying theses for which they argue that 
4 For an intensive exploration of this question, see Stump 2010, ch. 9.
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serve as objections and responses to each other, thereby shaping each fig-
ure’s speech into a “coherent” philosophical position, turning the book 
into a philosophical dialogue between different philosophical schools. 
Each character represents a different school—an idea that, in turn, will be 
borrowed by Maimonides in his interpretation of Job in the Guide, 
although the schools Saadia and Maimonides find in the book are not the 
same. So, for Saadia, Job is initially an Ash’arite: his God does whatever 
He wants without constraint, and justice is whatever God so decides. The 
three friends are all Mut‘azalites: they insist that everything God does is 
just (in our sense of the term); hence, Job must have sinned for which he 
suffers as punishment. Elihu is a revised Mut‘azalite (probably speaking 
for Saadiah himself) who introduces the doctrine of compensation and 
trials in addition to suffering and punishment. However, as Saadia empha-
sizes a number of times, none of the figures in the Book of Job, or their 
respective schools, claim that God acted unjustly, none deny divine justice. 
It is because they all assume divine justice that the characters disagree 
among themselves as to how to resolve that with Job’s suffering and evil.
In order to work out Saadia’s phenomenology of what is in the hearts 
of people when they suffer, let’s begin with his interpretation of the narra-
tive frame of the book, chs. 1–2.
According to its traditional literal meaning, Satan is God’s quasi-divine 
mythical adversary, and the description “bnei ha-elohim” (1, 6), which is 
usually translated as “children/sons of God,” traditionally refers to angel- 
like, supernatural, quasi-divine figures, demi-gods, or other fabular beings 
in the divine court. After arguing against these supernatural interpreta-
tions, Saadiah instead offers his own naturalistic reading:
I rendered “bnei ha-elohim” as “God’s beloved” (awliya’ Allah; Kafih: nikh-
badey hashem) in accordance with the widespread usage of the nation, as in 
Children are ye to the Lord your God (Deut. 14:1), My first-born child Israel 
(Exod 4: 22), Is corruption His? No, His children’s is the fault (Deut. 32: 5), 
and the like. These beloved would gather in a special place on appointed 
days to worship God and do His bidding. … The gathering was for worship 
of Him. … As for the adversary (satan), he was in fact an ordinary human 
being, like the one mentioned when Scripture says, The Lord raised an 
adversary (satan) to Solomon, Hadad the Edomite (1 Kings 11:14) It also 
says, And God raised up against him an adversary (satan), Rezon, son of 
Eliada (I Kings 11:23). Both of these were mortal men. … So commonly is 
this word (satan) applied to people who oppose one another that it occurs 
in many passages of Scripture which I shall not enumerate. … On the basis 
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of this and other parallels, the adversary here would be a human being. It is 
farfetched in the extreme to infer that he should be an angel. (Saadiah 
1988, 153–4)
In other words, the bnei ha-elohim are humans who assemble to wor-
ship God and obey His laws; hence, they are intimates of and beloved by 
God. Likewise, Satan is Job’s (not God’s) adversary (Saadiah 1988, 154), 
and (based on v 6) also one of God’s Beloved or nobles, hence, also a 
God-fearing and God-worshiping human but a special rival of Job, the 
leader of the Job-opposition party.
But Saadiah’s naturalism does not stop here. His full explanation of 
Job’s suffering is also naturalistic: in terms of human psychology and atti-
tudes. As we said, the human bnei ha-elohim are sincere servants of God 
who shun sin and pursue virtue and, if they are not quite as virtuous as 
Job, nonetheless they are worthy to be loved by God, good people deserv-
ing happiness and a good life. But
with all Job’s probity and plenty, there were folk in that land who envied 
him on both accounts, who said of him that he served God only out of 
solicitude for His blessings, and that if some disaster befell him or if he were 
deprived of some of those blessings, he would falter in his faithfulness and 
turn apostate. (Saadiah 1988, 159)
Notwithstanding the fact that they were also beloved by God, these 
same folks envied Job for his piety and prosperity. They charged that, as 
blameless as he was, he was pious, if not in order to receive the plenty, then 
only so long as he was blessed with plenty. That is, they raise the suspicion: 
does Job prosper because he is pious or is he pious only because he is 
prosperous?
According to Saadiah, it is “envy” that gives rise to this suspicion about 
Job. Who or what creates the envy? According to the literal meaning of v. 
8, the source is God Himself who singles out Job’s exceptional blameless-
ness and God-fearingness—“for there is none like him in the land.” In 
other words, among God’s Beloved, all of whom worship God, all of 
whom are good people, God plays favorites—and rewards Job more than 
the others. What Saadiah is getting at, in more contemporary terms, is the 
basic inequity of distribution of goods in social life. Not everyone, even 
when they are all good and deserving, is treated or rewarded equally. Or 
at the very least not everyone perceives him/herself to be equally well 
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treated as everyone else is. Someone will always take someone else to be 
better treated, more beloved, than she is. We cannot help but compare 
ourselves to others and ask the following: What did I do not to deserve the 
same great fortune he is receiving? If I am as good as that other person, 
why is she better off than me? This sort of envy is a source of suffering, 
hence, an evil.
But even worse than this suffering is the suspicion of others that envy 
breeds. In these circumstances, it is all too easy to suspect the credentials 
of others whom we perceive to be doing better than us, to accuse others 
of being good only because they receive goods, that they would not act as 
well if they were subject to more difficult circumstances—if they were 
subject to the difficult circumstances that each person believes is his lot in 
life despite his good behavior. Hence, others are always less, or at least no 
more, deserving than us. This delegitimation of others Saadiah calls “slan-
der” or “defamation” (Saadiah 1988, 159), a kind of humanly inflicted 
violence, again, an evil.
This, I propose, is how Saadiah interprets the opening frame of the 
Book of Job. Job’s world, for all of its pious obedience and worship, was a 
very unhappy place in which good people were nonetheless so jealous and 
envious of Job’s pious success that they could not but suspect his motives 
and sincerity. The challenge the author of the Book of Job presents to us—
or that God faces—is: How, in such a world, can one prove the righteous 
person’s, Job’s, true and genuine piety and love and fear of God? The 
scenario Saadiah proposes is to make Job suffer. In Satan’s words, he will 
then “falter in his faithfulness and turn apostate.” Therefore, God inflicts 
Job to vindicate him of this charge. In more naturalistic terms, the Book of 
Job adopts what I call the “Thucydidean test.”
In the various cities these revolutions were the cause of many calamities—as 
happens and always will happen while human nature is what it is, though 
there may be different degrees of savagery, and, as different circumstances 
arise, the general rules will admit of some variety. In times of peace and 
prosperity cities and individuals alike follow higher standards, because they 
are not forced into a situation where they have to do what they do not want 
to do. But war is a stern teacher; in depriving them of the power of easily 
satisfying their daily wants, it brings most people’s minds down to the level 
of their actual circumstances. (Thucydides 1972, 242)5
5 See also Reeve 1999.
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If we follow Thucydides’ wisdom, in order to discover who humans 
really are, to expose true human nature and the authentic characters of 
humans, we should pinch them, put them under pressure: subject them to 
a plague, civil war, disease, loss of children, illness—in a word, suffering. 
Prosperity deceives or at least fails to expose the true self. Only when 
someone is desperate and suffering does she manifest who she really is. 
Only then, depending on how she endures or expresses herself in her suf-
fering, can we tell whether she is as pious and deserving as she should be to 
receive goods and rewards. Happy circumstances leave open the question 
whether one is pious because she is prosperous or prosperous because she 
is pious. The function of suffering is to disambiguate or resolve this doubt.
However, as Saadiah goes on to interpret the story of Job, suffering 
alone does not disambiguate his situation. Thus I take part of the point of 
the Book of Job according to Saadiah to be a critique of the Thucydidean 
idea that suffering will unambiguously reveal the true self. Instead, suffer-
ing itself admits multiple interpretations and breeds its own ambiguities. 
Let me give you just one of a number of examples.
One would prima facie think that Elihu’s theodicy of future compensa-
tion or reward is a good alternative to either incriminating Job (thereby 
making his suffering, punishment) or (allowing Job to be innocent) to 
rendering God arbitrary at best and unjust at worst. But in fact Elihu’s 
theodicy creates a further ambiguity in suffering. On the table now are 
three disjuncts. Suffering can either be unjust persecution of Job despite his 
absolute innocence or punishment for prior sins or a trial to be compen-
sated in the future. According to Saadia, no character or school in the Book 
of Job entertains the first disjunct: that God is unjust. With Elihu’s inter-
vention, however, that leaves two other disjuncts. Ambiguity persists. 
Whenever one suffers, one knows that it is either for one or for the other, 
but not which one. Hence, the Thucydidean test, suffering, fails to disam-
biguate Job’s true piety. Beginning with ch. 37, Saadiah again and again 
emphasizes the ambiguity that accompanies Job’s suffering, the fact that 
the victim must continually ask himself and ask God: Why am I suffering? 
The impossibility of clarification or disambiguation leads to isolation and 
alienation. Following Elihu’s speech,
Job heard this discourse but held his peace, offering no rebuttal to Elihu. 
His silence at this point might indicate one of two things: either acquies-
cence or reservations. And it was for this reason that God addressed Him, to 
exhort to acknowledge Elihu’s arguments and leave behind his fancies and 
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suppositions, which in effect constitute his failing—although He does not 
say so directly, lest the people think little of Job’s forbearance. (Saadiah 
1988, 379)
Is Job silent because he accepts Elihu’s explanation for his suffering—
silence is assent—or is he silent because he is silenced by Elihu—that is, 
overpowered by his rhetoric and too exhausted to fight it, though he 
resents and rejects it in his heart—or perhaps he is simply unsure? 
According to Saadiah, the question before God, as it were, is as follows: 
How will Job be perceived and judged by his fellow humans? God knows 
what Job feels, but it is necessary that Job publically articulate his reasoned 
acceptance of suffering for and to other humans if he is to disambiguate 
and thereby vindicate his piety. This in turn forces God to address Job in 
order to make him publically acknowledge Elihu’s theodicy. And we would 
prima facie think that God’s own speech to Job is unambiguous. But it 
isn’t. Recall that Job has repeatedly pleaded with God to respond to his 
suffering by either killing him or by revealing his sin to him. God’s lack of 
response, His silence, has only increased Job’s lonely suffering. And when 
God finally speaks to Job from the whirlwind, Saadiah argues that what 
literally appears to be God extolling His all-powerfulness and control of 
Creation, is in fact, a new kind of silence.
Job had tried to understand why God tormented him and had entreated 
God to make the reason known to him [See 23: 3–5]. … But God did not 
make this known to him. Sifting through many of the accounts of the 
ancients, we find that whenever one of them was afflicted by God in some 
way, and then asked his Lord to make known to him why that misfortune 
had been loosed upon him, we find a division: if the victim had suffered 
deservedly, God made it clear to him and told him, “This is for your wrong 
doing.” … But if the sufferer was being tested and had committed no 
offense to begin with, God did not explain his sufferings, so as not to 
undermine his forbearance in people’s eyes. … This is the pattern with those 
who are undergoing a trial. God does not directly inform them that they will 
be recompensed. Rather they must persevere on the basis of their reason 
alone. … So when Job asked his Lord to make known to him why He tor-
mented him, God did not answer him about that but spoke to him instead 
about something else, describing Himself to him in terms of His power and 
greatness, and His choosing what is best for all creation. And this answer on 
God’s part was one mark of His wisdom. (Saadiah 1988, 383–384)
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God’s “silence”—his blank refusal to answer Job’s question: Why am I 
suffering?—is His four-chapter-long and very loud speech extolling His 
power and beneficence. In reality, Saadia writes, this very speech is a dem-
onstration of God’s powerlessness. God cannot tell Job why he is suffer-
ing—as a trial to prove his piety that in turn will be compensated in the 
future—because were He to reveal that reason, people would say that Job 
accepts his suffering only to receive that reward—thereby undermining 
the test and injuring Job yet again. Thus God is constrained to be silent 
about the one thing Job wants to know—constrained by His own cre-
ation, other humans’ perceptions, and the implications of His own speech. 
All of God’s talk about His all-powerfulness is a mask to conceal His pow-
erlessness. To be sure, this also makes Job suffer, but perhaps it is the lesser 
of the evils God would have committed had He explicitly answered him.
What exactly is it for Saadiah for humans “to persevere on the basis of 
their reason alone”? I don’t have a full answer to this question but one 
thing emerges in God’s speech. According to Saadia,
When God says, I shall ask thee (38, 30), it does not mean that God is giving 
him the power to answer as he pleases. Rather He is requiring Job to answer 
truthfully, that is, to submit (altaslim) to Him. (Saadiah 1988, 396)
First, when challenged, as in a debate—and Saadiah uses here terminol-
ogy like altaslim and mas’ala drawn from the logical language of dialec-
tic—one perseveres by reason by committing or submitting oneself to the 
challenger’s question, responding explicitly and openly according to the 
demands and standards of truth as revealed by reason and science. One 
does not evade or ignore the challenge. One takes it up and responds.
Second, by “perseverance on the basis of reason alone” Saadiah also 
seems to mean that one should follow her reason even when it leads to 
uncertainty, doubt, and more suffering. When God has completed His 
speech, describing His wisdom manifest in nature, Saadiah tells us
Since the word had descended upon Job from God, it seemed best to him 
to hold his peace and say nothing. He supposed that such would be the 
proper behavior for one who submitted to Him. This called for a second 
address by God, making known to Job that discourse (al-kalam) was prefer-
able. (Saadiah 1988, 396–7)
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I take Saadiah to mean that Job’s silence after God’s speech, like his silence 
after Elihu’s speech, is still ambiguous, so, God forces Job in ch. 40 to 
speak to disambiguate “the thoughts in his heart.” But even so, Job does 
not speak unambiguously:
What he says can bear two different senses. This statement of Job’s was 
ambiguous. It does not convey to the hearer a clear idea of his meaning. 
One who says to someone who confronts him, “Truly, I cannot answer 
you,” could be understood in two ways: either he is admitting the justice of 
the other’s position and saying that he is not prepared to refute the truth, or 
he could be implying that the other is in the wrong, and saying, “How can 
I refute you when you have the upper hand?” (Saadiah 1988, 402)
Now, Job’s speech, rather than his silence, is ambiguous. And “by sugges-
tion he is impugning divine justice.” And for yet a third time, this ambigu-
ity repeats itself in ch. 41 when Job again does not speak. According to 
Saadiah,
[God says to Job:] ‘As long as you leave your answer in suspense, you are in 
fact impugning My justice while holding yourself blameless.’ The fruit of 
this utterance should be for Job to make a clear statement before his Lord, 
explaining to all who hear him that he acknowledges that God is the Alljust, 
who does no injustice, and that it is imperative to admit that He treats His 
servants only as is best. And that is what Job does. (Saadiah 1988, 408–9)
Ambiguity persists in both silence and speech. True submission (taslim) 
requires explicit acknowledgment through a confession of impotence, 
ignorance, or limitations on one’s knowledge, and regret—all aspects of 
repentance. This is what Job finally delivers in ch. 42.
In this passage Job combines all that was required of him: he confesses his 
impotence and his paltry ability to comprehend the grace in the governance 
and decree of the Allwise; he repents of what has passed … and he resigns 
himself submissively (yaslam) to God, taking solace for himself. (Saadiah 
1988, 410)
The ending of the book is reconciliation of Job with God—reconciliation 
depicted as a complex act of repentance. But this is not repentance for a 
sin he committed but a confession of his finite condition, his being a crea-
ture of creation, and his inability to comprehend the benevolence in the 
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governance of God, which is accompanied by regret (haratah) and reject-
ing, or spurning, of his previous state, and submission, yielding solace.
However, Job’s repeated ambiguous remarks underscore the prob-
lematics of ambiguity as an expression of his own mental suffering and of 
the evil he experiences. As long as he is not explicit, whether in speech or 
in silence, he is perceived as “controverting” God’s justice. Although Job 
is innocent, he cannot state “I am innocent” because that would implicate 
that God is guilty, hence, unjust. So, to avoid that implicature, Job must 
do one of two things, neither of which is true to himself. Either he can say 
that he is guilty—but that would violate his own integrity. Or he must 
explicitly acknowledge that God is just and only acts for his creatures’ 
good (408), which effectively belies his own suffering, re-describing the 
evil he experiences as a divine good.
What, then, “is in the hearts of people when they reach the limits of endur-
ance in a trial”? First and foremost: repeated instances of ambiguity, both 
of silence and of speech, both about why one is suffering and about how 
to react. As we said, ambiguity is a species of doubt, and doubt is an epis-
temic evil. I am tempted to say that for Saadiah, Job’s suffering state of 
mind and doubt replaces the earlier bodily, material, familial, and physical 
evils he suffered. The inner state of epistemic evil—how Job thinks about 
his external suffering—replaces the external evil of physical and material 
suffering. But the evil is twofold. First, the ambiguity allows others to 
continue to impugn Job’s piety, which is yet another moral evil inflicted 
on Job. Second, the ambiguity reflects Job’s own state of mind, his uncer-
tainty, anxiety, isolation, and powerlessness due to his ignorance of why he 
is suffering and how he should react. But this kind of inability to under-
stand God’s justice and governance is not because God’s will is incompre-
hensible, as it is for the Ash‘arite. Job’s lack of understanding is an 
achievement of his own reason, not a surrender. Job’s reason leads him to 
its limits, but at the same time he is empowered by it to fulfill the obliga-
tion of submission or commitment to God—to explicitly, propositionally, 
discursively articulate in the third person what he is thinking. This kind of 
submission, and consequent reconciliation, not a theodicy, is what the 
Book of Job teaches us and that is the reason why it was written:
[God] caused their [Job’s and the other friends’] history to be written as a 
lesson to all creation, so that we may bear sufferings with fortitude when 
they befall us and not hasten to impugn God’s judgment but submit to God 
and accept His wisdom and direction. (Saadiah 1988, 410)
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CHAPTER 17
Randomness, Causation, and Divine 
Responsibility
Scott A. Davison
What does it mean to say that someone is responsible for something? It 
turns out that the concept of responsibility is both vague and ambiguous. 
Let us say that someone is casually responsible for something E in virtue of 
actively contributing causally to E’s production.1 Being causally responsi-
ble for something E is not enough, all by itself, for being morally respon-
sible for E, where moral responsibility includes also the possibility of the 
appropriate application of the retrospective, reactive attitudes of praise or 
blame.2 But being causally responsible does seem to be necessary for being 
morally responsible.3
1 Could one also be causally responsible for the occurrence of something E simply because 
one failed to prevent it? This is an interesting and complicated question; I do not want to 
enter the dispute about it here, so I will simply set it aside. (For a powerful and detailed 
discussion of the power of causal absences, see Goldschmidt 2016.)
2 Being morally responsible for something does not imply that one deserves praise or blame 
for it, though—one might be morally responsible for something that is neutral, in such a way 
that neither praise nor blame is appropriate.
3 See Fischer and Ravizza 1998, chapter 1.
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What else is necessary for being morally responsible? Although there is 
sharp disagreement about this,4 it seems to me that moral responsibility 
requires the capacity for foresight, the capacity for causal contribution, 
and the capacity for intentional action directed at a particular outcome. 
But I will not argue for these claims here, and as far as I can tell, nothing 
I say in this chapter assumes that they are correct. It is important to note 
that one could satisfy all of the criteria for being morally responsible for 
something that is neutral, so that one does not deserve praise or blame for 
it—rather than create a new category of responsibility to cover this kind of 
case, we should just keep in mind its possibility.5
Consider the following thesis:
Divine Moral Responsibility: God is morally responsible to some substan-
tial degree for the occurrence of every contingent event.
There seems to be strong support for Divine Moral Responsibility from 
the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions (e.g., see Freddoso 1988). In 
virtue of creating and sustaining the contingent universe, God contributes 
causally to every contingent event. Furthermore, God has the maximum 
capacity for foresight possible, and the greatest possible capacity for inten-
tional action directed at particular outcomes.6
But suppose that there are ontologically random events in the universe, 
events which have no sufficient cause and could have turned out differ-
ently in some respect, given the same initial conditions and laws of nature. 
Would the existence of such random events count against Divine Moral 
Responsibility? To explore this question, I will begin with a much- 
discussed approach to the problem of evil and God’s responsibility for free 
creaturely actions before turning to questions about shared moral 
responsibility.
4 A great deal has been written about the claim that libertarian freedom is necessary for 
moral responsibility; see Frankfurt 1969, Nagel 1976, Adams 1985, Fischer and Ravizza 
1998, and Morriston 2000 for the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Libertarian accounts of free 
action have their defenders (see, for instance, Van Inwagen 1983, Kane 1985, O’Connor 
2000, and Clarke 2003), but they are not as popular today as their compatibilist rivals. I will 
not try to resolve this dispute here.
5 For an interesting argument for the conclusion that God’s unsurpassable goodness 
implies that God does not deserve praise or thanks, see Howard-Snyder 2008.
6 This might lead us to think that for God, unlike for human beings, there is no such thing 
as casual contribution without moral responsibility.
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17.1  AugustiniAn ApproAches to evil
How could a perfectly good creator make a less than perfectly good world? 
Historically, the most popular approach to answering this question involves 
trying to blame the imperfections of the created world on created agents, 
rather than the creator, where such created agents are viewed as introduc-
ing randomness into the world in a way that provides some casual distance 
between God and evil. This strategy typically assumes that if one person is 
fully morally responsible for something, then nobody else is morally 
responsible to any degree for that same thing. In this section, I will explore 
the role that this assumption plays in typical Augustinian approaches to 
the problem of evil, and then explain in the next section why it is false.
Contemporary interest in the problem of evil can be traced to rigorous 
formulations of the problem generated by J.  L. Mackie (1955) and 
H. J. McCloskey (1960). Their articles led to influential responses from 
John Hick (1966) and Alvin Plantinga (1974a, b), among others. In his 
survey of historical approaches to the problem, Hick distinguished 
between two groups of theodicies, the Augustinian and Irenaean, where 
the former explains evil as an accidental by-product of the free choices of 
creatures, and the latter explains it as necessary for moral development 
(“soul-making”).7 Hick himself defended an Irenaean approach, whereas 
Plantinga developed a highly technical formulation of the Augustinian 
approach called the Free Will Defense. Plantinga’s Augustinian approach 
has received the lion’s share of attention in the literature, and I will return 
to it later. But it will be helpful to begin with St. Augustine himself in 
order to explain in more general terms how assumptions about causality 
and moral responsibility function in an Augustinian approach.8
7 St. Augustine’s theodicy is not the first one to be based explicitly on human freedom, 
though—that honor might belong to the author of the Biblical account in Genesis 3. Or it 
might belong to the great Stoic Cleanthes of Assos (c.331–232 BCE; see the discussion of 
Stoic responses to the problem of evil in Jordan 1987, 200–5); a version of this strategy can 
also be found in Plato’s Timeaus (42d–e). There is more to St. Augustine’s position than the 
argument concerning freedom and moral responsibility that I explore here, but I will con-
tinue to use Hick’s label (“Augustinian”) because it has become commonplace in the litera-
ture on this question; for perhaps the most detailed classification and survey of possible 
responses to the problem of evil, see Tooley’s essay in Plantinga and Tooley 2008.
8 I am not an expert in St. Augustine’s thought and do not claim that my brief summary 
here sheds any new light on his views; instead, I will draw only upon one of his early work 
(On Free Choice of the Will), which seems to capture adequately the general outlines of what 
I am calling here an Augustinian approach.
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In trying to explain how “the goods pursued by sinners are in no way 
evil things, and neither is free will itself,” St. Augustine says that
When the will clings to the common and unchangeable good, it attains the 
great and foremost goods for human beings. … But when the will turns 
away from the unchangeable and common good toward its own private 
good, or toward external or inferior things, it sins. (St. Augustine 1993, 68)
This movement of the will, the turning away from a higher good to 
embrace a lower one, is the essence of evil, according to Augustine.9 Since 
this movement is “not coerced, but voluntary, it is justly and deservedly 
punished with misery” (Augustine 1993, 68). What is the cause of this 
movement of the will, one might ask? Augustine answers:
But perhaps you are going to ask what is the source of this movement by 
which the will turns away from the unchangeable good toward a changeable 
good. This movement is certainly evil, even though free will itself is to be 
counted among good things, since no one can live rightly without it. For if 
that movement, that turning away from the Lord God, is undoubtedly sin, 
surely we cannot say that God himself is the cause of sin. So that movement 
is not from God. (St. Augustine 1993, 69)
St. Augustine seems to argue here as follows:
 1. If God were the cause of evil, then God would be morally respon-
sible for evil.
 2. God is not morally responsible for evil.
Therefore,
 3. God is not the cause of evil.
Although there are questions (to which I shall return later) about what 
exactly it is saying, to defend premise 2, the Augustinian might offer the 
following argument:
9 Here I am concerned only with what is often called moral evil, as opposed to natural evil 
(see Plantinga 1974a, 30). Plantinga claims that St. Augustine himself thought that all evil 
was moral evil, because he thought that all cases of apparently natural evil were caused by 
“Satan and his cohorts”: see Plantinga 1974a, 58.
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 4. If a created person S performs an evil action A freely, then God does 
not cause S’s performance of A.
 5. If God does not cause created person S’s performance of an evil 
action A, then God is not morally responsible to any degree for S’s 
performance of A.
Therefore,
 6. If a created person S performs an evil action A freely, then God is 
not morally responsible to any degree for S’s performance of A.
There is something to be said in defense of each of these premises. First, 
premise 4 reflects the Augustinian’s libertarian view of the nature of free 
action, according to which an action is free only if it is not determined. 
This view of freedom, which implies what I have called ontological ran-
domness, seems essential to the Augustinian approach to the problem of 
evil.10 As Plantinga says, “Now God can create free creatures, but He can’t 
cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then 
they aren’t significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely” 
(Plantinga 1974a, 30). One of Plantinga’s most vocal critics, J. L. Mackie, 
seems to agree:
[The Free Will Defense] alone allows the theist to admit that there are some 
real and unabsorbed evils, some items which the world would, from  however 
broad and ultimate a perspective, be better without (so that this is not the 
best of all possible worlds), and yet at the same time to detach their occur-
rence from God, to show them as not having been chosen by God.. (Mackie 
1982, 156)
Second, premise 5 is a clear consequence of the following general principle:
10 For more on St. Augustine’s libertarianism, see the preface to Augustine 1993, xi–xiv. 
Libertarian accounts of free action have their defenders (see, for instance, Van Inwagen 
1983, Kane 1985, O’Connor 2000, and Clarke 2003), but they are not as popular today as 
their compatibilist rivals. A great deal has been written about the Augustinian claim that 
libertarian freedom is necessary for morality in general, or praise and blame in particular; see 
Frankfurt 1969, Nagel 1976, Adams 1985, Fischer and Ravizza 1998, and Morriston 2000 
for the tip of the proverbial iceberg. I will not discuss here the plausibility of libertarian 
accounts of free action or the alleged connection between libertarian freedom and 
responsibility.
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 7. A person S is morally responsible for something E to some degree 
only if S causes E.
However, the inference from 4 and 5 to 6 is problematic. In order for 
4 to be true, the word “cause” must be understood as “provide a causally 
sufficient condition,” because God clearly provides many causally neces-
sary conditions for creaturely free action (more on this later). To avoid 
equivocation, then, “cause” must be understood in the same way in 5 (and 
hence in 7). But in general, providing a causally sufficient condition for an 
event E is not necessary for being morally responsible for E.11 For exam-
ple, “If two people pick up a heavy rock [together] and chuck it on a third 
person’s head, both will be responsible for the consequent injury” 
(Zimmerman 1985b, 355). So 5 and 7 are not plausible if “cause” is 
understood in the way that is required for 4 to be true. Could the 
Augustinian argument be revised in order to accommodate this fact about 
causation and moral responsibility?
Here is the most natural and straightforward way to revise 7 in order to 
meet this objection:
 8. A person S is morally responsible to some degree for something E 
only if S contributes causally to the production of E to some degree.
From 8, one might infer 9:
 9. If God does not contribute causally to any degree to a created per-
son S’s performance of an evil action A, then God is not morally 
responsible to any degree for S’s performance of A.
These revisions yield the following version of the Augustinian argument:
 10. If a created person S performs an evil action A freely, then God 
does not contribute causally to any degree to S’s performance of 
evil action A (replacing 4).
11 Some will say that 5 is false for another reason: because it is possible to be responsible for 
something that one fails to prevent, even though one does not contribute causally to its 
occurrence. (Still others would say, to the contrary, that the failure to prevent something is 
itself a kind of causal contribution.) I do not want to enter this dispute here, so I will simply 
set it aside; for a powerful and detailed discussion of the power of causal omissions, see 
Goldschmidt 2016.
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 9. If God does not contribute causally to any degree to a created 
person S’s performance of an evil action A, then God is not mor-
ally responsible to any degree for S’s performance of A 
(replacing 5).
Therefore
 6. If a created person S performs an evil action A freely, then God is 
not morally responsible to any degree for S’s performance of A.
Before commenting on the strength of this argument, I should point 
out that throughout the chapter, I am talking about causation in the sense 
of efficient causation (not formal, final, or material causation, to use 
Aristotelian terminology). Even if God does not exist on the same onto-
logical plane as creatures, as some people say, traditional theists hold that 
God is an efficient cause of the obtaining of various states of affairs in the 
world, whether or not God’s causation involves other created agents as 
intermediaries.
Returning now to the argument: it is clearly valid, but according to 
traditional theism, the first premise (i.e., proposition 10) is false. This is 
because according to traditional theism, God creates, sustains, and co- 
operates with the action of every created cause in the world, including free 
human beings (see the discussion of this point in Freddoso 1988); so God 
must contribute causally to the performance of every creaturely action, 
even those evil human actions that are free in a libertarian sense. But since 
God’s causal contribution is not sufficient, all by itself, for the perfor-
mance of those evil actions, and God does not intend them per se, the 
Augustinian approach outlined earlier would insist that God is not to be 
blamed for them.12 As the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit theologian 
Luis de Molina says,
From what has been said we have it only that our morally evil actions are not 
attributed to God as to a positive cause who has an influence on them. This 
is in accord with the example of the workman who produces swords. For 
just as the deeds which are done by those who do not use the swords rightly 
are not imputed to the workman (for the swords are indifferent with respect 
12 I will return below to the question of the relationship between moral responsibility 
and blame.
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to good or bad use), but are instead imputed to the free choice of those who 
use the swords badly, so too, since God’s general concurrence is indifferent 
with respect to good and evil actions, the evil actions should not be attrib-
uted to God, but should rather be attributed to those who abuse God’s 
general concurrence in order to do evil. (Molina 1989)
In other words, since created persons freely determine for themselves 
whether their actions are good or evil, they are completely morally respon-
sible for this, and therefore God is not. St. Augustine seems to agree:
There is nothing I feel so firmly and so intimately as that I have a will by 
which I am moved to enjoy something. If the will by which I choose or 
refuse things is not mine, then I don’t know what I can call mine. So if I use 
my will to do something evil, whom can I hold responsible but myself? (St. 
Augustine 1993, 72)
Perhaps, then, the following argument captures better than the previ-
ous ones the Augustinian approach to the problem of evil:
 11. If a created person S performs an evil action A freely, then S is fully 
morally responsible for performing A.
 12. If one person is fully morally responsible for something E, then no 
other person is morally responsible to any degree for E.
Therefore,
 6. If a created person S performs an evil action A freely, then God is 
not morally responsible to any degree for S’s performance of A.
This argument seems to capture the essence of the Augustinian 
approach. But is this argument sound, assuming that free creaturely 
action involves the kind of randomness described earlier? If so, then it 
seems that Divine Moral Responsibility is false, because God is not mor-
ally responsible to any degree for creaturely evil actions. And a parallel 
argument would seem to show that God is not morally responsible to any 
degree for any free creaturely actions at all, whether good or evil—but 
this would seem to be quite problematic, at least from the point of view 
of traditional theism.
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17.2  ZimmermAn on shAred responsibility
It seems to me that Michael J. Zimmerman has shown that premise 12 is 
false.13 In this section, I will present and extend his arguments for this 
conclusion. Along the way, I will also criticize his arguments for the view 
that degree of causal contribution is not a factor in determining degree of 
moral responsibility.
Zimmerman discusses possible cases of group action which are either 
oversupplied (i.e., “there is a greater supply of agents involved in the 
action than is in fact causally necessary for the outcome at issue”) or stan-
dard (i.e., not oversupplied: see Zimmerman 1985a, 116). According to 
Zimmerman, group action involves more than one individual acting 
together in such a way that each one contributes causally to a single out-
come.14 Consider the following case of standard group action, to which 
Zimmerman refers as case X:
Imagine a group of teenagers pushing a large boulder off a plateau, so that 
it rolls down a slope and wrecks a car at the bottom. Each of the teenagers 
intends to contribute to the damage to the car and freely participates in the 
enterprise, in the full knowledge that his contribution to the enterprise is 
required if the boulder is to be shifted and the car wrecked at all. (Zimmerman 
1985a, 116)
Zimmerman argues that in this case, each of the teenagers involved is fully 
morally responsible for the damage to the car. His argument for this inter-
esting conclusion involves an appeal to a slightly different case, Y, which 
differs from case X in only one respect: in Y, just one of the teenagers 
involved in case X is present (let’s call him “S”), and this teenager wrecks 
the car all by himself. In this case, Zimmerman claims, “there would be no 
hesitation in ascribing to S full (that is undiminished; not merely sole) 
responsibility for the damage” (116). In both cases, S’s action is causally 
necessary but not causally sufficient by itself for the damage (since S’s 
action requires the co-operation of other factors or agents in both cases, 
such as the boulder being able to be moved, the boulder and the car being 
13 Although other work on shared responsibility has been done since then, as far as I can 
tell, Zimmerman was the first to articulate this clearly, and his formulation of the question 
remains the standard formulation.
14 Although this description does not imply that the members of the group share a com-
mon purpose or make a concerted effort: see Zimmerman 1985a, 115–6.
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properly positioned relative to one another, the force of gravity, etc.). 
More formally, here is Zimmerman’s argument in detail:
 (A) The only respect in which case X differs from case Y concerns the 
type of co-operation which S receives in his endeavor.
 (B) This respect provides no reason to ascribe a lesser degree of moral 
responsibility to S in case X than in case Y.
 (C) If (A) and (B), then S is just as morally responsible for the out-
come in case X as in case Y.
 (D) In case Y, S is fully morally responsible for the outcome.
So,
 (E) In case X, S is fully morally responsible for the outcome.
Therefore,
 (F) In case X, all participants in the action are fully morally responsible 
for the outcome (Zimmerman 1985a, 117).
I think that Zimmerman’s main argument here is essentially right, 
although it seems to presuppose that degrees of moral responsibility do not 
depend upon degrees of causal contribution. This is especially evident in 
connection with premise (D). It is one thing to claim that someone acts 
without excuse, so that his or her moral responsibility is undiminished 
because of co-operating factors; it is another thing to claim that someone is 
fully morally responsible for something. Full moral responsibility would be 
responsibility to the highest degree possible, and degree of causal contribu-
tion does indeed seem to be relevant to determining this.15 Let me explain.
Consider Zimmerman’s agent S, the teenager in case Y who pushed the 
boulder down the slope and wrecked the car all by himself. Case Y must 
15 In personal correspondence, Zimmerman has explained that by “full” moral responsibil-
ity, he meant only undiminished-by-any-excuse moral responsibility and not moral responsi-
bility to the highest possible degree, because he does not know how to make sense of the idea 
of such a maximal degree. As will become clear, it seems to me that S would have the highest 
degree of moral responsibility for E just in case S contributed to the maximal degree to the 
obtaining of E, intended that E result for its own sake, and had maximally certain foresight 
that S’s causal contribution would lead to the obtaining of E. (Such a condition might be 
satisfied by God’s creation of the material world in its initial state ex nihilo, for instance.)
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differ from case X in some respect with regard to the initial conditions, 
since in case X, the contribution of each teenager is causally necessary for 
moving the boulder, whereas in case Y, S acts alone to accomplish (roughly) 
the same thing. Now compare case Y to a third case, Z, which involves just 
two persons, S and P. Suppose that S casually suggests to P the possibility 
that P could push the boulder down the slope all by herself, without any 
(other) help from S; imagine that S then walks away, but thanks to S’s sug-
gestion, P freely decides to do this and does so, where this possibility 
would not have occurred to P without S’s prompting.
Shouldn’t we say that S’s moral responsibility for the damage to the car 
in case Z is less than S’s moral responsibility for the damage to the car in 
case Y? After all, if we hold all of the other factors constant, S’s causal 
contribution to the wrecking of the car in case Z is not causally sufficient 
(in the circumstances) for the wrecking of the car, since it must operate 
“through” P’s free decision to push the boulder down the slope all by 
herself. (If P’s decision is free, then it is not determined by the prior events, 
including S’s attempts to persuade.16) By contrast, if we hold all of the 
other factors constant, S’s causal contribution to the wrecking of the car 
in case Y is causally sufficient (in the circumstances) for the wrecking of 
the car. Doesn’t this difference clearly indicate different degrees of causal 
contribution in the two cases, and doesn’t this difference indicate a differ-
ence in degrees of moral responsibility in the two cases?
I think so. But Zimmerman offers an argument against this approach. 
He mentions a variant on his original case X which involves S twisting P’s 
arm so that P will help S to push the boulder against P’s will, and says this 
about such a case:
In a case such as that just given it is common and tempting to talk of the 
differing “extents” to which S and P contributed to the outcome; but I 
think that such talk should be avoided. Presumably more blame is to be 
ascribed to S than to P—he is more to blame for the outcome than P is, he 
is also to blame for twisting P’s arm, and so on—but, given that the action 
of each is causally necessary and of neither is causally sufficient for the out-
16 Here I am assuming, of course, that P’s decision is free in some libertarian sense. (Those 
who find this example incoherent because they find the concept of libertarian freedom inco-
herent will find a different example of degrees of causal contribution leading to different 
degrees of responsibility in the discussion of Zimmerman in the next few paragraphs.) For 
persuasive arguments for the conclusion that intervening agents do not necessarily diminish 
moral responsibility, in general, see Zimmerman 1985b.
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come, it seems misleading to talk of S contributing to a greater extent than 
P to this outcome. In general, it seems to me best to say the following. 
There is a sense to be attached to the claim that different individuals have 
more or less “important” roles in the production of an outcome, but such a 
claim is, first, a normative one and, second, not to be confused with the 
non-normative issue of contribution to an outcome (a factor which admits 
of no degrees). (Zimmerman 1985a, 117)
I think that Zimmerman is mistaken here: just because various factors are 
in themselves neither causally necessary nor causally sufficient for a given 
outcome, it does not follow that there can be no differences between them 
in terms of their respective causal contributions. Case Z, involving causal 
contribution that is non-necessitating, seems to illustrate this clearly; 
causal contribution is a matter of degree.
Here is another way to illustrate this same point, this time by reference 
to another hypothetical case from Zimmerman. This case involves group 
action which is sequential instead of simultaneous:
Imagine a dozen people, with murder on their minds, each delivering one 
stab to the body of some victim. Let us suppose that each of the stabs is 
causally necessary for the death to ensue. I submit that, given certain other 
conditions (full freedom, intent, and so forth), each of the assailants is fully 
morally responsible for the death. (Zimmerman 1985a, 117)
Zimmerman’s argument for this last claim is essentially similar to the 
one mentioned earlier in connection with case X: each of the stabs is 
causally necessary but not causally sufficient, so each of the assailants is 
morally responsible to the same degree for the outcome. Furthermore, 
we could imagine a case in which only one of the assailants adminis-
tered just one stab and killed the victim, and there is no reason to 
regard that one person’s moral responsibility in the modified case as 
different from his moral responsibility in the original case involving the 
twelve people.
But Zimmerman’s case of the dozen stabbers can be modified easily to 
illustrate different degrees of causal contribution. Suppose that instead of 
people stabbing, we have a million people, each laying a single straw on 
the proverbial camel’s back, except for the last person, who lays a hundred 
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straws on the camel’s back (all at once, let’s say).17 As before, let’s follow 
Zimmerman in assuming that each of the million straws is causally neces-
sary for the outcome. Isn’t it obvious that the person who lays a hundred 
straws at once contributes causally to the breaking of the camel’s back to 
a greater extent than any of the other people do? This gives us good reason 
to think that Zimmerman is mistaken here, that causal contribution does 
come in degrees, and that degrees of causal contribution help to deter-
mine degrees of moral responsibility.
However, Zimmerman offers one final argument in this connection 
that is worth considering. This argument occurs in the context of the 
evaluation of group action which is oversupplied:
If the argument concerning the possibility of the proper ascription of full 
moral responsibility to each of the participants in a standard simultaneous 
group action is successful, then it is easy to argue for this possibility when it 
is oversupplied rather than standard action that is at issue. Suppose that fif-
teen teenagers had pushed the boulder instead of ten. This surely would not 
have diminished the responsibility of any of the original ten. (What an easy 
“out” that would be! Just invite a few more friends to participate.) 
(Zimmerman 1985a, 119)
My claim about the relevance of causal contribution to moral responsi-
bility might seem to imply that Zimmerman’s case of oversupplied group 
action should be diagnosed as involving diminished moral responsibility 
for the participants. But this apparent implication is only apparent; I agree 
with Zimmerman’s claim that adding more agents is insufficient, all by 
itself, to diminish moral responsibility. As Zimmerman says, in another 
context,
To say that someone is fully responsible is not to say that he is solely respon-
sible; responsibility is not to be cut up, like a pie, so that the more people 
that join in a wrongdoing, the less responsibility to be allocated to each. 
(Zimmerman 1985b, 355)
But it is easy to imagine a case which is similar to Zimmerman’s case 
involving the ten teenagers pushing the boulder in which it does make a 
17 For further discussion of this example with respect to the responsibility for created per-
sons in connection with answered petitionary prayers, see Davison 2017, chapter 7.
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difference if more agents are added. For example, suppose that fifteen 
teenagers are involved instead of ten, and imagine that the causal contri-
bution of each teenager is reduced accordingly (so that the case is not 
oversupplied, but rather standard, like the original case X). Then it seems 
reasonable to say that the moral responsibility of a given participant S 
would be less in this case than it would be in the original case X, all other 
things being equal. The difference might be slight, of course, and perhaps 
not important enough to make a difference practically in terms of our 
response to each individual, but there would be a difference.
Hence I conclude that Zimmerman is mistaken about degrees of causal 
contribution and that different degrees of causal contribution explain dif-
ferent degrees of moral responsibility, at least in some cases. But notice 
that along the way, Zimmerman has shown that just because one agent is 
fully morally responsible for a given event, it does not follow that no other 
person can be morally responsible for that same event—in other words, 
the Augustinian premise 12 is false.18 How should traditional theists who 
wish to pursue something like an Augustinian approach to answering the 
problem of evil respond to this?
It seems to me that they should accept the claim that God is partly mor-
ally responsible for evil in the world, but then argue that God’s responsi-
bility does not imply that God is worthy of blame for such evil. This could 
be done by explaining the reasons that actually justify God’s permission of 
evil (in the case of theodicy), or explaining the reasons that could justify 
God’s permission of evil (in the case of defense), or simply explaining why 
we should not expect to know such reasons if they existed (in the case of 
the so-called skeptical theism). If these strategies are successful, then either 
God would be worthy of praise for God’s contributions to such things, or 
at least God would be neither worthy of praise nor worthy of blame 
(although satisfying the other requirements for moral responsibility, in the 
sense mentioned at the beginning of this chapter). Whether or not such 
18 By way of reminder, I am understanding premise 12 of the Augustinian argument in 
terms of efficient causes. The argument I have cited here as showing that premise 12 of the 
Augustinian argument involves only creaturely efficient causes, rather than a combination of 
divine and efficient causes, but I don’t see how that makes any difference. (If there are other 
kinds of causation, then perhaps some analogue of premise 12 is true for them; I am agnostic 
about this possibility.)
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strategies can be successful, in terms of explaining how God could be 
responsible but not blameworthy for evil, falls beyond the scope of this 
chapter.19
17.3  conclusion
We should conclude that the ontological randomness involved in crea-
turely libertarian freedom (should actual creatures possess it, of course) 
does not by itself imply that God is not morally responsible to any degree 
for the free actions of creatures, whether good or evil, assuming (as tradi-
tional theists do) that God makes some causal contribution to the free 
actions of creatures. But what about random events that do not involve 
the free actions of any creatures, such as the random decay of radioactive 
isotopes?
In cases such as these, it seems important to note that the randomness 
in question is randomness over a limited range of possible outcomes. In 
the famous example of Schrödinger’s cat, for instance, there are only two 
possible states of the radioactive substance in the box with the cat: either 
it has decayed, or it has not. If it has decayed, then the Geiger counter 
detects the decay and triggers the hammer to release the poison, which 
kills the cat. If it has not decayed, then the Geiger counter does not detect 
the decay and does not trigger the hammer to release the poison, so the 
cat remains alive. Whether or not the cat is dead, then, involves what I 
have called ontological randomness. But this arrangement does not involve 
the possibility of the cat becoming a full-grown horse, a nuclear weapon, 
or an atom of hydrogen; these last three outcomes are inconsistent with 
the initial arrangement.
So if God is morally responsible for the fact that a random process is in 
place that will result in either X or Y, and God knows this, then it seems 
clear that God is morally responsible to some degree for X if it occurs and 
morally responsible to some degree for Y if it occurs. Assuming (as I have) 
that God’s degree of causal contribution to the outcome of a random 
process is not sufficient to guarantee any particular outcome, we might 
think that God’s causal contribution in such cases is less than it is in cases 
19 For an approach to theodicy that does not appeal to libertarian freedom among creatures 
at all, or to any kind of compensation in an afterlife, see my forthcoming paper, “A Naturalistic 
Intrinsic Value Theodicy.”
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in which God’s causal contribution is sufficient to guarantee a particular 
outcome. But as the discussion of degrees of causal contribution shows, 
causal contribution and hence moral responsibility come in degrees, so we 
cannot conclude that those cases that involve God’s causal contribution to 
random processes are cases in which God’s causal contribution is not nec-
essary or important. Hence traditional theists need not reject Divine Moral 
Responsibility because of the existence of what I have called ontologically 
random events in the world.20
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